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Summary 
 
Disputes over the restitution and return of cultural materials have steadily increased in 
recent years. While several restitution claims pertaining to Nazi-confiscated art have been 
resolved, other cases relating to the appropriation of cultural materials during war, foreign or 
colonial occupation, theft, or as a consequence of illicit trafficking have proliferated. 
 
Despite these challenges and recent developments in international law, international 
treaty law and current State practice in resolving restitution disputes primarily focus on 
arguments associated with State interests and property rights, and thus do little to 
accommodate the interests of the various stakeholders involved in restitution disputes. 
Moreover, because of major legal obstacles claimants face in restitution cases (namely the 
non-retroactivity of international treaty law, the protection of the bona fide purchaser and 
provisions on the lapse of time), a purely legal approach is not a viable option in many 
restitution disputes. Therefore, this dissertation introduces an approach that aims at taking into 
account the interests of the various stakeholders in the resolution of these disputes. In a 
second step, complementary and alternative mechanisms in the resolution of restitution 
disputes are examined in order to accommodate these different interests. The utilization of 
this interest-oriented approach will allow restitution disputes to be resolved in a more 
sustainable and cooperative manner; moreover, ethical and historical considerations can also 
be more adequately addressed than in a purely legal approach. It will be demonstrated that 
within the scope of the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage, other issues 
can be identified as being of common concern, including: physical and cultural preservation, 
access, integrity, and cooperation. Since these aspects form part of the ‘common interest’, 
they are valid not only for the protection of cultural heritage in war and peace, but must also 
be taken into account in the resolution of restitution disputes. Consequently, these common 
interests form new general principles in international cultural heritage law. 
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“We wish to state that, from our own knowledge,  
no historical grievance will rankle so long or be the cause of so much justified bitterness 
as the removal for any reason of a part of the heritage of any nation 
even if that heritage may be interpreted as a prize of war.” 
 
Wiesbaden Manifesto, Germany, drawn up by U.S. Capt. Walter I. Farmer, 
7 November 1945 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction and Question of Research 
 
 
While the debate surrounding the restitution and return of cultural materials is by no 
means a new one, it has become an increasingly controversial aspect of international law, and 
thus remains more unresolved than ever. In addition to well-known but yet unresolved cases, 
such as the case of the Parthenon Marbles in the British Museum claimed for return by Greece 
since 1984, the geo-political changes in the early 1990s have resulted in new restitution 
claims emerging from the opening of several archives in Central and Eastern Europe. Claims 
for the restitution and return of cultural objects removed as a consequence of war, foreign or 
colonial occupation, or vast human rights violations have increasingly challenged 
international law. Whereas several restitution claims pertaining to Nazi-looted art have been 
resolved in recent years, other cases relating to looted cultural objects – during the Armenian 
massacres for example – have surfaced only recently.1 Moreover, other issues – such as the 
steady demand of the international art and antiquities market, the general role of public 
museums and private collectors, as well as the continuing illicit trafficking in archeological 
artifacts – have become a growing part of the wider restitution debate. 
 
As a consequence, restitution claims have steadily increased in number, and claims 
continue to be a perennial preoccupation and a growing burden on States, public and private 
museums, and private collectors alike. Generally speaking, private and public collections 
strongly oppose to restitution claims, since they fear that the return of single objects would 
create momentum and legal precedent for further restitution claims, eventually dismantling 
entire collections. Thus, this anxiety still outweighs the commitment to cooperate and to 
engage in restitution disputes.2 It is this anxiety that too often leads to a strong sense of 
                                                 
1 With regard to restitution claims relating to the Armenian massacres (of 1915 to 1918 and 1920 to 1923), see: 
Charlotte Burns, Armenian restitution claims grow – Getty case may be tip of the iceberg, in: The Art 
Newspaper, No. 223, April 2011, p. 5.  
2 See, for example, the concerns expressed in the Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal 
Museums (December 2002), signed by major European and North-American Museums (the British Museum; the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art; the Louvre; the State Hermitage Museum St. Petersburg; State Museums Berlin; 
the Prado Museum, Madrid, et al), stating: “We should, however, recognize that objects acquired in earlier times 
must be viewed in the light of different sensitivities and values, reflective of that earlier era. The objects and 
monumental works that were installed decades and even centuries ago in museums throughout Europe and 
America were acquired under conditions that are not comparable with current ones”; reprinted in ICOM News 
No. 1 (2004), available at: http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/ICOM_News/2004-1/ENG/p4_2004-
1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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entitlement and an unwillingness to compromise in restitution disputes, which in turn 
undermine the spirit of exchange, cooperation, and possible mutual gain that could be realized 
in this field. Traditionally, national import and export restrictions have been considered to be 
the main tool in preventing the illicit trafficking in cultural artifacts, as supported by 
international conventions, such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention3 and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention.4 However, especially in culture-rich areas such as the Middle East, the 
Mediterranean, and Latin America, illicit trafficking in cultural materials continues at a steady 
pace. Similar to national export regulations, claims for restitution and return have mainly been 
based on the assumption that what has been found within a State’s national borders implicitly 
belongs to its national heritage. Despite the fact that modern State borders were primarily 
drawn up during the nineteenth century and often do not correspond to the boundaries of the 
ancient civilizations that produced the cultural artifacts in question, this territorial assumption 
gives rise to notions such as ‘national cultural heritage’ and ‘national cultural patrimony’. It is 
these notions that, in turn, evoke other notions, including ideas regarding the ‘repatriation’ of 
cultural materials. 
 
Although international law is still mainly driven by the interests of States, other 
stakeholders – including indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious groups, scientific 
communities, public and private museums, as well as individuals – have increasingly 
submitted claims for the return of cultural objects. Broader concepts such as ‘the common 
heritage of humankind’ and ‘common concern’ have evolved in international law, thus 
shifting legal perspectives along the way, and perhaps more importantly, defining even the 
international community as a stakeholder in its own right in international law. Despite the 
intensity of interests and the highly emotional character of the debate on restitution and return, 
scholarly analysis has mainly focused on the horizontal, inter-governmental dimension, 
paying little attention to the plurality of legal, cultural and economic interests on the one hand, 
and to the exploration of alternatives to current restitution mechanisms, on the other. It is time 
to reconsider the current concepts and practices pertaining to restitution and to develop an 
                                                 
3 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property (Paris, adopted 14 November 1970, entering into force 24 April 1972), 823 
UNTS 231, full text available at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html_eng/page1.shtml (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
4 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, adopted 24 June 1995, 
entering into force 1 July 1998, 34 ILM 1322, full text available at: 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/main.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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alternative approach that goes beyond traditional concepts in international cultural heritage 
law. 
 
Therefore, this thesis proposes an approach that takes into account the plurality of 
interests of the various stakeholders involved in restitution disputes, while also attempting to 
strike a balance between these interests, in order to identify complementary and alternative 
outcomes to current restitution practices. Due to the variety of stakeholders involved, the 
interests in the resolution of restitution disputes might be competitive or sometimes even 
mutually exclusive. It is, however, the objective of this thesis to argue that, by taking into 
account the various interests involved in restitution matters, common ground can found. In 
turn, current restitution practices often do not secure a balanced outcome that reflects the 
interests of all parties involved, since they mainly focus on the location of the object in 
question, legal title, and property rights. Consequently, current restitution disputes often result 
in a zero-sum solution − the item in question is returned (or retained) without any mutual gain 
for the parties involved. However, as this thesis will illustrate, restitution disputes do not have 
to end this way. Overcoming the shortcomings of currently employed restitution mechanisms 
requires an analysis of alternative means that encompass the positions of the various interests 
involved in restitution disputes. As will be discussed in this thesis, a broad variety of feasible 
options that aim at mutual gain in dispute resolution are available. These include: voluntary 
returns; temporary and permanent loan agreements; return without transfer of ownership; the 
exchange of objects; the fabrication of replicas; as well as joint custody and shared 
management agreements. 
 
As is apparent from the objective of this thesis, an analysis of this topic cannot be 
limited to legal analysis, but must also include an analysis of the ethical and historical aspects 
inherent in the restitution debate. The legal analysis will demonstrate that several multi-lateral 
conventions and bilateral agreements have been established in order to provide legal grounds 
for dealing with the appropriation of cultural materials and the subsequent question of 
restitution and return. However, most of the historical events that have given rise to many 
current restitution claims occurred before the promulgation of such measures. Consequently, 
enforceable legal action is often not an option − resulting in an unsatisfying outcome both 
legally and ethically. It is this concurrence of circumstances that has led to a situation in 
which ethical and historical considerations merge, and this requires the law to consider what 
can be summarized as ‘the remedying historical injustice’. This is particularly applicable in 
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cases in which the removal of a cultural object might have been considered as ‘legal’ or at 
least as ‘common practice’ at the time of its appropriation, but now fails to comply with 
present human rights standards, such as those that are now classified as internationally 
wrongful acts, including war of aggression and genocide.5 Therefore, it is essential to 
associate legal aspects with ethical and historical considerations in the attempt to resolve 
international cultural heritage disputes. The application of measures that take ethical and 
historical considerations into account within the context of restitution might even facilitate 
creative outcomes that are more appropriate to the interests of the parties involved and 
produce results that are more result-oriented in practical terms than the mere application of 
legal instruments. This is because legal instruments – should they be applicable – might 
provide for the reinstatement of ownership, without consideration of the particular 
circumstances that led to the removal of the property. 
 
It is neither exceptionally remarkable nor legally questionable that when, for example, 
an antique vase stolen from the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad in the aftermath of the 
2003 Iraq War later turns up in the hands of a Swiss antiques dealer, it should be returned to 
the museum and to the people of Iraq; other cases, however, are not so straightforward. In this 
hypothetical but unfortunately quite realistic case, the return of the antique vase to Iraq is 
clearly indicated, since: firstly, the theft of the vase was a breach of national law; secondly, 
the theft occurred in the context of war and occupation and thus was a breach of customary 
international law; and thirdly, the vase was classified as State property under Iraqi antiquities 
law and thus could neither be legally traded nor be legally exported without an official export 
license. In contrast to this straight-forward case, the international community has generally 
had difficulty agreeing on a common approach to restitution in historic cases, in which the 
appropriation took place decades or centuries ago; in such cases, no legal instruments are 
applicable and the circumstances of the removal may be obscure or unable to be definitively 
clarified. In such cases, it is frequently difficult to find a single means of facilitating an 
appropriate solution to restitution disputes, even when all legal circumstances, given the 
evidence, have been properly taken into account. There are certainly many cases in which 
material and ‘moral’ restitution should be made without reservation; however, there are just as 
many, in which the claim for restitution and return is much more questionable on both legal 
and ethical grounds. It is therefore the attempt of this thesis to identify complementary and 
                                                 
5 Cf. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects (Cambridge Press, 
2006), p. 299. 
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alternative mechanisms using an interest-oriented approach, in order to facilitate the 
resolution of restitution disputes. Although this thesis focuses primarily on cases in which 
legal remedies are not available or the circumstances of the removal are obscure, its 
application is not limited to such cases, since the use of complementary and alternative 
mechanisms may add value even in cases in which legal remedies are applicable. In the 
abovementioned example of the Iraqi vase, the parties involved may mutually agree that the 
return be postponed until safety measures have improved at the National Museum of Bagdad 
or additional scientific research on the object is conducted for the benefit of both the Iraqi 
museum and the returning State.6 These parties might even consider a touring exhibition of 
the vase in order to raise awareness of the problem of stolen Iraqi cultural materials and to 
raise funds for the Bagdad museum. As this dissertation will demonstrate, there is a vast 
variety of creative problem-solving options in restitution disputes. 
 
Moreover, as the number of restitution claims has risen, international awareness of the 
importance of protecting cultural heritage has also substantially increased over the last 
decades. This increasing awareness can be seen, for example, in the by now universal 
character of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention7 protecting sites of cultural and 
natural significance. Moreover, the immediate reaction and the public outcry in response to 
destruction and looting (as, for example, in the incident of the destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001, the looting of the National Museum and the National 
Library in Baghdad in 2003,8 and the looting of the National Museum in Cairo in 2011)9 
underline the general responsiveness of the international community with regard to the 
protection of cultural heritage. It was only a few days after the looting in the National 
Museum in Cairo that the international archaeological community published a declaration of 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion on this matter with the example of the ‘Afghanistan Museum-in-Exile’ in Bubendorf, 
Switzerland (1999-2007), see Chapter Five, Section 3.7. 
7 UNESCO World Heritage Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
adopted 16 November 1972; available at: http://www.unesco.org/whc/world_he.htm; the convention has 
currently 187 State Parties out of the total of 193 States (23 September 2011), see ratification status at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
8 For more on looting in Iraq, see “Lost from the Baghdad museum: truth”, by David Aaronovitch, in: The 
Guardian, 10 June 2003, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2003/jun/10/art.highereducation 
(accessed 27 August 2011). For up-to-date information about which items are missing: 
www.interpol.com/Public/WorkOfArt/Poster/Poster33a.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011); See with further 
details and legal analysis: Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid 
Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From Bamiyan to Iraq," in Art and Cultural Heritage, ed. Barbara Hoffmann 
(2006), pp.28. 
9 For more on the looting of the National Museum in Cairo, see “Egypt crisis: Looters destroy mummies in Cairo 
museum”, by Harriet Alexander, in: The Telegraph, 30 January 2011, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8291526/Egypt-crisis-Looters-destroy-
mummies-in-Cairo-museum.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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concern.10 Although international law will never be able to wholly prevent such incidents 
from occurring, the growing recognition of the importance of protecting cultural heritage is 
not without repercussion in international law. This serves to promote protection, preservation, 
access, and cooperation in terms of the development of legal standards and principles. It is 
therefore only logical, as this thesis argues, to introduce these elements into matters of 
restitution and return. 
 
In short, the research question of this work can be summarized as follows: claims for 
the restitution and return of cultural materials are often characterized by a sense of entitlement 
that often results in unwillingness to compromise on both the part of the requesting party and 
the current possessor. Although international law is still mainly driven by States and their 
national interests, other stakeholders have recently become more active in this field, with the 
result that the debate on restitution and return has gradually shifted away from traditional 
patterns of international law. Consequently, this thesis argues in favor of an alternative 
approach to current restitution practices on the basis of two premises: firstly, the assumption 
that the international community has a legal responsibility to protect cultural heritage as it 
constitutes the ‘common heritage of humankind’; and secondly, the imperative to balance the 
interests of the various stakeholders involved in restitution disputes. Going beyond current 
restitution mechanisms raises the questions of who can legitimately control and claim which 
cultural material, and what rights of access, use, and disposition may be granted or retained. 
Certain cases of restitution and return are quite straightforward; in many others, however, 
alternative solutions and result-oriented considerations could lead to win-win situations rather 
than zero-sum outcomes. 
 
While an argument in favor of both restitution and retention could certainly be made, 
the settlement of the dispute might be considered differently if the interests of the various 
parties involved are all taken into account. As a legal principle, ‘restitution’ aims at “reversing 
the effects of a former breach of the law,”11 but too often it fails to provide feasible solutions 
in international cultural heritage disputes. This is primarily due to five specific shortcomings: 
                                                 
10 „The International Archaeological Community is following with great concern the events unfolding in Egypt“, 
issued by the Society for American Archaeology, 4 February 2011, available at: 
http://www.saa.org/Portals/0/SAA/GovernmentAffairs/EGYPT.STATEMENT.pdf (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
11 Wojciech W. Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," in Resolution of Cultural Property 
Disputes, ed. The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague: Peace Palace Papers, 
2004), p. 33. 
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(1) legal instruments are often not available due to the fundamental principle of non-
retroactivity in international treaty law;12 (2) if legal instruments are available, national 
provisions often favor the bona fide purchaser; (3) statutes of limitation often prevent legal 
action because stolen or illicitly exported objects frequently reappear years or decades after 
the initial theft and illicit removal; (4) legal instruments too often fail to ‘remedy historical 
injustices’ since they do not adequately take ethical and historical considerations into account; 
and – most importantly within the scope of this thesis – (5) current restitution practices fail to 
take a broader perspective that encompasses the various interests involved in restitution 
disputes. Unequal bargaining powers among States as well as between States and other 
(private) stakeholders only add to the problem of balancing relevant interests. In light of these 
shortcomings, this thesis aims at providing sufficient reasoning for the introduction of an 
interest-oriented approach to resolving international cultural heritage disputes through 
mechanisms that promote mutual gain and cooperation. 
                                                 
12 See Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969; entering into force 27 
January 1980), 1155 UNTS 331. 
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CHAPTER II: Setting the Frame – Rationales, Categorizations, and 
Terminology 
 
 
Overview of the Chapter: 
This chapter starts by exploring the main dilemmas in current restitution disputes and 
looks at the history of plunder, appropriation, and the illicit trafficking in cultural materials. 
The chapter continues by analyzing the terminology commonly associated with restitution 
disputes, namely ‘reparation’; ‘restitution and return’; ‘repatriation’; and ‘retention’. The 
analysis of these terms will demonstrate the inconsistent use of terminology in this area of 
law, not only in international treaty law, but also in UN and UNESCO recommendations, as 
well as in multi- and bilateral agreements pertaining to restitution and return. 
 
Having established the terminological framework, the chapter continues by analyzing 
the different legal categories of restitution claims. A clear understanding of the different legal 
categories of claims is essential, since – apart from the terminological inconsistency in the 
field – the widespread tendency to commingle different categories of restitution claims is a 
major obstacle in adequately assessing restitution disputes. Five major categories of claims 
will be identified: (1) claims related to the removal of cultural objects during armed conflicts 
(war time regime); (2) claims related to illicit trafficking (peace time regime); (3) claims 
made for the return of cultural objects to their ‘countries of origin’; (4) claims made on the 
grounds of former ownership, mainly in relationship to Nazi-confiscated art; and (5) claims 
made for the return of cultural materials to a certain people, group or community. 
Subsequently, the chapter will introduce the interest-oriented approach to restitution and 
return developed in this thesis. 
1. Current Dilemmas in International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
A dilemma − or double proposition − is defined as a problem offering at least two 
solutions, of which none is practically acceptable or desirable. International cultural heritage 
disputes often resemble such dilemmas, since often neither return nor retention yields an 
outcome that meets the interests of both the requesting party and the current possessor. 
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In recent years, claims for the restitution and return of cultural materials have 
increasingly become matters not only of legal and moral concern, but also of financial 
concern. While the cultural rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic minority groups are still 
often largely ignored or simply neglected, auctioneers and lawyers hunt for potential clients. 
Whereas those interested in cultural rights base restitution claims on ‘cultural identity’ 
rationales, those with financial motives may submit a claim for the return of a valuable 
artifact with the ultimate aim of reselling this object at the highest market price on the 
international art and antiquity market. This trend is facilitated to a great extend by the fact that 
public and private museums as well as individual collectors still expend little effort and 
demonstrate little interest in researching the provenance of the objects in their collections. 
While museums and collectors are interested in the genuineness of the object, they are 
frequently much less interested in the history of its ownership. This persistent refusal to 
undertake such research seems to result from a general attitude that could be describes as ‘we 
keep what has not yet been claimed’.13 Nevertheless, there is another trend that takes the 
opposite approach asking not whether, but rather when museums will return large portions of 
their collections to the so-called ‘countries of origin’.14 Both attitudes, however, do little to 
resolve the rising number of restitution claims; instead they serve to increase the controversy 
and the legal uncertainty associated with restitution matters. 
 
There have been several restitution disputes that have sparked public and legal debate 
alike. These include many prominent examples, such as the Goudstikker case,15 which, after a 
long-standing debate, resulted in the restitution of 202 paintings to Jewish heirs by the Dutch 
government in 2006; the Altmann case,16 which concluded in the New York auction of six 
paintings by Gustav Klimt in 2006;17 or the unfolding dispute over two Qing bronzes most 
likely looted from the Imperial Palace in China and now associated with the Paris auction of 
                                                 
13 Cf. “Les musées ne restituent que s’ils y sont obligés”, interview with Hector Feliciano (author of Le Musée 
disparu), Le Monde, 2 February 2009. 
14 Opening statement of Philippe de Montebello, Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (MET), NY (1977-
2008) in a speech given in NY, November 2007. 
15 The restitution has been carried out on the recommendation of the ‘Advisory Committee on the Assessment of 
Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War’ (Restitutions Committee), Cf. 
Wayne Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
227. For details see: http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/rc_1.15/samenvatting_rc_1.15.html (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
16 Altmann vs. Republic of Austria, 142 F.Supp.2d 1187 (C.D.Cal. 1999), aff’d, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), as 
amended, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), 541 US 677 (2004). 
17 In 2006, the portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I (known as the ‘Golden Adele’) by Gustav Klimt (1907) was 
purchased by auction for the Neue Galerie in New York by Ronald Lauder for a US $135 million, the highest 
reported price ever paid for a painting: see, BBC News, 19 June 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/5093650.stm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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the Yves Saint Laurent’s private collection in 2009.18 These and many other cases 
demonstrate that restitution disputes involve not only questions regarding legal title and 
property rights, but also sensitive ethical and historical considerations. 
 
Legal aspects are strongly tempered by ethical and historical considerations, since the 
remedy of restitution, if conducted properly, is not merely a physical act, but rather one that 
addresses the effects of policies and practices that led to the removal of that piece of cultural 
heritage in the first place.19 The attempt to redress or to ‘remedy historical injustice’ is 
therefore a crucial aspect in restitution matters. This difficult undertaking, however, cannot be 
accomplished solely through the application of legal instruments. Since legal provisions must 
be consistent and coherent within their legal parameters, they tend to be rigid in their 
application and, as a result, lack the flexibility frequently required in restitution matters. 
Without a consistent and coherent framework, however, the law would be difficult to enforce. 
Notwithstanding the general difficulty associated with the enforcement of norms of 
international law, many restitution claims face an additional obstacle, namely their inability to 
rely on applicable legal regulations. This is a result of the fact that frequently current legal 
provisions do not apply retroactively or do not apply if the State in which the claimed cultural 
object is currently located has not yet ratified the relevant legal instruments. Consequently, 
enforceable legal action is not an option in many restitution cases. Even in cases in which 
legal provisions are accessible and could be applied with the consequence of setting legal 
precedent, the disputing parties frequently avoid making use of legal action, preferring non-
legal settlements that deliberately exclude legal obligations.20 
 
The reluctance to employ legal instruments is evident not only among the parties 
negotiating restitution matters, but also, and perhaps even more significantly, within the legal 
terminology found in multi- and bilateral treaties and other agreements drawn up to facilitate 
restitution and return. This chapter will demonstrate that both international treaties and 
bilateral agreements often lack legal terminology and specific legal regulations, because this 
would involve the creation of legal certainties, which States would rather avoid. These 
include: questions of compensation; the implied acknowledgement of the illegal nature of the 
                                                 
18 See: Steven Erlanger, Saint Laurent Art Sale Brings in $ 264 Million, in: The New York Times, 23 February 
2009; available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/arts/design/24auction.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
19 Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, p. 299. 
20 More detail on this issue is provided in Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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removal; and general conflicts between national and third party rights.21 However, this 
general tendency towards terminological vagueness and avoidance of legal means for 
restitution and return provide a greater margin of flexibility in negotiations pertaining to 
restitution and return. While this might be considered advantageous for parties with strong 
bargaining power in restitution disputes, other parties may find that they have even less 
influence on the negotiations, and the final outcome under such regime is less advantageous 
than it would have been with tight legal regulations.22 
 
In addition to the problematic use of legal terminology in international treaties and 
bilateral agreements, the traditional and still dominant approaches in international cultural 
heritage law mainly reflect adversarial models of legal interaction. These models – based on 
an oppositional understanding of cultural heritage matters – might be described as ‘either-or’ 
terminology.23 The concepts that underlie this choice of terminology rely heavily on 
traditional assumptions under international law, such as the predominance of the State and the 
overall importance of property rights. A dichotomous understanding of the parties involved in 
restitution matters − such as ‘restitution and return’ versus ‘retention’; ‘art-exporting’ versus 
‘art-importing countries’, or ‘source-countries’ versus ‘art-market countries’ − dominates the 
debate on restitution disputes. Other common dichotomies include ‘common heritage’ versus 
‘national patrimony’ or its siblings, ‘cultural internationalism’ versus ‘cultural nationalism’; 
‘underwater salvage’ versus ‘protection of the underwater heritage’; and so on. To a certain 
extent, classifications of this kind are to be expected and provide essential analytical 
constructs in the development of these concepts. They should, however, remain temporary 
constructs, which eventually yield – as they indeed have already begun to do – to multi-
faceted frameworks and an empirically valid regime of authority.24 The approach taken by 
this thesis attempts to overcome these adversarial constructs in order to facilitate outcomes 
that do not end in dilemmas, but rather identify and balance the interests of the stakeholders 
involved in restitution matters, while ensuring preservation, access and cooperation in cultural 
heritage. 
                                                 
21 Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, "Reparations for Cultural Loss," in Reparations  for Indigenous Peoples: International 
and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Federico Lenzerini (Oxford: 2007), p. 214. 
22 The question of unequal bargaining powers will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, Section 1.3. 
23 James A. R. Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," in Le Patrimoine Culturel De 
L'humanité - the Cultural Heritage of Mankind, ed. James A. R. Nafziger and Tullio Scovazzi (Hague Academy 
of International Law, 2008), p. 163. 
24 Ibid. 
 30
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
2. A Historical Analysis − Rationales for Returning Cultural Objects 
Throughout history, cultural materials have not only been the subject of trade, 
commerce and exchange, but also subject to destruction, theft and plunder.25 Although the 
looting of cultural material was already condemned in the Classical Age, ancient societies 
often condoned the practice of plunder in war.26 Over the centuries, armed conflicts and 
belligerent occupation often coincided with the removal of cultural artifacts ─ which were 
frequently displayed in triumphal processions to the capital by the conquering force. 
Interestingly, the cultural artifacts of the vanquished have consistently been valued by the 
victors, regardless the contempt for and humiliation of the people who created the artifacts. In 
fact, these characteristics associated with plunder, spoil, and the removal of cultural objects 
have been replicated by cultures on every continent and throughout the millennia.27 
Independent of the material value of an object, the motive for removal has often been the 
symbolic significance of a cultural artifact; thus, there are certain objects that have been 
subject to repeated removals over times. Examples of such recurring removals include the 
Horses of Saint Mark (Greece-Rome-Constantinople-Venice-Paris-Venice-Rome-Venice), 
and the Quadriga of the Brandenburg Gate (Berlin-Paris-Berlin). These symbolic removals, 
however, have not been confined to ancient or colonial empires. Policies of assimilation and 
centralization have also been deployed by modern states as a means to exert their control over 
disparate peoples and nations within their borders through the promotion of a single, and 
therefore dominating, national identity.28 
 
Given that plunder and destruction have repeatedly occurred since ancient times, and 
looting has commonly been assumed to be the privilege of the victorious party subsequent to 
periods of conflict, the concept of restitution and return of cultural materials is by no means a 
modern one.29 As early as 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia30 made provisions for the return of 
objects looted during the Thirty Years War; in compliance with this treaty, Sweden returned 
                                                 
25 Kurt Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," Académie de droit international, Receuil des cours 243, no. 
VI (1993): p. 241. 
26 Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick J. O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, vol. III: Movement (Butterworths, 
1989), p. 803. 
27 Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of 
the Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," paper presented at the Expert Meeting and Extraordinary Session 
of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee (ICPRCP) in Celebration of its 30th Anniversary, Seoul, 
November 25-28, 2008), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1336359. (2008): p. 
7. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 109. 
30 See Article CXIV of the Treaty of Westphalia, signed at Münster, Germany in 1648. 
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133 Bohemian archival records taken in 1648 at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Remarkably, this matter has yet to be completely resolved: the Gigas Code, the oldest known 
medieval manuscript − created in 1229 and looted by Swedish soldiers from Prague in 1648 − 
was returned to Prague on loan from the Swedish National Library from September 2007 to 
January 2008 – more than 350 years after it had originally been taken.31 
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the prohibition on the confiscation and 
removal of cultural materials in times of war was established as a principle in international 
law. This principle condemned not only the destruction but also the removal of cultural 
objects, which was considered comparable with their destruction. Thus, particular peace treaty 
provisions on the return of cultural material looted during wartime redefined what was meant 
by jus in bello.32 Along this vein, the 1815 Congress Treaty of Vienna33 imposed a restitution 
obligation on France, denying France the right to plunder works of art as had been done by 
Napoleon throughout Europe. The first codification that includes provisions on the protection 
of cultural property in armed conflict was the 1863 Lieber Code,34 drafted by the German-
American jurist Francis (Franz) Lieber, who fought in the Prussian Army during the 
Napoleonic Wars, and was signed by President Lincoln for the use of the Union Forces in the 
American Civil War.35 Only a few years later, this code formed the basis of a project to create 
an international convention on the laws of war, which was presented to the Brussels 
Conference in 1874 and later stimulated the adoption of the provisions of the 189936 and 
190737 Hague Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; these 
provisions generally prohibit pillage, destruction and seizure of enemy property unless 
necessitated by the demands of war.38 Despite these provisions, widespread damage and 
destruction of cultural property took place during the First World War (hereinafter WWI). 
Similar to the earlier Hague Conventions (and as a cultural analog to the Red Cross for 
                                                 
31 Lyndel V. Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," Art, 
Antiquity and Law XIII(2008): p. 175. 
32 Cf. Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 187. 
33 The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, embodying all the separate treaties, signed 9 June 1815. 
34 Lieber Code, Articles 34-36 and 44 (c): Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies, (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1899), Series III, 
Volume 3, pp 148-164, or full text version available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
35 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 804. 
36 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 29 July 1899), reprinted in 
AJIL, vol. 1 (1907), p. 129. 
37 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October 1907), reprinted in 
AJIL, vol. 2 (1908), p. 90. 
38 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 187.  
 32
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
medical neutrality), several States, including Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States, 
ratified the Roerich Pact in 1935.39 This treaty states that historic monuments and museums 
are to be considered neutral in armed conflicts and must be protected by the belligerent 
parties. Together with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 1935 Roerich Pact 
formed the basis for the drafting of the 1954 Hague Convention on the protection of cultural 
heritage in case of armed conflict.40 
 
Where looting could not be prevented, post-war treaties were drawn up regulating the 
return of specific cultural objects. Earlier treaties, such as the 1815 Congress Treaty of 
Vienna41 or the 1919 Peace Treaties of Versailles42 had included predetermined lists of 
specific items deemed to be surrendered by the defeated party; in contrast, the 1919 Saint-
Germain-en-Laye Treaty43 and the 1921 Treaty of Riga44 between Poland and Soviet Russia, 
for example, articulated general reparation provisions: firstly, by recognizing a formal 
obligation to return cultural objects; and secondly, by delineating principles and processes for 
the resolution of claims.45 These treaties reflect some of the earlier inter-State practices 
pertaining to the restitution and return of cultural materials after WWI.46 
 
As a result of the Second World War (hereinafter WWII), the incidents of destruction, 
war plunder and looting were vastly multiplied. These incidents include the plunder and 
looting of cultural objects through specialized units, such as the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, which 
assembled the collection of cultural objects to be placed in the Führermuseum in Linz close to 
Hitler’s birthplace, and coordinated Holocaust-related appropriation and looting of Jewish 
property in Germany and in occupied territories all-over Europe.47 The ensuing Nuremberg 
                                                 
39 Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments among the States of the 
Pan-American Union (Treaty of Washington), (signed 15 April 1935, entering into force 26 August 1935) 49 
Stat. 3267, 167 LNTS 289. 
40 In detail on the 1954 Hague Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.1. 
41 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, embodying all separate treaties (signed on 9 June 1815). 
42 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Versailles (signed on 28 June 1919, 
entering into force 10 January 1920), (1919) 225 Parry’s CTS 189. 
43 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, St-Germain-en Laye (signed on 10 
September 1919, entering into force 8 November 1921), (1919) 225 Parry’s CTS 482. 
44 Treaty of Peace between Poland and the Soviet Republics of Russia and Ukraine, Riga (signed on 18 March 
1921), LNTS vol. 6, No. 149, pp. 51-169, available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/lon/volume%206/v6.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
45 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 7. 
46 Cf. Lyndel V. Prott, "The Unesco Icprcp - Origin, Development, Accomplishments and Challenges," Seoul, 
Conference Paper of the Expert Meeting and Extraordinary Session of the ICPRCP in Celebration of its 30th 
Anniversary (2008): pp. 6. published only as conference material. 
47 Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 110. 
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Trials (1945-1949), which served to prosecute the most prominent Nazi war criminals, firmly 
established the fact that the confiscation, destruction, and damage of cultural material must be 
considered a war crime subject to prosecution and punishment; this, as a result, provided the 
first true instance of international enforcement of cultural property law.48 In particular, Alfred 
Rosenberg, Director of the notorious Einsatzstab, was founded guilty of war crimes based on 
his responsibility for the plunder of cultural objects throughout Europe. 
 
The Allies, having estimated the scale of cultural property looted by Nazi-Germany 
already before the war had ended, set up a non-binding statement regarding Nazi-looted 
property, known as the Declaration of London of 1943.49 Its validity was later stressed in 
numerous other documents, including the Final Act of the Bretton Woods Conference50 of 
1944 and, in particular, in the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparations51 of 1945. In 
these documents, the Allies and other like-minded States recognized that, under international 
law, no state possesses more than a ‘custodial interest’ in Holocaust-looted art, and that each 
State has the obligation to identify, locate, and return spoiled art to its proper owner. The 
declaration allowed the Allies, which had yet to win the war in 1945, to publicize the extent of 
Nazi plunder, to deny the legality of the confiscations, and to reserve the right to nullify all 
transactions carried out by the Nazi regime, even in neutral States, such as Sweden and 
Switzerland.52 This declaration was an especially important precedent, because it emphasized 
the fact that these transactions, even those “apparently legal in form, even when they purport 
to be voluntarily effected” might be declared invalid.53 Immediately after WWII measures 
were taken to implement the Declaration of London in a number of countries, as for example 
in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France.54 In Germany, 
                                                 
48 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 160. 
49 Declaration of the Allied Nations against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territory under Enemy 
Occupation or Control (hereinafter ‘Declaration of London’), 5 January 1943, (8, Department of State Bulletin 
21), full text also available at: http://www.lootedartcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
50 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference Final Act, Resolution VI: Enemy Materials and Looted 
Property, New Hampshire, 1-22 July 1944, See: 
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/lootedart_brettonwoods.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
51 Act of the Paris Conference on Reparations (Paris, 21 December 1954), see: 
http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/civilian/rg-43.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
52 Cf. Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," pp. 178. 
53 See Declaration of London, para. 3 (above n.49). 
54 For example in France: Decree No. 47-2105 of 29 October 1947, Journal officiel de la République Francaise 
1947, 10831. The Decree declared null and void all legal transaction on French territory with former Nazi-
Germany and its public authorities. Most national legislations of this kind ordered the restitution of goods 
dispossessed in a manner contrary to international law by violence, confiscation, requisition or similar methods 
used by the occupying power. At the same time, this legislation granted a good faith possessor the right to 
compensation. 
 34
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
the Allied (United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union) issued laws on 
restitution for their respective zones of occupations that overrode provisions of the German 
Civil Code which would have prohibited restitution by protecting the good faith possessor.55 
The 1943 Declaration of London also inspired the wordings of subsequent agreements, such 
as those issued by the newly independent States in Africa, which began laying claim to their 
cultural materials in the beginning of the 1960s.56 
 
Although the Soviet Union, as one of the Allies, signed the 1943 Declaration of 
London condemning the wrongful displacement of cultural heritage by the Nazi, looting by 
Soviet troops took place on a grand scale in Germany between 1945 and 1947. The Trophy 
Committee of the Red Army removed many artifacts directly out of museums or security 
depositories, as well as salt mines and caves, where items had been stored for protection from 
Allied bombing. In addition, many Central and Eastern European museums, particularly in 
Hungary and Poland, lost cultural materials not only due to destruction and looting under 
Nazi occupation, but also by the Soviet army at the end of WWII.57 The Soviet Union, 
however, declared the appropriation of the confiscated works of art by its troops and their 
subsequent retention as “compensatory reparation”58 for the damages incurred on Soviet 
Russian territory in WWII by Nazi-Germany and its allies. These objects have also been 
described with the ambiguous term ‘trophy art’.59 Whereas some of these artifacts have been 
returned after “having been located for temporary preservation in the Soviet Union”60 and as 
“symbols of friendship” to the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 
1950s,61 others were only returned in the early 1990s subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, many items still remain in Russian museums and archives, most of them 
undocumented and many subject to environmental conditions that may contribute to their 
                                                 
55 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," pp. 178. 
56 Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 803. 
57 István Fodor, "The Restitution of Works of Art in Hungary," in The Spoils of War, ed. Elizabeth Simpson 
(1997), p. 92. 
58 Such ‘compensatory reparation’ included not only works of art, libraries and archives but to great parts 
industrial equipment. 
59 Cf. John Henry Merryman, Albert E. Elsen, and Stephen K. Urice, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, 5 ed. 
(2007), p. 63. A note to German terminology: “Beutekunst” -“booty”, defined as war-related removal of art by 
the victors of war vs. “Raubkunst” – “robbery”, defined as Nazi-looted art.   
60 The return upon only “temporary preservation in the U.S.S.R.” indicates that the Soviets did not claim title to 
the objects removed, Cf. Mark Boguslavsky, "Legal Aspects of the Russian Position in Regard to the Return of 
Cultural Property," in The Spoils of War, ed. Elizabeth Simpson (New York: 1997), p. 189.  
61 Unilateral action of the Soviet Union restoring artifacts to the German Democratic Republic, taken from the 
Dresdner Gemäldegalerie in 1945; see: Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 119. 
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deterioration.62 In many cases, it is not known whether an object was lost or destroyed during 
WWII or if it has survived in Russian storage.63 It has been estimated that some two million 
books and more than one million pieces of German artwork (of which some two hundred 
thousand that could be significant for museum collections) are still kept in Russia.64 In 1998, 
the Russian parliament (Duma) passed a law entitled: ‘Federal Law on Cultural Valuables 
Displaced to the U.S.S.R. as a Result of the Second World War and Located on the Territory 
of the Russian Federation’.65 This law asserts Russian State ownership of cultural property 
removed during and at the end of WWII,66even though Germany and the Soviet Union agreed 
on a provision regarding the preservation and the return of cultural materials in the 1990 
bilateral ‘Treaty on Good-Neighborliness Partnership and Cooperation’ (Article 16).67 This 
preservation and return provision was also confirmed by the 1992 Cultural Agreement 
between Germany and Russia.68 
 
The end of the Cold War allowed for the opening of archives in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which in turn has led to the identification of many looted cultural objects. As a result, 
many new incidences of Nazi-looted art have been revealed. In light of the unprecedented 
scale of unsolved cases pertaining looted and displaced cultural objects, forty-four states 
participated in the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Materials, which 
                                                 
62 In 2005, Anatoly I. Vilkov, Deputy Chief of the Russian federal agency preserving cultural heritage, claimed 
that Russia held 249,000 works of art, more than 260,000 archives files, and 1.25 million books taken from 
Germany, see: Steven Lee Myers, “In Moscow, a Proud Display of Spoils ”, New York Times, 17 May 2005. 
63 The revelation, for example, that the Trojan gold, also known as King Priam’s Treasure, had survived WWII 
gave rise to a set of claims for the objects from Turkey (where the Treasure was excavated by Schliemann in the 
1873), Germany (where the Treasure was held in the Museum für Vor-und Frühgeschichte Berlin until 1945), 
and Russia (where it is now). Until the treasure turned up at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow in 1993 and was 
exhibited there in 1996, the Soviet Union denied any knowledge of the fate of Priam’s Treasure. The matter 
remains unsettled. 
64 Waldemar Ritter, "The Soviet Spoils Commission: On the Removal of Works of Art from German Museums 
and Collections," International Journal of Cultural Property 7(1998): p. 447. 
65 Federal Law on Cultural Valuables Displaced to the USSR as a Result of World War II and Located on the 
Territory of the Russian Federation, Federal Law N 64-FZ of 15 April 1998, adopted by the State Duma on 
February 5, 1997, English translation available at: http://docproj.loyola.edu/rlaw/r2.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
66 Merryman, Elsen, and Urice, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p. 64. 
67 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Socialist Republics on Good-
Neighborliness Partnership and Cooperation (signed on 9 November 1990), in: 30 I.L.M. 505 (1991). Article 16 
of the Treaty reads: “The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will seek to 
ensure the preservation of cultural treasures of the other side in their territory. They agree that missing or 
unlawfully removed art treasures which are located in their territory will be returned to the owners on their legal 
successors.” See also: Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 119. 
68 Cultural Agreement between the German Federal Republic and the Russian Federation (signed 16 December 
1992 in Moscow, entering into force 18 May 1993), see: Article 15, BGBl. II, 1256 (1993). 
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concluded by endorsing the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-confiscated Art.69 
These non-binding principles were designed to assist governments in resolving issues relating 
to Jewish property confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted. The principles 
establish the following guidelines: records and archives should be open and accessible; the 
pre-war owners of confiscated property or their heirs should be located; and art that has yet to 
be restituted should be identified, in order that steps “to achieve a just and fair solution” can 
be undertaken.70 The principles were reaffirmed by the Holocaust Era Materials Conference 
in June 2009 that adopted the legally non-binding Terezin Declaration of 30 June 2009.71 In 
addition to the 1998 Washington Principles, this Declaration deals specifically with issues 
such as immovable property, Jewish cemeteries and burial sites, judaica (religious cultural 
materials), archival materials, and general issues of remembrance and research. In several 
cases, the Washington Principles have expedited the restitution of Nazi-confiscated objects; 
however, various institutions that hold art with an ambiguous provenance are reluctant to 
facilitate the identification of artifacts, since clear evidence of ownership is often not 
available; they therefore tend to keep what they are not expressively obliged to return.72 
 
After WWII, several international instruments, such as the 1954 Hague Convention, 
the 1970 UNESCO Conventions, and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention were established.73 
Despite these legal provisions, destruction and plunder as well as illicit trade in cultural 
materials still threaten the world’s cultural heritage. Among the recent examples of this 
phenomenon are: the devastation of mosques, Orthodox churches, libraries and ancient city 
centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s and early 2000s and the destruction 
of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001.74 In the wake of the 2003 Iraq War about 
13,000 objects were stolen in the looting of the Baghdad museum in the aftermath of the 
military actions. Some of these cultural artifacts have been recovered; most, however, appear 
                                                 
69 Washington Conference Principles On Nazi-Confiscated Art, released in connection with the Washington 
Conference on Holocaust-Era Materials, Washington, DC, 3 December 1998, reprinted as Annex I to this thesis, 
available at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/981203_heac_art_princ.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
70 For detailed analysis of the 1998 Washington Principles, see Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
71 Holocaust Era Materials Conference, Prague and Terezin, 26-30 June, 2009.Terezin Declaration of 30 June 
2009, text available at: http://www.lootedartcommission.com/NPNMG484641 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
72 Cf. “Les musées ne restituent que s’ils y sont obligés”, interview with Hector Feliciano (author of Le Musée 
disparu), Le Monde, 2 February 2009. 
73 For detailed analysis of the relevant legal instruments, see Chapter Three. 
74 Cf. Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," pp. 28. 
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to have disappeared and might be subject to illicit international trade.75 Immediately after the 
looting in Iraq, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1483/200376 adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,77 which is binding to all member States. The objective of the 
established trade prohibition is to disrupt the international market for stolen and illicitly 
exported Iraqi cultural objects and to safeguard the return of Iraqi cultural heritage to Iraq. 
Additionally, in July 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation No. 
1210/2003 establishing a ban on the import, export, and trade of cultural items exported from 
Iraq after 2 August 1990.78 Several items have been returned from foreign States, and others 
were recovered from Iraqi civilians who were granted amnesty under the ‘no questions asked-
policy’ of Iraqi investigators.79 Although the scale of looting and destruction in Iraq was 
smaller than originally feared, it was still substantial enough to renew concerns about the 
adequacy of existing legal and physical protection of cultural materials during armed 
conflict.80 War crimes tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), clearly confirm that any act of “seizure of, destruction or willful damage 
done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and the sciences, 
historic monuments and works of art and science”81 is a violation of the laws and customs of 
war. Moreover, the ICTY established that the targeting of cultural heritage belonging to a 
culturally distinct group constitutes a crime against humanity, if the act is committed with 
discriminatory intent. In this regard, the ICTY acknowledges the essential connection between 
the intent to persecute a certain group of people and the destruction of the cultural and 
religious sites that form part of their history, culture, spiritual heritage, and identity.82 
 
Furthermore, clandestine excavations and the looting of archaeological sites have 
drawn major attention to the prevalence of illicit trafficking in cultural material over the last 
decades. The fight against illicit trafficking faces several problems: (1) the growing 
                                                 
75 See http://www.theartnewspaper.com/iraqmus/index.html with link for up-to-date information about which 
items are missing: www.interpol.com/Public/WorkOfArt/Poster/Poster33a.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
76 UNSC Resolution No. 1483/2003, (22 May 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1483, ILM, 2003, p.1016 ff; See: 
paragraph 7; full text version: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1465505.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
77 See full text of UN Charter under http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
78 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic 
and financial relations with Iraq and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2465/96, (Official Journal 2003, L 169/6). 
79 Cf. Catherine Phuong, "The Protection of Iraqi Cultural Property," The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2004): p. 996. 
80 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 160. 
81 See Article 3(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNGA 
Resolution 827/1993 (25 May 1993). 
82 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001) and Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanovic & 
Kubura (IT-01-47, 15 March 2006). 
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international art and antiquity market; (2) the increasing international demand for ‘cultural 
treasures’; and (3) the process of decolonization, which is linked to a rising awareness of the 
significance of ‘national cultural heritage’.83 As a consequence, the newly independent States, 
created in the 1950s and 1960s, continue to bring restitution claims against the former 
colonial powers, whose institutions hold cultural material that had been removed from former 
colonial territories. It is estimated that the British Museum, for example, holds some 90,000 
African artifacts that came into its possession as the result of colonial removal,84 such as the 
so-called Benin bronzes taken from the territory of what is now Nigeria by the 1897 British 
Punitive Expedition.85 Occasionally, former colonial territories may even claim restitution 
from one another: for example, Malaysia has made a claim for ethnological and historical 
material from Singapore, both of which were British colonies.86 Previous standards and 
practices pertaining to the removing of cultural material often do not comply with current 
legal and moral standards on the restitution and return of cultural artifacts, since many of 
these conceptualizations have mainly been articulated only within recent years.87 Due to the 
principle of non-retroactivity in international law,88 current legal provisions are not directly 
applicable to these historical cases of removal. Nevertheless, these cases must be decided on 
the basis of some legal and/or moral grounds and, as this thesis argues, in consideration of 
complementary and alternative mechanisms to the current practices, which do not take the 
various interests involved in restitution disputes sufficiently into account. 
 
Generally speaking, the importance of returning cultural objects to their ‘country of 
origin’ may often conflict with sometimes questionable previous authorization given for the 
removal of cultural material or previous practices, such as the partition (‘partage’) of 
excavation finds.89 Although the division of archeological finds between various parties does 
not correspond with current understandings of archeology (in terms of preserving the context 
                                                 
83 Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, Third Edition ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 222. 
84 Cf. James A. R. Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," in Le Patrimoine Culturel De L'humanité, ed. 
Académie de Droit International de la Haye (2007), 244. 
85 Robert K. Paterson, "Resolving Material Culture Disputes: Human Rights, Property Rights, and Crimes 
against Humanity," in Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of Conquest, Colonization, and Commerce, ed. 
James A. R. Nafziger and Ann M. Nicgorski (2009), p. 376. 
86 See: Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of Expropriation, Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
Doc. A/10244, at 3-4 (1975). 
87 Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, p. 5. 
88 See Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969; entering into force 27 
January 1980); 1155 UNTS 331. 
89 See, for example, the permission that Thomas Bruce, Seventh Earl of Elgin, British ambassador to the 
Ottoman Empire (1799- 1803) obtained from the Ottoman authorities in 1801 to remove about half of the 
surviving sculptures of the Parthenon (more on this case in detail in Chapter Four). 
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and integrity of excavation finds), dividing finds in such a manner had previously been a 
common and widespread practice, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Thus, 
the great Western museums that hold such archeological finds in particular refer to the 
common practice of ‘partage’ as being legal at that time. In turn, many ‘countries of origin’ 
stress the fact that while they were not proper States at that time, they were still deprived of 
their cultural heritage – regardless the legality or illegality of the removal. Recent 
developments in international law, however, attempt to take a much broader approach to the 
issue of restitution and return, by including concepts such as state responsibility and self-
determination under the umbrella of the ‘remedying historical injustice’. Facilitating these 
new approaches, stakeholders other than States − such as indigenous people, museums and 
the international community as a whole – have increasingly become involved in the resolution 
of restitution disputes.90 This requires the exploration of means of resolving international 
cultural heritage disputes, which are complementary to the currently employed horizontal, 
inter-governmental settlement patterns that only give little attention to the plurality of the 
legal, economic and cultural interests involved in restitution disputes. 
3. Terminological Approaches to Restitution and Return  
The terminology employed in the debate on the restitution and return of cultural 
materials is frequently inconsistently applied and used interchangeably. The language of 
international treaties as well as of the academic literature in the field is by no means an 
exception. This is partly because the subject is interdisciplinary, involving not only lawyers 
with different legal backgrounds, but also archeologists, anthropologists and art historians. 
Given that each discipline utilizes its own methodological approaches, the general debate is 
certainly enriched, but it does not necessarily ease the development of uniform terminology. 
 
As the subject of restitution disputes is also frequently covered by the media around 
the world, the problem is exacerbated by the use of both legal and non-legal terminology, and 
is further complicated by difficulties associated with translation.91 An analysis of the legal 
                                                 
90 Cf. Frank Kuitenbrouwer, "The Darker Side of Museum Art: Acquisition and Restitution of Cultural Objects 
with a Dubious Provenance," European Review 4, no. 13 (2005): p. 604. 
91 As, for example, the confusing and even over time changing translation from the English original of UN 
documents into the German version of the terms ‘restitution’ and ‘return’: ‘Rückgabe’ (restitution) and 
‘Rückführung’ (return); whereas ‚Rückführung’ was later translated by ‘Rückerstattung’, see thereto: Thomas 
Fitschen, "30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr Gegenstand Abhanden 
Kam," Vereinte Nationen, no. 2 (2004). The problem of proper and consistent translation continues on the 
European level: the Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully 
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terminology used in the context of restitution and return will demonstrate the first dilemma 
associated with the research in this field: namely, the fact that the legal terminology in this 
field is varied and inconsistent. Moreover, the terms used in this area of the law frequently 
tend to be deployed in order to blur rather than clarify the legal connotation associated with 
certain concepts. This terminological inconsistency is consequently perpetuated by various 
international and national legal traditions. The inconsistent use of terminology, however, 
leaves the door open to further negotiations, as claims are often made on ethical and historical 
rather than legal grounds, thereby deliberately avoiding legal terminology.92 
 
In particular, the term ‘restitution’ often raises concerns among the parties involved, as 
it is implicitly connected to other legal questions of compensation and non-retroactivity, and 
might conflict with national and third party rights.93 Its legal connotation is the main reason 
why ‘restitution’ is almost always complemented by or left out in favor of other terms in 
international treaties, bilateral agreements, and non-binding instruments, as will be shown at a 
later point in the analysis. These other terms, namely ‘recovery’, ‘retrieval’,94 ‘repatriation’, 
the more neutral term ‘return’, or simply ‘transfer’ are frequently employed in lieu of 
‘restitution’.95 Each of these terms has a slightly different shade of meaning: the expression 
‘repatriation’ is one such example, as it clearly indicates that the political purpose of the 
return of cultural objects to the ‘patria’ – the ‘fatherland’ or, generally speaking, the ‘country 
of origin’.96 Other terms are clearly used in lieu of restitution, in order to evade legal 
connotations and their embedded legal obligations.97 The rather neutral and unencumbered 
notion of ‘transfer’ has been utilized in several bilateral agreements and the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.98 Whereas the title of the Convention avoids both the notion of ‘restitution’ and 
‘return’ by opting for ‘transfer’, the text of the Convention employs the traditional notions of 
                                                                                                                                                        
removed from the territory of a Member State (Official Journal L 074 of 27 March 1993, 0074-0079) uses in 
English the term ‘return’, whereas in French it speaks of ‘restitution’, and in German of ‘Rückgabe’. 
92 This will be demonstrated later in Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
93 Vrdoljak, "Reparations for Cultural Loss," p. 214. 
94 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 863 ff. 
95 Cf. Ibid., p. 832 ff. 
96 Cf. Ibid., p. 836 f. 
97 The term ‘transfer’ is used, for example, in the Agreements between Italy and several U.S. Museums, 
including the Getty Museum, Boston Fine Arts Museum or the Metropolitan Museum of Art settling the ‘return’ 
of illegal exported items to Italy; see for further details Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
98 The rather neutral and non-legal term of “transfer” has been used in the bilateral U.S.-Italian agreements, see 
Chapter Three, Section 2.10 and in the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.2. Moreover, 
also the Swiss law of 2005 implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention uses the notion ‘transfer’. The Swiss 
implementing law is entitled: “Cultural Property Transfer Act” (CPTA), full text available at: 
http://www.bak.admin.ch/themen/kulturguetertransfer/01104/index.html?lang=en (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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‘reparation’ (Article 2) and ‘return’ (Article 7).99 Frequently, however, the terms ‘return’ and 
‘restitution’ are considered to be equivalent, and are often used without distinction when 
describing this phenomenon. 
 
Nevertheless, examining the terms used in the debate will help to circumscribe the 
conceptual terrain explored in this thesis. Apart from the general concept of ‘reparation’ and 
its originally war-related connotation, the trilogy of ‘restitution’, ‘return’, and ‘repatriation’, is 
commonly used in the debate dealing with displaced cultural materials.100 Although the terms 
of ‘restitution’ and ‘return’ within certain contexts are lacking in legal clarity, they are, 
nevertheless, the terms that are commonly used in legal literature and official documents. The 
following section of this chapter will examine in detail the terminological development of 
these terms and will set out the terms that will be used in this thesis. 
3.1 Reparation 
The term ‘reparation’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘restitution’, although the 
concept of ‘reparation’ is much broader and combines various other categories, ‘restitution’ 
being only one of them. The term reparation was originally used exclusively in connection 
with what were, in effect, fines exacted against States, usually for damages incurred during 
wartime.101 Once hostilities had ceased, the victor would commonly insist that the vanquished 
party had caused the conflict, and that it, therefore, should be compelled to compensate the 
victor for war-related expenses and resulting damages. Reparations were thus a relatively 
unambiguous and tangible form of victor’s justice and were resented accordingly. The 
indemnities imposed on Germany after WWI are probably the most notorious example of 
such reparations.102 While this term has certainly retained this historical connotation, it has in 
the meantime come to refer to a host of different activities, in which amends are made to non-
State groups or individuals. This shift has taken place due to the expansion of human rights in 
response to the carnage of WWII, particularly the Holocaust.103 It should be noted, however, 
                                                 
99 See Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
100 See for example: Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 31. 
101 John Torpey, Making Whole What Has Been Smashed - on Reparations Politics (Harvard University Press, 
2006), p. 8. 
102 ———, "Politics and the Past," in Politics and the Past - on Repairing Historical Injustices, ed. John Torpey 
(2003), p. 4. 
103 See for example: The Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany, in German known as: 
Luxemburger Abkommen, (signed 10 September 1952, entering into force 27 March 1953). According to the 
agreement, West Germany was to pay for slave labor, the persecution of Jews during the Holocaust, and to 
compensate for stolen Jewish property. West Germany paid Israel a sum of 3 billion Deutsche Marks over the 
next fourteen years, with an additional 450 million Deutsche Marks paid to the World Jewish Congress. The 
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that the concept of reparation has not only been broadened; in many ways, the concept has 
undergone a complete reversal in its substantive meaning, at least as it had been understood 
prior to WWII − namely, from a term referring to the monetary compensation paid by the 
vanquished to the victor, to a concept of general redress for internationally wrongful acts.104 
Consequently, the term ‘reparation’ has to be seen as referring to all means through which 
States are obligate to repair the consequences of a breach of international law for which they 
are responsible (State responsibility105).106 Provisions on reparation can be found in the early 
1907 Hague Convention (Article 3),107 the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in time of war (Article 33),108 and in UN human rights treaties.109 In fact, 
reparations have become an essential complement to the spread of human rights at the 
international level.110  
 
Since the term ‘reparation’ gained a human rights dimension,111 it now encompasses 
various types of redress. Without going into great detail, the following general types of 
reparation can be identified: (1) ‘restitution’, including the restoration of freedom, legal rights, 
social status, citizenship, employment, and goods; (2) ‘restitution-in-kind’, in cases in which 
the original is lost or destroyed; (3) ‘compensation’, in cases of material damage and loss of 
income, as well as physical or psychological damage; (4) ‘rehabilitation’, including medical 
coverage and access to legal and social services; and (5) ‘moral reparations’112 (‘satisfaction’) 
and guarantees of non-repetition. If these various forms of redress are taken under 
                                                                                                                                                        
money was invested in Israel's infrastructure and played an important role in establishing the economy of the 
newly founded State. 
104 Francesco Francioni, "Reparation for Indigenous People: Is International Law Ready to Ensure Redress for 
Historical Injustices?," in Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives, ed. 
Federico Lenzerini (2007), p. 32. 
105 See: Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts completed by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 2001. For the text of the Articles and commentaries see Official Records of the UN 
General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10, 43, (A/56/10). 
106 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2005), p. 7. 
107 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 18 October 1907, entering into force 26 January 
1910), reprinted in AJIL, vol. 2 (1908), p. 90. 
108 Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 
(adopted 12 August 1949, entering into force 21 October 1950), 75 UNTS 287. 
109 See, for example, Article 14 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, (adopted 10 December 1984, entering into force 26 June 1987), 1465 UNTS 85. 
110 Torpey, "Politics and the Past," p. 5. 
111 Federico Lenzerini, "Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Law: An 
Introduction," in Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Federico 
Lenzerini (2007), pp. 10-11. 
112 Moral reparation might comprise: investigation of the facts; the full and public disclosure of the truth; 
apologies; public acknowledgement of the facts; acceptance of responsibility; legal or administrative sanctions 
against the perpetrators of the violations; and commemoration of the victims. 
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consideration, ‘reparation’ as a general concept often seems more satisfactory than item-by-
item restitution. As a result, it is also conceptually more difficult, since it does not deal 
exclusively with the material aspect of ‘restoration’.113  
 
Since the aim of this thesis is to extend the conceptualization of restitution and return 
beyond current practices in resolving restitution disputes, both the material and the non-
material aspects of ‘reparation’ must be included in this analysis. This will be achieved by 
discussing the concept of ‘remedying historical injustice’ on the basis of ethical and historical 
considerations.114 That said, the term ‘reparation’ as such will not be used in this thesis, as it 
represents the super-ordinate concepts discussed above, of which restitution (and return) is 
only one aspect – namely, the aspect that deals specifically with the removal of cultural 
materials and the corresponding question of return. 
3.2 Restitution and Return 
Despite the general terminological inconsistencies, the notions of ‘restitution’ and 
‘return’ are widely used in legal literature and in legal documents, such as UN and UNESCO 
documents. Although one might assume that use of terminology would be more or less 
consistent within these legal documents, the conventions surrounding the use of terminology 
have changed several times: this has been done primarily for political reasons, and rarely for 
the sake of distinct definitions. The terminological changes within the resolutions adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) are particularly remarkable. Starting in 1973 
as an initiative by the newly independent African States, who under the decolonization 
process began demanding ‘restitution’ of ‘what belongs to them’,115 the issue has been 
broadened over the years to cover illicit trafficking in cultural objects as well. In 1976, the 
UNGA used the single term ‘restitution’ in Resolution No. 31/40116 to refer to ‘cultural 
property lost either as a consequence of foreign or colonial occupation, or through illicit 
traffic prior to the 1970 UNESCO Convention’.117 In 1978, UNGA Resolution No. 33/50118 
                                                 
113 Charles S. Maier, "Overcoming the Past? Narrative and Negotiation, Remembering, and Reparation: Issues at 
the Interface of History and the Law," in Politics and the Past - on Repairing Historical Injustices, ed. John 
Torpey (2003), p. 297. 
114 See Chapter Three, Section 5. 
115 UNGA Records, XXX, 2410th Plenary Meeting, statement made by the delegation of Zaire. 
116 UNGA Resolution on: Protection and Restitution of Works of Art as Part of the Preservation and further 
Development of Cultural Values, (A/RES/31/40), 31st Session, 30 November 1976, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/31/ares31.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
117 For a detailed overview about the history of the UNGA resolutions over the past thirty years, see: Fitschen, 
"30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr Gegenstand Abhanden Kam," p. 47. 
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introduces the term ‘return’ and refers to ‘restitution and return’ in its title. One year later, in 
1979, UNGA Resolution No. 34/64119 inverts the terms in favor of the more neutral term 
‘return’, substitutes the ‘and’ with an ‘or’ and revised the title as ‘return or restitution of 
cultural property’.120  
 
However, legally speaking, the notions of ‘restitution’ and ‘return’ should not be 
understood to be interchangeable. Restitution can be defined as an action aimed at reversing 
the effects of a former breach of the law.121 Within the context of cultural heritage disputes, 
this applies both to looting during war, and theft during times of peace. The connecting 
characteristic of these two seemingly distinct scenarios is the violation of a legal prohibition, 
namely looting and theft. The aim of restitution is the full restoration of the former state of 
affairs (restitutio in integrum).122 This might be accomplished either directly (by handing 
back the object identified as originating from pillage or theft), or – quite debatable – 
indirectly, through ‘restitution in kind’ (by the furnishing of objects similar to those which 
were destroyed or cannot be found).123 Restitution of looted and stolen objects concerns the 
ownership of that property and has also been described as ‘title dispute’.124 
 
In comparison to the notion of ‘restitution’ that refers to pillage and theft, the notion of 
‘return’ refers to cultural objects taken during the colonial period, as well as to objects that 
have been illegally exported from one State to another.125 The notion ‘return’ began to 
emerge as an autonomous concept,126 since the notion ‘restitution’ was increasingly avoided 
by States because of its clear legal character as a remedy in international law. In 1978, the 
Director-General of UNESCO introduced ‘A Plea for the Return of an Irreplaceable Cultural 
                                                                                                                                                        
118 UNGA Resolution on: Protection, Restitution and Return of Cultural and Artistic Property as Part of the 
Preservation and further Development of Cultural Values, (A/RES/30/50), 33rd Session, 14 December 1978, 
available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/33/ares33.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
119 UNGA Resolution on: Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin, (A/RES/34/64), 
34th Session, 29 November 1979, available at:  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/ares34.htm (23 
September 2011). 
120 Cf. Fitschen, "30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr Gegenstand 
Abhanden Kam," p. 47. For a detailed discussion on the UNGA resolutions, see Chapter Three, Section 3.3  
121 Cf. Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 33. 
122 Cf. Kifle Jote, International Legal Protection of Cultural Heritage (Stockholm1994), p. 262. 
123 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 50. 
124 Kathryn Last, "The Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: Some Issues of Definition," in Resolution of 
Cultural Property Disputes, ed. The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague: 
Peace Palace Papers, 2004), p. 65. 
125 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 33. 
126 Ibid., p. 48. 
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Heritage to Those Who Created It’ using the term ‘return’ instead of ‘restitution’.127 The 
separated notions were formally reflected in the explicitly formulated ‘Intergovernmental 
Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its 
Restitution in Cases of Illicit Appropriation’ (ICPRCP).128 The distinction between the 
contexts of ‘restitution’ and ‘return’ is also apparent in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention that 
separates the two issues in different chapters: Chapter Two of the UNIDROIT Convention is 
entitled ‘Restitution of Stolen Cultural Objects’, whereas Chapter Three is entitled ‘Return of 
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects’.129 This conforms to the general distinction between 
‘stolen’ and ‘illegally exported’ objects as described above. Cases involving the return of 
cultural objects include the restoration of the ‘stone of Scone’ to Scotland seven hundred 
years after its removal from Edinburgh to London,130 and the decision of the Glasgow City 
Council to return the ‘Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt’ to the ‘Wounded Knee Survivors’ in the 
United States (South Dakota).131 
                                                
 
This short appraisement of terminology has shown that the use of ‘restitution’ (which 
refers to stolen cultural objects – either through looting during war or theft during times of 
peace) can be differentiated from ‘return’ (which refers to illegally exported cultural objects 
as well as to removal during the colonial era). However, the use of the original non-legal term 
‘return’ (or sometimes simply ‘transfer’) by negotiating parties has become more and more 
frequent in settings that ought to use legal terminology to designate legal rights. Whereas the 
term ‘restitution’ is generally associated with ‘claim’ or ‘dispute’ – making the term 
‘restitution disputes’ into a commonly used collocation in this field of study, the term 
‘restitution’ almost never appears in the wording that attests the actual settlement of 
‘restitution disputes’.132 Thus, it can be noted that the parties involved often actively choose 
 
127 Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, A Plea for the Return of an Irreplaceable Cultural Heritage to Those Who Created 
It, 7 June 1978, as available in Annex VII of the Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes, Peace Palace Papers 
(2004). 
128 Committee of Experts on the Establishment of an Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of 
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Cases of Illicit Appropriation, Dakar, March 
1978, Final Report 20 C/86, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/legalprotection/committee/html_eng/index_en.shtml (accessed 23 September 
2011) 
129 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, adopted 24 June 1995, 
entering into force 1 July 1998, 34 ILM 1322. 
130 Norman Palmer, "Sending Them Home: Some Observations on the Relocation of Cultural Objects from Uk 
Museums Collections " Art, Antiquity and Law 5, no. 4 (2000): p. 343. 
131 Memorandum submitted by Glasgow City Council to the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, 
reprinted in 5(4) Art, Antiquity and Law, 15 (2000), p.371. This case is described in detail, see Chapter Six, 
Section 3.1. 
132 For a detailed case study, see Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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to avoid the term ‘restitution’ in an effort to exclude legal connotation. This has a twofold 
effect: firstly, it allows the parties to avoid the mentioning of any legal obligations 
automatically associated with the term ‘restitution’. Secondly, it allows the parties to retain 
their position on the initial legality of the removal without being side-tracked into sterile 
argument too early on in negotiations. Although this might be quite promising for the 
development of a more result-oriented and cooperation-focused practices in restitution 
disputes, the legal certainty and the implementation of a consistent framework for restitution 
practices risks being impaired by the use of the terms in this manner. 
                                                
 
In summarizing, it is important to emphasize that despite the complexity of the terms 
‘restitution’ and ‘return’ and the different legal connotation associated with them, these terms 
are often used interchangeably. This thesis will utilize the commonly employed collocation of 
‘restitution dispute’, although the broader but much longer collocation of ‘international 
cultural heritage disputes’ is clearly preferred, as indicated in the title of this thesis. Moreover, 
this thesis will use – unless otherwise indicated – the terms of ‘restitution and return’ as one 
set of remedies for resolving ‘restitution disputes’. However, as this thesis attempts to go 
‘beyond restitution’, the term ‘return’ will be given preference over the term ‘restitution’ (in 
line with current State practice) – particularly when it comes to defining alternative solutions 
to current restitution practices. Going ‘beyond’ restitution means to overcome what can be 
described as zero-sum solution – meaning that the cultural object in question is returned (or 
retained) without any mutual gain for the parties involved.133 
3.3 Repatriation 
In the legal literature, the term ‘repatriation’ is used less frequently than ‘restitution 
and return’ and is more comparable, due to its terminological origin, to the term of 
‘reparation’.134 Originally, the term of repatriation referred to the process of returning 
refugees, so-called displaced persons, or soldiers, following an armed conflict. However, the 
term has been used in legal literature in order to describe two scenarios, on the one hand, 
restitution disputes that relate to the succession of States,135 and, on the other, disputes related 
to human remains.136 In contrast to the terms ‘restitution and return’, which are based on the 
 
133 For details, see Chapter Two, Section 5. 
134 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 3.1. 
135 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 50. 
136 For example, the 1990 U.S. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) prescribes 
the process of returning Native-American human remains found on federal land to culturally affiliated tribes with 
the notion of ‘repatriation’. Other incidents cover the collections of heads and other body parts of mainly 
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premise that the cultural material in question has been removed, the term ‘repatriation’ has 
been used to describe situations in which the object itself has not moved, but national borders 
have changed; as a result of this change, the item appeared to be out of its original cultural 
context.137 During the process of nation-State-building in the nineteenth century, the status of 
cultural objects altered without physical dislocation, when various territories were subject to 
political reassignment due to territorial cession, or through the dissolution of multi-ethnic 
States. The Austrian-Italian Treaty of 1866138 should be mentioned as one of the first 
emerging cases of repatriation on a larger scale.139 The treaty settled the conflicts between 
Italy and Austria following the Austrian succession of Venetia to the French Empire, which in 
turn ceded Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy. Italy, which was in the process of unifying at this 
time, requested that the Austro-Hungarian Empire returns all works of art, historical relics, 
and archives removed under the Habsburg reign. The treaty was based on the territorial link 
between Italy and the cultural objects in question. However, ‘repatriation’ was only 
performed after protracted negotiations, and only on an item-by-item basis, and was 
contingent upon reciprocity on the part of Italy. Whereas questions of ‘repatriation’ in the 
case of the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, for example, seem to have finally been 
settled by a 2001 agreement,140 the removal of cultural objects after WWII as well as issues 
pertaining the collapse of the Soviet Union remain unresolved between Germany, Poland and 
Russia on the one hand, and Russia and the former Soviet Republics on the other.141  
 
Criticizing the use of the term ‘repatriation’ as a general term in cultural heritage 
matters, Merryman argues that the term ‘repatriation’ “asserts that an object has a patria, a 
homeland, a nation to which, and in which, it belongs.”142 He suggests that scholars should 
                                                                                                                                                        
indigenous peoples such as Indigenous Australians and Maori for display in museums as they have been 
exhibited as an "anthropological curiosity". See, for example, the controversial case of the repatriation of the 
Yagan’s skull from London to Australia in 1997. The head spent over a century in storage at a museum, was 
buried in 1964, exhumed and repatriated to the Noongar tribe. To date, the head remains unburied. 
137 Last, "The Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: Some Issues of Definition," p. 69. 
138 Treaty of Peace between Austro-Hungary and Italy, Vienna, 3 October 1866, I Receil manuel et pratique de 
traits, conventions et autres actes diplomatiques (ser. 2), p. 387 (Charles de Martens, Ferdinand de Cussy/ 
Friedrich H. Geffcken eds., Leipzig 1885). 
139 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 44. 
140 Agreement on Succession Issues between the Five Successor States of the Former State of Yugoslavia, 41 
I.L.M. p. 5 (2002). 
141 See, for example, Agreement on the Repatriation of Cultural Property to the States of origin, Minsk (Belarus), 
14 February 1992, Ross. Gazeta, 24 February 1992. The process of ‘repatriation’ and the enforcement of the 
agreement lacks of the necessary approval by the Russian State Duma. 
142 John Henry Merryman, "Protection of the Cultural Heritage?," American Journal of Comparative Law 38 
(Supplement 1990)(1990): p. 521. 
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therefore avoid this term, as it stems from a form of “romantic nationalism”.143 Congruously, 
he also criticizes the use of the term ‘heritage’, because it also implies a ‘right to repatriation’, 
with which he disagrees, given his internationalist point of view.144 Despite this criticism of 
the concept of ‘heritage’, another question arises as to what conditions generate the relevant 
link between a cultural object and its ‘country of origin’ (pays d’origine) that would justify its 
‘repatriation’.145 Among others, such conditions might include the place of manufacture; the 
nationality of the maker; the State of its archaeological discovery; the State of the longest 
history of reception; or, the State in which the object was held for the longest period of 
time.146 Whereas, in some cases, the question of the ‘country of origin’ can easily be 
answered, in others, the answer is not that straightforward. This question is further 
complicated in cases of underwater cultural heritage, such as sunken vessels (incapacitated by 
either natural or war-related disasters) that have arbitrarily found their final resting place in 
territorial or international waters.147 
 
A definition of the notion ‘country of origin, offered by the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee,148 refers to “the country with the traditional culture to which 
the object was related”. This definition, however, remains unsatisfactory, since the strongest 
traditional link does not necessarily correlate with the ‘country of origin’; as Siehr points out, 
sometimes cultural objects can only be assigned locally rather than nationally.149 The 
problems associated with shifting State borders during the course of history, which has been 
addressed by the term ‘repatriation’, thus recurs when defining the term ‘country of origin’. It 
is notable that the link to a specific people, community, as well as ethnic or religious group 
may be historically more consistent than the sometimes random link to a State territory that 
exists in the current legal system.150 Since, however, States (and not peoples or communities) 
are still the fundamental actors in international law, the territorial link to States remains the 
dominant conceptualization in current international law, despite well-founded criticism. 
 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid.: p. 522. 
145 Stefan Turner, Das Restitutionsrecht Des Staates Nach Illegaler Ausfuhr Von Kulturgütern, Schriften Zum 
Kulturgüterschutz (2002), p. 9. 
146 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 367. 
147 For a detailed discussion on the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, see Chapter 
Three, Section 2.5. 
148 UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of 
Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP); for details, see Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
149 Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 147. 
150 For the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
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Although a totally satisfying definition of the notion ‘country of origin’ cannot be 
found, the term ‘repatriation’ can be defined as serving the purpose of protecting the integrity 
of a nation’s cultural heritage in the circumstance of a territorial cession or the collapse of a 
multi-national State.151 Depending on the situation, ‘repatriation’ can refer to a place or 
country whence a cultural object originated or an ethnic group to which it once belonged. The 
major criterion for restoration under these circumstances is the territorial or ethnic link to a 
given component of that heritage (established, for example, through archives or parish 
registers).152 
 
This short appraisal of the terminology in this area of the law demonstrates that three 
main terms, namely ‘restitution’, ‘return’, and ‘repatriation’, are commonly used within the 
general debate on international cultural heritage disputes. Thus, choosing completely different 
terms for the purpose of this thesis would be somehow artificial and would not facilitate the 
debate. Whereas ‘restitution and return’ will be used as one set of remedies for resolving 
international cultural heritage disputes,153 the term ‘repatriation’ will not be used in this 
thesis, since it has not yet been sufficiently established in international legal codifications 
apart from cases associated with human remains and State succession. Furthermore, although 
Merryman’s criticism pertaining to ‘repatriation’ might be exaggerated, it cannot be denied 
that the term is terminologically encumbered and is not likely to foster the attempt at 
identifying alternative mechanisms in the resolution of international cultural heritage disputes. 
3.4 Retention 
The opposing term to the concept of ‘restitution and return’ is that of ‘retention’. This 
non-legal term is generally used either to refer to national export restrictions or to describe a 
certain position or general attitude that aims at keeping current collections in (Western) 
museums. In both cases, ‘retentive schemes’ are often described as a means of ‘protecting’ 
cultural heritage.154 Retentive approaches, for example, have been deployed in the above-
mentioned 2002 ‘Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums’.155 The 
collections of several Western museums, which were compiled mainly through purchase, 
donation, bequest, or the division of archeological excavations (‘partage’) during the 
                                                 
151 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 50.  
152 Ibid., p. 50. 
153 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 3.2. 
154 Craig Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (2010), p. 16. 
155 Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums (December 2002), reprinted in ICOM News 
No. 1 (2004). 
 50
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century, have been continually enlarged through the 
removal of cultural materials from occupied or colonized parts of the world. Those who 
oppose the return of cultural materials to their ‘countries of origin’ argue that these removals 
were in compliance with the applicable laws of the period. In the majority of cases, national 
export restrictions, mainly passed in the twentieth century, did not exist at the time of removal 
and do not have retroactive impact. 
 
Merryman, for example, contrasts the term ‘retention’ with ‘protection’ in reference to 
the inability of certain requesting States, indigenous people, or ethnic and religious groups to 
guarantee the preservation, access, study, and research of cultural objects, especially when 
they refuse to allow even duplicate cultural material to be taken abroad.156 The opposing 
position, which favors the return of cultural material to its ‘countries of origin’, uses 
‘retention’ as a derogatory term in reference to the arguments made by the so-called art-
market countries in favor of maintaining possession of cultural materials, without regard to 
the rights of requesting States and indigenous people to cultural participation and self-
determination. Although the negative connotation now associated with the term ‘retention’ is 
almost unavoidable, this thesis will use the term ‘retention’ to refer to the position of the 
requested party who refuses the prompt and immediate return of the requested cultural object. 
The approach taken by this thesis does not intend to advocate for either ‘restitution and return’ 
or ‘retention’, rather, it suggests mechanisms that provide complementary and alternative 
means of resolving debates over provenance and possession. 
4. Legal Categorization of Claims for Restitution and Return 
While distinguishing between the different categories of claims for the restitution and 
return of cultural materials is not an easy task, it is an essential one. Several attempts have 
been made to identify categories that fit the wide range of possible claims arising under 
international law. Some of these attempts have been helpful in terms of simplification; others 
have failed to provide a useful schematic in terms of terminology and categorization, 
primarily because they introduce unnecessary complications into this already complex issue. 
An attempt at classification has been made, for example, by Last, who identifies three 
categories of claims: ‘disputes concerning ownership’; ‘disputes concerning location’; and 
‘disputes concerning stewardship’;157 Gerstenblith has also proposed a classification triad: 
                                                 
156 Merryman, Elsen, and Urice, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p. 418. 
157 Last, "The Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: Some Issues of Definition," p. 65. 
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‘works of aesthetic values intended for sale’; ‘archaeological objects’; and ‘ethnographic 
objects of cultural or religious value’.158 While these categories seem to be comprehensible 
and constructive at first, closer analysis demonstrates that they end up further complicating 
the scholarship on restitution matters, since these categories are not exclusive (given that 
claims may fall within more than one of these categories) and the different legal instruments 
associated with these classifications are not adequately defined. Understandably, every 
scholar in this field is tempted to develop their own classification system for these claims in 
an effort to improve on existing classification systems. Nevertheless, the added value of such 
classification systems to efforts at finding solutions to these claims is questionable, since re-
grouping does not change the legal framework applicable to these cases. Therefore, rather 
than inventing a new classification system, this thesis adopts the conventional categories of 
claims as currently recognized by international law. 
 
As demonstrated in the historical overview159 and the discussion of terminological 
issues,160 the legal provisions pertaining to ‘restitution and return’ have evolved primarily to 
protect cultural sites, monuments and movable cultural objects during times of armed 
conflicts (war time regime). The protection of cultural heritage during times of peace (peace 
time regime) evolved only as a consequence of the massive destruction, looting and theft 
during wartimes – which served to raise awareness that destruction, plunder and theft of 
cultural materials is not only an issue during wartime. While legal provisions focusing on the 
protection of cultural heritage serves a preventive function, restitution and return as such are 
not part of this protective-preventive regime; rather, they aim at reversing the effects of a 
breach of protective measures.161 Generally, the aim of restitution (and return) is the full 
restoration of the former state of affairs162 (restitutio in integrum): the removed cultural 
material is ‘restituted’ to its previous rightful owner. This, of course, applies both to looting 
during times of war, and to theft during times of peace. Therefore, the overall distinction 
between the legal provisions in international cultural heritage law is between the wartime and 
the peacetime regimes.163 
                                                 
158 Patty Gerstenblith, "The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects," Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, no. 16 (2001): p. 197. 
159 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
160 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 3. 
161 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 33. 
162 Cf. Jote, International Legal Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 262. 
163 Cf. Christiane Freytag, "Cultural Heritage: Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf "Ihr" Kulturgut?," 
in Prinzipien Des Kulturgüterschutzes - Ansätze Im Deutschen, Europäischen Und Internationalen Recht, ed. 
Frank Fechner, Thomas Oppermann, and Lyndel V. Prott (Berlin), p. 175. 
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In addition to the two rather broad wartime and peacetime regime categories, 
developments after WWII necessitated that international law adopts additional legal 
provisions in order to respond adequately to: firstly, the Holocaust-related looting of Jewish 
cultural property (defined as genocide not war); and secondly, the process of decolonization 
and the requests for the return of cultural materials to their ‘country of origin’ (although 
colonization is defined neither as war nor peace, it still encompasses elements such as 
genocide);164 and thirdly, the dramatic increase of illicit trafficking in cultural materials since 
the 1950s (which is not depend on definitions of war and peace, but in violation of national 
export regulations). 
 
The following section analyzing the different categories of claims for the return and 
restitution of cultural materials will complete the historical framework outlined above and 
will also pave the way for the legal analysis of the instruments dealing with return and 
restitution in international law (Chapter Three). Apart from the terminological inconsistency 
in the field, a clear understanding of the different categories of claims is essential, since 
confusing the different categories of claims (and thus the application of different legal 
regimes) is a major obstacle in the accurate assessment of international cultural heritage 
disputes. Based on the traditional regimes established under international law (the wartime 
and peacetime regimes), five major categories of claims for restitution and return can be 
identified in international cultural heritage law:165 (1) claims related to the removal of cultural 
objects during armed conflicts (wartime regime); (2) claims related to illicit trafficking 
(peacetime regime); (3) claims made for the return of cultural objects to the ‘countries of 
origin’(in neither war nor peace); (4) claims made on the grounds of former ownership, 
mainly in relationship to Nazi-confiscated art; and (5) claims made for the return of cultural 
objects to a particular people, group or community. 
4.1 Return of Cultural Objects removed during Wartime 
The earliest provisions on restitution and return, namely the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War,166 were established within the context of armed 
                                                 
164 Paterson, "Resolving Material Culture Disputes: Human Rights, Property Rights, and Crimes against 
Humanity," p. 376. 
165 Cf. Kerstin Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems (2005), pp. 161. 
166 See Article CXIV of the Treaty of Westphalia, signed at Münster, Germany in 1648. 
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conflict.167 Against the backdrop of conflict and belligerent occupation, the need to develop a 
regime to protect cultural materials within the auspices of international humanitarian law 
became essential. Thus, over the centuries, customary international law developed obligations 
pertaining to the protection of cultural heritage against the four fundamental wartime threats: 
deliberate attack, incidental damage, pillage and outright theft.168 Today, the legal core of 
these provisions has been cemented in international law by the early provisions of the 1899169 
and 1907170 Hague Conventions, and the more recently, the 1954 Hague Convention and its 
Protocols;171 taken as a group, these conventions prohibit theft, pillage, misappropriation, and 
any act of vandalism directed against monuments and works of art while simultaneously 
establishing the obligation to return objects displaced during armed conflict.172 
 
Where looting during the armed conflict could not be prevented, post-war treaties 
were drawn up to regulate the return of cultural materials. Among these early treaties are the 
1815 Congress Treaty of Vienna,173 the 1919 Peace Treaties of Versailles,174 and the 1921 
Treaty of Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia175, all of which provide general provisions 
on restitution.176 These peace treaties were successful in facilitating the return of appropriated 
cultural materials in certain cases – one of the most recent being the return of the Axum 
Obelisk to Ethiopia in 2005 on the basis of a 1947 Peace Treaty;177 other incidents, such as 
the spoliation committed by the Soviet army in Central and Eastern Europe in 1945, remain 
unresolved.178 While Russia classifies the objects taken by the officially deployed Soviet 
‘Trophy Committee’ as ‘compensatory restitution’, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic 
                                                 
167 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
168 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 186. 
169 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899, entering into force 4 
September 1900), reprinted in AJIL, vol. 1 (1907), p. 129. 
170 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 18 October 1907, entering into force 26 January 
1910), reprinted in AJIL, vol. 2 (1908), p. 90. 
171 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts (adopted 14 May 
1954, entering into force 7 August 1956), 249 UNTS 215. 
172 For a detailed analysis of customary international law, see Chapter Three, Section 6. 
173 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, embodying all separate treaties (signed on 9 June 1815). 
174 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Versailles (signed on 28 June 1919, 
in force 10 January 1920), (1919) 225 Parry’s CTS 189. 
175 Treaty of Peace between Poland and the Soviet Republics of Russia and Ukraine, Riga, (signed on 18 March 
1921, LNTS, Vol. 6, No. 149, pp. 51-169, available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/lon/volume%206/v6.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
176 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 7. 
177 For detailed information on the case of the return of the Axum Obelisk from Italy to Ethiopia in 2005, see 
case study Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. 
178 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
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States still await the return of thousands of cultural items, including artworks, books and 
archival materials.179 Since the early 1990s, Germany has drawn up several bilateral 
neighborhood treaties and cultural agreements with Russia and several other former Soviet 
States in order to resolve this problem.180 However, these treaties have only resulted in the 
return of individual items; one successful example is the 2008 return of the fourteenth century 
stained-glass windows by Russia to the cathedral of Frankfurt (Oder) in Germany.181 
4.2 Return of Illicitly Exported Cultural Objects 
Within the ‘peace time regime’, claims for restitution and return are made on the 
grounds that cultural objects have been illicitly exported from one State to another. Thus, the 
second category of claims is primarily a consequence of illicit trafficking in cultural materials. 
An export is considered to be illicit if the object was exported outside a State’s territory in 
breach of its national export regulations. National regulations on the export (as well as on the 
import) of cultural goods either completely prohibit the export (and/or import)182 of certain 
cultural objects (or groups of objects), or require that an object intended to be exported is 
accompanied by an official export certificate.183 The conditions under which such an export 
certificate is issued or not depend on national legislation and therefore vary from State to 
State (generally depending on the age and/or value of the object).184 Without an export 
certificate, the export is considered to be illicit. Today, a growing number of States have 
passed export regulations pertaining to the protection of their national cultural patrimony 
(thus prohibiting the export), and the surveillance of trade (thus restricting the import and 
export of cultural objects).185 However, because of the fundamental principle of State 
sovereignty in international law, domestic legislation (including regulations on the export of 
                                                 
179 Cf. Fodor, "The Restitution of Works of Art in Hungary," p. 92. 
180 See, for example, Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Socialist Republics on 
Good-Neighborliness Partnership and Cooperation, (signed on 9 November 1990), in: 30 I.L.M. 505 (1991) and 
Cultural Agreement between the German Federal Republic and the Russian Federation, (signed on 16 December 
1992 in Moscow), BGBl. II, 1256 (1993); See in this respect also: Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," 
p. 119. 
181 See: http://www.fr-online.de/kultur/fenster-der-marienkirche-wieder-komplett/-/1472786/3299184/-
/index.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
182 See, for example, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1210/2003 that establishes a ban on the import, export, and 
trade of cultural items exported from Iraq after 2 August 1990: Council Regulation (EC) No. 1210/2003 of 7 July 
2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic and financial relations with Iraq and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No. 2465/96, (Official Journal 2003, L 169/6). 
183 See, for example, Council Regulation (EC) No. 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the export of cultural 
goods, (Official Journal L 39/1, 10 February 2009). This regulation was enacted to control the export of cultural 
objects outside the area of the European internal market. The respective categories of cultural objects are defined 
through minimum age and/or economic value, see Annex I of the regulation. 
184 For examples of national export regulations, see Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
185 Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick J. O'Keefe, Handbook of National Regulations Concerning the Export of Cultural 
Property (Paris1988). 
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cultural materials), is generally not enforced by courts of foreign States.186 In order to provide 
an international legal framework for the recognition of national export regulations among 
States, two conventions have been established: the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention. Whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is self-executing, and as 
such does not require national implementation (and is therefore still lacking major 
international acceptance by States), the 1970 UNESCO Convention, (by now ratified by 120 
States),187 must be implemented into national law by its States parties. These national laws, 
however, differ extensively from State to State, and create several practical problems in 
providing for the return of illicitly exported cultural objects.188 
 
Whereas the protection of cultural materials and the restitution of appropriated cultural 
materials provided by the wartime regime are already considered to be part of customary 
international law,189 the provisions pertaining to the return of cultural materials under the 
peacetime regime remains less developed. This is primarily because the peacetime regime 
developed much later – initially in the late 1930s190 and substantially only after WWII – and 
therefore has not yet achieved customary international law status (although promising 
tendencies in this direction can be observed).191 Moreover, this regime is more sensitive to the 
legal difficulty associated with interfacing national and international law when it comes to 
regulations against trafficking in cultural materials.192 The return of an illicitly exported 
object might necessitate, firstly, the expropriation of the current possessor, and, secondly, 
payment of compensation if the object had been acquired in good faith. These requirements 
might conflict with civil law provisions or constitutional rights, namely property rights, of the 
                                                 
186 Recent developments in which foreign courts recognize national ownership laws of another State, such as in 
the case of Iran vs. Barakat (2007) will be discussed separately, see Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
187 See list of States Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E&order=alpha (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
188 In detail on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
189 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 124 and 69. Wilfried Fiedler, "Zur Entwicklung Des Völkergewohnheitsrechts Im Bereich 
Des Internationalen Kulturgüterschutzes," in Staat Und Völkerrechtsordnung. Festschrift Für Karl Doehring, ed. 
Kay Hailbronner, Georg Ress, and Torsten Stein (1989), p. 217. 
190 One of the earliest examples is the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic 
Monuments among the States of the Pan-American Union (Treaty of Washington), (signed 15 April 1935, 
entering into force 26 August 1935) 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 289. 
191 Cf. Tullio Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of 
Cultural Property," Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 94, no. 2 (2011): p. 366. For detailed analysis on customary 
international law, see Chapter Three, Section 6. 
192 Manlio Frigo, "Réflexions Sur Quelques Aspects Juridiques De La Protection Internationale Des Biens 
Culturels," in La Protezione Internazionale Dei Beni Culturali, ed. Istituto Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario 
(Rome: 1986), pp. 218. 
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requested State, and therefore must be resolved through each State’s national implementation 
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Despite all of these obstacles, many claims – some of 
which have been successful in recent years – are brought forward on the basis of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention and the national laws that serve to implement this Convention.193 
 
4.3 Return of Cultural Objects to the ‘Countries of Origin’ 
This third category encompasses claims made on cultural materials that were 
appropriated from their place of origin during the period of colonial domination or earlier 
appropriation of territory. The colonial removal of cultural materials constitutes a problematic 
category of its own, as – legally speaking – such claims do not fit properly into either the war 
or the peace-time regime category.194 Thus, this category comprises both legal and illegal 
removal of cultural materials resulting from – sometimes quite dubious – acquisitions or 
trade-offs as well as theft or pillage. Although colonial domination included removal through 
the extensive use of force and violence (which could therefore be understood as a type of 
prolonged foreign occupation),195 these removals, nonetheless, do not properly fall within the 
scope of the ‘peacetime regime’ or the ‘wartime regime’ as they are traditionally understood 
in international law. Under international law, the process of colonization is by definition not 
considered to be war; colonized territories were – at least at that time – considered to be an 
extension of national territory, rather than under foreign occupation.196 Thus, claims for the 
return of cultural materials falling into this third category can also be described as ‘historical 
claims’, since – as common in international law197 – international treaties, such as the 1970 
UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, do not apply retroactively.198 
As a consequence, these claims cannot be decided on the basis of these conventions. Rather, 
they must be considered within the wider framework of ethical and historical considerations 
that influence the formation of custom and general principles under international law.199 One 
forum that has been given a mandate to deal with claims prior to the entry into force of 
                                                 
193 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
194 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 181. 
195 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 370. 
196 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 181. 
197 See Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entering into force 
27 January 1980); 1155 UNTS 331. 
198 More information on the 1970 UNESCO Convention is provided in Chapter Three, Section 2.2; more 
information on the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is provided in Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
199 A detailed legal analysis is provided in Chapter Three, Section 5 and 6. 
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current legal instruments is the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the 
Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit 
Appropriation, created in 1978.200 Despite all efforts at improving the work of the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee over the past thirty years of its existence, the number of cases 
brought in front of the Committee is rather disappointing, given the number of incidents of 
colonial removals that are likely to exist (since its establishment in 1978, only eight requests 
for return have been submitted to the Committee of which six were resolved).201 The principal 
reasons for the few number of cases brought before the UNESCO Committee are twofold: 
firstly, States are generally rather reluctant to handle restitution disputes at the international 
level for various political and diplomatic reasons; and secondly, parties are often unable to 
properly document the actual circumstances surrounding the colonial removal of cultural 
materials to the extent necessary to present a claim.202 While the facts of certain removals are 
well known, such as the Benin bronzes taken from the territory of what is now Nigeria by the 
1897 British Punitive Expedition, the vast majority are not.203 The scope of colonial removal 
was vast, both in geographical and numerical terms: many items were traded or gifted, while 
others were stolen, obtained through force or misunderstanding, or removed by early 
missionaries and others.204 
 
While the scope of the two previous categories of claims is more or less apparent, the 
scope of this third category of claims, especially as it pertains to the return to the ‘countries of 
origin’, remains highly controversial.205 Museums and cultural institutions currently holding 
cultural materials that fall under this category frequently object to claims brought by the 
‘countries of origin’, alleging that the artifacts were obtained through valid acquisition or with 
the permission of the governing authority at that time (for example, agreements on the 
‘partage’ of archeological finds). Moreover, the argument is often put forward that these 
                                                 
200 The Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or 
its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP) was created by the General Conference of UNESCO, 
Resolution adopted by 20 C/Resolution 4/7.6/5 of its 20th Session, 24 October-28 November 1978. More on the 
mandate and function of the UNESCO Committee is provided in Chapter Three, Section 3.2. Information on 
proposals amending the current mandate of the Committee is provided in Chapter Six, Section 4.2. 
201 See list of cases of return and restitution under the aegis of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, 
available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/movable-heritage-and-museums/return-of-cultural-
property/committes-successful-restitutions/ (accessed 18 August 2011). 
202 Paterson, "Resolving Material Culture Disputes: Human Rights, Property Rights, and Crimes against 
Humanity," p. 376. 
203 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, pp. 141. 
204 Cf. Paterson, "Resolving Material Culture Disputes: Human Rights, Property Rights, and Crimes against 
Humanity," p. 376. 
205 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 181. 
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institutions have saved cultural materials from deterioration by removing them, and this is 
often difficult to deny (at least in some cases). Due to the difficulty of reconstructing the 
actual circumstances of the removals, as well as the amount of time that has elapsed since 
removal, most claims falling in this third category lack legal rather than moral grounds.206 As 
a result, arguments in favor of the concept of ‘remedying historical injustice’ have been 
articulated as a mean through which the gap between legal and moral obligations might be 
filled.207 This approach does not argue with the legality or illegality of the removal; rather, it 
views the removals within the context of current standards of human rights in international 
law, based on concepts such as the ‘right to self-determination’.208 Through the discourse of 
‘remedying historical injustice’, several claims have been resolved,209 while others – such as 
the famous Parthenon Marbles in the British Museum – remain unresolved. 
4.4 Return of Cultural Objects to Individual Owners 
Unlike the first three categories of claims, which are based on territory (namely States 
requesting the return of cultural materials to their territory), this fourth category is based on 
private ownership. In principle, the question of private ownership is a matter of national civil 
law rather than international law.210 Whereas questions of ownership with a transnational 
dimension (i.e. across States) are covered by private international law, international (public) 
law is generally not engaged with the question of private ownership, because of the principle 
of State sovereignty under international law. Despite this fact, States may conclude multi-or 
bilateral treaties in order to harmonize their civil law provisions; this has been done, for 
example, within the framework of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.211 
 
While not previously mentioned, the distinction between national and international 
(public) law with regard to the matter of ownership is also evident in the three categories 
discussed above: in the cases of (1) removal during wartime, (2) removal through illicit 
export, and (3) removal under colonial domination, the legal and/or moral obligation to return 
refers to the return of the cultural object in question to a State, not the actual individual 
(rightful) owner. Whether or not the State subsequently transfers the returned object to the 
                                                 
206 Ibid., p. 187. 
207 For more details, see Chapter Three, Section 5. 
208 See Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
209 See, for example, the voluntary return of the ‚Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt’ by the Glasgow Museum (UK) to 
the Wounded Knee Survivors’ Association in South Dakota (US), see Chapter Six, Section 1.1. 
210 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 187. 
211 For more details, see Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
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former private or public owner is the prerogative of that State, and is based on the provisions 
of its national civil or administrative law. Therefore, neither the 1954 Hague Convention nor 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention contain provisions on ownership; claims in the third category 
(i.e. return to the ‘country of origin’) inherently imply the return of cultural materials to States 
that had recently gained sovereignty as a result of decolonization. However, this does not 
ensure return to communities or tribes, who might have been the ‘true owners’ of the returned 
cultural items. 
 
Consequently, this fourth category forms an exception by circumventing the general 
principle that supports the position that exclusive protection of ownership rights is a matter 
for national legislation. Whereas the massive looting of cultural property by the Nazis outside 
German territory during WWII and the Holocaust (1939-1945) falls within the provisions of 
the first category (i.e. removal during wartime), the massive looting and privation of Jewish 
individuals in Germany (1933-1945) falls under national jurisdiction. Given this situation, 
specific provisions were established under national German law in the early 1950s to provide 
restitution and compensation.212 Due to the large scale of Holocaust-related looting, and early 
attempts to deal with them internationally rather than nationally – such as by the 1943 London 
Declaration213 – additional obligations to return cultural materials to individuals (not to 
States) have been drawn up under international law. Despite recoupment and restitution 
programs such as the ‘Central Collecting Points’ set up by the Allies in 1945, several cases of 
Nazi-confiscated art remained unresolved. This is due to several important factors: firstly, the 
massive amount of looting; secondly, the brief statutes of limitations associated with the 
restitution provisions from the 1950s (it was thought that these problems could be resolved 
within a few years); and, thirdly, the creation of the Iron curtain that blocked access to 
archives in the Soviet Bloc States. In several cases, Nazi-confiscated Jewish cultural property 
was return to Austria, France, the Netherlands and other European countries; however, instead 
of identifying the owners or their heirs, many objects were transferred to public museums, 
eventually becoming part of their collections. 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new international attempt was made to resolve the 
avalanche of open cases related to Nazi-confiscated art. In 1998, forty-four States adopted the 
                                                 
212 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 189. 
213 For more details on the 1943 London Declaration, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
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non-legally binding Washington Principles of Nazi-Confiscated Art214 to assist the resolution 
of issues relating to Nazi-confiscated art. The underlying assumption of these principles was 
that restitution could be arrived at through negotiations based on the good will of the relevant 
States, thus avoiding legal proceedings and the inherent difficulty in providing evidence, as 
well as legal complications (such as those arising from the protection of bona fide purchasers 
under national law or national provisions on the statutes of limitations).215 In order to 
strengthen the application of the principles articulated by the 1998 Washington Conference, 
the International Council of Museums (ICOM) drew up the 1999 Recommendations 
concerning the Return of Works of Art Belonging to Jewish Owners; it contained the same 
principles, but was addressed to museums rather than States.216 
 
Another set of cases falling in this category of return to individual owners is the return 
of cultural objects to victims of Soviet communism.217 Thousands of people, mainly wealthy 
(non-Jewish) Eastern Europeans, immigrated to Western Europe or the United States as a 
result of imposition of communism in Eastern Europe. The problem then arose as to whether 
their Nazi-confiscated cultural property should be returned to their former countries of 
residence (i.e. behind the Iron curtain), or to these individuals wherever they might reside. In 
abrogation of the traditional State practice of returning such objects to the States of origin (see 
categories one to three) and against the political protest of the communist States concerned, 
the United States decided to return cultural objects not to the communist States in Eastern 
Europe but to individual refugees, i.e. the rightful owners of that property. Since the United 
States was not obliged under international law to return objects to individual owners, the 
decision to do so must be understood against the backdrop of the Cold War and thus as a 
matter of U.S. politics rather than of law.218 With the exception of this instance of Cold War 
politics, the return of cultural materials to the individual owners in cases of Nazi-confiscated 
art remains legally non-binding, although it can now be seen as a solid category of its own 
under international law. 
                                                 
214 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, agreed upon Washington, D.C., 3 December 
1998, full text available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/23231.htm (accessed 23 September 2011); 
reprinted as Annex I to this thesis. 
215 Kowalski, "Claims for Works of Art and Their Legal Nature," p. 43. 
216 ICOM Recommendations concerning the Return of Works of Art Belonging to Jewish Owners, 14 January 
1999, available at: www.icom.museum/wordlwar2.html (accessed 23 September 2011). For further information, 
see Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
217 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 190. 
218 Ibid., p. 191. 
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4.5 Return of Cultural Objects to a People or Community 
As seen in the analysis of the abovementioned three categories, the return of cultural 
materials is traditionally based on territory: States submit claims for the return of cultural 
materials to their national territory. The fourth category, as discussed above, forms an 
exception to this traditional principle of territory, because it focuses on the link of individual 
ownership – traditionally not recognized in international law in relation to the question of 
restitution and return. The fifth and last category of claims focuses neither on the link of State 
territory nor the link of individual ownership but rather on ‘collective ownership’, i.e. the link 
between a certain people or community and (their) cultural materials. The concept of a nation-
State or that of ‘country of origin’ is, however, not always congruent with the concept of a 
‘people’ or an ethnic community. Whereas many ethnic communities or ‘peoples’ may build a 
case for the return of their cultural material based upon a territorial link (within a current 
nation-State), they often lack governmental support in requesting (their) cultural materials. 
This is because many governments fear that the return of cultural (symbolic) materials to a 
specific ethnic minority within their territory could foster separatist movements within the 
State, thereby endangering the integrity of the State. Religious communities, in turn, might 
have political support in their claim, but lack the other fundamental link in restitution and 
return cases, namely territory and individual ownership. 
 
The genesis and historic need for this fifth category of claims lies, once more, in the 
massive looting related to the Holocaust (Shoah). Whereas Nazi-confiscated art is returned if 
the owner or the heirs can be traced, return is not possible if the owner or heirs cannot be 
identified. Moreover, religious and sacred items (judaica) were frequently left without a 
‘place of origin’ to which they could be returned, since in many cases synagogues were 
destroyed and local Jewish populations were murdered. Consequently, such heirless or 
‘orphan’ objects could be returned to neither individual owners, nor to the State in which the 
religious community was formerly located.219 Instead, these objects were returned to 
international Jewish organizations, such as the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization220 
                                                 
219 These communities were mainly located in Eastern European countries. 
220 The Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), New York, founded in 1948, information available 
at: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0011_0_10155.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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or the later Jewish Claims Conference221 that received these heirless objects and distributed 
them among the Jewish communities mainly in the United States (and later, in Israel). Initial 
protests by Eastern European countries as well as by Germany in the 1950s did not prevent 
this practice by the Allies. 222  
 
The historic need to deal with Holocaust-related cultural (religious) materials shifted 
international legal perspectives with regard to other incidents of forced removals of cultural 
materials, namely to questions regarding the restitution and return of cultural objects to 
indigenous people. Whereas nation-States and newly independent States with their own 
claims (category three) have traditionally strongly objected to claims made by indigenous 
peoples, some States with large indigenous populations (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States) began dealing with these claims and created legal provisions (in the 
United States, for example, the Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA)223) for 
intra-State returns to indigenous communities within their State territory.224 Examples of 
returning cultural materials to indigenous communities across State borders (inter-State), such 
as the return of the ‘Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt’ from Glasgow to the Wounded Knee 
Survivors’ Association in 1999225 are exceptional, since indigenous people do not yet have 
international legal personality. Recent developments in international law, however, provide 
concepts – such as the right to self-determination226 – which are opening up the debate 
beyond the intra-State return. 
                                                
5. The Interest-oriented Approach to Restitution and Return 
Both the historical analysis and the analysis of the classification of legal categories of 
claims given in this introductory chapter have demonstrated the complexity of this subject 
matter. Traditionally, the matter of restitution and return was exclusively related to armed 
conflicts; over time, however, it gained widespread recognition in times of peace. Thus, as 
will be argued, the protection of cultural heritage has found common ground in international 
 
221 The Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany (JCC), New York, founded in 1951, information 
available at: http://www.claimscon.org/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
222 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 192. 
223 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 101-601 of 16 November 
1990. The Act prescribes the process of returning Native American Indian human remains as well as related 
cultural objects found on federal land to culturally affiliated tribes. Full text of the Act available at: 
http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/MANDATES/25USC3001etseq.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
224 For more information, see Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. 
225 For detailed case study, see Chapter Six, Section 1. 
226 See Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
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cultural heritage law, since it represents a fundamental interest of humankind.227 Against this 
backdrop, the thesis attempts to demonstrate that common ground can be found not only in 
the principle of protecting cultural heritage but also in restitution matters. This, of course, is 
not an easy undertaking, since – as has been shown in the introductory remarks of this chapter 
– the matter of restitution and return remains highly controversial within international law on 
both legal and moral grounds. 
 
Recent trends in international law indicate movement towards a broader understanding 
of restitution matters. This can be seen in the growing recognition of ethical and historical 
considerations as part of the effort to ‘remedy historical injustice’. To go a step further, this 
thesis argues that it is not only ethical and historical considerations that have to be taken into 
account, but also the various interests of the stakeholders involved in restitution disputes. Due 
to the variety of stakeholders involved, the interests in the resolution of restitution disputes 
might be competitive or sometimes even mutually exclusive. It is, however, the objective of 
this thesis to make the argument that by taking into account the various interests of 
stakeholders, common interests can be identified. Based on the assessment articulated above – 
namely, that legal instruments and current restitution practices do not adequately encompass 
the variety of interests involved (Chapter Three and Four) – this thesis argues for the use of 
complementary and alternative mechanisms in resolving restitution disputes (Chapter Five 
and Six). The solutions to be discussed are both complementary and alternative, as it is by no 
means the intent of this work to exclude ‘restitution’ – either as legal principle or as practical 
outcome – but rather to add value to it. The solutions to be discussed include the following: 
(1) voluntary returns, (2) temporary loan agreements, the creation of replicas and the 
exchange of cultural objects, (3) permanent loan agreements and return without transfer of 
ownership, (4) joint custody and shared management, as well as transfer of expertise, (5) re-
purchase of objects, compensation funds, and (6) consideration of the international reputation 
of museums and other art-holding institutions as an effective mechanism in restitution 
disputes. 
 
In this thesis, it will be argued, that complementary and alternative mechanisms can 
reinvigorate deadlocked restitution disputes. Going ‘beyond’ restitution means overcoming 
                                                 
227 Cf. Francesco Francioni, "Principi E Criteri Ispiratori Per La Protezione Internazionale Del Patrimonio 
Culturale," in Protezione Internazionale Del Patrimonio Culturale : Interessi Nazionali E Difesa Del Patrimonio 
Comune Della Cultura ed. Francesco Francioni (2000), p. 13. 
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what can be described as zero-sum solutions, in which the cultural object in question is 
returned (or retained) without any mutual gain for the parties involved. This kind of outcome 
could be described as ‘barren return’ – without any added (‘fruitful’) value or outcome. 
Moreover, the notion ‘barren return’ as applied to a cultural object claimed for restitution and 
return can metaphorically be compared to the situation in child custody law.228 In both cases, 
two opposing parties claim custody rights. Whereas child custody law has established a 
general interest-based principle, namely the doctrine of ‘the best interest of the child’, no such 
general principle has been established in international cultural heritage law. Since child 
custody law bears a striking resemblance to the approach taken by this thesis, the ‘best 
interest’ doctrine will be discussed as a legal analogy to the resolution of restitution 
disputes.229 In order to frame the legal basis for complementary and alternatives solutions, 
this thesis proposes an interest-oriented approach to restitution disputes that seeks to balance 
the respective interests involved and aims at identifying common interests in resolving 
restitution disputes. The need for such an interest-oriented approach is based on the three 
rationales discussed below. 
                                                
 
5.1 Rationale One: From ‘Cultural Property’ to ‘Cultural Heritage’ 
Firstly, the conceptual shift in international law from the notion of ‘cultural property’ 
towards the notion of ‘cultural heritage’ over the past thirty years230 necessitates a 
corresponding shift in the way in which restitution disputes are handled in international law. 
The notion ‘cultural property’ was first used in an international legal context by the 1954 
Hague Convention.231 This notion was supposed to serve as a wide-ranging and synthetic 
category of objects, both movable and immovable, worthy of protection because of their 
inherent value, rather than because of their fragile nature.232 However, ‘cultural property’ as 
such is limited in its scope, since it does not incorporate the social value associated with 
cultural materials, also referred to as ‘intangible cultural heritage’. Although the intangible 
aspect of cultural heritage may not seems particularly relevant to the scope of this thesis 
 
228 In a similar vein of comparison: Harry S. Martin, "In the Best Interests of the Art," Kunstrechtsspiegel, no. 3 
(2007): p. 170-71. 
229 See Chapter Four, Section 1.2. 
230 Cf. Francesco Francioni, "A Dynamic Evolution of Concept and Scope: From Cultural Property to Cultural 
Heritage," in Standard-Setting in Unesco, ed. Abdulqawi Yusuf (2007), p. 221. 
231 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts (adopted 14 
May 1954, entering into force 7 August 1956), 249 UNTS 215; available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
232 Francioni, "A Dynamic Evolution of Concept and Scope: From Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage," p. 
225. 
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(which focuses on tangible, movable objects in restitution disputes), most restitution disputes 
involve social and cultural issues, since appropriation has frequently occurred within the 
context of foreign or colonial occupation and/or genocide. Furthermore, the notion of ‘cultural 
property’ highlights another limitation highly relevant to the scope of this thesis. This 
limitation derives from the fact that ‘cultural property’ emphasizes the aspect of private (and 
public) ownership and the exclusive sovereign interests of the private owner or the territorial 
State in which the ‘property’ is located.233 Generally speaking, property rights entail the 
exclusion of other interests, which are not linked to ownership rights. 
 
Therefore, a conceptually broader notion has been introduced into international law – 
namely, the notion of ‘cultural heritage’. Although the notion was first established in the 1954 
Hague Convention (like the notion of ‘cultural property’),234 it was only with the 1972 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention235 that it developed as a broader legal concept. The 
1972 UNESCO Convention is based on the premise that “parts of the cultural and natural 
heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world 
heritage of mankind as a whole”.236 Thus, ‘cultural heritage’, as articulated by the 1972 
UNESCO Convention, includes both cultural and natural heritage, and encompasses 
considerations independent of property rights, namely protection, preservation, integrity and 
public access.237 Consequently, the concept of ‘heritage’ has become emancipated from that 
of ‘property’ so as to acquire a connotation associated with the ‘historical or artistic legacy’ of 
cultural material whose value and safeguarding are necessary in order to protect the public 
interest, irrespective of ownership rights.238. It is this shift that is highly relevant to the scope 
of this thesis, as it is argued that dispute resolution must account for factors beyond those of 
title and ownership, and a shift towards a broader approach that is able to include ‘common 
interests’, such as the above mentioned (i.e. preservation, access, integrity and cooperation). 
Although this shift has happened within the scope of the 1972 UNESCO Convention with 
                                                 
233 For details on the aspect of property rights, see Chapter Four, Section 2.4. 
234 See the Preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention and Article 1 that reads: “For the purpose of the present 
Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ shall cover […] (a) movable or immovable property of great importance 
to the cultural heritage of every people”. 
235 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, (adopted 16 
November 1972, entering into force 17 December 1975), 1037 UNTS 151; for details on the 1972 UNESCO 
Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.3. 
236 See, Sixth recital of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention. 
237 Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick J. O'Keefe, "'Cultural Heritage' or 'Cultural Property'?," International Journal of 
Cultural Property (1992): p. 309. 
238 Francesco Francioni, "Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction," in Cultural Human Rights, ed. 
Francesco Francioni and Martin Scheinin (2008), p. 7. 
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regard to cultural and natural sites designated as World Heritage sites,239 this shift has not yet 
occurred in the context of resolving restitution disputes, since States and their national 
(property) interests are still the main concern in the current regime of international law. In 
recent years, however, several attempts to resolve restitution disputes have been undertaken 
on non-legal grounds, simply through diplomatic negotiations and bilateral agreements. This 
recent trend leads to the need for the second rationale for the interest-oriented approach taken 
by this thesis. 
 
5.2 Rationale Two: Contracts and Unequal Bargaining Power 
Diplomatic negotiations and bilateral agreements have played an increasingly 
important role in the resolution of international cultural heritage disputes both among States 
and between States and private entities (such as private museums and collectors).240 Since 
bilateral agreements are contractual in nature, they suffer from a major shortcoming insofar as 
their terms depend, in part, on the bargaining power of the negotiating parties. This is 
particularly problematic, if legal aspects are explicitly excluded in bilateral agreements 
settling restitution disputes, as is frequently the case. As a result, successful outcomes in 
restitution disputes often depend to a significant extent on political and diplomatic 
commitment of States as well as their bargaining power, rather than on general principles of 
law. The usage of the national and international media in order to create public awareness and 
political pressure only exacerbates differences in bargaining power. It goes without saying 
that bargaining power is unequally distributed, in particular with regard to the parties involved 
in restitution disputes. This, however, not only affects the final outcome of negotiations in 
terms of mutual gain and cooperation, but also inhibits the development and application of a 
consistent legal framework in restitution matters. Furthermore, restitution claims often reflect 
difficult issues associated with war, foreign or colonial occupation, or significant human 
rights violations that have resulted in the looting and the appropriation of cultural materials. 
Attempts made to ‘remedy historical injustices’ by addressing the question of restitution and 
return241 are often hampered by unequal bargaining powers as hegemony and dependence 
tend to persist in international relations − dividing parties into so-called ‘source countries’ and 
‘art-market countries’. While inequality in bargaining power is frequently unavoidable in 
many adverse disputes, it might be possible to mitigate this disparity by counterbalancing the 
                                                 
239 See Chapter Three, Section 2.3 and Chapter Six, Section 4.4. 
240 See Chapter Three, Section 2.9. 
241 See Chapter Three, Section 5. 
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respective interests on the basis of general principles that aim at creating solutions that result 
in mutual gain, exchange and cooperation. 
 
5.3 Rationale Three: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Common Interest 
Both legal concepts of ‘property’ and ‘contract’ generally fail to adequately resolve 
international cultural heritage disputes in a sustainable, cooperative manner; they also fail to 
take the different interests of the various stakeholders involved into account, and fail to 
provide a consistent legal framework pertaining to the resolution of disputes over cultural 
materials. Therefore, an alternative approach to current restitution practices is very much 
needed. This leads to the third rationale for an alternative approach, which relies on the 
common denominator in international cultural heritage law: namely, the ‘common interest’ in 
the protection of cultural heritage. 
 
While the various legal instruments pertaining to cultural heritage in international law 
each function within their respective spheres of application,242 they all have one common 
theme, namely that the protection of cultural heritage is a ‘common concern’ – or in other 
words – the ‘common interest’ of humankind.243 The analysis of the legal framework will 
demonstrate that all legal instruments pertaining to cultural heritage in international law 
contain terms that describe cultural heritage as belonging to or being protected in the interest 
of all humankind.244 Consequently, as will be argued, the concept of ‘protection’ is common 
ground in cultural heritage issues and establishes a general responsibility of States (and other 
stakeholders) to protect cultural heritage in war and peace. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
within the scope of the ‘common interest’ in protecting cultural heritage, certain other 
interests can be identified; these include: physical and cultural preservation, access, integrity, 
and cooperation.245 Since these interests form part of the ‘common interest’, they are valid not 
only for general cultural heritage issues in periods of war and peace, but must also be taken 
into account in the resolution of international cultural heritage disputes. However, current 
restitution practices do little to accommodate the ‘common interest’ in the protection of 
cultural heritage. 
                                                 
242 These various needs include, inter alia, the protection of immovable and movable cultural heritage in armed 
conflict (1954 Hague Convention), the protection of movable cultural heritage in case of theft and illicit 
trafficking (1970 UNESCO Convention), the protection of underwater cultural heritage (2001 UNESCO 
Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention), and the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage (2003 Intangible 
Cultural Heritage Convention). For a detailed analysis of the legal instruments, see Chapter Three, Section 2. 
243 Cf. Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 405. 
244 Ibid. 
245 For detailed analysis, see Chapter Four, Section 1.1 and Chapter Five, Section 3. 
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Therefore, this thesis attempts to introduce an alternative approach to currently 
employed restitution practices, in order to not only facilitate and accelerate the return of 
cultural material when legitimate and appropriate, but also to provide a basis for the denial of 
a request for the return of an object, if its return would contradict the ‘common interest’. It 
will be one of the tasks of this thesis to outline complementary and alternative mechanisms 
that facilitate the application of methods that are able to balance the various interests of the 
stakeholders involved in order to resolve disputes in a more satisfactory and cooperative 
manner. By moving ‘beyond restitution’, this approach raises the questions pertaining to who 
should legitimately control and determine which cultural material, and what rights of access, 
usage, preservation, and disposition should be granted or retained. Certain cases of restitution 
and return are quite straight forward; in others, however, complementary and alternative 
mechanisms might lead to a win-win situation instead of zero-sum solutions (i.e. ‘barren 
return’ or simple retention). Thus, the interest-oriented approach proposed by this thesis may 
enhance cooperation and exchange in cultural heritage matters, while preserving cultural 
materials and preventing their loss and dispersion. 
 
It is, however, important to clarify that this thesis does not argue against restitution; 
rather, it attempts to approach international cultural heritage disputes from a problem-solving 
perspective. As a result, going ‘beyond restitution’ means exceeding the predominant 
importance of title and ownership by attempting to create alternative solutions to current 
restitution practices.246 However, this can only be accomplished by reconciling the tangible 
characteristics of cultural heritage (i.e. physical preservation of and access to cultural objects) 
with the intangible characteristics, such as cultural affiliation and the recognition of rights. 
The latter element is particularly essential, as claims for restitution and return stem from the 
infringement of rights, including property rights, the right to self-determination, the right to 
cultural and religious participation, and the right to cultural diversity and development. 
 
In short, the approach taken by this thesis aims at providing at least four additional 
contributions to the restitution debate: firstly, an analysis of the shortcomings of the existing 
legal regime of international cultural heritage law and the current State practice in resolving 
restitution disputes, both of which are primarily driven by the interests of States and property 
                                                 
246 For detailed analysis, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
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considerations; secondly, an analysis of the different stakeholders and their various interests 
and motives in restitution disputes; thirdly, the application of the concept of ‘common 
interest’ and similar recently developed concepts in international law to the resolution of 
international cultural heritage disputes; and fourthly, the identification of complementary and 
alternative mechanisms to current restitution practices, in terms of both law and policy. 
Summary of the Chapter:  
This chapter has prepared the foundation of this thesis. It began by exploring the 
current dilemmas in international cultural heritage disputes and provided a short history of the 
evolution of international cultural heritage law – from the ‘right to plunder’ to customary 
obligations protecting cultural heritage in times of war and peace. The historical overview 
was followed by an analysis of the commonly-used – but rather inconsistently defined – 
terminology associated with this field of study, including the terms of ‘reparation’, ‘restitution 
and return’, ‘repatriation’, and ‘retention’. 
 
Subsequently, five categories of claims were identified: (1) claims related to the 
removal of cultural objects during armed conflicts (war time regime); (2) claims related to 
illicit trafficking (peace time regime); (3) claims made for the return of cultural objects to the 
‘countries of origin’; (4) claims made on the grounds of former ownership, mainly in 
relationship to Nazi-confiscated art; and (5) claims made for the return of cultural objects to a 
certain people, group or community. Whereas the first three categories of claims are based on 
the link of territory (States requesting the return of property belonging to their territory), the 
fourth and fifth category are not based on the territorial link between an object and a State; the 
fourth category is based on the link of individual ownership (property rights), whereas the 
fifth category foregoes both territory and traditional property rights, being based on the idea 
of a ‘collective ownership’ and the cultural affiliation of cultural materials to a certain people 
or community. 
 
On the basis of this conceptual framework, the chapter introduced the interest-oriented 
approach proposed by this thesis. This approach is based on the assumption that by taking into 
account the various interests of the stakeholders involved in restitution disputes, more 
equitable solutions for the resolution of restitution disputes can be found. Whereas current 
approaches to restitution and return are mainly based on arguments related to location, title 
and ownership, the interest-oriented approach aims at developing complementary and 
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alternative mechanisms that go beyond the ‘barren return’ of cultural materials. Three 
rationales have been identified that demonstrate the need for such an alternative approach: 
firstly, the conceptual shift away from ‘cultural property’ towards ‘cultural heritage’ that has 
been made in the overall context of international cultural heritage law but not yet applied in 
terms of resolving restitution disputes; secondly, the lack of general principles for resolving 
restitution disputes, given that diplomatic negotiations and contractual agreements are mainly 
based on bargaining power, which is too often unequally distributed among the interested 
parties; and thirdly, as ‘property’ and ‘contract’ predominantly fail to provide a general legal 
framework for dispute resolutions, the need for taking the ‘common interest’ in preservation 
into account in the resolution of international cultural heritage disputes. 
 71
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
 72
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
 
CHAPTER III: The Regime of International Cultural Heritage Law – An 
Appraisal 
 
 
Overview of the Chapter: 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the existing legal instruments in 
international cultural heritage law, by ascertaining the current limits and shortcomings of 
these instruments as they pertain to restitution and return. Four major categories of legal 
instruments in international cultural heritage law can be identified: (1) international 
conventions and bilateral agreements; (2) soft law instruments; (3) codes of conduct and 
codes of ethics; and (4) customary international law. In addition to these four categories of 
legal instruments, a reflection on ethical and historical considerations will be provided in 
order to augment the legal analysis. Although not strictly legal in nature, such considerations 
are essential within the particular context of restitution disputes for two reasons: firstly, 
because restitution disputes are frequently resolved on the basis of non-legal considerations 
(e.g. through political commitment and moral acknowledgment); and, secondly, because 
ethical and historical considerations have decisively shaped international State practice 
pertaining to restitution and return (as for example in cases pertaining to Nazi-looted art), thus 
contributing to the further development of international law. 
 
In order to illustrate the recent developments in the field of restitution and return, the 
legal analysis of this chapter includes several examples of recently resolved restitution 
disputes. Against the backdrop of the existing law as well as these cases, it will be 
demonstrated that the majority of restitution disputes either remain unresolved or are resolved 
through bilateral agreements and out-of-court-settlements. In many cases, it is apparent that 
the purely legal approach does not provide adequate solutions in restitution disputes, since the 
ethical and historical dimensions intrinsic to issues of restitution and return are not 
sufficiently taken into account by the existing legal provisions. Therefore, as will be argued in 
this chapter, both legal and non-legal considerations as well as customary international law 
play a vital role in the resolution of restitution disputes. 
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1. The Legal Framework of International Cultural Heritage Law 
The area of international cultural heritage law is unique in three aspects. Firstly, 
international cultural heritage law deals with objects of unique and irreplaceable value; this 
distinguishes it from other legal fields (such as, for example, commercial law). The 
desirability of cultural material is frequently associated with both their singularity and the 
aesthetic pleasure they provide. This is less of a factor with other valuable chattels such as 
jewels and automobiles, because they are normally fungible and can be acquired almost 
anywhere by anyone with the requisite financial resources. In contrast, cultural objects are by 
their very nature unique.247 Given this focus, it is readily apparent why this field of law 
cannot concern itself solely with property rights, but must instead also address other issues, 
such as the interests of stakeholders other than those of the current possessor, as well as the 
physical and the cultural aspect of preserving cultural heritage.248  
                                                
 
Secondly, no other area of the law must consistently challenge non-legal 
considerations, including ethical as well as archeological, anthropological and historical 
concerns; these concerns may come into play either as a complement to legal considerations 
or as the sole basis for a claim made on ethical and historical considerations when legal 
instruments are not available, due to the non-retroactivity of legal provisions or a statute of 
limitations. 
 
Thirdly, from a legal point of view, international cultural heritage law, and specifically 
the matter of restitution and return, is unique insofar as it overlaps with several other legal 
areas, including: international and national private law (such as property or contract law); 
international and national public law (including tax and customs legislation) as well as 
criminal law regarding stolen cultural objects and clandestine excavations; intellectual 
property rights law (with regard to rights to copy, publish and use the proceeds deriving from 
the commercial aspects of cultural materials); and international humanitarian law as well as 
international human rights law (in cases dealing with the removal of cultural materials during 
wartime, foreign or colonial occupation, and the annexation of territory). Especially the latter 
two fields of international law play an overall important role in dealing with restitution 
disputes, since they provide specific provisions on State responsibility, State succession, and 
 
247 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 155. 
248 Cf. Roger W. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural 
Property under International Law," Fordham International Law Journal 16(1992-1993): p. 1035. 
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the right to self-determination. Thus international cultural heritage law is concerned with legal 
provisions and general principles derived from all these areas of international law. 
 
Since restitution and return engages with different legal fields and involves various 
stakeholders,249 restitution disputes generally occur in three major constellations: (1) 
international public law, pertaining traditionally to claims between States but also more 
recently to claims between States and non-State actors; (2) international private law, dealing 
with claims between non-State actors and governments, where the question is not whether a 
rule of public international law should be applied but rather which applicable domestic law 
should apply; and (3) national public law, namely claims within a State, where the legitimacy 
of the claim is not dealt with by international law mechanisms (although attempts have been 
made to raise restitution claims to that level),250 but rather on grounds of national 
regulations.251 This thesis focuses primarily on the first constellation of restitution disputes, 
which fall within the framework of international public law, as the other two constellations 
extent beyond the scope of this research. References to the two other constellations, however, 
are made if deemed appropriate. Furthermore, the interest-oriented approach − as conceptual 
methodology − is not limited in its scope and might therefore be fruitfully applied to 
situations pertaining to restitution disputes that do not fall within the application of 
international public law. 
 
The legal problem addressed by this thesis can best be summarized by referring to the 
example of the stolen Iraqi vase provided in the introductive chapter of this thesis. It is 
important to reiterate that it is neither exceptionally remarkable nor legally questionable that 
the antique vase stolen from the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad in the aftermath of the 
war in Iraq in 2003, which later turned up in the hands of a Swiss dealer, has to be returned to 
the museum and to the people of Iraq. As previously noted, the return is clearly indicated, 
since firstly, the vase was stolen under breach of national and international law; secondly, the 
theft occurred in the context of war and occupation, and therefore has been removed in breach 
of customary international law; and thirdly, the vase has been classified as an inalienable 
object (res extra commercium) of national importance to Iraq and thus can neither be legally 
traded under Iraqi antiquities law nor be legally exported without an official export license. 
                                                 
249 For detailed analysis of the stakeholders involved, see Chapter Five, Section 1. 
250 Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 803. 
251 An example for such a national regulation is the U.S. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 101-601, 16 November 1990. 
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Even the self-described “cultural internationalists”252 would agree that stolen material should 
be returned.253 
 
In contrast to this straight-forward example, the international community has difficulty 
agreeing on a common approach to restitution in cases, in which the appropriation has taken 
place decades or centuries ago and thus no legal instruments are applicable and the 
circumstances of the removal are obscure or cannot be definitively clarified. In such cases, it 
is frequently difficult to find a single means of facilitating an appropriate solution to 
restitution disputes, even when all legal circumstances, given the evidence at hand, have been 
properly taken into account. There are certainly many cases in which material and ‘moral’ 
restitution should be made without reservation; however, there are just as many, in which the 
claim for restitution and return is much more questionable on both legal and ethical grounds. 
It is therefore the attempt of this thesis to identify complementary and alternative mechanisms 
on the basis of an interest-oriented approach to restitution, in order to facilitate the resolution 
of restitution disputes. Although this thesis focuses primarily on a set of cases in which legal 
remedies were not available or the circumstances of the removal were obscure, it does not 
limit itself to this set of cases. This is because the application of complementary and 
alternative mechanisms on the basis of the interests involved is likely to add value even in 
cases to which legal remedies are applicable. 
1.1 The Responsibility to Protect Cultural Heritage 
The task of the present chapter is not only to analyze the legal instruments that provide 
the basis for claiming restitution and return of cultural materials but also to determine those 
norms of international law that indicate: firstly, that there is a ‘common interest’ in the 
protection of cultural heritage, and secondly, that there is a general responsibility to protect 
cultural heritage. This appraisal is important, since the identification of a general 
responsibility to protect cultural heritage binds States as well as the international community 
as a whole to commit to the ‘common interest’ in cultural heritage matters. Since cultural 
heritage can be damaged or destroyed in both times of war and times of peace, such a 
responsibility to protect must be a component of both legal regimes.254 
                                                 
252 For the debate on ‘nationalism vs. internationalism’, see Chapter Four, Section 2.1. The so-called ‘cultural 
internationalists’ would only disagree with regard to national export regulations limiting the free market of 
cultural objects but not to the return of objects stolen from museums. 
253 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 246. 
254 For the legal categorization of claims, see supra Chapter Two, Section 3.1. 
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The protection of cultural heritage during times of peace has traditionally been 
considered as the exclusive prerogative of the State, obstructing the development of 
international law within the peace time regime.255 Historically, the protection of cultural 
heritage during times of peace has been overshadowed by incidents of destruction and plunder 
of cultural heritage during times of war, since combat has always represented the major threat 
to cultural heritage.256 Nevertheless, the destruction or deterioration of cultural heritage has 
occurred not only in times of war but also during times of peace. Early examples of peacetime 
destruction include the historical use of ancient structures as stone quarries (such as the 
Colosseum in Rome); the destruction of artifacts that were considered as symbols of royal or 
religious oppression in the aftermath of the French revolution (such as the beheading of 
figures at the façade of Notre Dame in Paris and other incidents of massive iconoclasm, such 
as the destruction of religious icons by the Protestants in the early modern period);257 or the 
demolition of churches and castles in the Era of Stalinism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Traditionally, almost every regime change in history has been followed by the destruction or 
removal of its symbols of power. Examples include the destruction of the Bastille subsequent 
to its liberation in 1789; the demolition of the Berlin wall in 1989; or the removal of the statue 
of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 2003. These deliberate destructive acts mainly occurred as 
a result of the visual and symbolic potency of these statues and monuments. The literal ‘fall’ 
of a monument or a statue seems to be predestined to symbolize the metaphorical fall of the 
same regime that had ordered its erection.258 Generally, it is not until a certain period of time 
has elapsed that certain symbols and monuments are recognized as historically unique and 
worthy of preservation.  
 
It was not until the mid-twentieth century with the evolution of international 
conventions (such as the instruments adopted by UNESCO) that the protection of cultural 
heritage during times of peace became a concern of the international community.259 As a 
consequence, the standards establishing protection of cultural heritage in the armed conflict 
                                                 
255 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 150. 
256 For the history of international cultural heritage law, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
257 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 17. 
258 Dario Gamboni, The Destruction of Art: Iconoclasm and Vandalism since the French Revolution (1997), p. 
51. 
259 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 129. 
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regime are more advanced than the legal provision on the protection of cultural materials in 
times of peace. Whereas the armed conflict regime concerns legal provisions pertaining to 
conduct on foreign territory and with respect to foreign cultural materials, legal provisions 
within the peace time regime concern cultural materials within a State’s own territorial 
boundaries; moreover, these provisions serve to limit national decision making authority 
within a State’s sovereign territory.260 It is, however, questionable whether the extent to 
which the differentiation between the armed conflict and the peace time regime in terms of 
protective standards is still legitimate in international cultural heritage law, especially in view 
of the ‘cultural heritage of all mankind’ argument, and whether the standards that are valid 
within the context of the armed conflict regime ought a fortiori to be valid within that of the 
peace time regime.  
 
The international awareness of the importance of protecting cultural heritage has 
increased tremendously over the last decades, and the legal emphasis has shifted from a 
‘negative’ responsibility of States to avoid destruction of cultural heritage in times of armed 
conflicts towards the development of a ‘positive’ responsibility for the protection of cultural 
heritage in peacetime, which is binding on not only States, but also the international 
community as a whole. It has been recognized that the threats to cultural heritage during times 
of peace, such as the illicit trade in cultural materials, mass tourism, environmental pollution, 
clandestine excavations or underwater expeditions have an international dimension.261 
Therefore, the protection of cultural heritage during times of peace is no longer considered as 
exclusively a matter of state sovereignty, but rather as a common concern of the international 
legal community.262 This can be seen both generally in the increasing efforts made by States 
to combat illicit trafficking in cultural materials, and in several conventions, declarations and 
recommendations protecting the ‘cultural heritage of all mankind’ adopted by the United 
Nations and its specialized agency UNESCO. More specifically, general approval for the 
protection of cultural heritage has been expressed by the international community through the 
2003 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage,263 
                                                 
260 Ibid., p. 150. 
261 Cf. Sabine Schorlemer von, Internationaler Kulturgüterschutz - Ansätze Zur Prävention Im Frieden Sowie Im 
Bewaffneten Konflikt (1992), pp. 101. 
262 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 130. 
263 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference, 17 October 2003, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17718&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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which was made in response to the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001.264 This 
declaration refers explicitly to the regime of State responsibility, while condemning the 
willful destruction of cultural heritage “wherever such heritage is located” as a “crime against 
the common heritage of humanity” (Article 3).265 Taking this general shift in international 
law pursuant to cultural heritage into account, it is important to identify those provisions in 
the instruments of international cultural heritage law that demonstrate the existence of a 
general responsibility to protect cultural heritage, since this responsibility will be an 
indispensable basis for the introduction of general principles in restitution matters. 
                                                
1.2 Recent Normative Developments in International Law 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore alternatives in the resolution of international 
cultural heritage disputes that go beyond restitution. For that reason, the approach adopted 
here clearly goes beyond an analysis of current restitution practices and therefore cannot be 
limited to the legal analysis of international law currently in force (lex lata); rather, it must 
extend its considerations to include recent normative developments and evolutionary trends in 
international law (lex ferenda).266 The emergence of new legal norms and the growing 
recognition of non-State actors as stakeholders in international law have stimulated new 
developments in cultural heritage matters.267 With regard to the resolution of restitution 
disputes, these recent development include the following: firstly, a debate on the relevance of 
human rights obligations to restitution matters;268 secondly, a debate on the appropriateness of 
recognizing ethical and historical considerations in restitution;269 thirdly, the question of the 
impact of the right to self-determination on issues of restitution and return;270 fourthly, the 
relevance of erga omnes obligations pertaining to the protection of cultural heritage 
(responsibility to protect);271 and fifthly, the impact of legal concepts, such as ‘common 
heritage of humankind’, ‘common concern’ and ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ on 
 
264 The 2003 UNESCO Declaration’s Preamble states: “Recalling the tragic destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan that affected the international community as a whole”. 
265 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 37. 
266 With a similar objective, see: Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the 
Field of Return of Cultural Property," p. 341. 
267 Francesco Francioni, "Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of 
Humanity," Michigan Journal of International Law, no. 25 (2004): p. 1209. 
268 For details on human rights obligations under Article 27 UDHR and both Covenants, see Chapter Three, 
Section 2.6; for details on customary international law and general principles, see Chapter Three, Section 6. 
269 For a discussion on the concept of ‘remedying historical injustice’, see Chapter Three, Section 5. 
270 For a discussion on the right to self-determination, see Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
271 For details, see Chapter Three, Section 6.4. 
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restitution matters – concepts that have recently been developed in other areas of international 
law (i.e. the law of the sea and international environmental law).272 
 
While the various legal instruments pertaining to cultural heritage in international law 
have developed in response to specific needs within their particular scope of application (e.g. 
peace and wartime regime), they all have one common theme, namely that the protection of 
cultural heritage is a ‘common concern’ – or positively expressed – a ‘common interest’ of 
humankind.273 As the legal analysis in this chapter will demonstrate, all legal instruments 
pertaining to cultural heritage in international law contain terms that describe cultural heritage 
as belonging to or being protected in the interest of all humankind.274 Consequently, the 
concept of ‘protection’ constitutes common ground in cultural heritage matters, while also 
establishing a general responsibility of States (and other stakeholders) to protect cultural 
heritage. This general responsibility to protect comprises, first of all, the legal obligation to 
return cultural materials that have been removed in violation of international law, particularly 
in view of the principles of State responsibility (as in the above mentioned case of the Iraq 
vase).275 
 
Since, however, the appropriation of the cultural material in question in many 
restitution disputes occurred prior to the establishment of the respective norms of international 
law, these norms do not apply. However, against the backdrop of the concept of ‘remedying 
historical injustices’ and in conjunction with the concept of the ‘common interest’ of 
humanity in the protection of cultural heritage, it will be argued that the responsibility to 
protect cultural heritage encompasses the moral obligation to recognize the various interests 
involved in cultural heritage matters. Within the context of international law, the recognition 
of and commitment to such moral obligations is, however, not novel by any means, and has 
provided the basis for international instruments such as the 1998 Washington Principles 
pertaining to Nazi-confiscated art, which have been agreed to by more than forty States.276 In 
these principles the participating States declared their intention to achieve ‘just and fair 
                                                 
272 See Chapter Four, Section 2. 
273 Cf. Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 405. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Cf. Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 8. 
276 Principles of the Washington Conference with Respect to Nazi-Confiscated Art, released 3 December 1998, 
full text available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). For detailed 
analysis see Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
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solutions’ in restitution disputes,277 and to develop ‘alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
for resolving ownership issues’.278 Although these principles establish soft law (rather than 
hard law) mechanisms, they nevertheless shape State practice, and therefore serve to influence 
the development of international law. Other recent developments, such as the ‘Principles for 
Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material’ which was adopted 
by the International Law Association in 2006,279 demonstrate the need for general principles 
in the resolution of restitution disputes.280 
2. International Treaty Law: Multi-lateral Conventions and Bilateral Agreements 
Five major codifications shape the legal framework of the current international 
cultural heritage law, within these the UNESCO conventions are of primary importance: the 
1954 Hague Convention281 and its two Protocols of 1954282 and 1999;283 the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention;284 the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention;285 the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention;286 and the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention.287 Two 
other principal instruments were also specifically designed to ensure the protection of 
intangible cultural heritage: the 2003 UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention,288 
and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expression.289 
 
                                                 
277 See principles 8 and 9 of the 1998 Washington Principles. 
278 See principle 11 of the 1998 Washington Principles. 
279 Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material, adopted by the 
International Law Association (ILA), Resolution No. 4/2006, 72nd Conference, held in Toronto, 4-8 June 2006 
(hereinafter: 2006 ILA Principles). 
280 For a detailed discussion on the 2006 ILA Principles, see Chapter Three, Section 4.2. 
281 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts, (adopted 14 May 1954, 
entering into force 7 August 1956), 249 UNTS 240. 
282 Protocol to The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 14 May 1954, entering into force 7 August 1956); 249 UNTS 358. 
283 Second Protocol to The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (adopted 26 March 1999, entering into force 9 March 2004), 38 ILM (1999) 769. 
284 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, (adopted 14 November 1970, entering into force 24 April 1972), 823 UNTS 
231. 
285 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, (adopted 16 
November 1972, entering into force 17 December 1975), 1037 UNTS 151. 
286 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, (adopted 24 June 1995, entering 
into force 1 July 1998), 34 ILM (1995) 1322. 
287 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
entering into force 2 January 2009), 41 ILM (2002) 37. 
288 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (adopted 17 October 2003, 
entering into force 20 April 2006), 2368 UNTS 1. 
289 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression (adopted 20 
October 2005, entering into force 18 March 2007, 2440 UNTS 311. Note: this convention will not be discussed, 
as it exceeds the scope of this thesis. 
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These multi-lateral conventions (open to all States) are complemented by bilateral 
agreements between individual States, as well as between States and non-State actors. Within 
the field of international cultural heritage law, the development of international treaty law 
within the last sixty years has served to improve the protection of tangible cultural heritage in 
times of both war and peace; these developments have also improved the recognition and 
protection of intangible cultural heritage. Despite all these improvements, it is clear that 
international treaty law in the field of cultural heritage has not yet reached its full potential, 
especially in comparison with the developments in other legal areas, such as international 
environmental law.290 Whereas the protection of tangible cultural heritage during times of war 
(including the obligation to return cultural objects appropriated during times of war and 
subsequent occupation) is commonly accepted and constitutes customary international law, 
the protection of cultural heritage, including an obligation to return stolen and illicitly 
exported object in times of peace, is much less developed.291 Even taking into account the fact 
that the ‘peace time regime’ has only developed within the last sixty years,292 the disparity 
between the protection of cultural materials in war and peace remains notable, for three 
reasons: firstly, it is only until recently that the protection of cultural heritage in times of 
peace is not any longer considered an area of exclusive State sovereignty;293 secondly, the 
scope of protection through national export regulations varies from State to State and is far 
from being standardized; thirdly, the complex interplay between international and national 
law creates many conflicts, as international treaty law may conflict with national provisions 
on property rights, the protection of the bona fide purchaser, and questions pertaining to 
compensation in cases that require the return of cultural materials.294 In order to identify the 
limits and shortcomings as well as the potential areas of development, the current legal regime 
in international cultural heritage law will be analyzed in the following sections of this chapter. 
2.1 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols 
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict295 (hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention) prohibits theft, pillage, misappropriation, 
                                                 
290 Cf. Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 163. 
291 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 172. 
292 For details, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
293 For details on recent normative developments in international law, see supra Chapter Three, Section 1.2. 
294 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 173. 
295 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts (adopted 14 
May 1954, entering into force 7 August 1956), 249 UNTS 215. 
 82
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
any act of vandalism directed against monuments and works of art; moreover, it extends 
protective obligations to occupying powers in the case of war (Art.4 (3)). The 1954 Hague 
Convention is built upon a foundation of previous legal provisions and custom in international 
law: particularly the 1899296 and 1907297 Hague Conventions Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land; the Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions of war criminals related to 
the massive destruction and looting during WWII; as well as upon the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.298 In addition to 
the early provisions of 1899 and 1907, the 1954 Hague Convention can be seen as the first 
comprehensive international treaty addressing the protection of tangible cultural heritage. 
Since its entry into force in 1956, more than 120 States have ratified the 1954 Hague 
Convention, the United States being one of the most recent ratifying States.299 
 
During wartime, destruction and plunder of cultural objects are prohibited, unless they 
are imperatively demanded by the necessities of war (Art.23g), as this derives from the 
customary rule of military necessity.300 Under the regulations applicable to occupation, all 
plunder is expressly forbidden and private property cannot be confiscated (Art. 46, 47). In 
times of peace, the convention requires the States parties to prepare against foreseeable effects 
of armed conflicts on cultural heritage, and establishes designated zones of protection for 
cultural heritage sites (designated with a distinctive emblem). Whereas the 1954 Hague 
Convention does not provide detailed provisions on the removal of cultural objects from 
occupied territories, the 1954 Protocol301 does and it requires occupying powers to prevent 
the illegal export of cultural material and imposes the obligation on States to seize and return 
illegal imports. Therefore, cultural objects traded in the aftermath of war are subject to return 
to the occupied territory.302 The 1954 Protocol also restates in Article 1(3) the principle 
according to which cultural property taken during war “[…] shall never be retained as war 
                                                 
296 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899, entering into force 4 
September 1900), reprinted in AJIL, vol. 1 (1907), p. 129. 
297 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 18 October 1907, entering into force 26 January 
1910, reprinted in AJIL, vol. 2 (1908), p. 90. 
298 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), (adopted 12 August 1949, entering into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. 
299 As of 23 September 2011: 123 States Parties (by acceptance, ratification, or notification of succession); see 
current status of State Parties at: http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
300 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 164. 
301 Protocol to The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 14 May 1954, entering into force 7 August 1956); 249 UNTS 358. 
302 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 812. 
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reparations”. Moreover, the occupying forces are obliged to aid the occupied State in the 
preservation of its cultural heritage.303 A Second Protocol (adopted in 1999)304 reinforces 
existing rules, mandates prosecution or extradition of violators, sets forth procedures to 
designate enhanced zones of protection, and establishes an implementing States Committee. 
Most of the provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1954 Protocol, including those 
on the prohibition of the removal of cultural material and the obligation to return removed 
objects, correspond with the general principles of international law and can be considered as 
belonging to customary international law.305 
 
Regardless the universal character of the 1954 Hague Convention, recent incidents 
illustrate that the 1954 Hague Convention has not been well respected, since intentional 
destruction of cultural heritage has repetitively taken place. Recent examples include: the 
Yugoslav Wars between 1991 and 1995 with the destruction of mosques, churches and 
historic city centers; the conflicts in Afghanistan with the destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan in March 2001; and the massive looting of museums, libraries and archeological 
sites in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War. With regard to the Iraq War, it should be 
mentioned that although the United States as the major military power did not ratify the 1954 
Convention until March 2009, it was bound by the overall principles constituted by the 1954 
Hague Convention and thus obliged to protect Iraqi cultural heritage. In other words, while 
the Hague Convention has not yet been legally binding on the United States when the Iraq 
War began in 2003, the United States, as a signatory of the Hague Convention in 1954, was 
obliged to refrain from all actions that would defeat the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention. Moreover, irrespectively of the legal status, the U.S. Pentagon had made a pledge 
to respect the rules associated with the 1954 Hague Convention in its military operational 
guidelines.306 Thus, any substantial diversion of resources away from minimal protection of 
monuments and sites in occupied Iraq contravened the obligation of the United States.307  
 
Although the scope of the 1954 Hague Convention focuses on the protection of 
cultural heritage in times of war, it, nevertheless, imposes duties that relate to times of peace. 
                                                 
303 See Article 1 (1) of the 1954 Protocol. 
304 Second Protocol to The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (adopted 26 March 1999, entering into force 9 March 2004), 38 ILM (1999) 769. 
305 Cf. Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 356. For details on customary international law, see Chapter Three, Section 6. 
306 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 38. 
307 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 165. 
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As mentioned above, States parties are obliged under Article 3 to prepare in time of peace 
against foreseeable effects of armed conflicts “by taking appropriate measures”. Although the 
interpretation of what is meant by “appropriate measures” is left to the parties, this provision 
clearly imposes an obligation to undertake measures to protect one’s own cultural heritage. In 
Article 5, the 1999 Second Protocol outlines these preparatory measures in some details. 
Preparatory measures shall include the “preparation of inventories, the planning of emergency 
measures for the protection against fire or structural collapse, the preparation for the removal 
of movable cultural property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of such cultural 
property, and the designation of competent authorities responsible for the safeguarding of 
cultural property”. Moreover, the Second Protocol also includes a waiver for imperative 
military necessity conceded by Article 4(2) of the Hague Convention as well as a provision on 
“enhanced protection” (Article 10). In summarizing, the 1954 Hague Convention and both 
Protocols impose specific obligations during both war and peace: during war, States are 
obliged to prevent the appropriation of cultural objects from occupied territories; moreover, 
they are required to seize and return to the occupied territories any cultural object illegally 
removed during war or occupation. In times of peace, States are obliged to undertake 
preparatory measures to protect cultural objects on their own territory. 
2.2 1970 UNESCO Convention and its National Implementations 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property308 (hereinafter 1970 
UNESCO Convention) was drafted based on a growing awareness in the international 
community of the increase in the illicit trafficking in cultural materials.309 In order to inhibit 
the illicit trafficking in cultural materials, the States parties agree to oppose the 
“impoverishment of the cultural heritage” through “illicit import, export and transfer of 
ownership”; consent that trade in cultural objects exported contrary to the law of the State of 
origin is “illicit”; and agree to prevent the importation of such objects and to facilitate their 
return (Articles 2 and 3).310 Despite the initial controversy over its wording and the 
                                                 
308 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property (Paris, adopted 14 November 1970, entering into force 24 April 1972), 823 
UNTS 231, full text also available at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html_eng/page1.shtml (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
309 Paul M. Bator, "An Essay on the International Trade in Art," Stanford Law Review 34(1982): p. 280. 
310 Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1054. 
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difficulties pertaining to how to implement the 1970 UNESCO Convention into national law, 
the Convention has so far been ratified, forty years after its adoption, by 120 States.311 
                                                
 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention does not prohibit the export of cultural objects in 
itself and therefore does not impose a general obligation on States parties to procure the return 
of stolen or illegally exported objects. Rather, it is designed to give international effect to 
national export provisions by obliging the State parties “to prevent museums and similar 
institutions within their territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another 
State party which has been illegally exported” and “to take appropriate steps to recover and 
return any such cultural property imported.”312 The approach taken by the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention is to protect cultural property at its source by preventing its illegal export from 
one State to another. These national export regulations, however, are often fairly general in 
terms of their scope and vary from State to State. Many States have established a specific 
date, and objects created prior to this date are not allowed to be exported without a valid 
export certificate; examples include Israel (before 1700 B.C.), Cyprus (before 1850), Brunei 
(before 1894), and Nigeria (before 1918). Other States have established a ‘moving date’ based 
on the age of the object; examples include Kuwait (for objects more than 40 years old), 
Indonesia (for objects more than 50 years old), Iceland (for objects more than 100 years old), 
Belize (for objects more than 150 years old), and Yemen (for objects more than 500 years 
old).313 Other States are more selective, and only limit the export of certain categories of 
objects based on cultural categories (as for example ‘objects of national importance’) or 
monetary value thresholds.314 In addition to export regulation law, several States have 
established so-called national ownership laws; these laws generally aim to protect cultural 
sites, limit archeological excavations, and determine that all archeological items are State 
property upon discovery. Early examples of such laws include Greece (1834), Egypt (1883), 
the Ottoman Empire (1874), and Italy (1907).315 Many other States enacted such laws 
following their ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.316 
 
311 As of 23 September 2011: 120 States Parties (by acceptance, ratification, or notification of succession); see 
current status of State Parties at: http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
312 See Article 7 (a) in connection with Article 7(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  
313 Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 29. 
314 Cf. Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 159. 
315 Legge N. 386 Tutela della conservazione dei monumenti e degli oggetti d’antichità e d’arte, 27 June 1907, 
available at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/italy/italia_loi27_06_1907_ita_orof.pdf (accessed 
23 September 2011). The law of 1907 has been amended in 1939 and in 2004, see Law no. 1089 of 1939 has 
been replaced by the Italian Code of the Cultural and Landscape Heritage (Codice dei beni culturali e del 
paesaggio), Legislative Decree No. 42 of January 22, 2004, available at: 
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With regard to the obligation to return cultural materials, the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention does not employ the term ‘restitution’; instead it utilizes the terms of ‘reparation’ 
(in Article 2) and ‘return’ (in Article 7).317 Article 7(b) (ii) establishes the obligation “to take 
appropriate steps to recover and return cultural property” to a State upon request. The concept 
of “appropriate steps” is relative, since this may mean taking no action other than advising the 
requesting State to take legal action (e.g. civil or criminal proceedings in a foreign court).318 
The requesting State, in turn, is obligate “to pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser 
or to a person who has valid title to that property”.319 Due to the narrowly defined category of 
objects in Article 7(b) (i), the return – as provide in Article 7 (b) (ii) – is restricted to cultural 
objects stolen from a very limited number of places: firstly, “from a museum, a religious or 
secular public monument, or similar institution”. Moreover, such objects must be 
“documented as appertaining to the inventory of that institution”. This, however, leaves two 
fundamental gaps, because many States lack proper inventories of their museum collections, 
and because objects originating from illicit archaeological excavations do not fall under the 
provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.320 
 
In addition to being designated as ‘cultural property’ and falling into one of the 
relevant categories laid out in eleven different categories (Article 1(a-k)), the cultural object 
must also have a sufficient connection to the requesting State, and must form part of its 
cultural heritage so that its loss would constitute “the impoverishment of the cultural heritage 
of the countries of origin of such property”.321 However, this connection between a State and 
a cultural object in question is not sufficiently defined within the Convention and is – in line 
with the overall ‘national spirit’ of the Convention – left to the determination of each State 
party’s national regulation on cultural heritage without a right of review by the State against 
which the request for return has been submitted.322 The only requirement the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention sets out is that the object has been found in, created in, or has legitimately entered 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/italy/it_cult_landscapeheritge2004_engtof.pdf. (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
316 Jonathan S. Moore, "Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market," Yale Law Journal, no. 
97 (1988): p. 467. 
317 For detailed discussion on the terminology in restitution matters, see supra Chapter Two, Section 3. 
318 Patrick J O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, 2 ed. (2007), p. 60. 
319 Article 7 (b) (ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
320 O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 59. 
321 Article 2 para. 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
322 Cf. Stephanie Schulz-Hombach and Katrin Schenk, "Der Gesetzesentwurf Zur Ausführung Des Unesco-
Kulturgutübereinkommens," Kunst und Recht (KUR) (2006): p. 50. 
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the State beforehand (Article 4 (a-e)). There is, however, no time limit for a cultural object to 
have remained in a State’s territory before that State may legitimately claim it as its national 
heritage. 
 
The non-self-executing character of convention requires national implementation; 
however, only a small number of the currently 120 States parties passed specific 
implementing legislation, such as the United States (1983), Switzerland (2005), Germany 
(2007), and the Netherlands (2009).323 The United States was one of the first so-called ‘art-
market countries’ to ratify and implement the Convention (in 1972, and 1983 respectively). 
Although the U.S. implementation act, entitled ‘Convention on Cultural Property 
Implementation Act’,324 has given momentum to the international acceptance of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, several provisions of that act have been subject to criticism. Whereas 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention is designed to give international effect to national export 
provisions,325 foreign export regulations are per se not enforceable in the United States (as in 
many other States).326 Thus, the U.S. act sets out provisions that allow the U.S. authorities to 
conclude bilateral agreements with other States parties in order to restrict the import of 
archaeological and ethnological materials into the United States.327 Consequently, the 
enforceability of U.S. import restrictions (and the subsequent return of illegally imported 
cultural materials) is preconditioned on whether or not the U.S. has concluded a bilateral 
agreement with the requesting States. The establishment of such bilateral agreements, 
however, requires that the requesting State demonstrates that (1) its cultural patrimony is “in 
jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials”;328 (2) it has taken 
measures consistent with the UNESCO Convention to protect its cultural patrimony; (3) the 
application of import restrictions would be of “substantial benefit in deterring a serious 
situation of pillage”; and (4) that the application of the import restrictions is “consistent with 
the general interest of the international community in the interchange of cultural property 
                                                 
323 See for number of ratifications: http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E; see for 
national implementation laws the UNESCO Database on National Cultural Heritage Laws, available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=33928&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
324 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) 19 U.S.C. 2601 (1983). 
325 See Article 7 (a) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
326 Cf. Maria P. Kouroupas, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Die Erfahrungen Der Vereinigten Staaten," 
KUR, no. 5 (2010): p. 156. 
327 U.S. provisions 2601-2613 implement Article 9 in connection with Article 7 (b)(i) of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention. 
328 On how the term „patrimony“ fits very poorly with the rest of the wording of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 
see O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 69. 
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among nations for scientific, cultural, and educational purposes”.329 Thus, the U.S. approach 
of implementation requires subsidiary provisions in addition to the primary obligation of 
States parties to uphold own measures to protect cultural heritage. The U.S. has justified these 
additional requirements by arguing that national deficits of protection and safekeeping should 
not be compensated on the international level by creating obligations for third parties.330  
 
Although this argument is comprehensible to a certain extent, the U.S. approach has 
been criticized as being too narrow; in particularly, the requirement that a prior bilateral 
agreement must exist has been describe as nothing more than an “agreement to agree”.331 As a 
matter of fact, it is not apparent why international treaty law, whose primarily purpose is to 
regulate an issue among all its States parties, is implemented into national law by drawing up 
additional bilateral agreements only with some selected States parties, with the consequence 
that all other States parties cannot evoke the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 
cases involving the United States. Despite this criticism, the U.S. has concluded bilateral 
agreements with several countries, including Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada,332 China, 
Colombia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iraq (special additional legal 
provisions), Italy, Mali, Nicaragua, and Peru.333 Switzerland has also taken the same selective 
approach for implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Having ratified the Convention in 
2003, Switzerland has concluded bilateral agreements with Italy and Peru (2006), Greece 
(2007), Colombia and Egypt (2010).334 
                                                
 
Generally speaking, however, the 1970 UNESCO Convention does not work properly, 
since most States have failed to pass legislation implementing the Convention, which means 
 
329 Section 2602 U.S. CIPA. 
330 Cf. Martin Philipp Wyss, "Rückgabeansprüche Für Illegal Ausgeführte Kulturgüter," in Prinzipien Des 
Kulturgüterschutzes - Ansätze Im Deutschen, Europäischen Und Internationalen Recht, ed. Frank Fechner, 
Thomas Oppermann, and Lyndel V. Prott (1996), p. 214. 
331 O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 110. See also Wyss, "Rückgabeansprüche Für 
Illegal Ausgeführte Kulturgüter," p. 213. 
332 The bilateral agreement with Canada expired in 2002. 
333 The list of the bilateral agreements concluded between the U.S. and foreign States is available at: 
http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop.html (accessed 23 September 2011). For further information see 
Kouroupas, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Die Erfahrungen Der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 156. 
334 While four of these agreements (which impose import restrictions and provide for the return of specifically 
designated cultural objects) have already entered into force, namely with Italy (since April 2008), Egypt (since 
February 2011), Greece (since April 2011), and Colombia (since August 2011), the agreement with Peru has not 
yet entered into force. As an example, the bilateral agreement between Switzerland and Italy covers cultural 
materials, including stone, metal, ceramics, glass, bone, wood, organic materials, paintings and amber dating 
from 1500 B.C. until 1500 A.D.). The list of the bilateral agreements is available at: 
http://www.bak.admin.ch/themen/kulturguetertransfer/01985/index.html?lang=en (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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that the Convention is not enforceable in domestic courts in many States that are party to the 
Convention.335 The following example from France illustrates the problem foreign States 
have if national implementation is missing. In the case of Nigeria vs. France for the return of 
Nok and Sokoto statuettes in 2004, Nigeria based its claim on the 1970 UNESECO 
Convention but the claim was rejected by the French Court of Appeal based on the fact that 
the Convention, ratified by France in 1997, was not directly applicable and no legislation 
implementing the provisions of the Convention had been enacted.336 Had the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention been a provision of EU law, France would have been penalized for non-
compliance for its failure to take measures ensuring that the provisions had been implemented 
into national law, with the effect that EU law would be directly applicable.337 However, since 
no such instruments exist within the framework of international law, non-compliance ends up 
burdening the claiming party, and not the non-implementing States party. In this particular 
case, France agreed, upon the intervention of ICOM, to enter into negotiations with 
Nigeria.338 Without making a legal reference to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, both parties 
completed a joint agreement in 2006 acknowledging Nigeria’s ownership of the objects but 
granting a renewable twenty-five year loan to the Quai Branly Museum in Paris.339 Similarly, 
Italy ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention as early as 1978, but has not yet enacted specific 
implementing legislation. When challenged on this issue, the Italian authorities indicate that 
the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention are sufficiently covered by existing Italian 
legislation.340 They also refer to the ratification of the self-executing 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention; this Convention, however, does not provide legal grounds for requesting returns 
for States that have not ratified the UNIDROIT Convention.341 
                                                
 
 
335 Kurt Siehr, "Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends toward a Liberal Exchange of Cultural 
Objects," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 38(2005): p. 1067, 77. 
336 The Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Alain de Montbrison, Court of Appeal, Paris Judgment of 5 April 2004 
(2002/09897), upheld by the Court of Cassation, Judgment of 20 September 2006 (JCP 2006, IV, 3005, pp. 
1917); cf. Marie Cornu and Marc-André Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: 
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution," International Journal of Cultural Property, no. 17 (2010): p. 2. 
337 This would be the case if an EU Member State fails to implement an EU directive within the given period of 
time. 
338 Kwame Opoku, Revisiting Looted Nigerian Terracotta Sculptures in Louvre/Musée du Quai Brainly, Paris, 
14 July 2011, available at: http://www.myweku.com/2011/07/revisiting-looted-nigerian-nok-terracotta-
sculptures-in-louvre-musee-du-quai-branly-paris/(accessed 23 September 2011). 
339 Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute 
Resolution," p. 3. For details on the complementary and alternative mechanisms, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
340 Italian Code of the Cultural and Landscape Heritage (Codice dei beni culturali e del paesaggio), Legislative 
Decree No. 42 of January 22, 2004, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/italy/it_cult_landscapeheritge2004_engtof.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
341 For details on the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
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Criticisms have been levied against not only the lack of national implementation of the 
1970 UNESCO Convention, but also the Convention itself. First of all, the wide variety of 
cultural items that hinder the Convention’s effective functioning has been criticized: there are 
no less than eleven broad categories, ranging from antiquities to stamps. Moreover, the rather 
vague provision on the duty “to ensure the protection of their cultural property against illicit 
import, export and transfer of ownership […] as appropriate for each country”342 has also 
been criticized, which leaves wide discretion to States parties on how they structure their 
export prohibitions; this, consequently, broadens the provisions, rather than harmonizing 
export standards.343 Along the same vein, criticism has been voiced regarding the imposition 
of a system of differing national export limitations, given that this might increase the risk of 
corrupt practices in poorly equipped States, and the contribution of this provision to efforts to 
combat the illicit trafficking in cultural material is questionable.344 Moreover, the State-
centric elements of the Convention have frequently been criticized, since the Convention 
determines the cultural significance of objects in terms of their “importance for archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art or science”, rather than in terms of their importance to the 
cultural or religious identity of a people, group, or community. Thus, only the nation-State is 
the unit of identity, rather than the ethnic group or indigenous peoples to whom such objects 
may have the greatest cultural significance.  
                                                
 
As mentioned above, the 1970 UNESCO Convention does not cover undocumented 
cultural materials, thus excluding from its provisions the largest category of cultural objects 
vulnerable to illicit trafficking, namely archeological artifacts deriving from clandestine 
excavations. In addition, the Convention has been criticized for its failure to permit private 
action against a foreign State and that it does not operate retroactively.345 Article 15 of the 
Convention does provide States parties the possibility by concluding special (bilateral) 
agreements in order to overcome the general principle of non-retroactivity;346 however, so far 
no State has made use of this provision.347 Lastly, in terms of statutes of limitation the 1970 
UNESCO Convention does not establish time limits for the request of return and is thus the 
 
342 Article 5 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
343 Kuitenbrouwer, "The Darker Side of Museum Art: Acquisition and Restitution of Cultural Objects with a 
Dubious Provenance," p. 597, 99. 
344 Cf. Ibid. 
345 O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 9. 
346 The principle of non-retroactivity is a general principle of customary international law and is codified in 
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For details see, Chapter Six, Section 1.1. 
347 Freytag, "Cultural Heritage: Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf "Ihr" Kulturgut?," p. 181. 
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only international convention in this field without such a limitation.348 This, of course, might 
be interpreted either as an advantage or disadvantage in terms of legal certainty. Apart from 
the fact that there is no apparent distinction between publicly and privately owned cultural 
property within the Convention, the question of the status of the bona fide purchaser and the 
rather pronounced gap in understanding between the Continental-European and the Anglo-
American legal tradition was not touched upon in the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and was 
only later addressed in 1995 by the UNIDROIT Convention.349 
 
Despite these various shortcomings and the general reluctance of States to enforce 
foreign export law, domestic courts have repeatedly used the 1970 UNESCO Convention to 
underline to the emergence of an international public policy that prohibits the illicit trafficking 
in cultural objects. One of the earliest examples is the decision of the German 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in 1972 concerning several Nigerian masks.350 The traditional 
masks were shipped to Germany in violation of Nigerian export laws. During the transport, 
several mask disappeared from the container ship under unknown circumstances. Based on 
the insurance contract, the insurer paid the loss insured and sued the shipping company for 
compensation. The BGH ruled that the insurance contract was contra bonos mores (against 
public policy) and thus was void under German civil law. By referring to the international 
public policy pertaining to the illicit trafficking in cultural objects, which has began to emerge 
with the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the BGH declared that “in the interest of 
the moral principles of international trade, the export of cultural objects in violation of an 
export prohibition of the State of origin does not deserve protection under private law, 
including protection through the insurance of the transportation of cultural goods from the 
territory of a foreign State in violation of that State’s export control laws”.351 Interestingly, 
the BGH referred in its decision of June 1972 explicitly to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 
even though the Convention had only entered into force shortly before the decision was issued 
(in April 1972), and Germany was not a States party to the Convention at that time.352 
                                                
 
 
348 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 369. 
349 For details on the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, see Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
350 BGH, 22 June 1972, BGHZ 59, 14. 
351 BGH, 22 June 1972, BGHZ 59,14, para. 82. 
352 Germany ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention not before 2007. 
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Along a similar vein, the 2007 Barakat vs. Iran case is notable,353 since in this case 
the British Court of Appeal also made reference to public policy arguments. Moreover, the 
Court has asserted – in light of the existing international treaty law – that States should assist 
one another in preventing the unlawful removal of cultural materials.354 The case concerned 
eighteen artifacts offered for sale at Barakat Galleries, London. The third-millennium B.C. 
artifacts were alleged illicitly excavated and thus considered stolen under Iranian ownership 
laws. The High Court dismissed the claim for restitution, since Iranian national legislation 
granting State ownership to archeological artifacts was not enforceable in the United 
Kingdom.355 The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the decision on ground that the Iranian 
law356 grants both ownership and immediate rights to possession to the State. Having 
examined the existing international treaty law (the court referred to the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, Directive 93/7/EEC, and the 1993 
‘Commonwealth Scheme for the Protection of the Material Cultural Heritage’), the Court of 
Appeal asserted that “none of these instruments directly affects the outcome of this appeal, 
but they do illustrate the international acceptance of the desirability of protection of the 
national heritage. A refusal to recognize the title of a foreign State, conferred by its law, to 
antiquities unless they had come into the possession of such State, would in most cases render 
it impossible for this country to recognize any claim by such a State to recover antiquities 
unlawfully exported to this country”.357 In conclusion, the Court of Appeal affirmed that if 
the rights granted by Iranian law were equivalent to ownership in English law, then English 
law would have treated that as ownership for the purpose of resolving the conflict of laws; 
thus, it is British public policy to recognize the ownership claim of foreign States to cultural 
materials that belong to their patrimony.358 Both cases therefore demonstrate that even if the 
legal provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention are not applicable, general principles 
established in international treaty law have an impact on national public policies pertaining to 
the prevention of illicit trafficking in cultural materials and the interpretation of national civil 
laws. 
                                                 
353 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The Barakat Galleries Ltd. (2007) EWCA Civ. 1374; Court of 
Appeal, 21 December 2007. 
354 Supra, paras.154-155. 
355 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The Barakat Galleries Ltd. (2007) EWHC 705 QB; Queen’s 
Bench Division, 29 March 2007. 
356 National Heritage Protection Act (3 November 1930), Administrative Regulations of the National Heritage 
Protection Act 1930 (19 November 1932), as well as the Legal Bill regarding Prevention of Unauthorized 
Excavations and Diggings (17 May 1979). 
357 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The Barakat Galleries Ltd. (2007) EWCA Civ. 1374, 
paras.155-163. 
358 Supra, para. 152. 
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With regard to the question as to whether the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides 
provisions that support the existence of a general responsibility to protect cultural heritage, 
the following provisions can be mentioned: Article 2(1) establishes that international 
cooperation is “one of the most efficient means of protecting each country's cultural property 
against all dangers resulting from illicit import, export and transfer of cultural property” and 
that “necessary reparations” can constitute an effective outcome in certain instances.359 
Moreover, Article 5(a) stresses that all States parties should “undertake measures to secure the 
protection of cultural heritage”. Although this provision aims at ensuring the protection of 
cultural heritage primarily through the creation of provisions against illicit trafficking, it 
inevitable also includes the physical protection of cultural materials. In other words, physical 
protection of cultural heritage is necessary to mitigate against the reduction of a State’s 
cultural heritage. This assumption is confirmed by several of the Convention’s provisions, 
including: the establishment of specific administrative services for the protection of cultural 
heritage (Article 5); the establishment and maintenance of national inventories of protected 
property (Article 5(b)); the provision on educational measures to stimulate and develop 
respect for cultural heritage (Article 5(f)); and the provision of appropriate publicity in cases 
when an item of cultural property has disappeared (Article 5(g)). Although the 1970 
UNESCO Convention has been heavily criticized and it does not provide clear measures or 
remedies in cases of non-compliance, it nevertheless includes the obligation to establish 
measures for the protection of cultural heritage, and thereby establishes a general obligation to 
protect cultural heritage. As a result, the 1970 UNESCO Convention has shaped the 
development of international cultural heritage law and, as demonstrated, has had an impact on 
the development of national public policies pertaining to the prevention of illicit trafficking in 
cultural materials. 
2.3 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention 
The 1972 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage360 (hereinafter 1972 UNESCO Convention) attempts to promote a system of 
international cooperation and assistance among States in the context of preserving outstanding 
cultural and natural sites as part of the ‘world heritage of mankind’.361 Since 1972, 188 States 
                                                 
359 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 206. 
360 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, (adopted 16 
November 1972, entering into force 17 December 1975), 1037 UNTS 151. 
361 See Preamble of the 1972 UNESCO Convention. 
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have become party to the Convention, which has, in consequence, gained general international 
acceptance.362 The 1972 UNESCO Convention operates through the World Heritage 
Committee,363 which firstly, sets out the criteria for establishing the ‘outstanding universal 
value’ of the cultural heritage to be designated (Operational Guidelines);364 and secondly, 
decides on an annual basis whether or not the cultural and natural sites nominated by States 
parties will be included in the ‘World Heritage List’ (Article 11).365 In order to comply with 
the overall threshold of ‘outstanding universal value’, the complex and difficult requirement is 
the identification of cultural heritage that represents “the totality and diversity of all cultures 
of the world in their intellectual, aesthetic, religious, and sociological expressions”.366 Each 
site inscribed as World Heritage remains the property of the State upon whose territory the 
site is located. Early attempts in 1965 and 1971 to establish a ‘World Heritage Trust’ that 
would manage sites extraterritorially by placing them into international custody were rejected 
by the majority of States.367 Although the Convention does not limit the sovereignty of its 
States parties, it clearly expresses that it is in the interest of the international community to 
preserve each site for future generations of humanity.368 Therefore, the protection and 
preservation of these sites are a concern of all States parties to the 1972 UNESCO 
Convention. That said, it is difficult to evaluate the practical effect of such a Convention that 
consists for the most part of declaratory provisions.369  
 
In contrast to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1972 UNESCO Convention deals 
only with immovable cultural property including monuments, groups of buildings, and special 
sites of archaeological interest (Article 1). Although it is less relevant for the question of 
restitution and return of movable cultural property, it nevertheless has an impact on the 
                                                 
362 As of 23 September 2011: 188 States Parties (by acceptance, ratification, or notification of succession); see 
current status of States Parties at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
363 The Committee is composed of 21 States parties elected by the General Conference of UNESCO. 
364 The ‘Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention’ contain the criteria 
for determining the ‘outstanding universal value’ of cultural heritage. Since the criteria are not in the Convention 
itself, they can be amended from time to time when the Committee considers it to be appropriate. The current 
criteria in the 2008 Guidelines are the sixth manifestation of the Guidelines since they were first drafted in 1977. 
The 2008 Guidelines, as well as the previous manifestations, are available at:  
http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines (accessed 23 September 2011). 
365 The World Heritage List increases in the number of sites designated every year: with the decisions of the 35th 
session of the World Heritage Committee (July 2011), a total of 936 properties are designated: 725 cultural, 183 
natural, and 28 mixed sites in 153 States. The list is available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
366 Francesco Francioni, The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary (2008), p. 20. 
367 Preliminary Study, UNESCO Doc. 16 C/19 (Annex No. 50). 
368 Cf. Florian Pfeifle, Unesco-Weltkulturerbe - Vom Globalen Völkerrecht Zur Lokalen Infrastrukturplanung, 
vol. 4, Schriften Zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht Und Infrastrukturrecht (2010), p. 21. 
369 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 226. 
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general debate regarding restitution and return.370 Moreover, it is highly relevant in 
determining the obligation of States in the protection of cultural heritage. Such an obligation, 
as expounded in the beginning of this chapter, is the necessary basis for introducing general 
principles that can then be used to formulate general objectives in restitution practices. Along 
these lines, the 1972 UNESCO Convention stipulates that the States parties are not to damage 
any cultural heritage on another State’s territory.371 Moreover, the Convention binds all States 
parties to conserve and protect their own cultural properties (Article 4 and 12), even if they 
are not included in the World Heritage List.372 
 
A violation of this provision has, for example, taken place in 2001, when the Buddhas 
of Bamiyan in Afghanistan were demolished. The giant Buddha Statues, dating back to the 
third and fifth centuries A.D. in Bamiyan and situated 230 km northwest of Kabul, were 
caved in sandstone cliffs fifty-three and thirty-six meters tall and represented one of the most 
important cultural sites in Afghanistan.373. Their destruction is remarkable insofar as military 
damage to cultural materials normally concerns property belonging to an enemy; in this case, 
however, military and paramilitary forces of the Taliban demolished the pre-Islamic heritage 
that belonged to their own people. It took almost a month of intensive bombardment by tanks 
and dynamite to destroy the Buddhas. There is also evidence indicating that the demolition of 
the Buddha Statues was not an isolated incident, but was the apex of systematic policy of 
destruction pursued by the Taliban regime.374 Even if one does not consider the Taliban as the 
official government at the time of the destruction in 2001, the actions of those acting as the 
‘government’ (as it is generally assumed in case of so-called ‘failed States’) are still 
considered to be acts of State.375. Despite the serious damage the Buddhas of Bamiyan 
suffered in 2001, the Buddhas remain an important site of cultural heritage and, moreover, a 
                                                 
370 For a detailed discussion on restitution and return in the context of World Heritage Sites, see Chapter Six, 
Section 4.4. 
371 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 226. 
372 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 32. 
373 See: http://www.rawa.org/statues.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
374 Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini, "The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International 
Law," European Journal of International Law 14, no. 4 (2003): p. 627. 
375 Article 9 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts completed by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001, ILC Report on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 
56th Session, Supp. No.10, 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). With Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 the 
UNGA gave the Articles to the attention of governments “without prejudice to the question of their future 
adoption or other appropriate action”. 
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testimony to the tragic destruction by the Taliban.376 Considering both the cultural importance 
of the Statues and their tragic destruction, the World Heritage Committee decided to include 
the “Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley” in the ‘List of 
World Heritage in Danger’ in 2003.377 This incident represents a clear case in which 
Afghanistan breached its obligations to protect its own cultural property under the 1972 
UNESCO Convention.378  
 
In summarizing this section on the 1972 UNESCO Convention, three main 
conclusions should be highlighted: firstly, although the Convention does not contain 
provisions on restitution and return, due to its scope in immovable cultural and natural 
heritage,379 it clearly articulates the responsibility of the international community to protect 
cultural heritage of outstanding universal value. Since movable cultural materials are integral 
parts of many cultural sites inscribed in the World Heritage List, the responsibility to protect 
must inevitably be extended to the movable elements associated with designated sites. 
Without their movable contents, the Palace of Versailles,380 the Museums Island of Berlin,381 
and the Taj Mahal,382 would only be empty shells. Secondly, due to the universal acceptance 
of the Convention (i.e. 188 States out of the total of 194 States are party to the convention),383 
it provisions have become customary international law384 and, for this very reason, binding 
for both States parties and non-States parties to the Convention.385 Thirdly, although the 
Convention does not restrict the sovereign rights of States, it clearly expresses that it is in the 
                                                 
376 Cf. Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 31. The authors refer in comparison to the World Heritage List of a similar site that was 
included in 1996: namely, the Chinese Mt. Emei and Leshan Giant Buddha. 
377 Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley: included in 2003 into the List of 
World Heritage in Danger, further information available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208 (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
378 In the same vein: Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural 
Heritage: From Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 31. 
379 For details on the issue of restitution and return in the context of World Heritage sites, see Chapter Six, 
Section 4.4. 
380 See: Palace and Park of Versailles, inscribed as world heritage in 1979; detailed information available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/83 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
381 See: Museumsinsel Berlin (Museum Island), inscribed as world heritage in 1999, detailed information 
available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/896 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
382 See: Taj Mahal, inscribed as world heritage in 1983; detailed information available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/252 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
383 See above n. 362. 
384 For details on customary international law, see Chapter Three, Section 6. 
385 Francesco Francioni, "Thirty Years On: Is the World Heritage Convention Ready for the 21st Century?," The 
Italian Yearbook of International Law (2003): p. 22. Cf. George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, "The Unesco 
Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage," in Le Patrimoine Culturel De 
L'humanité - the Cultural Heritage of Mankind, ed. James A. R. Nafziger and Tullio Scovazzi (Hague Academy 
of International Law, 2008), p. 428. 
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interest of the international community to preserve each site for future generations of 
humanity.386 
2.4 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects387 
(hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention) was prepared as a supplementary convention to the 
1970 UNESCO Convention, in view of the significant number of gaps in that Convention, 
which have subsequently become apparent.388 Thus, the focus of the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention was on questions pertaining to the interplay between public and private law 
concepts that were not addressed within the framework of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.389 
Improving the instruments pertaining to the protection of cultural objects and addressing, in 
particular, the lack of reference to the bona fide purchaser (omitted from the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention), the UNIDROIT Convention sets specific requirements for due diligence and 
expressly requires that the purchaser of cultural materials accepts the risks associated with 
failure to act prudently when acquiring cultural materials.390 Imposing this responsibility for 
due diligence on the purchaser and therewith reversing the onus of proof,391 the Convention 
reinforces the right of the bona fide purchaser to “fair and reasonable compensation” (Article 
6). In contrast to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention is self-
executing and therefore does not require national implementation. However, it does not 
formulate an independent supranational policy of international protection, but instead restricts 
itself − once more − to the international enforcement of national export bans and, similarly to 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention, does not apply retroactively to objects removed prior to the 
date of entry into force of the Convention for each States party.392  
 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention distinguishes between the contexts of ‘restitution’ 
and ‘return’ and separates the two issues in different chapters: Chapter Two is entitled 
                                                 
386 Cf. Pfeifle, Unesco-Weltkulturerbe - Vom Globalen Völkerrecht Zur Lokalen Infrastrukturplanung, p. 21. 
387 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, (adopted 24 June 1995, entering 
into force 1 July 1998), 34 ILM (1995) 1322; full text also available at: 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/main.htm (23 September 2011). 
388 Cf. Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 207. For detailed discussion on the 
shortcomings of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
389 Cf. Gerte Reichelt, "Prinzipien Der Unidroit-Konvention 1995," in Rechtsfragen Der Restitution Von 
Kulturgut, ed. Gerte Reichelt (2008), p. 43. 
390 See Article 4 (4) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, which identifies factors that apply to the determination 
of whether this requirement of due diligence is satisfied, such as the price paid, whether registers of stolen 
objects have been consulted, and “the character of the parties” involved.  
391 Reichelt, "Prinzipien Der Unidroit-Konvention 1995," p. 48. 
392 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 207. 
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“restitution of stolen cultural objects”, whereas Chapter Three is entitled as “return of illegally 
exported cultural objects”.393 Under the context of ‘restitution’ the term “stolen cultural 
object” is extended to include objects unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but 
unlawfully retained (Article 3). In terms of statute of limitations, claims for restitution expire 
three years after the claimant actually discovers where the stolen object is located and who 
possesses it. All claims must be made within fifty years from the time of the theft. This rule of 
repose does not apply to objects belonging to public collections, forming part of identified 
monuments or archeological sites, or belonging to certain categories of tribal or indigenous 
cultural objects.394 With regard to the ‘return’ of “illegally exported cultural objects”, Chapter 
Three of the Convention requires that objects must be returned upon the request of a States 
party if they have been illegally exported according to the national laws of the requesting 
State (Article 5(2)). Whereas States must recognize other States’ export controls under the 
1970 UNESCO Convention (which they often not do), the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention does 
not require the recognition of foreign export law; instead, it requires that the requesting State 
must establish that the requested object has been “illegally exported” under its national 
law.395 Therefore, States can no longer refuse to return cultural materials by simply arguing 
that they cannot exercise foreign national export laws.396  
                                                
 
In order to limit this broad scope of application, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
provides for additional criteria for the return of illegally exported cultural objects. Thus, 
Article 5(3) requires that the requesting State must prove that the removal of the object from 
its territory “significantly impairs” specific interests; unless one or more of these interests 
listed interests are given, the return of the requested object is not required under the 
Convention.397 These criteria for claiming a cultural object include specific interests in: (a) 
the physical preservation of the object and/or its context; (b) the integrity of the object and its 
components; (c) the preservation of the scientific or historical information pertaining to the 
object; (d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribe or indigenous community; as 
well as the overall “significant cultural importance for the requesting State”. The approach 
taken by the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is quite remarkable, since it expands the interests 
 
393 For detailed discussion on the terminology employed in the debate over restitution and return, see supra 
Chapter Two, Section 3. 
394 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 251. 
395 Beat Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - 
Entwicklung (2009), p. 89. 
396 Kurt Siehr, "Vereinheitlichung Des Rechts Der Kulturgüter in Europa?," in Aufbruch Nach Europa, 75 Jahre 
Max-Planck-Institut Für Privatrecht, ed. Jürgen Basedow, et al. (2001), p. 89. 
397 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 208. 
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supported by its provisions beyond the territorial interest of States to other non-territorial 
interests associated with the object itself: namely, the physical preservation of the object, 
preservation of its context and integrity; provisions to address scientific and historical issues; 
and, most revolutionary, recognition of its cultural importance for groups and/or peoples 
within the territory of the requesting State. By including the latter criteria pertaining to 
cultural importance, the Convention emphasizes that the interest of affiliation is one of equal 
value in determining whether or not the requested object should be returned.398  
 
The preliminary draft version of the UNIDROIT Convention placed an even stronger 
emphasis on these interests, insofar as it required that “any request […] shall contain all 
material information regarding the conservation, security and accessibility of the cultural 
object after it has been returned to the requesting State.”399 However, this provision suggested 
by the study group was rejected without substitution by the governmental expert group due to 
lack of consent, since some States feared this additional requirement might be used as a 
pretext for systematically refusing the return of requested objects.400 Another mitigating 
change was made with regard to Article 5(3), which reads that the requesting State 
“establishes” (draft version: “proves”) that the removal of the object from its territory 
significantly impairs one of the interests.401 In addition to the four criteria listed in Article 
5(3)(a-d), a fifth criterion was included in the drafting process, which functions as a ‘catchall 
category’, and as such serves to supersede the other four criteria.402 Consequently, the State 
requesting the return can avoid fulfilling the four criteria set out in the Convention (criteria a-
d) by simply establishing the fact that the object was of “significant cultural importance” of 
that State. In determining whether an object would fall within this ‘catchall category’, it 
should be noted that, firstly, an item might easily be of “significant cultural importance” to 
more than just one State; and secondly, that the draft version referred to “outstanding” rather 
than “significant” cultural importance, and thus the threshold of this fifth criteria had been 
broadened without ever having been clearly defined.403 Consequently, the four specific 
criteria established on general interest considerations have been weakened by the addition of a 
                                                 
398 Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - Entwicklung, p. 
89. With regard to the element of cultural preservation, see Chapter Five, Section 3.1.2. 
399 Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (approved by the 
UNIDROIT Study Group on the International Protection of Cultural Property at its Third Session 
on 26 January 1990, UNIDROIT, LXX-Doc 51. 
400 Wyss, "Rückgabeansprüche Für Illegal Ausgeführte Kulturgüter," p. 212. 
401 Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary on the Unidroit Convention (1997), p. 55. 
402 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 253. 
403 Ibid. For details on this discussion, see also: Prott, Commentary on the Unidroit Convention, p. 60. 
 100
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
non-specific, not clearly defined criterion that endorses the traditional approach of prioritizing 
the territorial interest of States. 
 
Despite the inclusion of this fifth criterion that undermines the impact of the other 
criteria in the final draft, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention clearly highlights the importance 
of interest considerations. In practical terms, however, requesting States are not required to 
comply with these specific criteria, since they can simply refer to the “significant cultural 
importance” of the requested object. More progressively, however, the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention provides an alternative approach to the conventional scheme of return or retention 
in Article 6(3): it provides that the party required to return an object may decide − in 
agreement with the requesting State − either to retain ownership, to transfer ownership against 
payment, or to transfer possession of the object in question gratuitously to a person of its 
choice residing in the requesting State, who can guarantee that the object will be properly 
safeguarded.404 Both the rather small number of ratifications and the absence of cases 
resolved under the UNIDROIT Convention (so far no case has been decided under the 
provisions of 1995 UNIDROIT Convention)405 demonstrate the general reluctance of States 
to commit to this self-executing convention. None of the currently thirty-two States parties is 
one of the leading art and antiquities market States (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, 
Japan and Germany never signed the UNIDROIT Convention; whereas France, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands and Russia signed but have not yet ratify).406 In 2011, Denmark and Sweden 
ratified the Convention, and consequently the number of EU Member States that are party to 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention continues to steadily increase.407  
 
Interestingly, given the lack of broad international support for the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention, the 1970 UNESCO Convention seems to have unexpectedly gained new 
attractiveness.408 This is probably due to the fact that the ratification of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention enables States to show political commitment in this field of international law, but 
                                                 
404 For detailed discussion on these options, see: Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," 
p. 208. 
405 Cf. Siehr, "Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends toward a Liberal Exchange of Cultural 
Objects," pp. 1067. 
406 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention entered into force on 1 January 2005; for the current list of States Parties, 
see: http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-main.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
407 So far the following States of the European Union have ratified the Convention: Cyprus (2004), Denmark 
(2011), Finland (1999), Greece (2007), Hungary (1998), Italy (1999), Lithuania (1997), Portugal (2002), 
Romania (1998), Slovakia (2003), Slovenia (2004), Spain (2002), Sweden (2011). 
408 Cf. Kuitenbrouwer, "The Darker Side of Museum Art: Acquisition and Restitution of Cultural Objects with a 
Dubious Provenance," p. 597, 602. 
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– unlike the self-executing UNIDROIT Convention – the 1970 UNESCO Convention allows 
States to make certain reservations and to employ a wide margin of discretion in 
implementing the Convention. While, for example, the UNIDROIT Convention does not 
recognize bona fide purchase as a valid ownership title,409 many civil law States do;410 thus, 
by ratifying the 1970 UNESCO Convention (instead of UNIDROIT) States do not have to 
amend their national legal norms that give the bona fide purchaser a valid title. Moreover, 
while the 1970 UNESCO Convention envisages diplomatic action and bilateral agreements at 
the inter-State level to achieve the return of cultural objects, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
attempts to provide individuals with the right to bring an action before domestic courts for the 
restitution of stolen and the return of illegally exported cultural objects.411 Although this 
Convention permits direct legal action, it can be assumed that States are reluctant to bring 
court actions in front of a foreign court in order to recover cultural materials. 
 
In summarizing, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention represents a major advancement in 
harmonizing and unifying otherwise conflicting national laws under the umbrella of linking 
public and private law provisions. It provides specific provisions pertaining to restitution and 
return and, moreover, stipulates general criteria based on interest considerations. In other 
words, by introducing these interests as additional conditions for the return of illegally 
exported cultural objects, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention distinctly presumes the existence 
of universal values associated with cultural objects: namely, preservation, integrity and 
affiliation.412 Although the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention does not explicitly intend to 
establish alternative solutions to current restitution practices, it established remarkably new 
standards. With regard to the question of whether the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention also 
confirms a general obligation to protect cultural heritage, such an obligation can be seen in the 
overall objective of “[…] improving the preservation and protection of the cultural heritage in 
the interest of all.”413 Both elements – the interest considerations and the explicit focus on the 
                                                 
409 Cf. Article 6 of the 1995UNIDROIT Convention. 
410 Whereas in common law States, the original owner of stolen property is entitled to recover his property not 
only from the thief but also from any bona fide purchaser that holds it, in civil law States the protection of the 
bona fide purchaser often prevails the original ownership rights. Cf. Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: 
Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - Entwicklung, pp. 112.  
411 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 374. 
412 See Merryman that speaks about “the injection of object-oriented values into the UNIDROIT Convention”, 
in: John Henry Merryman, "The Nation and the Object," International Journal of Cultural Property 3, no. 1 
(1994): p. 71. 
413 See Preamble of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
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inherent aspects of preservation, integrity and affiliation – underline the existence of general 
interests as argued for by this thesis. 
2.5 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention 
Although the matter of restitution and return is traditionally linked to tangible property 
on land, illicit trafficking increasingly affects cultural materials found on the seabed. Thus, 
restitution claims might be made concerning cultural materials appropriated from underwater 
archaeological sites, such as submerged ancient ports, shipwrecks, or even a single object of 
lost cargo.414 In terms of international law, the question of who has the rights to claim objects 
found in underwater sites that have yet to be explored or have yet to be identified remains to 
be determined. In particular, the issue of the commercial exploitation of these sites is highly 
important, since the looting and destruction of underwater sites by commercial companies as 
well as private treasure hunters have increased over the past years.415 This is mainly due to 
the fact that new diving technologies have made underwater sites more accessible and thus 
more vulnerable. Domestic legislation can only provide protection to underwater cultural sites 
located within territorial waters, that is, the part of the sea adjacent to the territory that falls 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State. The lack of protection of underwater 
cultural sites in international waters has resulted in the adoption of the 2001 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage416 (hereinafter 2001 
UNESCO Convention), which addresses the issue of underwater cultural heritage beyond 
coastal States’ jurisdiction. Interestingly, the 2001 Underwater Convention employs the 
concept of ‘heritage’ instead of using ‘property’ in its phrasing, thus being in line with the 
1972 UNESCO Convention. Underwater cultural heritage is defined in Article 1 of the 2001 
UNESCO Convention as: “all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or 
archaeological character which have been partially or totally under water, periodically or 
continuously, for at least hundred years.” The Convention’s blanket protection, which applies 
to all vessels and shipwrecks older than hundred years, has been criticized as too broad, since 
it does not take the scientific, historical, or archaeological significance or non-significance 
                                                 
414 As, for example, in the case of the so-called ‘Victorious Youth’ (Athleta di Fano), a bronze statue at the Getty 
Museum in Los Angeles, requested by Italy; more details on the case, see Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
415 For example, the legendary luxury liner ‘Titanic’ that sank in 1912 was not located until 1985. Several other 
examples and statistics can be found in the UNESCO information kit on Underwater Cultural Heritage, available 
at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/underwater/infokit_en/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
416 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
entering into force 2 January 2009), 41 ILM 37 (2002). 
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into consideration.417 Nevertheless, the Convention advocates the comprehensive protection 
of underwater cultural heritage in situ as a fundamental principle;418 moreover, it requires that 
underwater cultural heritage should not be commercially exploited.419 
 
Claims related to the restitution and return of cultural materials found on the seabed 
are likely to occur in two scenarios: in the first scenario, cultural materials recovered from the 
seabed eventually appear on the international antiquity market (e.g. many ancient coins are 
obtained from shipwrecks). Determining the place of origin of cultural objects found on land 
is already a difficult undertaking; this task becomes nearly impossible if the place of origin is 
located underwater. One recent example is the case of the so-called ‘Victorious Youth’ (Atleta 
di Fano). While the dispute between the Getty Museum and the Italian government over 52 
archeological objects was resolved in 2007 through bilateral agreements, the dispute over the 
‘Victorious Youth’, a bronze athlete dating back to the fourth century BC, remains 
unresolved, since neither party has yet been able to satisfactorily ascertain whether the bronze 
was found in Italian or international waters.420 
 
The second scenario is related to the growing number of commercial salvage 
companies, which specialize in detecting underwater sites. Historic shipwrecks in deep waters 
are particularly valuable for two reasons: since these shipwrecks have been conserved and 
untouched by man often for centuries, they contain valuable historical information for 
archeologists; at the same time, since these ships frequently carried valuable cargo, they are 
especially prized by commercial companies and private treasure hunters. The concurrence of 
archeological and commercial interests may result in restitution disputes, as in Black Swan 
case.421 In May 2007, the U.S. salvage company ‘Odyssey Marine Exploration’ announced its 
discovery of a colonial-era sunken vessel in the Atlantic Ocean. However, the company 
refused to reveal either the identity of the wreck (code-named Black Swan) or disclosed its 
exact location. The artifacts recovered included, among other objects, over 500,000 silver 
                                                 
417 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 231. 
418 Article 2(5) of the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention states: “The preservation in situ 
of underwater cultural heritage shall be considered as the first option before allowing or engaging in any 
activities directed at this heritage”. 
419 Article 2(7) of the UNECO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention. 
420 For details on the bilateral agreement between the Getty Museum and Italy and the sculpture of the 
‘Victorious Youth’ see, Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
421 For detailed analysis of the case, see Amy Strecker, "Pirates of the Mediterranean? The Case of the Black 
Swan and Its Implications for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Region," Conference Paper, 
9th Mediterranean Research Meeting (2008). 
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coins weighing more than 17 tons and hundreds of gold coins, making it the largest maritime 
discovery of its kind with an overall value at upwards of U.S. $500 million.422 Similarly to the 
previously mentioned case of the ‘Victorious Youth’, the point of contention in this case is the 
exact location of the shipwreck. While the company refuses to disclose the wreck’s identity 
and exact location, it asserts that the wreck was found in international waters. Spain, however, 
suspects that the wreck is located within Spanish territorial waters, and – given the cargo – 
that the ship is actually the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes, a Spanish navy frigate that was 
returning from the then-Spanish colony of Peru when it was sunk by a British bombardment 
in October 1804.423 
 
Since the vessel’s cargo had been transferred to Florida before the company 
announced the treasure’s discovery, Spain filed an ownership claim in the U.S. Federal Court 
in Tampa, Florida, where the company is based.424 Spain demanded the disclosure of the 
identity and location of the shipwreck and the return of the salvaged cargo, since Spain had 
never abandoned its sovereignty over the vessel. The U.S. salvage company, however, 
claimed that, firstly, the salvage took place outside of territorial waters and thus was outside 
legal jurisdiction of any State, and, secondly, that the import of the vessel’s cargo into the 
United States was in conformity with salvage law and with the 1982 Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), which gives precedence to the application of salvage law.425 The court 
ordered the company to reveal its findings to Spain and ruled in December 2009 that the 
company should return the cargo to Spain. Much of the arguments centered on whether the 
vessel should be classified as merchant ship or warship, since under UNCLOS only the latter 
grants Spain clear rights to the vessel, its cargo, and any human remains at the site. The 
company appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in May 2010. After hearings in 
May 2011, the case is still pending.426 It is interesting to note that not only Spain but also two 
dozen descendants of merchants who were transporting goods on the Mercedes have laid 
                                                 
422 Stacy Mitch, Treasure Hunters in Dispute with Spain, 24 January 2008, in: ABC News, available at: 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/WireStory?id=4184190&page=1 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
423 Lisa Abend, Spain Claims Sunken Treasure, 8 May 2008, in: Time World, available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1738445,00.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
424 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. vs. The Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels (No.8, 2006 cv01685, 
13 September 2006). 
425 Article 303(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (signed on 10 December 
1982, entering into force 16 November 1994), 1982, 21 ILM 1261. 
426 Further details and updated information available at: http://www.shipwreck.net/blackswanlegal.php (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
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claim to a portion of the salvaged cargo, along with Peru, which also filed a claim to the 
cargo, arguing that the gold was most likely minted in what is today Peru’s territory.427 
 
Both presented cases demonstrate that there is a need for legal clarification pertaining 
to underwater cultural heritage. In addition to the archeological question of how to best 
protect underwater sites, the legal subsumption in this field is quite complex. Under private 
maritime international law,428 the title to shipwrecks discovered outside the territorial waters 
of States is granted to the salvor (salvage law).429 The 2001 UNESCO Convention reverses 
the rules of salvage law by stating that “any activity relating to underwater cultural heritage to 
which this Convention applies shall not be subject to the law of salvage or law of finds.”430 
Although the 2001 UNESCO Convention prohibits the appropriation and commercial 
exploitation of cultural objects found underwater, and thus activities of salvage companies 
such as the one involved in the Black Swan case, it is, however, questionable whether the 
principle of in situ protection should generally prevail over other interests, such as property 
rights of descendents, or interests in the preservation of and access to such cultural material. 
 
Since the 2001 UNESCO Convention still lacks wide-spread recognition of States,431 
and (like all other international treaties) does not apply retroactively, the potential number of 
restitution disputes not covered by the 2001 UNESCO Convention requires emendation 
through the inclusion of policy and interest-oriented considerations. The granting of property 
rights on a random basis, which occurs under current salvage law, is certainly out-dated, and 
thus needs revision in respect to the fundamental principle of the protection of cultural 
heritage. In light of the interest-oriented approach advocated by this thesis, the area of 
underwater cultural heritage is particularly interesting. In contrast to cultural objects found in 
and on land, cultural materials found in international waters corresponds exactly to the 
                                                 
427 For further discussion, see Whose Treasure is it really? in: The New York Times, 4 September 2007. 
428 Maritime law is a distinct body of private international law governing the relationships between private 
entities that operate vessels on the oceans. It must be distinguished from the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which 
is a body of public international law dealing with navigational rights, mineral rights, and jurisdiction over coastal 
waters governing relationships between States. 
429 Strecker, "Pirates of the Mediterranean? The Case of the Black Swan and Its Implications for the Protection 
of Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Region," p. 15. 
430 Article 4 of the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage provides for the following exceptions: “(a) is 
authorized by the competent authorities, (b) is in full conformity with this Convention, and (c) ensures that any 
recovery of the underwater cultural heritage achieves its maximum protection.” 
431 As of September 2011, the Convention has forty States parties, a list is available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E&order=alpha (accessed 23 September 
2011). Major international actors with maritime interests, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France have not yet ratified the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention. 
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concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’,432 since objects found in international waters 
are outside of any State’s territory and national jurisdiction. On the basis of the concept of 
‘common heritage of humankind’ and the presupposition that the protection of cultural 
heritage, both on land and underwater, is a common interest, alternative mechanisms could 
not only facilitate dispute resolutions but could also rectify current legal shortcomings.433 
2.6 2003 UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention 
Although this thesis focuses on restitution and return of tangible, movable cultural 
objects, some remarks should be made on the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Convention).434 
While the intangible aspects of an object have always existed within the tangible object itself, 
the 2003 UNESCO Convention must be credited with differentiating the two; as a result, the 
recognition and articulation of the importance of these intangible aspects of cultural heritage 
has facilitated their protection – independent of the protection of the physical object itself.435 
The Convention substantially replicates the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention by 
imposing upon States the obligation to protect intangible heritage located in their territory.436 
Similarly to the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, the 2003 UNESCO Convention 
embeds this principle obligation of the States parties within a structure of international 
cooperation and assistance designed to assist the territorial State in the protection of cultural 
heritage (or to use the vocabulary of the 2003 UNESCO Convention, “the safeguarding of 
cultural heritage”).437 In light of the success and wide recognition of the World Heritage 
List,438 the 2003 Convention establishes a ‘Representative List of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage of Humanity’ in order “to ensure better visibility of the intangible cultural heritage 
and awareness of its significance, and to encourage dialogue which respects cultural 
diversity.”439 Discussing the very complex and difficult question of what might fall within the 
                                                 
432 For details, see Chapter Four, Section 2.1. 
433 For detailed discussion and legal analysis, see Chapter Six, Sections 1 and 2. 
434 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (adopted 17 October 2003, 
entering into force 20 April 2006) UNESCO Doc. 32C/Resolution 32, 2368 UNTS 1. 
435 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 385. 
436 Ibid., p. 373. 
437 Ibid. 
438 The 1972 World Heritage Convention is almost universally accepted (188 States parties as of 23 September 
2011). For details see, supra Chapter Three, Section 2.3. 
439 Article 16 (1) of the 2003 Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention. The 2003 Intangible Cultural Heritage 
Convention, only eight years since its adoption, has already been ratified by 137 States parties (as of 23 
September 2011). 
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scope of ‘intangible cultural heritage’ is outside the scope of this thesis.440 However, for the 
limited purpose of this thesis, the rather vague definition given in Article 2 of the Convention 
should suffice: according to the Convention, intangible cultural heritage is defined as “the 
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, 
artifacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some 
cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage”. 
 
Against the backdrop of restitution and return, two observations on intangible cultural 
heritage that are relevant for the scope of this thesis must be made: firstly, tangible and 
intangible cultural heritage cannot be strictly separated, since – as expressed by the definition 
of Article 2 – intangible heritage has associated physical attributes.441 Thus, aspects of 
intangible heritage might be of importance to restitution disputes, since restitution claims are 
frequently based on the symbolic value of objects and aspects of ‘cultural identity’ related to a 
wider human rights discourse.442 Secondly, while at first glance, the Convention appears to 
take account of stakeholders other than States (namely, communities, groups and individuals 
that practice intangible traditions),443 the 2003 UNESCO Convention primarily outlines the 
obligations and prerogatives of States.444 Thus, the Convention conforms to the traditional 
pattern of State dominance in international law, even though the very subject matter dealt with 
by the Convention demands an approach that reflects the various stakeholders who created the 
oral traditions, expressions and social practices that the Convention intents to protect. The 
Convention does contain much more progressive language in its provisions on international 
cooperation and assistance, especially the section that demands that “the States parties 
recognize that the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage is of general interest of 
humanity”.445 On the basis of this assumption, States parties are requested to undertake 
“bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international cooperation” through, inter alia, “the 
exchange of information and experience, joint initiatives, and the establishment of a 
mechanism of assistance to States parties in their efforts to safeguard the intangible cultural 
heritage.”446 Both of these elements – the aspect of a ‘general interest of humanity’, and the 
                                                 
440 For details on the debate and the development leading to the adoption of the 2003 Convention, see Janet 
Blake, "On Developing a New International Convention for Safeguarding International Cultural Heritage," Art, 
Antiquity and Law 8, no. 4 (2003): p. 381. 
441 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 373. 
442 For details, see Chapter Three, Sections 2.8 and 5. 
443 Article 2 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention. 
444 Cf. Francioni, "Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction," p. 6. 
445 Article 19 (2) of the 2003 Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention. 
446 Article 19 (1) of the 2003 Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention. 
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concept of ‘international cooperation and assistance’ – will be explored further, since both are 
fundamental to the interest-oriented approach introduced by this thesis.447 
2.7 Council of Europe Conventions on Cultural Heritage 
In 2005, the Council of Europe adopted a ‘Framework Convention on the Value of 
Cultural Heritage for Society’.448 This framework convention (not yet in force) focuses on 
ethics and principles pertaining to the use and development of European heritage under the 
influences of the globalization.449 It is intended to underpin the currently existing legal 
instruments of the Council of Europe, namely the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the 
Architectural Heritage of Europe (Granada Convention);450 the 1992 European Convention 
on the Protection of Archaeological (Valetta Convention, subsequently revised);451 and the 
1985 European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property (Delphi 
Convention).452  
 
                                                
Whereas the first two instruments (namely the Granada and Valetta Conventions) 
promote conservation policies and guidelines by facilitating cooperation among the States 
parties, in order to enhance the exchange of experience and experts in the field of European 
cultural heritage, the 1985 Delphi Convention aims to protect cultural property against 
criminal activities. On the basis of “the concept of common responsibility and solidarity in the 
protection of European cultural heritage”,453 the 1985 Delphi Convention creates a legal 
obligation to return cultural objects, which have been subject to theft, appropriation through 
violence or menace, or have been illegally obtained. Moreover, the destruction and damage of 
cultural property constitutes an offence under this Convention (Article 6 in conjunction with 
 
447 For details, see Chapter Four, Section 2.1 and 2.3. 
448 Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, CETS No.199, 
signed in Faro, 27 October 2005, not yet entered into force, full text version available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/199.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
449 See: Explanatory Report to the 2005 Framework Convention, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/199.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
450 European Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, CETS No. 121, signed in 
Granada, adopted 3 October 1985, entering into force December 1, 1987, full text version available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/121.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
451 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (revised), CETS No. 143, signed in 
Valetta, adopted 16 January 1992, entering into force 25 May 1995, full text version available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/143.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
452 European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, CETS No. 119, signed in Delphi, 23 June 
1985, not yet entered into force; by 23 September 2011 six States have signed the convention (Cyprus, Greece, 
Italy, Lichtenstein, Portugal, Turkey, all in 1985), no ratifications have been made so far (3 ratifications needed 
for the entry into force), full text version available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/119.htm 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
453 See: Summary of the treaty, provided by the Council of Europe, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/119.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Article 3, Appendix III). The 1985 Delphi Convention has distinguished itself from other 
international legal instruments insofar as it does not refer to national export regulations (as the 
1970 UNESCO Convention and 1995 UNIDROIT Convention do) but instead delineates a list 
of offences set out in the Convention (Appendix III).454 It is notably, however, that none of 
the forty-seven member States of the Council of Europe has yet ratified the 1985 Delphi 
Convention. This demonstrates, once more, the general reluctance of States (both on the 
international and regional level) to commit to a treaty which creates legal obligation in 
conjunction with the restitution of cultural materials. 
2.8 Hu
 genocide and gross violations of human rights, including racial and religious 
discrim
Article 27 that all people have the right of free participation in the cultural life. In line with 
                                                
man Rights Obligations under Art. 27 UDHR and both Covenants 
Restitution claims by Holocaust survivors and their heirs as well as the growing 
number of claims by indigenous peoples and ethnic minority groups highlights the potential 
importance of restitution and return of cultural objects as a remedy for human right violations. 
Throughout history, the looting, removal, and destruction of cultural heritage have been an 
intrinsic part of campaigns designed to discriminate against, segregate and ultimately 
eliminate targeted groups.455 Such strategies have been used in times of war, belligerent 
occupation, and colonization; they were used excessively during WWII, and more recently in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina through the intentional destruction of mosques, churches, historical 
bridges and libraries, as well as in Afghanistan, with the destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan. Although there is a shortage of legal provisions dealing with cultural rights within 
the framework of human rights law, the development of the law over the last fifty years has 
demonstrated that targeted destruction of cultural heritage is highly relevant to human rights 
law.456 Therefore, restitution and return have been an important aspect of restorative justice 
following acts of
ination.  
 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights457 (hereinafter UDHR) proclaims in 
 
454 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 176. 
455 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 9. 
456 Francioni, "Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction," pp. 7. 
457 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UNGA, Resolution 217 A (III), 10 
December 1948, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), full text available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
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this, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights458 
(hereinafter ICESCR) addresses the right: “to take part in cultural life and the right to enjoy 
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”, and goes on to discuss “the 
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture” that should be fully 
realized by the State members. The ‘right to participation in cultural life’ has also been 
confirmed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights459 (hereinafter ICCPR), 
which states that: “persons belonging to [ethnic, linguistic, or religious] minorities shall not 
be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture […].” Although these rather general provisions do not specifically create about a right 
to restitution or return of cultural materials, it is self-evident that the absence of cultural 
materials forecloses participation in cultural life and precludes the exercise of this particular 
cultural right. Nigeria, for example, claims to have lost more than half of its cultural heritage 
through colonization.460 These provisions entail a ‘negative obligation’ for all States to 
abstain from conduct aimed at the destruction, damage, alteration or profanation of cultural 
objects, while also imposing a ‘positive obligation’ to take steps to protect, conserve and 
develop cultural groups and communities and therein implicitly the cultural heritage of the 
groups and minorities living within the nation-State boarders.461  
 
However, provisions pertaining to cultural rights often do not establish substantive 
rights, with corresponding precise and unconditional obligations, but rather express common 
political commitments of a programmatic character.462 Therefore, the link between cultural 
rights and ethnic minority groups, which has been established through human rights law, is 
essential to both the protection and restitution of cultural heritage, for two reasons. Firstly, 
States tend to protect only the cultural heritage that corresponds to the desired national State-
image; cultural symbols that do not fit into this scheme are either neglected, or are simply 
destroyed. This phenomenon can be observed in many cases in which, for example, the 
current predominant religion does not coincide with former religious traditions (as was the 
case with the destruction of the Buddhist cultural past by the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the 
destruction of mosques in former Yugoslavia). Other examples are the ‘Cultural Revolution’ 
                                                 
458 International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entering into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
459 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entering into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
460 Ekpo Eyo, "Nigeria, In: Return and Restitution of Cultural Property (Special Issue)," Museum (UNESCO) 
XXXI, no. 1 (1979): pp. 31. 
461 Francioni, "Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction," pp. 11. 
462 Ibid. 
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in China between 1966 and 1968 or the stealthy ‘cultural cleansing’ in Middle and Eastern 
Europe following WWII and continuing through 1989, during which many churches, 
cloisters, castles and symbols of religious and national identity were demolished. Therefore, 
the obligation of States to protect, in particular, the culture and therein the cultural heritage of 
minorities and ethnic groups is fundamental in terms of the general protection of cultural 
heritage. 
 
Secondly, for many indigenous peoples and minorities, decolonization was an 
incomplete process that merely replaced one occupier, the former colonial power, with 
another, the newly independent nation-State.463 Furthermore, during the 1950s, 1960s and 
even 1970s international initiatives for the protection and restitution of cultural objects refer 
exclusively to the State as the formal claimant. The limitations in international law on the 
ability of indigenous peoples and ethnic minority groups to obtain claimant status have a 
direct impact on their ability to preserve and develop their cultural identity. These groups 
could only rely on the rights afforded individual members under the international human 
rights framework, or the benevolence of the relevant State to provide a measure of protection 
for their collective identity.464 States rarely claim cultural objects on the behalf of indigenous 
peoples located within their territory, and are even less likely to assign property rights to 
minority groups after requested cultural materials have returned. Therefore, the 
acknowledgment of the right of indigenous peoples and ethnic minority groups to act on their 
own behalf as claimants for the restitution and return of cultural materials is a precondition to 
their full right of participation.465 
2.9 Bilateral Agreements: intra-and inter-State Provisions 
International cultural heritage disputes are frequently resolved not on the legal basis of 
international treaty law (such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention), but through bilateral agreements. These bilateral agreements might establish a 
legal obligation to return certain cultural materials, or might facilitate the return of cultural 
objects without referring to any legal obligations pertaining to restitution and return. Two 
major categories of bilateral agreements can be identified: intra-State agreements, which 
                                                 
463 Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, p. 198. 
464 Ibid., p. 199. 
465 For a discussion on the return of cultural objects to a people or community, see supra Chapter Two, Section 
4.5; for a discussion on indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious groups as stakeholders in restitution disputes, 
see Chapter Five, Section 1.5. 
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address cultural objects removed within the territory of a State (for example due to war or the 
colonization of indigenous peoples within the own territory); and inter-State agreements, 
which deal with cultural objects removed across former or current State borders (for example 
due to war, foreign or colonial occupation and State succession). Within the latter category of 
inter-State agreements, provisions for restitution and return can be found in the provisions of 
peace treaties, and, much less frequent, in bilateral agreements dealing with the removal of 
cultural materials during the period of colonization. Whereas peace treaty provisions on 
restitution and return are traditional in international law, the negotiation of bilateral 
agreements between States and private actors (such as museums and other art-holding 
institutions) in order to resolve restitution disputes is a rather recent phenomenon, and one 
which may increasingly gain international importance, as States cede their position as the 
exclusive stakeholder in international law.466 
2.9.1 Peace Treaty Provisions 
As early as in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia,467 provisions for the return of 
appropriated cultural objects have been a part of peace treaties.468 Since at least the nineteenth 
century, peace treaties that redrew territorial boundaries frequently included provisions for the 
return or exchange of selected cultural materials. Early examples, such as the 1815 Congress 
of Vienna469 as well as the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaties,470 included lists of specific items 
deemed of particular significance, including paintings, libraries, and archives. Nevertheless, 
these treaties generally contained no formal obligation for return or compensation.471 It was 
only gradually that provisions pertaining to restitution and return developed so that they 
applied generally rather than to a specific object or set of selected objects. In contrast to the 
predetermined lists in early peace treaties, treaties such as the 1919 Saint-Germain-en-Laye472 
and the 1921 Treaty of Riga473 between Poland and the Soviet Union474 recognized a general 
                                                 
466 For a detailed discussion on the various stakeholders in international cultural heritage disputes, see Chapter 
Five, Section 1. 
467 Treaty of Westphalia, signed at Münster, Germany in 1648, Article CXIV. 
468 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 175. 
469 The Final Act of Vienna, embodying all the separate treaties, signed on 9 June 1815. 
470 Peace Treaty of Versailles between the Allied Powers of WWI and Germany, 28 June 1919. 
471 The Peace Treaty of Versailles provided provisions on return (Article 245), compensation in specie by 
delivery of similar objects, and compensation by reunification of dispersed parts of two triptychs (Article 247); 
see also: Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 116. 
472 Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye between the Allied Powers of WWI and Austria, 10 September 1919. 
473 Peace Treaty of Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia/Soviet Ukraine, 18 March 1921.  
474 The Soviet Union was to surrender Polish national treasure and works of art acquired from Polish territories 
after 1772 (for example the objects associated with the Zaluski Library). 
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right to restitution by enunciating principles and processes for the resolution of claims.475 
Such general provisions on the restitution and return of removed cultural materials were also 
included in the 1947 Peace Treaties between the Allied and the (with Nazi-Germany) 
associated powers after WWII.476 It is notable, however, that no such provisions were 
included in the peace treaty with Japan, and thus the return of cultural materials appropriated 
by Japanese troops from China and Korea still remains unresolved.477 
 
An example of a successful restitution case based on a peace treaty provision is the 
return of the Obelisk of Axum (or Aksum) from Italy to Ethiopia in 2005. The return was 
mandated by the 1947 Peace Treaty, in which Italy renounced sovereignty over its former 
colonies of Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland, and subsequently recognized their 
sovereignty and independence. In addition, Italy was required to return all works of art, 
religious objects, archives, and objects of historical value removed after 3 October 1935.478 In 
accordance with Article 37 of the Peace Treaty, Italy promised to “restore” the obelisk within 
eighteen months, vowed to do so again within six months in a 1956 Agreement on the 
settlement of economic and financial matters, and renewed its promise a third time in a joint 
statement in 1997.479 Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States sought to enforce the 
provision of the 1947 Peace Treaty,480 and despite several requests by the Ethiopian 
government over these decades the obelisk remained in Rome until April 2005. 
 
The 152 ton, 23.5 meter stone funeral stele, dating back to 100-300 B.C., was removed 
by occupying Italian troops and shipped to Rome to celebrate Mussolini's fifteenth year of 
power in 1937. The obelisk, which had broken in five fragments as a result of an earthquake 
centuries earlier, was transported by the Italian troops over land from Axum to Massawa, by 
ship to Naples and was finally brought to Rome to the Piazza di Porta Capena in 1937 and 
erected in front of what was back then the Italian Ministry of Colonies, where it stood as a 
reminder of former Italian colonial ambitions and as a symbol of Mussolini’s annexation 
                                                 
475 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 7. 
476 The Paris Peace Conference (29 July-15 October 1946) resulted in the Paris Peace Treaties between the 
Allied and the Associated Powers, respectively Bulgaria (Art. 22), Finland and Hungary (Art. 24), Italy and 
Romania (Art. 23), respectively. They were signed on 10 February 1947, entering into force 15 September 1947. 
477 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 183. 
478 Apart from the return of the Obelisk of Axum in 2005, Italy also returned the throne of Emperor Menelek II 
to Ethiopia on the basis of the 1947 Peace Treaty and subsequent negotiations in 1982. 
479 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 358. 
480 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 183. 
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policy in the 1930s and 1940s.481 Since 1951, this building has served as headquarters of the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
 
A number of arguments were advanced against returning the stele, including the 
political instability of Ethiopia and the resulting uncertainty about the country’s ability to 
preserve the obelisk, the logistical challenges of safely returning it, and the high cost of 
transport. Instead, Italy suggested extending the international territory of the FAO in order to 
include the Obelisk as a gift of Ethiopia to the organization. Since the costs of returning of the 
obelisk had been estimated at six million Euros, Italy also offered to invest this amount in 
social projects in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians, however, refused both proposals and in turn 
pointed to the highly damaging air pollution in Rome and the outstanding importance of the 
obelisk to their national heritage.482 The monolith is one of the most important surviving 
artifacts of a pre-Christian site in Northern Ethiopia in the Tigray region close to the Eritrean 
border. Axum, founded around 100 B.C., was the capital of the Kingdom of Axum that 
flourished as a major trading centre from the fifth century B.C. to the 10th century A.D. At its 
height, Axum was the heart of a kingdom that extended across the areas of modern Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen; as such, the Kingdom of Axum was the most powerful 
State between the Eastern Roman Empire and Persia of the time. Even long after its political 
decline in the 10th century AD, Ethiopian emperors continued to be crowned in Axum. In 
1980, the ancient site of Axum, with its monolithic obelisks, giant stele, royal tombs, and 
ruins of ancient castles, was inscribed in the World Heritage List under the 1972 UNESCO 
World Heritage Convention.483  
 
In 2002, lightning struck the obelisk in Rome, which had no lightning rod attached, 
and broke off several feet of granite, which effectively undercut the argument that Italy could 
take better care of the artifact, and strengthening the Ethiopian case for return. After a 
renewed promise in 1997 to enhance bilateral relations on the basis of the 1947 Peace Treaty, 
Italy and Ethiopia defined the procedures for the return in a joint statement and Ethiopia 
formed a national committee for the return of the obelisk. This committee, working with the 
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property 
                                                 
481 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 357. 
482 Alberto Sbacchi, "Italia E Etiopia: La Rilettura Del Periodo Coloniale E La Valutazione Delle Sue 
Conseguenze Sul Paese Africano," I Sentieri della Ricerca 6(2007): p. 192. 
483 World Heritage List, Aksum, Ethiopia, date of inscription: 1980 (Ref. 15); further information available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/15 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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(ICCROM), carried out research and technical analyses to prepare the segmentation and 
transportation of the obelisk to Ethiopia. 
 
The obelisk was dismantled into three segments in November 2003 and remained in a 
warehouse near Rome's airport until April 2005. In November 2004,484 the Italian government 
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia, in which Italy agreed to finance 
the transportation of the obelisk to Ethiopia, the preparatory studies and archaeological 
conservation undertaken by UNESCO (phase 1), as well as the reinstallation of the obelisk in 
situ (phase 2). The total budget for activities implemented by UNESCO was estimated at U.S. 
$ 4.78 million,485 of which U.S. $ 2.83 million was provided by Italy.486 Both States 
requested UNESCO’s cooperation in returning the obelisk and agreed in light of the 1972 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention that UNESCO experts should oversee the 
reinstallation. Therefore, in June 2007 UNESCO signed a contract with an Italian construction 
company to carry out the reinstallation, including the construction of a foundation for the 
obelisk and a temporary steel tower for lifting the three separate segments and positioning 
them. In a final step (phase 3) the obelisk would be cleaned and restored, and the steel support 
structure dismantled and removed.487 
                                                
 
The return of the obelisk encountered a series of obstacles: access through the nearby 
Eritrean port of Massawa – which was the port through which the obelisk had originally left 
Ethiopia in 1937 – was impossible due to the strained relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
Therefore, a Russian Antonov was needed to carry the heaviest object ever to be transported 
by air. The runway at Axum Airport had to be upgraded and extended because it was too short 
for a cargo plane of this size, and streets and bridges had to be renovated to bear the load. 
Upon the arrival of the third segment in Axum in April 2005, archaeologists announced the 
discovery of a large network of underground tombs beneath the site where the obelisk was to 
be erected, so the stele was put in storage in January 2006. Meanwhile, the original footings 
 
484 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 358. 
485 See: Press Kit Axum Obelisk Reinstallation Project, Fact Sheet UNESCO Culture Sector by World Heritage 
Centre, May 2008, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/news/documents/news-436-2.doc (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
486 See: UNESCO World Heritage Center Press Release, “UNESCO launches the re-erection project of the 
Axum Obelisk”, 19 June 2007, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/350/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
487 See: Press Kit Axum Obelisk Reinstallation Project, Fact Sheet UNESCO Culture Sector by World Heritage 
Centre, May 2008, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/news/documents/news-436-2.doc (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
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of the obelisk were discovered, making it possible to re-erect the monument at its original 
location. Some experts, however, suggested that it would be fare better in a museum.488 The 
continued delay was not only expensive, but also seemed to demonstrate a lack of political 
will on the Ethiopian side. A petition was drafted to the Ethiopian Minister of Culture and 
Tourism, stating: “We, Ethiopians, groups and concerned individuals, are signing this petition 
to express our frustration over the delays in re-erecting our returned Axum Obelisk. If the 
Axum Obelisk could stand in Rome, it cannot be allowed to lie on the ground in Axum. […] 
We also request the re-erection of all the fallen obelisks of Axum, to restore the city to its 
former greatness”.489  
 
The reinstallation works at Axum started in October 2007, two years after the stele’s 
arrival. On 31 July 2008, the third and last segment of the obelisk was mounted, and on 4 
September 2008 the inauguration ceremony for the Axum Obelisk has taken place.490 In 
October 2008, the UNESCO Executive Board expressed its “deep appreciation for the 
successful completion of the project and congratulated Italy and Ethiopia for their exemplary 
cooperation”.491 After the delay of about 57 years from the deadline set out in the 1947 Peace 
Treaty, Italy had complied with its obligation under the Peace Treaty. However, two questions 
arise: firstly, whether Italy had an obligation to return the Obelisk not only under the 1947 
Peace Treaty provisions but also under customary international law, and secondly, whether 
Italy was required not only to return but also to re-erect the obelisk, since the re-erection was 
a major part of the costs. 
 
It could be argued that since the obelisk was appropriated from Ethiopian soil by 
occupying Italian troops in 1937, Italy was bound by the provisions of the1899492 and 1907493 
                                                 
488 Angela M.H. Schuster, “Axum Obelisk To Go Home”, 27 May 1998, available at: 
http://www.archaeology.org/online/news/axum.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
489 The ‘Reerect Axum Obelisks Petition’ to the Ethiopian Ministry of Culture and Tourism was created by 
Members of Axum Alumni Association and written by Beyene Haile, Kokeb Tarekegn, Richard Punkhurst, 
Andrew Lawrence, available at: http://www.petitiononline.com/Axum2000/petition.html (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
490 See: UNESCO World Heritage Center Press Release, “Inauguration Ceremony for the Axum Obelisk”, 5 
September 2008, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/458; “Mission Accomplished: Aksum Obelisk 
successfully reinstalled”, 1 August 2008, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/456; and “Second block of 
Aksum Obelisk successfully reinstalled”, 28 July 2008, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/455 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
491 UNESCO Executive Board, Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 180th Session, doc. 180 
EX/Decisions of 17 November 2008, p. 20. 
492 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899), entering into force 
September 4, 1900, reprinted in AJIL, vol. 1 (1907), p. 129. 
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Hague Conventions. While there was no formal state-of-war declared between Ethiopia and 
Italy, one could say that the illegality of the removal resulted from the fact that the bellicose 
annexation of Ethiopia was itself illegal.494 This is underlined by the fact that the Council of 
the League of Nations condemned the annexation of Ethiopia on 7 October 1935, based on the 
argument that Italy had resorted to armed aggression in violation of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.495 On this basis, it could be argued that Italy was obliged to return the 
obelisk not only on grounds of the 1947 Peace Treaty, but also because it was obliged under 
customary international law to do so. However, the question remains as to whether Italy was 
similarly bound to re-erect the obelisk. The general aim of restitution is the full restoration of 
the former state of affairs (restitutio in integrum).496 Along the same vein, the 1947 Peace 
Treaty directs Italy to “[restore] the obelisk within eighteen months”. The obligation to 
“restore” might comprise – to a certain degree – preservative measures. Generally speaking, 
however, this obligation does not include any further measures, such as the re-erection. Italy, 
however, voluntarily improved the former situation in situ by re-erecting the obelisk, which 
was on the ground in fragments when it was expropriated in 1937. Thus, the re-erection can 
be considered as a sort of reparation for the delayed return.497 
2.9.2 Bilateral inter-State Agreements regarding Restitution and Return 
Several other bilateral agreements regarding the return of objects removed from their 
place of origin to a former colonial power have been negotiated, such as the agreement 
between France and Laos (1950) concerning Laotian objects of art; an agreement between 
France and Algeria (1968), which led to the return of some 300 paintings; and an 1977 
arrangement between the Netherlands and Indonesia for the return of Buddhist and Hindu 
statues. In addition, Belgium returned 114 ethnographic works to Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) in 1970 and several thousand additional cultural items in 1977 on the 
basis of an agreement between the Royal Museum of Central Africa, Tervuren, and the 
National Museum of Kinshasa. However, the Belgian Royal Museum has since opposed any 
further restitution, because a large number of the returned objects were stolen amid political 
                                                                                                                                                        
493 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 18 October 1907, entering into force 26 January 
1910), reprinted in AJIL, vol. 2 (1908), p. 90. 
494 Cf. Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 358. 
495 Ibid. 
496 Cf. Jote, International Legal Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 262. 
497 See: Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 360. 
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turmoil in Congo; these objects are now said to have reappeared on the international 
commercial antiquity market.498 Although this agreement is remarkable in formal terms (as it 
was concluded directly between the museums without governmental involvement), it failed in 
practical terms. This disappointing result convinced the Royal Museum that the wholesale 
return of objects collected during the colonial era is not a viable option.499  
 
Other examples include the agreements between France and Iraq in 1980 that arranged 
a mutual long-term loan under which fragments of Babylonian codes that had been held in the 
Louvre for study were returned to the National Museum in Baghdad (and which have been 
partially missing since 2003); the 1981 ‘exchange agreement’ between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe arranging the return of carved birds that were held in the South African Museum 
of Cape Town; or, more recently, the 2006 agreement between France and Nigeria concerning 
three terracotta Nok and Sokoto statuettes. The latter recognizes Nigerian ownership of the 
statuettes in exchange for a twenty-five year renewable loan of the three statuettes to the Quai 
Branly Museum in Paris.500 
2.9.3 Bilateral inter-State Agreements regarding National Import Restrictions 
In consequence of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, several States (most notably the 
United States and Switzerland) have concluded bilateral agreements specifying the provisions 
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention with regard to import restrictions in relation to a particular 
State and to a specific designated group of cultural materials. Within these bilateral 
agreements, the States parties normally agree to conduct all necessary administrative and 
judicial proceedings under their national legal system, in order to facilitate the return of stolen 
or illicitly imported cultural materials. The major shortcomings of these bilateral agreements 
are twofold: firstly, they frequently apply only to designated categories of cultural objects 
(e.g. archaeological or ethnological materials), and secondly, they apply only to States with 
whom a bilateral agreement has been concluded, since only these States are entitled to place a 
claim for the return of cultural materials under the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention. 
 
                                                 
498 For many other instances of return, see: Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 371. 
499 Guido Gryseels, Assuming our Responsibilities in the Present, in: ICOM News, No. 1 (2004), p. 8. or: 
http://icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p8_2004-1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
500 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 3. For a detailed discussion on the case of the Nok and Sokoto statuettes, see Chapter 
Six, Section 3.2. 
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Whereas Switzerland has been utilizing bilateral agreements only since 2005 
(ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2003),501 the United States have a much 
longer tradition in concluding bilateral agreements (starting with the ratification of the 
UNESCO Convention in 1972). Bilateral inter-State agreements have been set up by the U.S. 
State Department with several States, mainly in Latin-America, in order to prevent the import 
of designated cultural materials originating from the contracting State party. Early examples 
include: a treaty of cooperation with Mexico (1970),502 Peru (1981),503 and Guatemala 
(1984).504 Interestingly, these early bilateral agreements did not fall under the provisions of 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention, since the national legislation implementing the Convention, 
which could have provided a legal basis for these agreements was not passed until 1983. The 
‘Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act’ (CPIA),505 allows the U.S. State 
Department in line with Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention to impose import restrictions 
on stolen and illicitly exported archaeological and ethnological objects when so requested by 
States that are a party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention.506 Upon the recommendation of the 
‘Cultural Property Advisory Committee’ (CPAC), the U.S. State Department evaluates these 
requests and, if appropriate, may enter into a bilateral agreement with the requesting State.507 
 
Originally, the United States limited the enforcement of foreign export restrictions 
exclusively to temporary so-called ‘emergency actions’ pertaining to a very specific category 
of cultural materials (e.g. textiles or stone sculptures from a certain region). Such emergency 
import restrictions have been concluded, for example, with: Bolivia (1989-1996) on the 
import of antique Aymara textiles from the region of Coroma; Cambodia (1999-2002) on the 
import of Khmer stone sculpture and architectural elements; and Cyprus (1999-2005) on the 
import of Byzantine ecclesiastical and ritual ethnological material.508 Although the official 
                                                 
501 Switzerland has concluded bilateral agreements with Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Italy and Peru (the agreement 
with Peru has not yet entered into force); for further information see, supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
502 Treaty of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Recovery and Return of 
Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties (Art. III), signed July 17, 1970, reprinted in: ILM 9 
(1970), pp. 1028, effective from 19 July 1970 until 19 July 1972 (expired). 
503 Agreement between the United States and Peru for the Recovery and the Return of Stolen Archaeological, 
Historical and Cultural Properties, signed 15 September 1981. 
504 Treaty for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties between the 
United States and Guatemala, signed 21 May 1984. 
505 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) 19 U.S.C. 2601 (1983). 
506 For details on the limited implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention in the United States, see supra 
Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
507 A list of the bilateral agreement concluded between the U.S. and foreign States is available at: 
http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
508 A list of the emergency actions concluded between the U.S. and foreign States is available at: 
http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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terminology used in these bilateral agreements continues to be ‘emergency actions’, these 
emergency import restrictions have lasted several years, and may be renewed if the threat to 
the designated category of cultural materials remains current. In recent years, however, most 
‘emergency actions’ have been expanded to become bilateral agreements (so-called 
Memorandum of Understanding) that now impose import restriction not only for one specific 
category of cultural materials, but rather for various categories of archaeological or 
ethnological materials and frequently include additional provisions on cultural exchanges, 
technical assistance and loan programs (generally concluded for a period of five years with 
the option of renewal).509 The overall intention of such bilateral agreements is therefore, “not 
only to impose import restrictions, but to promote international collaboration in developing 
sustainable safeguards for cultural heritage, and increased international access to it for 
cultural, educational, and scientific purposes”.510 There are two main requirements for 
establishing such bilateral agreements: firstly, the requesting State must demonstrate that its 
cultural patrimony is in jeopardy; and, secondly, it must demonstrate that it has taken 
measures to protect its cultural patrimony (e.g. by creating inventories and protecting 
archeological sites).511 
 
Since 1995, the United States has primarily concluded bilateral agreements pertaining 
to import restrictions (instead of ‘emergency actions’) with various States parties to the 
UNESCO Convention, including: El Salvador (1995), Peru (1997), Bolivia (2001), and 
Colombia (2006) on pre-Columbian archaeological objects and Colonial and Republican 
period ethnological materials; Guatemala (1997), Nicaragua (2002), and Honduras (2004) on 
pre-Columbian archaeological objects, Iraq (1990) on any archaeological and ethnological 
materials; Mali (1997) on archaeological materials dating from the Paleolithic Era (Stone 
Age) to approximately the mid-eighteenth century; Canada (1997-2002) on Indian 
archaeological and ethnological materials; Cambodia (2003) on archaeological materials 
dating from the Bronze Age to the end of the Khmer Empire; Italy (2001) on pre-Classical, 
Classical, and Imperial Roman archaeological materials; Cyprus (2002) on Pre-Classical and 
Classical archaeological objects; and China (2009) on archaeological materials from the 
Paleolithic Period through the Tang Dynasty, and monumental sculpture and wall art that is at 
                                                 
509 Kouroupas, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Die Erfahrungen Der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 157. 
510 Citation taken from the homepage of the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, which is available at: http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
511 See Section 2602 U.S. CIPA. For further details on the specific requirements under the CIPA, see supra 
Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
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least 250 years old. With the exception of the bilateral agreement with Canada that expired 
and was not extended, most agreements are valid at least until 2012.512 As a consequence of 
these agreements, the designated cultural materials can enter the United States only if 
accompanied by an official export permission issued by the respective State authority, or by 
verifiable documentation demonstrating that the exportation occurred prior to the date upon 
which the agreement came into force. Notably, the burden of proof lies with the importer, not 
with the requesting State.513 If these requirements are not met, the import is assumed to be 
illegal, and the object must consequently be returned to the State of origin. The scope of these 
bilateral agreements, however, is not confined to the return of illegally exported cultural 
objects, but also encompasses the establishment of a broader cooperation between the 
contracting parties through loans, exhibitions, joint research programs and excavation 
campaigns.514 Similar cooperative provisions in the context of returning cultural objects have 
also been included in recent bilateral agreements between States and private actors. 
2.10 Bilateral Agreements between States and Non-State Actors 
Bilateral agreements between States and private actors regarding the return of cultural 
objects are a quite recent phenomenon. As this section will demonstrate, this trend is 
associated with the emergence of other non-State actors in this field of international law, who 
act on their own behalf on the international level. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or 
agreements are concluded between the government and a foreign – mainly private – museum 
or cultural institution. Although they cannot be considered as international treaties in the 
narrowest sense, they do correspond with the international contracts that are regularly 
concluded between States and private companies, for example, for the exploitation of natural 
resources, such as carbon or oil.515  
 
In contrast to agreements between State actors, the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
between States and non-State actors for the resolution of disputes has several advantages: (1) 
the requesting State can overcome the obstacle posted by the fact that the State in which the 
objects in question are located has no or little legal means to compel its citizens, private 
museums, or other privately run institutions to return claimed objects; (2) the requesting State 
                                                 
512 For further details see the list of concluded bilateral agreement between the U.S. and foreign States, available 
at: http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
513 Kouroupas, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Die Erfahrungen Der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 157. 
514 See, for example, the 2001 U.S.-Italian Memorandum, Art II, para. E); Cf. Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: 
Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural Property," p. 379. 
515 Ibid. 
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can overcome the obstacles posed by the uncertainty of litigations before a foreign court (e.g. 
in terms of costs, the burden of proof, and statutes of limitation);516 (3) such agreements allow 
non-State actors, namely museums and art holding institutions, to preserve their international 
reputation as truthful partner that does not engage in pillage but instead participates in 
combating the illicit trafficking in cultural materials; and (4) both parties can utilize 
negotiations as a mean through which they can establish and strengthen their relationship for 
future cooperation and cultural exchange.517 
 
There are several recent examples of agreements regarding the return of cultural 
objects. The bilateral agreement between the Yale University and Peru, that was concluded in 
2007, failed in 2008,518 and was subsequently renewed and carried out in 2010/2011, which 
led to the return of some 400 archaeological items from Machu Picchu (including whole 
skeletons and bones, pottery, ceramics, decorative objects and tools), which had been 
excavated by U.S. archeologists at the Machu Picchu in 1911 and 1915. The agreement 
includes provisions on cultural cooperation, such as the construction of a new museum and a 
research center at the National University of San Antonio Abad in Cuzco, Peru, traveling 
exhibits, and the share of rights in the research and use of the collection.519 Another example 
includes the agreement reached between the University of Heidelberg and Greece in 2006 
regarding the return of a small piece of the Parthenon frieze,520 and the agreements between 
                                                 
516 For a detailed discussion on legal obstacles, see Chapter Six, Section 1. 
517 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 380. 
518 In 2008, the government of Peru filed a lawsuit against Yale University to obtain the return of the Machu 
Picchu artifacts, only one year after the parties appeared to have settled the dispute, see Republic of Peru vs. Yale 
University, Case No.1:2008cv02109, 5 December 2008. 
519 See the Joint Statement by the government of Peru and Yale University of 14 September 2007, available at: 
http://opa.yale.edu/news/article.aspx?id=2376; more details available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6998408.stm (accessed 23 September 2011). Despite the bilateral agreement 
signed in 2007, Yale University was sued by Peru before U.S. Federal court in December 2008. In the lawsuit, 
Peru was seeking a declaration of its ownership of the Incan relics (excavated in 1911 and 1915) and to receive a 
portion any profits Yale made form exhibiting the pieces; see: http://www.avvo.com/news/peru-sues-yale-
university-over-artifacts-88.html (accessed 23 September 2011). An out-of-court settlement was reached in 
November 2010. 
520 The Heidelberg University’s Museum of Antiquities returned a piece of the Parthenon sculptures (8x11 cm in 
size) to Greece in January 2006. The return has been made “exclusively in recognition of the significance of the 
Parthenon as part of the world’s cultural heritage”. Although it is not entirely known how the fragment came to 
Heidelberg, it is most likely that it was originally acquired as a souvenir by a German visitor in Athens. The 
fragment was registered in the university’s antiquities collection in 1871. Interestingly, at the back of the 
fragment is a modern incised inscription, in Greek, with the word “Parthenon”. Thus, it is most likely that such 
small fragments were rather frequently sold to foreign tourists as souvenirs. Further details available at:  
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=218&article=16659 and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6063970.stm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Italy521 and five major U.S. museums: namely, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (2006),522 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (2006),523 the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los 
Angeles (2007),524 the Princeton University Art Museum (2007),525 and the Cleveland 
Museum of Art (2008).526 Of these, the only published agreement is that between Italy and 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art (MET).527 It is, however, most likely that the other 
agreements are similar, especially because the general terms of the agreements were revealed 
in some detail through the press releases made in conjunction with the returns.528  
                                                
 
The U.S.-Italian agreements reached in 2006-2008 are quite remarkable not only in 
legal terms but also in terms of reaching alternative solutions in restitution disputes. In 
addition to the general advantages of such bilateral agreements mentioned above, the 
following five particular aspects of the U.S.-Italian agreements are particularly noteworthy: 
(1) the agreements constitute efficient out-of-court settlements and thereby avoid protracted 
litigation and legal expenses; (2) the major part of the disputed objects of rather dubious 
provenance (nearly all of them most likely obtained through illicit excavations) were returned; 
(3) the objects were returned in exchange for the Italian commitment to loan out similar 
works, some of which are specifically listed in the agreements;529 (4) the agreements 
combined the return with extensive cultural collaborations, including reciprocal loans of 
major works of art, joint exhibitions, research, and conservation projects;530 and (5) since 
both sides, the U.S. museums (mainly the J. Paul Getty museum) and the Italian authorities 
did not hesitate to utilize the media for their purposes, the U.S.-Italian restitution campaign 
 
521 The Italian Ministry of Culture jointly with the Commission for Cultural Materials of the Region of Sicily, 
hereinafter Italy. 
522 Press release of 28 September 2006: “Museum of Fine Arts, Boston and Italian Ministry of Cultural Sign 
Agreement Marking New Era of Cultural Exchange”, available at: http://www.mfa.org/collections/art-
past/italian-ministry-culture-agreement (accessed 23 September 2011). 
523 The Agreement between the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Republic of Italy, concluded on 
21 February 2006, has been reprinted in: International Journal of Cultural Property (2006) 13, p. 427-434. 
524 Press release of 25 September 2007: “Italian Ministry of Culture and the J.Paul Getty Sign Agreement in 
Rome”, available at: www.getty.edu/news/press/center/italy_getty_joint_statement_092507.html (accessed 23 
September 2011).  
525 Press release of 30 October 2007: “Princeton University Art Museum and Italy Sign Agreement over 
Antiquities”, available at: www.princeton.edu/press_release (accessed 23 September 2011). 
526 Elisabetta Povoledo, “Pact Will Relocate Artifacts to Italy from Cleveland,” New York Times, 20 November 
2008.  
527 See: International Journal of Cultural Property (2006) 13, p. 427-434. The agreements with the other U.S. 
museums have not been published to the best knowledge of the author. 
528 Ibid. 
529 The term of the agreements is forty years, renewable by agreement between the parties. 
530 Cf. Claire L. Lyons, "Museums as Sites of Reconciliation," in Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of 
Conquest, Colonization, and Commerce, ed. James A. R. Nafziger and Ann M. Nicgorski (2009), p. 431. 
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was covered by the world media, demonstrating a rising awareness of the problem of illicit 
trafficking in cultural artifacts. 
 
The U.S.-Italian agreements were made possible because of a series of criminal 
investigations by Italian authorities into illicitly exported cultural objects. Much of the distinct 
evidence came from a raid on the warehousing facility of Giacomo Medici in the Geneva 
Freeport in Switzerland in 1995. The raid revealed trafficking patterns between Italian tomb 
robbers (tombaroli) and dealers in Italy and abroad, mainly in Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, but also the United States. Most of these dealers (including the five U.S. museums) 
have subsequently said that they purchased the objects unaware of their illicit origin. The 
Italian investigators seized looted antiquities and uncovered more than 4,000 photographs and 
negatives of archaeological objects, partially arranged into albums that looked almost like 
prospectuses for potential purchasers. Many photographs showed ancient vases and pots still 
encrusted with dirt, in some cases photographed in the open countryside. Others showed 
fragments of ancient artifacts wrapped in local newspapers to prove their Italian provenance, 
and still others depicted recently discovered tombs, their crude openings sealed with 
makeshift covers.531 Moreover, documents were found, including shipment invoices, relating 
to business relations between art dealers and several museums. The Italian investors also 
found handwritten notes revealing by name the chain of persons involved, including tomb 
robbers, middle men, art dealer, as well as the five U.S. museums.532 
 
These photographs allowed the Italian authorities to identify items on exhibition in 
several museums. Most identified items were on display at the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los 
Angeles. Thus, in January 2006, Italy formally issued a claim against the Getty for the return 
of fifty-two antiquities, alleging that they had been illegally excavated and exported before 
being purchased by U.S. museums during the 1980s and early 1990s. This was not the first 
time that Italy had questioned the legitimacy of the purchase of artifacts: the dispute over a 
2,500 year-old Euphronios crater (a vessel for mixing water and wine), began shortly after the 
Metropolitan Museum purchased it for $1 million in 1972. However, unlike former claims, 
                                                 
531 See for example: Helena Smith, “It’s art squad vs. tomb raiders as Greece reclaims its pillaged past”, in: The 
Guardian, 21 July 2006, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/21/parthenon.arttheft; Hugh 
Eakin, “Director of Getty is unrattled by claims of Italy and Greece to Antiquities”, in: New York Times, 15 May 
2006, available at: http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/arts/design/15bran.html?fta=y (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
532 Peter Watson and Cecilia Todeschini, The Medici Conspiracy - the Illicit Journey of Looted Antiquities 
(2006), p. 16. 
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these were supported by the compelling evidence of seized photographs. With criminal 
proceedings initiated against Marion True, the Getty’s former antiquities curator, and Robert 
Emanuel Hecht, a Swiss art merchant,533 the Getty Museum offered to return twenty-six of 
the disputed objects in November 2006.534  
                                                
 
Following several breakdowns in the negotiations, the parties came to a compromise 
and finalized an agreement in August 2007, which obligates the J. Paul Getty Museum to 
return forty out of the fifty-two originally requested items to Italy. In the meantime, Italy also 
negotiated with the other U.S. museums mentioned above; however, the negotiations with the 
Getty were particularly contentious. Although the Getty had brought up the question of joint 
ownership for some objects, this suggestion was not incorporated in the agreements.535 The 
agreement with the J. Paul Getty Museum could only be finalized without making reference to 
a disputed bronze statue, the so-called ‘Victorious Youth’ (Athleta di Fano). Both parties 
agreed on the adjournment of further discussions on the bronze statue due to the pending legal 
proceedings in Italian courts in 2007.536 This bronze statue, dating back to the fourth century 
BC, was purchased by the Getty in 1977 after it was found by Italian fishermen in the 
northern Adriatic Sea in 1964. The fishermen hauled it ashore and hid it rather than declaring 
it to Italian authorities, as required under Italian law. Three fishermen and a priest, who 
helped to hide the statue, were convicted of trafficking in stolen property, but an appeals court 
overruled the conviction in 1970 because of insufficient evidence. At the time, however, the 
statue was still missing and its value was unknown. In the early 1970s, the statue resurfaced in 
London and was offered for sale and bought by the Getty museum. However, the records 
indicate that J. Paul Getty himself never authorized the purchase of the statute, since he had 
concerns about its legal status (J. Paul Getty died in 1976, the bronze was purchased by the 
Getty Museum Trust in 1977).537 Experts assume that the bronze statute may be the lone 
surviving work of the Greek artist Lysippus, who served Alexander the Great. The bronze was 
most likely lost at sea after being looted by Roman soldiers in Greece around the time of 
 
533 Both are charged with conspiracy to traffic in looted artifacts, currently pending before the Tribunale di 
Roma. 
534 “The Getty’s side”, Los Angeles Times, 28 November 2006, p. 21. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Lyons, "Museums as Sites of Reconciliation," p. 431. 
537 Jason Felch, Italian official seeks return of ‘Getty Bronze’, Los Angeles Times, 27 March 2011, available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/27/entertainment/la-et-getty-bronze-20110328 (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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Christ (the Greek government, however, has never intervened in the case by asking for the 
return of the bronze to Greece).538 
 
In 2007, the main points of contention between Italy and the Getty were twofold: the 
precise spot where the bronze statue had been found (namely, whether it had been in national 
(Italian) or international waters); and whether the Getty museum acquired the statute in good 
faith. As a result of the 2007 agreement with the Getty, Italy followed through with the 
promise to drop civil charges against Marion True.539 Her criminal trial, however, continued 
for five years until October 2010, when the charges of having received stolen art and 
conspiring to deal in looted artifacts were dropped due to the statute of limitations.540 The 
matter of the bronze statue, which had been adjourned in 2007, resurfaced again in February 
2010, when the regional tribunal of Pesaro (Tribunale di Pesaro) found that – despite the 
uncertainty over the bronze’s precise underwater find spot – it was illegally exported once it 
passed through Italian territory. Accordingly, the Italian tribunal ordered the bronze’s 
immediate forfeiture and its return to Italy – the Getty, in turn, appealed the order to the 
Italian Court of Cassation. The enforcement of the Italian confiscation order would require a 
grant of authority by a U.S. court in a proceeding to enforce the Italian judgment.541 This, 
however, appears unlikely to happen. In the meantime, the Italian Court of Cassation refused 
to hear the case; it is now pending again before the tribunal of Pesaro.542 
 
As mentioned above, the Italian government has signed similar agreements with other 
major U.S. museums in addition to the bilateral agreement with the Getty museum. In the 
light of these bilateral agreement, Italian authorities have continued to negotiate with other 
museums that might have acquired antiquities of Italian origin but of dubious provenance, 
including with: the National Museum of Antiquities in Leiden, Netherlands; the Toledo 
                                                 
538 Ibid. 
539 See: Livia Borghese, “Italy exhibits its recovered masterpieces”, Los Angeles Times, 18 December 2007; 
available at: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-getty18dec18,0,7195492.story?coll=la-
home-center (accessed 23 September 2011). 
540 Side note: it even might be possible that dropping the criminal charges against Marion True was also part of 
the (unofficial) deal. For further details, see CBC News, Antiquities case vs. ex-Getty curator dismissed, 13 
October 2010, available at: http://www.cbc.ca/arts/artdesign/story/2010/10/13/antiquities-looted-getty-true-
marion.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
541 Martha Lufkin, Greek bronze will stay in the Getty Villa – Museum rejects Italian judge’s decision because 
the Fano Athlete was found outside Italian waters, The Art Newspaper, 14 April 2010, available at: 
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Greek-bronze-will-stay-in-the-Getty-Villa%20/20504 (accessed 23 
September 2011).  
542 Jason Felch, Italian official seeks return of ‘Getty Bronze’, Los Angeles Times, 27 March 2011, available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/27/entertainment/la-et-getty-bronze-20110328 (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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Museum of Art in Ohio; the New Carlsberg Glyptotek in Copenhagen; the Minneapolis 
Institute of Art; the Miho Museum in Shiga, Japan; and the Antikensammlung in Munich. 
Current negotiations regarding the return of cultural materials might be concluded using 
bilateral agreements similar to those used with the U.S. museums. 
 
After the antiquities were returned, a special exhibition was set up at the Italian 
presidential palace in Rome’s Palazzo del Quirinale in December 2007.543 The exhibition 
included sixty-nine of the most prized sculptures and vases purchased by the four U.S. 
museums, in order to both demonstrate the government’s success and to grant immediate 
public access to the returned objects. The exhibit was titled “Nostoi,” meaning 
“homecoming”, alluding to a lost epic poem recounting the return of heroes from the Trojan 
War. Italy has not announced where the objects will definitely go, but many are expected to 
return to regional museums near where they are believed to have been illegally excavated.544 
The exhibit also features five of eight pieces returned to Greece in 2007 by the Royal Athena 
Galleries in New York. The Greek government lent the objects to thank Italy for its help in 
pressing separate Greek claims for objects said to be looted.545 As a result, the Greek 
government and the J. Paul Getty museum, for example, concluded an agreement for the 
return of a gold funerary wreath and a Parian marble statue in 2007.546 Some objects on the 
Nostoi exhibition are the result of other recoveries, like the fragment of an ivory head from 
the first century B.C. that was seized in 2003 from the collection of a London antique dealer. 
As Greece and Italy have agreed to work together in their attempt to retrieve illegally 
exported artifacts from abroad, the Nostoi exhibition was temporarily transferred to the new 
Acropolis Museum in Athens on 26 September 2008 after having been on display in Rome.547 
The Acropolis Museum still lacks major exhibits as it is still waiting for the arrival of the 
Parthenon Marbles, which were removed in 1801 and placed in the British Museum in 
                                                 
543 “Nostoi: Capolavoi ritrovati” – (English: “Nostoi: Recovered Masterpieces”), Roma, Palazzo del Quirinale, 
Galleria di Alessandro VII, Exposition from 21 December 2007 until 30 March 2008, and afterwards at the 
Palazzo Poli a Fontana di Trevi; catalogue of the exhibition published by: Segretario generale della presidenza 
della Repubblica Italiana. 
544 See: Livia Borghese, “Italy exhibits its recovered masterpieces”, Los Angeles Times, 18 December 2007; 
available at: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-getty18dec18,0,7195492.story?coll=la-
home-center (accessed 23 September 2011). 
545 See Elisabetta Povoledo, After Legal Odyssey, Homecoming Show for Looted Antiquities, The New York 
Times, 18 December 2007; available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/arts/design/18trea.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 23 September 2011). 
546 Lyons, "Museums as Sites of Reconciliation," p. 431. 
547 Nostoi Exhibition at the New Acropolis Museum, 18 September, 2008; further information available at: 
http://www.elginism.com/20080918/1340/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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London. Most of the objects of the 2007 Nostoi exhibition are currently on display in the 
Museo Nazionale (Palazzo Massimo) in Rome.548 
 
The exhibition of the returned objects is part of a media campaign that has played an 
important role throughout the U.S. – Italian negotiations. Francesco Rutelli, the former Italian 
Minster of Culture, as well as Michael Brand, the Getty’s director, conducted a war of words 
in interviews and statements in Italian and U.S. newspapers.549 Minster Rutelli, for example, 
dedicated a one-page statement in The Wall Street Journal to present his version of why the 
talks with Getty stalled for almost eight months in 2006.550 At the opening of the exhibit in 
Rome, Rutelli stated at a press briefing, “Excavated from the bowels of the earth, […] 
deprived of their identity, and reduced to mere objects of beauty, without a soul, [these 
pieces] conclude their odyssey here today.”551 
 
The intense effort by Italy to negotiate the return of antiquities is also reflected in the 
exhibition placards, one of which reads “Attic black-figure amphora with Heracles fighting 
Geryon, circa 540 B.C., formerly J. Paul Getty Museum.” Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
statements from each of the four U.S. museums in the introduction to the exhibition catalogue 
suggests no ill will. Thus, Philippe de Montebello, the director of the Metropolitan wrote, “An 
exhibition such as this serves to remind us all that we share a common heritage and a 
reverence for artistic achievement that cannot but unite, rather than divide, us in the future.” 
Moreover, the Getty Museum’s director, Michael Brand, declared “While the Getty Villa will 
greatly miss the carefully tended objects returning to Italy, the Getty can celebrate the long-
term loans offered by Italy as part of the accord.”  
 
                                                 
548 Further information available: http://archeoroma.beniculturali.it/musei/museo-nazionale-romano-palazzo-
massimo (accessed 23 September 2011). 
549 See for example: Christopher Knight, “The grandstand erected by Italy – Why is its culture minister trying to 
rough up the Getty? Politics for the home crowd”, in: The Los Angeles Times, 25 July 2007, available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/25/entertainment/et-getty25; “Rutelli contro il Paul Getty Museum – Non 
possono esporre opera rubate”, in: La Repubblica, 23 November 2006, available at: 
http://www.repubblica.it/2006/11/sezioni/spettacoli_e_cultura/getty-museum-polemiche/parla-rutelli/parla-
rutelli.html; Lee Rosenbaum, “Italy’s Rutelli Threatens Getty with Sanctions”, in: Artsjournal, 11 July 2007, 
available at: http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2007/07/italys_rutelli_threatens_getty.html (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
550 Francesco Rutelli, “Italy vs. Getty”, in: The Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2007, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116900785965978585-
search.html?KEYWORDS=Rutelli&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month (accessed 23 September 2011). 
551 See: Elisabetta Povoledo, “After Legal Odyssey, Homecoming Show for Looted Antiquities”, New York 
Times, 18 December 2007; available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/arts/design/18trea.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Indeed, the agreements between the Italian government and the U.S. museums did 
include several long-term loans, mainly for periods of four years, to the museums “on an 
agreed, continuing and rotating basis selected from archaeological artifacts, or objects of 
equivalent beauty and artistic/historical significance”. It is important to emphasize that these 
loans are not treated independently of the transfer of the requested objects; this is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that the Italian ministry has agreed that the transfer shall take place 
in the context of these “long-term cultural cooperation agreements” to ensure the optimum 
utilization of the Italian cultural heritage, and as part of the policy of the ministry to recover 
Italian archaeological materials. The agreements also establish that the items on loan shall be 
exhibited with the legend: “Lent by the Republic of Italy.” Furthermore, both parties agreed to 
provisions on study and restoration that allow archaeological items originating from 
authorized excavations, undertaken on the initiative and at the expense of the respective 
museum, to leave Italy for the time necessary for study and restoration. Afterwards, the items 
shall be returned to Italy and then shall eventually be loaned to the museum for exhibition 
“for a period of four years, or for the maximum period permitted by Italian law at the time the 
loan begins”. 
 
These bilateral agreements avoid using the legally-charged terms ‘restitution’, ‘return’ 
and ‘claim’ by employing instead more neutral words such as ‘transfer’ and ‘request’. These 
agreements also prevent Italy from taking any further legal action, since the museums reject 
any accusation that they had knowingly obtained objects of alleged illegal provenance in 
Italian territory. Furthermore, the decision to ‘transfer’ the requested items does not constitute 
an acknowledgment on the part of the museum of any type of civil, administrative or criminal 
liability for the original acquisition or holding of the items. The Italian government explicitly 
waives its right to pursue or support any legal action against the museums under Italian, U.S., 
or another jurisdiction. Despite the existence of evidence that was at the very least persuasive 
enough to support a compromise on the part of the U.S. museums, Italy chose not to take legal 
action, but instead pursued an out-of-court settlement based entirely on diplomatic 
negotiations.  
 
These bilateral agreements are revolutionary for three reasons: First, the bilateral 
agreements are not between States but between a private actor and a State. Second, the 
existence of reliable evidence of the illicit origin of the objects under dispute afforded Italy 
the opportunity to open a criminal case and to make a plausible threat of civil action. This 
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threat was bolstered by an international media campaign, especially in the case of the Getty 
Museum, which drew the attention of the world’s press. The third point concerns an aspect 
often neglected in current appraisals in the field of cultural heritage law that surely affects 
policy considerations: the relevance of the international public reputation of museums that 
have been asked to return cultural objects. In the U.S.-Italian agreements some of the world’s 
most famous museums were involved; the Getty’s reputation in particular was highly 
threatened during the dispute. Thus, these negotiations and final agreements can be described 
as a mix of legal threats and moral suasion bolstered by a news media campaign. Without 
question, the Italian strategy succeeded and certainly will revolutionize current practices in 
restitution disputes, especially since Greece has begun to follow the same pattern of 
negotiations; and other States may chose to follow, as well. 
 
Summarizing briefly this section on bilateral agreements, it is important to emphasize 
that these bilateral agreements apply exclusively to specific cultural materials and do not 
create general provisions for restitution and return. However, the U.S-Italian agreements can 
definitely be described as groundbreaking, especially in terms of successful restitution 
outcomes between a State and private actors. Although the issue of unequal bargaining power 
in regard to bilateral agreements is surely a crucial one,552 these agreements may set 
innovative standards by responding to the request for restitution in a cooperative manner, 
resulting in the mutual exchange of cultural materials between the two partners. 
3. Soft Law Instruments 
In no other area of international law are soft law instruments as important as they are 
in the area of international cultural heritage law. Although, as discussed above, international 
treaties and bilateral agreements provide legal provisions for restitution and return to a certain 
extent, the resistance to the codification of legally binding instruments is still quite vigorous, 
especially among States. However, non-binding instruments − such as the 1998 Washington 
Conference Principles on Nazi-confiscated Art − provide guidelines and set out certain 
principles pertaining to restitution and return.553 Therefore, this section of the chapter 
discusses the role of soft law instruments and aims at identifying those elements that advocate 
for towards cooperation, mutual agreement, and an exchange of information and cultural 
objects − principles that are in the center of the interest-oriented approach taken by this thesis. 
                                                 
552 The problem of unequal bargaining power in negotiations pertaining to the restitution and return of cultural 
materials will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, Section 1.3. 
553 For details on the 1998 Washington Principles, see Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
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Based on this analysis, the current role and mandate of the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for 
Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case 
of Illicit Appropriation’ (hereinafter UNESCO Committee) will be scrutinized. Although the 
work of the UNESCO Committee has not been particularly successful since its creation in 
1978, it is the only international body that deals specifically with restitution and return. 
Should its mandate be extended and its function improved,554 the UNESCO Committee might 
become an essential organ in balancing the interests of stakeholders in restitution disputes. 
 
Generally, ‘soft law’ is a rather vague description for a variety of legally non-binding 
instruments used in international law. According to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, soft law is 
not a primary source of international law; nevertheless, it provides evidence of current legal 
standards or values, and indicates the direction of future developments in international law.555 
This means that soft law instruments a priori cannot establish a legal basis for a claim for 
restitution and return. However, once soft law begins to interact with binding instruments, its 
non-binding character may be altered and may function as a tool for interpreting or clarifying 
binding instruments. These provisions are ‘soft’ because they do not grant a right to make a 
claim; however the qualification as ‘law’ is justified because these regulations have 
substantial practical effect through their significant power of persuasion.556  
 
Furthermore, the references to soft law instruments have become increasingly 
frequent, and the importance of these instruments to international law provides evidence to 
indicate that they are developing into legal norms. Therefore, soft law has a preparatory role 
in international law, insofar as it might pave the way for a legal provision that has not yet 
been commonly accepted in international law. Therefore, one could say that soft law 
instruments are not invariably law per se, but that they may be evidence of existing law, and 
therefore formative of the opinio iuris or State practice that generate new principles under 
customary international law557. There are three particular virtues of soft law: firstly, soft law 
is an attractive alternative to law-making by treaty, because it may often be easier to reach 
agreement when the form as such is non-binding. It is especially true in negotiations that 
might otherwise stall, if at the time of the negotiations the commitment to legally binding 
                                                 
554 For a detailed discussion on how to improve the work of the UNESCO Committee, see Chapter Six, Section 
4.2. 
555 Michael Bothe et al., Völkerrecht, ed. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, 3 ed. (2004), p. 32. 
556 Beat Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments (2009 ), p. 229. 
557 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007), p. 212. 
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instruments does not find common ground. The use of soft law instruments enables states to 
agree to more detailed and precise provisions because there is no immediate legal 
consequence in case of non-compliance. Secondly, it may be easier for some states to adhere 
to non-binding instruments because they can avoid the domestic treaty ratification process, 
and perhaps escape democratic accountability for the policy to which they have agreed. 
Thirdly, soft law instruments are more flexible. Normally, they will be easier to supplement, 
amend or replace than treaties, and may therefore provide more immediate evidence of 
international support and consensus than a treaty, whose impact may be constricted by 
reservations, as well as the need to wait for ratification and entry into force.558 When national 
parliaments make law, they also make policy choices about how to balance competing 
political, social, economic, or cultural objectives. These policy choices of States, and the 
interests expressed therein will play an important role in balancing the interests of 
stakeholders in international cultural heritage disputes. 
 
With regard to the restitution and return of cultural materials, the following soft law 
instruments will be discussed: the recommendations and declarations of the UNESCO 
General Conference, including an excursus on the mandate of the 1978 UNESCO Committee; 
the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); the resolutions 
adopted by ECOSOC; and the 1998 Washington Principles on Nazi-confiscated art. 
3.1 UNESCO Recommendations and Declarations 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), a 
specialized agency in the system of the United Nations, has adopted several recommendations 
and declarations that outline basic principles pertaining to cultural heritage;559 these include 
considerations on the protection of archaeological excavations,560 the protection and 
preservation of movable cultural objects,561 the prevention of illicit trafficking in cultural 
                                                 
558 Ibid., p. 214. 
559 All recommendations and declarations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO are available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12026&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
560 UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations, 5 
December 1956; available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13062&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
561 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or 
Private Works, adopted 19 November 1968, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13085&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011); and 
UNESCO Recommendation for the Protection of Movable Cultural Property, adopted 28 November 1978, 
available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13137&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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materials and questions of their return,562 access to cultural objects in museums,563 the 
international exchange of cultural objects,564 and general principles on international cultural 
cooperation.565  
 
Whereas international conventions are legally binding to its States parties, both 
recommendations and declarations are of legally non-binding nature; however, they do 
constitute a method for standard-setting on a particular subject, in which preferred conduct by 
States is indicated without the imposition of any specific legal obligation.566 Within this 
spectrum, recommendations might vary from a mere expression of hope or invitation to 
contribute to the achievement of a particular goal (without any procedure and means to be 
adopted) to an exhaustive study of the subject matter and a detailed analysis of a possible 
common approach to be adopted by member States.567 UNESCO member States are required 
to present the recommendations of the UNESCO General Conference to their competent 
national authorities; these, in turn, are then required to submit a report on the national actions 
taken on the basis of the adopted recommendations; in practice, many States do not present 
these reports in a timely fashion or fail to present them at all. Declarations, in contrast, are 
(legally non-binding) normative texts constituting general principles that should guide the 
actions of the international organization and its member States.568 
 
In the field of restitution and return, the major UNESCO recommendations that 
support general principles related to preservation, access, integrity and cooperation in cultural 
heritage matters, include the 1956 Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to 
                                                 
562 UNESCO Recommendations on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted 19 November 1964, available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13083&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
563 UNESCO Recommendations concerning the Most Effective Means of Rendering Museums Accessible to 
Everyone, adopted 14 December 1960, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13063&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
564 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property, adopted 26 
November 1976, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13132&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
565 UNESCO Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, adopted 4 November 1966, 
available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13147&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
566 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 222. 
567 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, "Unesco Practices and Procedures for the Elaboration of Standard-Setting Instruments," 
in Standard-Setting in Unesco - Volume I, ed. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf (2007), p. 36. 
568 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, "Monitoring, Supervision and Coordination of the Standard-Setting 
Instruments of Unesco," in Standard-Setting in Unesco - Volume I, ed. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf (2007), p. 56. 
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Archaeological Excavations.569 This recommendation aims at restricting the illicit trade in 
antiquities and the illicit export of archaeological finds in particular, and seeks to facilitate the 
recovery of cultural objects from clandestine excavations or theft. Moreover, the 1976 
Recommendation concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property570 aims at 
promoting international cooperation by facilitating the circulation of cultural objects between 
institutions, it states in its Preamble that “a systematic policy of exchanges among cultural 
institutions, by which each would part with its surplus items in return for objects that it 
lacked, would not only be enriching to all parties but would also lead to a better use of the 
international community's cultural heritage which is the sum of all the national heritages” and 
in Article 12 (4) that “the attention of cultural institutions […] should be drawn especially to 
the opportunities for reassembling a presently dismembered work which would be afforded by 
a system of successive loans, […] enabling each of the holding institutions to take its turn to 
display the work in its entirety”. 
 
With a particular focus on restitution matters, the 1982 Mexico City Declaration on 
Cultural Policies, adopted by the World Conference on Cultural Policies571 calls for bilateral 
negotiations between art-holding institutions and countries of origin with the goal of 
encouraging exchange and cooperation in restitution matters. Moreover, this declaration 
includes a specific recommendation concerning the Parthenon Marbles, recommending its 
return to Greece in application of “the principle that elements abstracted from national 
monuments should be returned to those monuments […] under the heading of the 
safeguarding of the cultural heritage of mankind”.572 Another individual case that has led to 
the adoption of a specific instrument, namely the 2003 Declaration concerning the Intentional 
Destruction of Cultural Heritage,573 was the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 
                                                 
569 UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations, adopted 5 
December 1956, available at:  http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13062&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
570 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property, adopted 26 
November 1976, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13132&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
571 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, adopted by the World Conference on Cultural Policies, 6 
August 1982, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=35197&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
572 Cf. Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 223. (Recommendation No. 55). 
573 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, adopted 17 October 
2003, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17718&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Afghanistan in 2001.574 In its declaration, the UNESCO General Conference refers explicitly 
to the regime of state responsibility and condemns the deliberate destruction of cultural 
materials as a “crime against the common heritage of humanity” (Article 3).575 This 
declaration is the first instrument that exclusively deals with the intentional destruction of 
cultural heritage not related to war; that said, it does refer to several previous war-related 
instruments, such as the early 1907 Hague Convention.576 The declaration assumes that States 
do not have unlimited freedom to destroy their own cultural heritage.577 This, however, does 
not result in effective measures to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future. The 
international community and international organizations, such as UNESCO, can only fulfill 
their role in monitoring and sanctioning the violation of cultural heritage. 
 
Whereas the two abovementioned declarations were motivated by individual cases of 
removal (Parthenon Marbles) and destruction (Buddhas of Bamiyan), another declaration 
taken note of by the General Conference of UNESCO in 2009 refers to a specific period of 
removals, namely WWII; it is entitled: The Draft of the Declaration of Principles relating to 
cultural objects displaced in connection with the Second World War.578 The draft Declaration 
was the focus of lengthy discussion during the almost eight year period of its negotiations, 
primarily because of Russian and Polish attempts to include the principle of ‘restitution in 
kind’ in the wording of the draft Declaration.579 Russia in particular called for legalizing the 
removal of cultural materials by Soviet troops from Germany and Eastern European countries 
at the end of WWII and the related legislation approved in the Duma in 1998 declaring these 
objects to State property of Russia.580 Moreover, other States, namely Turkey, tried to include 
                                                 
574 The 2003 UNESCO Declaration’s Preamble states: “Recalling the tragic destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan that affected the international community as a whole”. 
575 Cf. Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 37. 
576 Bandeira Galindo, "The Unesco Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage," p. 
412. 
577 Ibid., p. 420. 
578 Draft of the Declaration of Principles relating to cultural objects displaced in connection with the Second 
World War, taken note of by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 35th session, Paris 6-23 October 2009, 
Doc. 35 C/24 (31 July 2009), available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001834/183433E.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
579 See ‘Statement by the Russian Federation Delegation on the Draft of the Declaration’, 27 October 2009, 
declaring that “[…] individual culture items are to be retained as a non-pecuniary restitution for cultural property 
destroyed or irretrievably lost as a result of aggression”; available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/f68cd37b84711611c3256f6d00541094/acd8b550dd73f5c6c325765d005601d8?Ope
nDocument (accessed 23 September 2011). 
580 For details, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2; in particular: Russian Federal Law on Cultural Valuables 
Displaced to the USSR as a Result of World War II and Located on the Territory of the Russian Federation, 
Federal Law N 64-FZ of 15 April 1998, adopted by the State Duma on 5 February 1997, English translation 
available at: http://docproj.loyola.edu/rlaw/r2.html (accessed 23 September 2001). 
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the principle of ‘the return to the countries of origin’ into the wording of the draft 
Declaration.581 Due to the high level of controversy and the strong dissent among States, the 
draft Declaration was not adopted but only “taken note of” by the General Conference of 
UNESCO at its 35th session in October 2009.582 It is, however, surprising that no consensus 
could be reached, as the final text of the draft Declaration is nothing more than simple 
reiteration of current customary international law pertaining to the removal of cultural objects 
in armed conflict. The draft Declaration includes, among other things, the following 
principles: States have the responsibility to return cultural objects removed during WWII 
(Principle III); cultural objects shall never be retained as war reparations (Principle IX); and 
nothing in these principles shall be interpreted as amending, abrogating or replacing relevant 
international law (Principle XI). 
 
In summarizing the concerns expressed in the recommendations and declaration 
adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO over the last sixty years, it should be noted 
that the protection and preservation of cultural materials (both in terms of context and 
physical integrity) is one of the principles in cultural heritage matters. Moreover, several 
recommendations expressed the desire of the international community for international 
cooperation in this field of law, and that access to cultural materials is imperative in cultural 
heritage matters. 
3.2 Establishment and Mandate of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee 
Following the diplomatic negotiations of the 1970 UNESCO Convention583 it was 
clear that, due to the usual rules relating to treaty interpretation and especially the principle of 
non-retroactivity, two crucial issues would not come within the ambit of the 1970 
Convention: firstly, the return of cultural materials removed over the preceding centuries of 
colonial domination; and secondly, the return of objects that have been appropriated prior the 
entry into force of the convention for the ratifying States.584  
 
                                                 
581 See Commission for Looted Art in Europe, Draft Declaration of Principles: “Latest status of amendments of 
which no consensus was reached by the Russian Federation, Poland and Turkey, available at: 
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/OVNKN480270 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
582 See UNESCO 35C/Resolution 41 (p. 53), Records of the UNESCO General Conference, 35th session, Paris, 
6-23 October 2009. The 35th session of the UNESCO General Conference adopted Resolution 41 which, among 
other items, determines to take note of the draft Declaration; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001864/186470e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
583 For details on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
584 Cf. O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 9. 
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As a consequence of the limited application of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 
UNESCO General Conference opted to create an intergovernmental body in order to deal with 
the issues not covered by the 1970 UNESCO Convention.585 In the course of establishing this 
intergovernmental body, the Director-General of UNESCO M’Bow issued “A Plea for the 
Return of an Irreplaceable Cultural Heritage to those who Created It”,586 which gave 
impetus to the Committee’s future work.587 In 1978, the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for 
Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case 
of Illicit Appropriation’ (ICPRCP) was created by the General Conference of UNESCO, 
initially the Committee comprised twenty member States elected by the General Conference 
of UNESCO (since 1995 the Committee is comprised of twenty-two member States).588 Its 
establishment was not only driven by the desire to fill the gaps left by the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, but also by the desire to complete the decolonization process with regard to the 
removal of cultural objects from formerly colonized territories.589  
                                                
 
Its first session was held in Paris in May 1980, and the Committee continues to meet 
on a biannual basis at UNESCO’s headquarters; lately, it has met even more often, on a quasi 
annual basis (May 2009, September 2010, and July 2011).590 Examining the historical 
documentation of the Committee’s sessions since its first session in May 1980 reveals how 
much the expectations as well as the mandate of the Committee have changed. The initial 
1977 ICOM Study591 recommended, for example, that the Committee’s mandate should be 
limited to a ten-year-period in the hope that this would be sufficient time to alleviate all the 
 
585 The creation of an intergovernmental body was proposed in Study on the Principles, Conditions and Means 
for the Restitution and Return of Cultural Property in view of Reconstituting Dispersed Heritages (1977). This 
report was prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the Executive Council of ICOM (established 1976); 
the report is published as UNESCO Doc. CC-78/CONF.609/3 Annex 1 and in (1979) Museum, Vol. XXXI, no. 
1, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 62-66. 
586 ‘A Plea for the Return of an Irreplaceable Cultural Heritage to those who created it’, 7 June 1978, by 
Director-General of UNESCO Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow; See: UNESCO Doc. SHC-76/CONF.615.5,3. 
587 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 188. 
588 Resolution of the General Conference of UNESCO: Resolution 4.128 C4/7.6/5; Statutes of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its 
Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation, adopted by 20 C/Resolution 4/7.6/5 of the 20th Session of the General 
Conference of UNESCO, Paris, 24 October - 28 November 1978; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145960e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
589 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 11. 
590 The statutory documents, working documents and meeting results of all session of the Committee (first 
session in May 1980, last session in July 2011) are available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/movable-heritage-and-museums/return-of-cultural-
property/sessions-of-the-committee/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
591 See, above n. 585. 
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requests of the States involved in claims.592 Three decades later, in November 2009, the 
Committee celebrated its thirtieth anniversary with an extraordinary session in Korea, which 
clearly indicated that no special time limit can be set for the matter of restitution and return of 
cultural materials. 
 
The Intergovernmental Committee’s mandate, as set out in its Statutes, is multi-fold. It 
seeks ways and means: to facilitate bilateral negotiations for restitution and return; to promote 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the view to the restitution and return; to encourage 
the necessary research and studies for the establishment of coherent programs for the 
constitution of representative collections in countries whose cultural heritage has been 
dispersed; fostering public information campaigns on restitution matters; encouraging the 
establishment or reinforcement of museums or other institutions for the conservation of 
cultural property and the training of personnel; as well as promoting the exchange of cultural 
property.593 Its general function can be described as advisory, through which it provides a 
framework for discussion and negotiation; its recommendations, however, are not legally 
binding on States.594 A request for restitution and return can be brought to the Committee by 
any member State or associate member of UNESCO, if the cultural object in question has a 
“fundamental significance from the point of view of the spiritual values and cultural heritage 
of the people” of that State and “which has been lost as a result of colonial or foreign 
occupation or as a result of illicit appropriation”.595 Although the formal request must be 
made by a State or associate member of UNESCO, States may also represent the interests of 
their own nationals, who are requesting the return of cultural materials. 
 
Starting in 1981, the UNESCO Committee concentrated on developing a ‘Standard 
Form concerning Requests of Return or Restitution’ (issued in 1986),596 which it was hoped 
would facilitate the resolution of the high number of cases for restitution and return that were 
                                                 
592 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 190. 
593 See: Article 4 of the Statutes of the Intergovernmental Committee, CLT/CH/INS-2005/21, adopted by the 
General Conference of UNESCO at its 20th session (1978), last amended in October 2005; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145960e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
594 Cf. UNESCO Information Kit on Restitution: Promote the Return or the Restitution of Cultural Property, p. 8; 
text available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001394/139407eb.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
595 See: Article 3 (2) of the Statutes of the Intergovernmental Committee, CLT/CH/INS-2005/21, adopted by the 
General Conference of UNESCO at its 20th session (1978), and last amended in October 2005; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145960e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
596 ICPRCP Standard Form concerning Requests of Return or Restitution (January 1986); available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/pdf/formulario_retorno.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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expected by the Committee.597 However, there have been no more than eight requests lodged 
with the Committee since its establishment in 1978. Of those eight cases, six have been 
resolved – the latest case (resolved in May 2011) is that of the ‘Sphinx of Bogazköy’ between 
Turkey and Germany. The case has been pending before the Committee since 1987, and was 
resolved through bilateral negotiations “in a spirit of friendship and cooperation” which 
resulted in a 2011 memorandum of understanding agreeing to the return of the Sphinx from 
the Berlin Museum (Museumsinsel) to Turkey (the Sphinx was returned in July 2011).598 
Currently, only one request remains pending before the UNESCO Committee: the case of the 
‘Parthenon Marbles’ – also called Parthenon Sculptures – between Greece and the United 
Kingdom (specifically, the British Museum).599 The case has been pending before the 
Committee since 1984 without notable progress in settling the matter. Another case is 
currently suspended due to national court litigations (Brussels Court of Appeal): namely, the 
case of the archaeological objects from the ‘Necropolis of Khorvin’ between Iran and 
Belgium. The case was submitted to the UNESCO Committee in 1985; however, 
consideration by the Committee was suspended in 1987 (in accordance with its Statutes) until 
all internal legal remedies have been exhausted.600 
 
Out of the six cases submitted to the UNESCO Committee and subsequently 
resolved,601 two were resolved by mediation: the case of the ‘Phra Narai lintel’ between 
Thailand and United States (1988); and the case of the ‘Panel of Tyche’ between Jordan and 
the United States (Cincinnati Art Museum, 1986). One case was solved by immediate return: 
the case of the ‘Bogazköy cuneiform tablets’ between Turkey and the German Democratic 
Republic (1987); and return after several years of bilateral negotiations: the case of the 
‘Sphinx of Bogazköy’ (2011) between Turkey and the German Democratic Republic (until 
1989) and Germany (1990-2011). One was resolved through seven years of national court 
litigation: namely, between Ecuador and Italy on pre-Columbian ceramics (1983); and one by 
an agreement for the donation of the object, the ‘Makondé mask’, from the Barbier-Müller 
                                                 
597 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 191. 
598 See: Recommendation No. 3, adopted at the 17th session of the UNESCO-Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 
June-1 July 2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF. 208/COM.17/5; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001937/193720E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
599 See: Recommendation No. 2, adopted at the 17th session of the UNESCO-Committee (above n. 598). 
600 See: Secretariat Report to the 17th session of the Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 June-1 July 2011 in Paris, 
CLT-2011/CONF.208/COM.17/2, p. 1, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001927/192728e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
601 See list of cases of return and restitution under the aegis of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, 
available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/movable-heritage-and-museums/return-of-cultural-
property/committes-successful-restitutions/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Museum of Geneva, Switzerland to Tanzania (brought to the Committee in 2006, and 
resolved in May 2010602). Interestingly, several States that had shown the most interest in the 
establishment of an international forum for restitution matters not covered by the 1970 
UNESCO Convention have never presented a request to the Committee (with the sole 
exception of Greece, whose request regarding the ‘Parthenon Marbles’ remains yet to be 
solved).603 Most States seem to avoid engagement with any intergovernmental body and, if 
they engage at all, prefer bilateral negotiations, thereby avoiding consultation with the 
UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee.604 
 
Considering the small number of requests lodged with the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee and the increasing numbers of cases that are solved outside the 
Committee, its mandate was broadened in 2005 by the General Conference of UNESCO605 
adding mediation and conciliation to the Mandate of the Committee (Article 4.1. of the 
Statutes). Mediation involves a third party that seeks to assist disputing States in their 
negotiations. Although mediation falls short of adjudication, it involves the provision of 
suggestions, alternative proposals and attempts at reconciling the conflicting positions, the 
object of which is the resolution of the dispute through the negotiation of an agreed 
settlement. Conciliation, in contrast, is more formalized, and often involves the appointment 
of a conciliation commission by the disputing States. Although this might resemble an arbitral 
or judicial proceeding, the outcome of the mediation and conciliation is not binding on the 
parties concerned (Article 4.1. of the Statutes), and therefore takes the form of 
recommendations or opinions rather than a binding determination.606 If no solution can be 
found in the mediation and conciliation proceedings, the request for return remains before the 
Committee, similarly to any other unresolved case submitted to the Committee (Article 4.1. of 
                                                 
602 See: Press File of ICOM, Paris, 10 May 2010 on the Agreement for the donation of the Makonde Mask from 
the Barbier-Müller Museum of Geneva to the National Museum of Tanzania, 
http://icom.museum/press/MM_PressFile_eng.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
603 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 191. Prott refers 
to Brazil, the Byelorussian SSR, China, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Mali, Panama, Portugal, South Africa, the 
United States and Zaire, all of whom spoke on behalf of Resolution 3817 but never presented a request to the 
UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee. 
604 As, for example, was the case between Ethiopia and Italy regarding the return of the Axum obelisk, see supra 
Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1; and the case of the U.S.-Italian agreements, see supra Chapter Three, Section 
2.10). 
605 See: 33 C/Resolution 44, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 33rd session (3-21 October 
2005). 
606 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 15. 
 141
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
the Statutes).607 The possibilities of improving the role of the Committee and amending its 
mandate in view of mediation and conciliation will be discussed more in detail in Chapter Six, 
in terms of the practical consequences and alternatives considered by this thesis. 
3.3 Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 
UNESCO is not the only UN body that has dealt with the issue of restitution and 
return. Since 1972, the UN General Assembly (hereinafter UNGA) has regularly issued 
resolutions aimed at filling the gaps left by the legal instruments discussed above. In contrast 
to the UN Security Council (hereinafter UNSC), UNGA has no general legislative power, 
except a very limited number of financial matters that do not include cultural heritage 
matters.608 Therefore, resolutions adopted by the UNGA are legally non-binding (Article 10, 
13 UN-Charta) and are only ‘recommendations’ to its member States, to the UNSC, or 
both.609 However, the UNGA may also adopt declarations610 that might restate ‘principles’ 
with the consequence that they may be binding as custom or as an informal agreement that 
serve to facilitate the interpretation of the UN Charter. 
 
In 1973, the UNGA adopted its first resolution on the matter of restitution, which was 
entitled ‘Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of Expropriation’611. This 
resolution made specific reference to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples as well as to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. It deplores 
“the wholesale removal, virtually without payment, of objects d’art from one country to 
another, frequently as a result of colonial or foreign occupation” and claims for “prompt 
restitution […] without charge […] as it constitutes just reparation for damages done.” In 
1976, the terminological connotation of the resolution adopted changed; the UNGA resolution 
reissued under a new title: ‘The Protection and Restitution of Works of Art as Part of the 
                                                 
607 The UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee adopted at its 16th session (21-23 September 2010) Rules of 
Procedure for Mediation and Conciliation in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Statutes of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, CLT-2010/CONF.203/COM.16/7; full text available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001925/192534E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
608 Cf. Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 229. 
609 See Art. 10, 13 Charter of the United Nations; available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
610 For example, the 2007 UNGA Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the 
UNGA on 13 September 2007; for detailed discussion, see Chapter Three, Section 6.3 
611 UNGA Resolution on Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of Expropriation, (3187(XXVIII)), 28th 
Session, 18 December1973; available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
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Preservation and further Development of Cultural Values’.612 The change in the terminology 
demonstrates both an effort to mitigate against offending former colonial powers, and to 
emphasize the importance of protection and well as cooperation in cultural matters.613 In 
1978, the UNGA resolution introduces the term ‘return’ and speaks about ‘Restitution and 
Return of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin’ in the resolution’s title.614 Only one 
year later, the 1979 UNGA resolution inverts the terms in favor of the more neutral term 
‘return’, substitutes the ‘and’ with an ‘or’ − phrasing the title as ‘Return or Restitution of 
Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin’.615 The rapid modification of the terminology 
within only a few years is quite remarkable, considering the fact that the change affects not 
only the terms but also the concepts associated with this field of law. Since 1979, however, 
the titles of the UNGA resolutions pertaining to restitution and return have not modified.616 It 
is notably that the focus of these UNGA resolutions has been broadened to include the 
importance of international cooperation in restitution matters and the need for the preservation 
of the common cultural heritage. Moreover, practical suggestions, such as in the 1981 UNGA 
Resolution, have been made that added an appeal to museums and private collectors “to return 
totally or partially, or make available to the countries of origin […] the items kept in the 
storehouse of museums, and to help the countries of origin in their endeavors to prepare an 
inventory of collections”.617 
 
Despite the increasing recognition of the complexity of restitution matters over the 
past decades, the division of votes in the UNGA between the source countries, rich in cultural 
material, and the leading art-market countries has remained substantially the same.618 It is 
                                                 
612 UNGA Resolution on: Protection and Restitution of Works of Art as Part of the Preservation and further 
Development of Cultural Values, (A/RES/31/40), 31st Session, 30 November 1976, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/31/ares31.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
613 Fitschen, "30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr Gegenstand Abhanden 
Kam," p. 47. 
614 UNGA resolution Protection, Restitution and Return of Cultural and Artistic Property as Part of the 
Preservation and further Development of Cultural Values, (A/RES/30/50), 33rd Session, 14 December 1978, 
available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/33/ares33.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
615 UNGA resolution Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin, (A/RES/34/64), 34th 
Session, 29 November 1979, available at:  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/ares34.htm (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
616 See, UNGA resolutions on the Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin: 33/50 of 
14 December 1978, 34/64 of 29 November 1979, 35/127 and 35/128 of 11 December 1980, 36/64 of 27 
November 1981, 38/34 of 25 November 1983, 40/19 of 21 November 1985, 42/7 of 22 October 1987, 44/18 of 6 
November 1989, 46/10 of 22 October 1991, 48/15 of 2 November 1993, 50/56 of 11 December 1995, 52/24 of 
25 November 1997, 54/190 of 17 December 1999, 56/97 of 14 December 2001, 58/17 of 3 December 2003, 
61/52 of 4 December 2006 and 64/78 of 7 December 2009. 
for example, UNGA resolution (A/RES/61/52), 61st Session, 4 December 2006. 
617 UNGA Resolution 36/64, 1981 para. 7. 
618 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 818. 
 143
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
only in recent years that the voting pattern and, in particular, the number of abstentions in 
votes on these matters have changed.619 This change can be seen, for example, in the voting 
history of the U.S. and the U.K. which are both major art-market countries. The U.S. 
originally indicated that its abstention on the UNGA resolutions in no way affected the U.S. 
support for the evolution of general principles pertaining to cultural heritage matters, but 
rather that it was opposed to any governmental obligation beyond the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.620 In 2003, however, the U.S. assented to the UNGA Resolution No. 58/17.621 
The U.K., in turn, originally said it could not accept the principle that cultural property, which 
over the years had been acquired freely and legitimately, should be returned to their countries 
of origin.622 According to the U.K. position, the greater international collections of works of 
art constitute a unique international resource that benefits both the public and scholars alike. 
Nonetheless, the U.K. indicated that they would remain sympathetic to the wishes of States 
attempting to develop and improve their collections; and British museums would be pleased 
to collaborate.623 In 2002, however, the U.K. moderated its position, at least towards the 
trafficking in cultural objects, by ratifying the 1970 UNESCO Convention. The general 
moderation of positions can also be seen in the wording of the UNGA resolutions, which has 
not been substantially modified in recent years.624 
 
In summarizing, the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly have expressed 
many of the fundamental principles of interest in restitution and return, including: firstly, an 
affirmation of the implications of international cooperation in the matter of restitution and 
return of cultural materials; secondly, the necessity of taking adequate measures to prohibit 
and prevent illicit trafficking in cultural objects; thirdly, the necessity of preparing national 
inventories (as mentioned by the 1970 UNESCO Convention); fourthly, the desirability of 
strengthening museum facilities and infrastructures; and fifthly, the marshalling of 
professional expertise, the media and public opinion in favor of programs of restitution.625 
                                                 
619 Fitschen, "30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr Gegenstand Abhanden 
Kam," p. 50. 
620 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 230. 
621 Cf. Fitschen, "30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr Gegenstand 
Abhanden Kam," p. 50. 
622 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 231. 
623 Ibid., p. 231. 
624 See 2009 Resolution on the Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin (UN Doc. 
A/RES/64/78, 7 December 2009), which lists the relevant resolutions of the previous years since the first 
Resolution 3187 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973 (UN Doc. A/RES./3187 (1974)); available at: http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/466/51/PDF/N0946651.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 23 September 2011). 
625 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 212. 
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Moreover, it has to be noted that, despite their legally non-binding character, the UNGA 
resolutions demonstrate a shift in international law towards moderate wording with regards to 
restitution and return issues and thus indicate a change in how these matters are perceived by 
the international community. 
3.4 ECOSOC Resolutions and UNODC on Crime Prevention 
Although the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as one of the six principal 
organs of the UN, deals generally with the promotion of higher standards in economic and 
social affairs, it has recently begun to address the issue of trafficking in cultural materials. In 
order to facilitate the preparation of resolutions in this field, ECOSOC entrusted the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2004 and again in 2008,626 to provide ECOSOC 
with recommendations. Established in 1997, UNODC is active in elaborating preventive 
mechanisms in the area of human trafficking, migrant smuggling and trafficking in firearms. 
In order to confront the transnational organized crime in these specific areas, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, also 
known as Palermo Convention) in 2000,627 along with three supplementing protocols.628 At 
the request of ECOSOC, UNODC also undertakes activities in the field of illicit trafficking in 
cultural materials. This is only sensible, given that trafficking in cultural materials has become 
a major part of international crimes, in part due to cross-border nature of these activities and 
the structure of organized crime. In July 2010, ECOSOC adopted Resolution No. 2010/19, 
which was prepared by UNODC, on ‘Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice responses to 
protect cultural property especially with regard to its trafficking’.629  
 
                                                 
626 See, ECOSOC Resolution 2004/34, adopted 21 July 2004, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2004/resolution%202004-34.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011), and 
Resolution 2008/23, adopted July 24, 2008, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2008/resolution%202008-23.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
627 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UNGA Resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 
November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, opened for signature in Palermo, Italy, 12-15 December 2000, and entering 
into force 29 September 2003. Currently the Convention has 164 States parties, further information available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
628 The UN General Assembly adopted three protocols: based on Resolution No. 55/25 of 15 November 2000; 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2237 UNTS 319), 
entering into force 25 December 2003 (currently 146 States parties), the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2241 UNTS 507), entering into force 28 January 2004 (currently129 States parties); and based on 
Resolution No. 55/255 of 31 May 2001, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (2326 UNTS 208), entering into force 3 July 2005 (currently 89 States parties). 
629 ECOSOC Resolution 2010/19, adopted July 22, 2010, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2010/res%202010-19.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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As was demonstrated in the previous sections on UN resolutions and 
recommendations, the issue of illicit trafficking in cultural materials is interwoven with the 
issue of ‘restitution and return to the countries of origin’. Although most developed countries 
(art-market countries) attempt to separate these two issues in order to avoid a general (legal) 
obligation for the restitution and return of cultural objects, the wording of recent ECOSOC 
documents emphasizes the tendency towards a hybrid approach. The same tendency is also 
apparent within the works of UNODC. On the basis of the ECOSOC Resolution No. 2010/19 
the mandate of UNODC in the area of cultural materials has been strengthened. Thus, in its 
2010 resolution, ECOSOC requested that UNODC “further explore[s] the development of 
specific guidelines for crime prevention with respect to trafficking in cultural property” and 
the subsequent section adds “and its recovery and return”.630 The prospective activities of 
UNODC will determine whether and how UNODC might be able to establish itself as an 
additional forum – next to UNESCO – for the matter of illicit trafficking in cultural materials 
in the context of crime prevention, and whether UNODC will deal with general questions 
with regard to restitution and return. 
3.5 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art 
One of the most relevant, non-binding instruments pertaining to the restitution and 
return of Nazi-confiscated art is the Principles of the Washington Conference with Respect to 
Nazi-Confiscated Art, released on 3 December 1998 in connection with the Washington 
Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets.631 The Conference was initiated by the U.S. 
Undersecretary of State Stuart E. Eizenstat in order to find a general solution to the debate 
over unclaimed materials lost through Nazi persecution.632 Forty-four States as well as several 
non-governmental organizations such as associations for Jewish victims of persecution took 
part in the conference. The original objective of the U.S. delegation – namely to ratify 
internationally binding obligations – could not be achieved due to the different legal systems 
of the participating States with regard to stolen or otherwise lost artworks. The preamble to 
the Washington Principles that was approved at the 1998 conference expressly addressed the 
differences in these legal systems. 
 
                                                 
630 Ibid, see para. 16 and 17. 
631 Principles of the Washington Conference with Respect to Nazi-Confiscated Art, released 3 December 1998, 
full text available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm (accessed 23 August 2011); reprinted as 
Annex I of this thesis. 
632 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 230. 
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The principles, agreed on by all participating governments, contain legally non-
binding considerations; specifically, the principles contain no legal basis for bringing a claim 
to court.633 They are, however, an attempt to assist States in resolving cases of Nazi-
confiscated artworks. Thus, the general approach of these principles is to offer guidance in the 
informal resolution of these issues with the end-goal of brokering an agreement between 
otherwise litigious parties.634 The eleven principles include: (1) the identification of that 
property (Principles 1-3); considerations regarding the proof of evidence (Principle 4); the 
publication of relevant information pertaining to confiscated art (Principles 5-7); the 
achievement of just and fair solutions (Principles 8-9); the establishment of national 
commissions (Principle 10); and the development of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms for resolving ownership issues (Principle 11). These principles urge the 
participating states to facilitate the identification of Nazi-confiscated property in their public 
institutions and museums. Based on the national implementation635 of these non-binding 
principles, several cultural objects have been returned − involving not only German 
institutions636 but also, for example, the British Museum,637 the Swiss Art Museum in 
Chur,638 and the Israel Museum in Jerusalem.639 
                                                
 
Although the 1998 Washington Principles are only directed at States, some private 
institutions have also committed to implement them and accordingly have submitted their 
own declarations of self-regulations. Thus, the International Council of Museums (ICOM) 
released its own recommendations concerning the Return of Works of Art Belonging to 
 
633 Cf. Gunnar Schnabel and Monika Tatzkow, Nazi Looted Art, Handbuch Kunstrestitution Weltweit (2007), p. 
193. 
634 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 198. 
635 Cf. for example the “Guidelines” for implementing the Washington Principles of February 2001, revised in 
November 2007, (in German: Handreichung). For an overview of other national implementations, see the 
Central Registry of Information on Looted Cultural Property 1933-45, available at: 
http://www.lootedart.com/infobycountry (accessed 23 September 2011). 
636 One of the most controversial cases involved the return of the painting “Berliner Strassenzene” by Ernst 
Ludwig Kirchner from the Berlin Brücke Museum to the heirs of Hans Hess, detailed information available at: 
http://www.commartrecovery.org/germanex.php (accessed 23 September 2011). 
637 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 190. 
638 In 1999, the Bündner Foundation of the Art Museum Chur returned a painting entitled “Sewing School - The 
Workroom of the Amsterdam Orphanage” (German title:“Nähschule im Waisenhaus Amsterdam”) by Max 
Liebermann to the heirs of Max Silberberg, see for more details: Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: 
Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - Entwicklung, p. 276. 
639 In 2010, the Israel Museum returned a Paul Klee drawing to the estate of the Jewish art collector who owned 
the work before it was confiscated by the Nazis in 1941. The drawing was received in 1950 by the Israel 
Museum’s precursor, the Bezalel National Museum, through the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization, 
established after WWII to distribute Nazi-looted artworks whose owners or heirs were unknown; See: Israel 
Returns Nazi-Looted Art, Virtual Jerusalem, 29 September 2010, available at: 
http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/judaism.php?Itemid=952 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Jewish Owners in January 1999.640 A similar declaration to the Washington Principles was 
initiated by the European Council and expressed in the 2000 Declaration of Vilnius.641 This 
declaration also demands that all governments undertake all reasonable efforts to return 
Holocaust looted art to the original owners or their heirs. It stresses the importance of 
obtaining information, opening archives and facilitating the international collaboration of 
experts. Similarly to the 1998 Washington Principles, the 2000 Declaration of Vilnius forms a 
non-binding declaration of intent.  
 
The 1998 Washington Principles were reaffirmed by the Holocaust Era Materials 
Conference in June 2009, ten years after their coming into force. Under the auspices of the 
Czech presidency to the European Union, forty-six governments and several non-
governmental organizations adopted the (non-legally binding) Terezin Declaration of 30 June 
2009.642 In addition to the issues addressed in the 1998 Washington Principles (which focuses 
specifically on Nazi-confiscated movable cultural property), the Terezin Declaration deals 
with issues such as welfare of Holocaust (Shoah) survivors and other victims of Nazi 
persecution, immovable property, Jewish cemeteries and burial sites, judaica (religious 
cultural materials), archival materials, remembrance, research and memorial sites. 
4. Forms of Self-regulation: Codes of Conduct and Codes of Ethics 
In addition to legal provisions and soft law instruments, public and private codes of 
conduct have been established not only to rectify the international acquisition policies of 
museums and art dealers, but also to stimulate restitution matters. While such codes of 
conduct do not provide legal basis of claims for restitution (as they are not binding or legally 
enforceable),643 they might foster the development of good practices in a certain field of law 
and, eventually, might facilitate the evolution of legal provisions in that field. Given that this 
thesis argues for the construction of policy objectives in conjunction with the development of 
international legal provisions on restitution and return, these practical changes in museum 
codes of conducts and museum policies are highly relevant in defining the mechanisms that 
might alter current restitution practices. 
                                                 
640 ICOM Recommendations concerning the Return of Works of Art Belonging to Jewish Owners, December 14, 
1999, available at: http://icom.museum/worldwar2.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
641 Vilnius Forum Declaration, 5 October 2000, available at: http://www.lootedart.com/MFV7EE39608 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
642 Holocaust Era Materials Conference, Prague and Terezin, 26-30 June, 2009.Terezin Declaration of 30 June 
2009, text available at: http://www.lootedartcommission.com/NPNMG484641 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
643 Brodie, An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities, in:  Art and Cultural Heritage 
(2006),  Hoffmann, p. 52, 58. 
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4.1 ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums 
Guidelines regarding restitution and return of cultural property have also been 
provided by non-governmental organizations. Major actor among the NGOs concerned with 
cultural property is the International Council of Museums (ICOM), as an affiliate of 
UNESCO. ICOM is the largest international association of museums, with members in more 
than 140 countries, and it represents the museum community at its broadest, most inclusive 
level. Museum professionals associated with ICOM include curators, collection managers, 
archaeologists, and anthropologists. In 1986, ICOM established its Code of Ethics for 
Museums644 (hereinafter the ICOM Code) as a guide for professionals working with and 
within museums. Generally, such codes of ethics adopted by museums, other institutions and 
associations encourage compliance with legal requirements of return and restitution. They 
also serve to deter the doubtful acquisitions of cultural artifacts.645 Amended and revised in 
2001 and 2004, the ICOM Code of Ethics establishes basic expectations about the 
responsibility of museums and sets out minimum standards of professional practice and 
performance for museums and their staff. In May 2011, ICOM launched a so-called 
‘Checklist on Ethics of Cultural Property Ownership’ in order to organize the rather detailed 
and comprehensive articles of the ICOM Code of Ethics into eight core principles.646 Through 
the Code of Ethics as well as the 2011 Checklist, ICOM is attempting to raise awareness 
pertaining to ethical standards among the museum community. More specifically, ICOM is 
attempting to facilitate the international exchange of cultural objects by encouraging and 
standardizing the terms of loans and temporary exhibitions. It urges its member institutions to 
refuse the acquisition or display of works with an incomplete or doubtful provenance, and 
imposes an ethical obligation on members to uphold the export laws of foreign States and to 
establish a full history of a work of art prior to considering its acquisition.647 Although ICOM 
also promotes the preservation of cultural materials as part of the common heritage of all 
mankind, it nevertheless considers cultural heritage as strongly linked to its original context, 
and is therefore in line with the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.648 
                                                 
644 ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, 1986, amended 2001, 2004, available at: http://icom.museum/ethics.html 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
645 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 257. 
646 ‘Checklist on Ethics of Cultural Property Ownership’ establishing ‘The Principles of the ICOM Code of 
Ethics for Museums’ compiled by ICOM and the Koordinierungsstelle Magdeburg, Germany, full text and 
further information available at: http://icom.museum/who-we-are/the-vision/code-of-ethics/checklist-on-
ethics.html (accessed 23 September 2011). Text of the Principles reprinted as Annex III to this thesis. 
647 Robert Hallman, "Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist Approach," 
International Journal of Cultural Property 12(2005): p. 205. 
648 Ibid.: p. 204. 
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In terms of restitution, the ICOM Code includes the provision that members should be 
willing to consider restitution of cultural property by stating in its paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 that: 
“[…] based on scientific, professional and humanitarian principles as well as applicable local, 
national and international legislation, […] the museum concerned should, if legally free to do 
so, take prompt and responsible steps to co-operate in its return”. More specifically, and at the 
request of UNESCO, ICOM prepared a 1977 document entitled ‘Study on Principles, 
Conditions and Means for Restitution or Return of Cultural Property in View of 
Reconstituting Dispersed Heritage’ that paved the way for the establishment of the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee.649 In this study, ICOM declared that the reassembly of 
dispersed heritage through restitution or the return of objects, which are of major importance 
for the cultural identity and history of States that had previously been deprived thereof, should 
be considered to be an ethical principle recognized and affirmed by the international 
community.650 It also appealed to all its members “[…] to help disinherited countries to 
constitute representative collections of their heritage and to facilitate bilateral governmental 
negotiations in this field”.651 
 
As a practical manner, ICOM recommended in its 1977 study the creation of a special 
fund to be used as the privileged instrument to facilitate the reinforcement of the actions of 
the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee (created in 1978).652 So far, this entity has failed 
to receive proper funding. Comparable codes formulated by the U.S. museum organizations, 
like the AAM Code of Ethics,653 are demonstrably weaker. As a result, the rather strict ICOM 
Code has often been largely ignored in the past, although more and more museums and other 
art holding institutions now refer to the standards adopted by ICOM. However, trades in 
antiquities often still argue that it is the responsibility of States to protect their own heritage 
by national law, thereby implying that any material that slips out onto the market is fair game 
and therefore not illegal.654 The ICOM Code has been criticized based on the fact that it has 
                                                 
649 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
650 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 257. 
651 Quoted and referred to in UNESCO Doc. 20C/86, General Conference of UNESCO, 20th Session, 1978, p. 1; 
see also Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 234. 
652 ‘Information kit on Restitution’ (section on the Third Legal Development), published by the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its 
Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001394/139407eb.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
653 Statement on the Ethics of Acquisition by the American Association of Museum (AAM), 1993. 
654 Neil Brodie, "An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities," in Art and Cultural 
Heritage, ed. Barbara Hoffmann (Cambridge: 2006), p. 58. 
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not been fully accepted within the international museum community, partially because its 
State-based approach is unlikely to adequately represent the interest of the entire museum 
community, especially that of very actively collecting art institutions.655 However, only a 
small proportion of the international museum community is composed of actual purchasers 
and institutions that actively collect cultural artifacts from beyond the borders of their home 
country. For the rest of the museum community, including smaller national, local and poorly 
funded museums, international acquisitions are a non-issue.656 It should be noted that the 
Getty Museum in Los Angeles, one of the most active collecting institution in the world, had 
already introduced a revised acquisition policy, prior to concluding its bilateral agreement 
with Italy; this makes the Getty the first U.S. museum to adopt strict UNESCO standards.657 
 
Generally speaking, codes of ethics function only as a set of guidelines, as they are not 
legally binding.658 Although codes of conduct do not provide a legal basis for restitution 
claims, they nevertheless provide a system of voluntary regulations that shape international 
conducts and practices in the field. This is not only true for acquisition and collecting 
practices, but also for conducts in restitution matters. Whether it is openly acknowledged or 
not, the reassembly of dispersed heritage through restitution and return as well as the return of 
artifacts with a dubious provenance can already be considered to be an ethnical principle that 
might eventually become an element of customary international law.659 It is notable that the 
1977 ICOM Study did not address the issue of restitution as an ‘ethical principle’, but instead 
connects the question of restitution with the interest to reassemble dispersed cultural 
materials. Furthermore, this idea of reassembling is restricted to dispersed objects of ‘major 
importance’ for the cultural identity and history of a certain country, although what this term 
specifically encompasses has not been clarified. 
 
The best example of the issues associated with the reassembly of dispersed cultural 
heritage is best illustrated through perhaps the most famous restitution case: namely the claim 
by Greece for the return of the Parthenon Marbles, currently on display in the British 
                                                 
655 Hallman, "Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist Approach," p. 204. 
656 Ibid.: p. 203. 
657 As stated by the Getty Museum’s director Michael Brand, see: The Getty’s side, Los Angeles Times, 28 
November 2006, p. 21. 
658 Brodie, "An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities," p. 58. 
659 See, the 1977 ICOM Study on Principles, Conditions and Means for Restitution or Return of Cultural 
Property in View of Reconstituting Dispersed Heritage’ of the ICOM ad hoc ‘Committee for the restitution or 
return of cultural property to the country of origin. 
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Museum.660 Since 1983, the Greek authorities have been requesting the return of the three 
sets of sculptures (the metopes, the frieze and the pediments) held by the British Museum,661 
other fragments of the Parthenon are dispersed across several museums in Europe, but have 
not yet been officially requested by Greece. Several fragments can be found: at the Louvre in 
Paris; two heads belonging to a metope that is in the British Museum are now in Copenhagen; 
and further fragments of the Parthenon frieze can be found in Palermo and the Vatican; at the 
Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna; at the Antikensammlung in Munich, at the Würzburg 
University Museum, and at the Strasbourg University Museum. This example illustrates two 
issues: firstly, that restitution disputes might involve multiple claims involving various States; 
and, secondly, that the interest in the integrity of a cultural object (or a group of objects, as in 
the case of the Parthenon Marbles) should play a role in the resolution of restitution disputes.  
 
In some cases, the place in which an object is displayed and kept does not appear to 
make a significant difference to the cultural value of the object; however in other cases, the 
cultural value of the object might be significantly influenced by its spatial integrity and its 
proximity to its place of origin. This is certainly the case with the Parthenon Marbles. 
Therefore, restitution should perhaps be favored in cases in which the dispersed objects can be 
reassembled and their cultural unity can be restored; whereas restitution should perhaps be 
denied in cases in which restitution would result in the disruption of the unity of an object or – 
and this might be arguable – of a unique collection of objects.662 
4.2 2006 Principles of the International Law Association 
In order to move the regime of international law beyond its current, essentially 
adversarial status quo in restitution matters, the Committee on Cultural Heritage Law of the 
International Law Association (hereinafter: ILA) adopted the ‘Principles for Cooperation in 
the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material’ in 2006.663 The ILA − originally 
                                                 
660 Kate Fitz Gibbon, "The Elgin Marbles – a Summary," in Who Owns the Past? Cultural Policy, Cultural 
Property, and the Law, ed. Kate Fitz Gibbon (2005), pp. 109. 
661 The case of the Parthenon Marbles is pending in front of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee since 
1984, for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
662 For detailed analysis of the interests in integrity and context, see Chapter Five, Section 3.3. 
663 Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material, adopted by the 
International Law Association (ILA), Resolution No. 4/2006, 72nd Conference, held in Toronto, 4-8 June 2006; 
full text available at: http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/13 (accessed 23 September 2011); text 
reprinted as Annex II to this thesis. 
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called the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations664 − is an 
international non-governmental organization founded in Brussels in 1873, which today has 
consultative status with a number of UN organizations, including UNESCO. The objectives 
set out in its constitution are "[…] the study, clarification and development of international 
law".665  
 
In 1998, the Committee prepared a report, which was directed towards the 
development of a framework of principles that would include the sharing of and the public 
access to common cultural heritage.666 The starting point for this report was the Committee’s 
concern about the polarization of the legal framework in international cultural heritage law 
due to the existence of two extreme positions: on the one hand, the demand for the outright 
return of cultural objects and, on the other, the retentive view that cultural objects should only 
be returned under very limited circumstances.667 In view of the concern over this polarity and 
of the growing interest in and need for the development of alternative schemes, the 
Committee set out to create a set of recommendations designed to advance “a broader regime 
based on sharing and enhanced circulation of cultural heritage, rather than on reconciling 
principles of retention and return”.668 The Committee detects a “persistent weaknesses in the 
conventional mechanisms” in international cooperation and the protection of cultural heritage. 
Moreover, the Committee determined these mechanisms to be a “failure”, since they do not 
resolve the tensions between the claims for return and the art-market-based defenses for the 
retention of contested objects. In its report, the ILA also recommends that UNESCO should 
adopt cooperative, rather than unrealistically restrictive provisions in its standard-setting 
instruments.669 
 
Based on the preparatory work of the 1998 ILA Report, the 2006 ILA Principles 
pursued two objectives: firstly, to provide assistance in the resolution of restitution disputes; 
and secondly, to facilitate cooperation, exchange and transfer of cultural materials. The 
exchange and transfer of cultural objects, according to the ILA, might not only support the 
core value of education, but might also provide alternatives to the controversial acquisitions 
                                                 
664 Cf. Robert K. Paterson, "The "Caring and Sharing"Alternative: Recent Progress in the International Law 
Association to Develop Draft Cultural Material Principles," International Journal of Cultural Property (2005): 
p. 63. 
665 See: http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/13 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
666 “Heritage Law Creation – 1998 Report“, in Int’l L. Ass’n, Report of the 68th Conference, p. 217. 
667 Cf. Paterson, "The "Caring and Sharing"Alternative," p. 64. 
668 Report of 1998, p. 218. 
669 Cf. Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 273. 
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of objects, in the present or past, that so often generate deadlocked restitution disputes.670 
Therefore, the 2006 ILA Principles introduce a multi-value framework of principles, which 
contain two major practical considerations. The first is the development of guidelines (by 
museums or other institutions) which “may include alternatives to outright transfer such as 
loans, productions of copies, and shared management and control”.671 The second concerns 
public access, and suggests that objects, which are “seldom or never on public display or 
otherwise inaccessible should be lend or otherwise made available to the requesting party, 
particularly a party at the place of origin”.672 Although the latter suggestion in particular 
might seem to be quite self-evident from a practical point of view, it is groundbreaking in 
view of current practices and realities in restitution matters. 
 
The 2006 ILA Principles also attempt to cover new grounds in terms of overcoming 
the terminology that is traditionally used in legal instruments.673 Thus, the ILA Principles 
employ the more neutral term of “requests” instead of using the more traditional “claims for 
restitution and return”; they speak of “cultural material” rather than of “cultural property”; 
and they replace the commonly used term of “restitution disputes” (that implies an adverse 
connotation) by a rather cumbersome description of “good-faith negotiations concerning 
requests for transfer”. This description not only employs the neutral term “request” but also 
the non-legal but unencumbered term of “transfer”.674 Moreover, the 2006 ILA Principles also 
create a set of considerations to be taken into account by the negotiating parties. These 
include: the (1) significance of the object for the requesting party; (2) the reunification of 
dispersed cultural material; (3) the accessibility to the cultural material; and (4) its physical 
protection.675 It is, however, important to notice that “none of these considerations [expressed 
in the ILA Principles] may be legally enforceable but their observance reflects changing 
public policy and the recognition of the special signification of much cultural material to 
humanity in general.”676  
                                                 
670 Ibid., p. 275. 
671 2006 ILA Principles, Section Three (i), entitled: “Alternatives to the Transfer of Cultural Materials”. 
672 See, 2006 ILA Principles, Section Three (iii). 
673 For details on the problem of terminology in restitution matters, see supra, Chapter Two, Section 3. 
674 The neutral and non-legal term of “transfer” has also been used in the bilateral U.S.-Italian agreements, see 
supra: Chapter Three, Section 2.10 as well as in the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra, Chapter Three, 
Section 2.2. Moreover, the 2005 Swiss law that implements the 1970 UNESCO Convention is entitled: “Cultural 
Property Transfer Act” (CPTA), thus also this national law employs the notion “transfer”; the full text of the 
Swiss law is available at: http://www.bak.admin.ch/themen/kulturguetertransfer/01104/index.html?lang=en 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
675 See, 2006 ILA Principles, Section Eight, entitled: “Considerations for Negotiations concerning Requests”. 
676 See, note on the 2006 ILA Principles, Section Eight. 
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In summarizing, the 2006 ILA Principles have moved the discussion pertaining to 
international cultural heritage disputes towards a greater consideration of policy solutions. 
The attempt undertaken by the ILA to overcome the “persistent weaknesses in the 
conventional (legal) mechanisms” indicates the need for alternative approaches to restitution 
that go beyond the current restitution practices. Moreover, the considerations set out by the 
2006 ILA Principles clearly underline the general principles identified by this thesis, namely 
preservation, access, integrity, and cooperation. Most notably, the 2006 ILA Principles also 
include practical suggestions in terms of alternatives to the “outright transfer” of cultural 
objects, “such as loans, productions of copies, and shared management and control”.677 It is 
this practical approach to restitution matters that is highly promising.678 
5. Ethical and Historical Considerations − ‘Remedying Historical Injustice’ 
The decision to return cultural materials often involves moral or ethical concerns that 
are motivated by the desire to ‘remedy historical injustices’. Using different terminology to 
describe the same phenomena, ethical and historical considerations have also been described 
as: “repairing past injustices”, “reparations for past wrongs”, or “coming to terms with the 
past”.679 Thus, the subject of removal and return of cultural materials raises not only legal but 
also complex ethical and historical issues.680 Although not strictly a legal basis for a claim, 
ethical and historical considerations are essential in international cultural heritage law. This is 
primarily because the return of cultural materials is often undertaken based on non-legal 
considerations, but rather demonstrate political and diplomatic commitment,681 as well as the 
moral acknowledgment of claims by the returning party. As will be demonstrated in this 
section, moral and historical considerations decisively shape international practice pertaining 
to restitution and return, probably more than in any other field of the law. 
 
                                                 
677 Cf. 2006 ILA Principles, Section Three (i), entitled: “Alternatives to the Transfer of Cultural Materials”. 
678 For a detailed discussion on complementary and alternative mechanisms beyond restitution, see Chapter Six, 
Section 3. 
679 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?," in Bitburg in Moral and 
Political Perspective, ed. Geoffrey Hartman (1986). This essay is a translation of “Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung 
der Vergangenheit”, first published in 1959, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main. 
680 Guido Carducci, "The Growing Complexity of International Art Law: Conflict of Laws, Uniform Law, 
Mandatory Rule, Unsc Resolutions and Eu Regulations," in Art and Cultural Heritage, ed. Barbara Hoffmann 
(2006), p. 68. 
681 On the importance of political and diplomatic commitment, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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While ethical and historical considerations may influence the elaboration of a legal 
rule, ethics as such are not legally binding a priori.682 Unless a legal instrument expressly 
stipulates consequences, non-compliance with an ethical rule or principle per se does not 
result in legally enforceable action. However, ethical considerations − such as a code of ethics 
or a declaration of principles − can be used to define or interpret legal terms or even to lay out 
a set of principles modifying the current state of law.683  
 
International legal instruments providing restitution and return have emerged primarily 
over the last sixty years,684 and, as is commonly the case in international law, do not operate 
retroactively. This is problematic because many current restitution claims occurred as the 
result of historical events that took place before the promulgation of such measures (i.e. prior 
to 1945). Consequently, enforceable legal action is often not an option, and this results an 
unsatisfying outcome for claimants, both legally and ethically. It is this concurrence of 
circumstances that has led to a situation in which ethical and historical considerations merge, 
and requires the law to consider what can be summarized as ‘the remedying of historical 
injustice’. This is particularly applicable in cases in which the removal of a particular cultural 
object might have been considered as ‘legal’ or at least ‘common practice’ at the time of its 
appropriation, but now fails to comply with present human rights standards, such as those that 
are classified as internationally wrongful acts, including war of aggression and genocide.685  
 
Therefore, the question of removal and return of cultural materials is placed squarely 
within the context of the international community’s effort to provide legal protection for 
cultural heritage and human rights, while also requiring outcomes in restitution matters that 
are both legally and ethically satisfying.686 The mandate to take ethical and historical 
considerations into account within the context of restitution matters might even facilitate 
restitution outcomes that are more appropriate to the interests of the parties concerned and 
more result-oriented in practical terms than the mere application of legal instruments. This is 
because legal instruments – if they were applicable – might provide the reinstatement of 
ownership, without consideration of the particular circumstances that led to the removal of the 
property. 
                                                 
682 Cf. Guido Carducci, "Ethics, Law and Heritage," ICOM News, no. 3 (2005): p. 5. 
683 For example, the 1998Washington Principles on Nazi-confiscated Art; see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5.  
684 For details on the history of international cultural heritage law, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
685 Cf. Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, p. 299. 
686 ———, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 13. 
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The current human rights regime in international law developed as a result of the end 
of WWII and the subsequent era of decolonization; both of these events have fueled the sense 
that actions that were not technically illegal at the time they took place are now being 
reclassified as illegitimate. Against the backdrop of this broader understanding of human 
rights, it is only logical for certain parties to argue that such historical injustices must be 
compensated or redressed.687 In addition to the early developments in the new human rights 
regime following WWII, a new debate about how historical injustices could be redressed 
began with the end of the Cold War. This recent debate has increased the attention paid to 
efforts focused on the remedying of historical injustices, and the integration of ethical and 
historical considerations into the human rights discourse in international law. As a result, this 
recent focus on remedying historical injustices has also entered the debates surrounding the 
restitution and return of cultural materials.  
 
The attempt to achieve redress for historical injustices is part of a process that could be 
described as the ‘democratization of international law’, which triangulates justice, morality, 
and human rights.688 While general human rights considerations dominate the discussion, the 
critical discourse involves a rather vague set of ethic and moral values, which is cognizant of 
the tension between national governments, ethnic and minority groups and individuals. The 
intricate tension between group and individual rights is often at the core of restitution matters 
(as restitution and return of cultural materials can affect efforts at self-determination).689 An 
equitable system should be able to balance the interests of the current possessor (and bona 
fide purchaser), and States, indigenous peoples, and ethnic or religious groups.690 
Contemporary theories that address the problem of redress have not successfully resolved this 
tension, and the appeal to abstract rights detached from any historical context has long been 
criticized.691 That said, national governments, commercial companies, and even individuals 
have taken the burden of remedying past wrongs on themselves, by compensating for past 
injustice as well as present inequity and discrimination. The growing public awareness 
pertaining to the necessity of remedying historical injustices has given rise to restitution and 
reconciliation programs, official governmental apologies, and compensation funds. Examples 
                                                 
687 Torpey, "Politics and the Past," p. 4. 
688 Elazar Barkan, "Introduction: Reparation: A Moral and Political Dilemma," in Reparations: Interdisciplinary 
Inquiries, ed. Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar (2007), p. 2. 
689 On restitution and the right to self-determination, see Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
690 For an analysis of the stakeholders, see Chapter Five, Section 1. 
691 Cf. Barkan, "Introduction: Reparation: A Moral and Political Dilemma," p. 2. 
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of redress include the South African “Restitution of Land Rights Act” of 1994, which 
provides for the restitution of land rights to both individuals and communities who were 
dispossessed under apartheid;692 the attempt of more than forty governments to determine 
general principles that should be able to generate “just and fair” solutions with regard to Nazi-
confiscated cultural properties in 1998 (Washington Principles);693 the attempts by Germany 
to make reparations to those individuals subjected to forced labor during WWII through 
establishing the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation, which has provided 
special funds and an educational program since 2000;694 and the apology made by the 
Australian Prime Minister to indigenous Australians in 2008.695  
 
With regard to the return of cultural materials, the informal and voluntary return of 
such objects might be the material consequence of ethical and historical considerations 
pertaining to the circumstances of the removal or that of later acquisition. Although the aspect 
of ‘voluntary return’ pertaining to complementary and alternative mechanisms to current 
restitution practices will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Six,696 some brief remarks will be 
made at this stage in conjunction with the discourse on ethical and historical considerations in 
restitution matters. Voluntary return means that the return is made without a request for 
financial compensation (in contrast to cases of bona fide purchase), it is conducted without 
any formal (legal) procedure, and was not facilitated by third-party mediation.697 Voluntary 
return of cultural materials as an international practice is still controversial, since some fear 
that such initiatives would create legal precedence, and would eventually decimate the 
collections held by Western museums.698 Despite these concerns, several voluntary returns of 
                                                 
692 No. 22 of 1994: Restitution of Land Rights Act, 25 November 1994, full text available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1994/a22-94.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011); for details: Ruth Hall, "Two Cycles 
of Land Policy in South Africa: Tracing the Contours.," in The Struggle over Land in Africa, ed. Ward Anseeuw 
and Chris Alden (2010), pp. 176.  
693 See, principles eight and nine of the 1998 Washington Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, 3 December 1998; 
for a detailed discussion, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
694 The Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and Future" with its German Forced Labor Compensation 
Program was established on 2 August 2000. A forced labor fund,  financed jointly by the German government 
and private German enterprises involved in WWII, has paid out more than EUR 4.4 billion to 1.66 million of 
living victims around the world (these are one-off payments of between 2,500 to 7,500 Euros); details available 
at: http://www.stiftung-evz.de/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
695 The “Apology to the Stolen Generations” by the Australian Federal Parliament, read out by the Prime Minster 
Kevin Rudd regarding the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, 13 February 2008; full text 
available at:   http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,23206157-2,00.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
696 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
697 Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - Entwicklung, p. 
275. 
698 Such concerns, for example, have been expressed in the 2002 Declaration on the Importance and Value of 
Universal Museums, signed by major European and North-American Museums, stating: “We should, however, 
recognize that objects acquired in earlier times must be viewed in the light of different sensitivities and values, 
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cultural objects have been undertaken over the last years, and many of these cases involved 
Nazi-looted art.699  
 
Thus, voluntary actions might be considered as equivalent to soft law principles that 
also are not legally enforceable, but nevertheless influence current practices and standards, 
and indicate tendencies toward the further development of international law in the area of 
restitution and return.700 One example of voluntary return, among many others, is the decision 
taken by the American art collector Shelby White to return nine Greek and Etruscan 
antiquities to the Italian government in 2008. Although White insisted that she had bought 
these items in good faith, she decided to return them in part because of informal allegations 
that these items had been illegally excavated.701 Although voluntary return might be trigged 
in some cases by reputational concerns, or the fear of negative publicity and/or future 
litigation, the impetus to redress past injustices clearly dominates much of the debate 
surrounding restitution matters. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Ethical and historical considerations are particularly relevant to restitution matters that 
involve claims made by ethnic and religious (minority) groups. This is because the rights of 
these groups as well as their cultural perspectives and cultural identities were largely absent or 
essentially disregarded at the time of removal. In several cases, the museum or public 
institution currently holding appropriated cultural material are closely associated with the 
former colonial powers that were responsible for the removal, thereby perpetuating the denial 
of cultural rights.702 Although some acquisitions by Western museums – whether by 
purchase, gift, or partage – have been legal, others are far more questionable. Moreover, the 
ethical and historical considerations pertaining to the circumstances of removal often taint the 
acquisition of such objects.703 Especially in those cases that involve belligerent occupation 
reflective of that earlier era.”; reprinted in ICOM News No. 1 (2004), and available at: 
http://icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p4_2004-1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
699 Siehr, "Vereinheitlichung Des Rechts Der Kulturgüter in Europa?," p. 816. Siehr refers on p. 816 Fn. 33 to 
twelve cases of voluntary return in the period between 1998 and 2000.  
700 Cf. Bothe et al., Völkerrecht, p. 21. 
701 See: Elisabetta Povoledo, Collector Returns Art Italy Says Was Looted, in: The New York Times, 18 January 
2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/arts/18collect.html?_r=1&ref=arts (accessed 23 
September 2011). A tenth and remaining piece, a rare fifth-century B.C. Greek vessel, will be returned to Italy in 
2010. 
702 James D. Nason, "Beyond Repatriation: Cultural Policy and Practice for the Twenty-First Century," in 
Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation, ed. Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao (1997), pp. 291. 
703 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 392. See also: Vrdoljak, "Reparations for Cultural Loss," p. 197. 
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and genocide, the broader ethical dimension of international cultural heritage law cannot be 
neglected; rather this must play an active role in attempts to resolve restitution matters. 
nited 
Nations. 
tural heritage; (3) the right to self-
determination; and (4) the protection of cultural heritage. 
                                                
 
In summarizing, this section on ethical and historical considerations has clearly shown 
that attempts to resolve current restitution matters cannot be facilitate without the application 
of human rights consideration or considerations pertaining to the fairness and equity of the 
circumstances under which cultural materials were removed. Informal and voluntary return 
can be the practical consequence of attempts to remedy historical injustices. Moreover, ethical 
and historical considerations might facilitate the development and application of a more 
conciliatory restitution and returns regime. In contrast, the exclusive application of legal 
instruments may frequently prove unsatisfactory in attempts to remedy historical injustices.704 
Although the return (embedded in cooperation and exchange in cultural heritage matters) may 
be only a token gesture, it is, nevertheless, an important one, if undertaken properly. 
6. Customary International Law 
One of the primary sources of international law ─ other than international treaties and 
general principles of the law ─ is customary law.705 Customary international law consists of 
rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States that act in a certain manner out of a 
belief that they are legally required to act that way.706 The elements of customary 
international law include: (1) the widespread repetition of similar international acts by States 
over time; this is referred to as State practice (objective element); (2) the requirement that 
these acts must occur out of a sense of obligation, i.e. the belief that a behavior was performed 
because it was a legal obligation; this is referred to opinio juris (subjective element); and (3) 
that the acts are simultaneously accepted by and not rejected by a significant number of 
States. In other words, customary international law must be derived from a clear consensus 
among States, which in turn may be expressed as international law through the U
 
The following section will assess the impact of customary international law on 
resolving restitution disputes with regard to following four issues: (1) restitution and return of 
cultural materials; (2) the reunification of dispersed cul
 
704 Cf. Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 238. 
705 See, Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
706 Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (1984), p. 55. 
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6.1 International Custom regarding Restitution and Return 
Whereas for centuries looting and plunder of cultural materials have commonly been 
assumed to be the privilege of the victorious party in a conflict,707 the beginning of the 
nineteenth century saw the establishment of a prohibition against such removals as a principle 
of international law.708 The stipulation requiring the return of cultural materials appropriated 
during armed conflict under customary international law is indisputable, and is moreover 
ensured by the provisions of the 1899709 and 1907710 Hague Conventions Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (Article 46 and 47).711 Subsequent to the massive 
destruction and looting in WWII, these customs were reconfirmed by the 1954 Hague 
Convention,712 which prohibits theft, pillage, misappropriation, and any act of vandalism 
directed against monuments and works of art. Whereas these provisions under customary 
international law pertain to combatants in armed conflicts, the obligation to restore cultural 
objects displaced by third parties uninvolved in the armed conflict (as provided by the 1954 
Protocol to the Hague Convention) has yet to be generally accepted, and therefore cannot be 
viewed as part of customary international law.713 Some scholars, however, assume that the 
prohibition on the removal of cultural materials from occupied territories and the 
corresponding obligation to return such property does not yet constitute customary 
international law.714 Their argument is that there is a sufficient lack of State practice, since 
several States do not act accordingly. This is certainly true: Russia, for example, has 
contradicted this obligation to return cultural materials, as it pertains to the removals by 
Soviet troops at the end of WWII.715 However, Russia does not dispute the general principle 
                                                 
707 Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 109. 
708 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter Two, Section 2. 
709 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899), entering into force 
September 4, 1900, reprinted in AJIL, vol. 1 (1907), p. 129. 
710 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, adopted 18 October 1907, entering into force 26 January 
1910), reprinted in AJIL, vol. 2 (1908), p. 90. 
711 Cf. Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 356. In the same vein: Freytag, "Cultural Heritage: Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf 
"Ihr" Kulturgut?," p. 183. 
712 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts (adopted 14 
May 1954, entering into force 7 August 1956), 249 UNTS 215; for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.1. 
713 Francesco Francioni, "Au-Dela Des Traites: L'emergence D'un Nouveau Droit Coutumier Pour La Protection 
Du Patrimoine Culturel," Revue Générale de Droit International Public 1, no. 11 (2007): p. 29.; Freytag, 
"Cultural Heritage: Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf "Ihr" Kulturgut?," p. 183. 
714 Raymond Goy, "La Restitution Des Objets Culturels Deplacés En Relation Avec La Second Guerre Mondiale 
À L'unesco," Hague Yearbook of International Law (2008): p. 60-67. In the same vein: Guido Carducci, La 
Restitution Internationale Des Biens Culturels Et Des Objets D'art: Droit Commun, Directive Cee, Convention 
De L’unesco Et D’unidroit (1997), p. 123-24. 
715 See, supra Chapter Two, Section 2 
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of restitution, but argues that there should be exceptions to restitution and war reparations, 
namely ‘restitution in kind’, allowing Russia to retain cultural objects as “non-pecuniary 
restitution for cultural property destroyed or irretrievably lost as a result of aggression”.716 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), however, ruled in the Nicaragua case that “the Court 
does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice 
must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. […] If a State acts in a way prima 
facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions 
or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in 
fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to 
weaken the rule”.717 On this basis, and the basis of the Hague Conventions of 1899, 1907 and 
1954, it is clear that international legal custom prohibits the misappropriation of cultural 
materials from occupied territories during armed conflicts, and therefore imposes an 
obligation to return displaced cultural materials. 
                                                
 
The question, however, is whether such an obligation under customary international 
law persists in times of peace. A simple application of the war-time provisions to the peace-
time regime, while desirable, would contradict the principles of customary international law. 
The identification of a peace-time obligation to return cultural materials under customary 
international law begins with the widespread iteration of State practice, as mentioned above. 
This means that a decisive number of States must repetitively return cultural objects, and that 
they do so out of a sense of legal obligation, as required by opinio juris. 
 
An indication of the development of such a custom can be seen in the several 
UNESCO recommendations and declarations on this issue adopted by UNESCO member 
States.718 Moreover, the nearly biannual restatement of the resolution on the ‘Return or 
Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin’ by the UN General Assembly 
since the early 1970s also point in this direction.719 Although the number of States adopting 
 
716 See in this regard the ‘Statement by the Russian Federation Delegation on the Draft of the Declaration of the 
Declaration of Principles relating to cultural objects displaced in connection with the Second World War’, 27 
October 2009 on the occasion of the General Conference, 35th session, Paris 6-23 October 2009. For further 
details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.1. The statement by Russia is available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/f68cd37b84711611c3256f6d00541094/acd8b550dd73f5c6c325765d005601d8?Ope
nDocument (accessed 23 September 2011). 
717 Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States of America). 
Merits, Judgment of 26 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186. 
718 For a detailed discussion, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.1. 
719 For a detailed discussion, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.3. 
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the UNGA resolution on restitution and return has increased over the last thirty years, it is 
doubtful as to whether the constant reiteration of resolutions by the UN General Assembly 
provides anything more than a reminder to the international community that the question of 
restitution and return has yet to be fully resolved.720 The continuing vigorous debate among 
professionals associated with collecting institutions within art-market countries, as well as 
initiatives towards stricter codes of conduct (for example the ICOM code of conduct as well 
as others) indicate a growing awareness of restitution matters in the private sector as well. 
These developments both on the international and national level have also been furthered by 
the evolution of international treaties and bilateral agreements pertaining to restitution and 
return, as well as voluntary acts of return by States and individuals.721  
 
Nevertheless, the question remains: have these well-intentioned activities served to 
both fundamentally increase international awareness regarding the issue of cultural restitution 
as well as alter State practice pertaining to the restitution and the return of cultural objects? 
Many museums and other art holding institutions seem to have realized their moral obligation 
to assist requesting States; however, this might often be done more out of a concern for their 
own international reputation or a sign of good will than out of altruism, especially since recent 
restitution disputes have involved major national as well as international media campaigns.722 
Many cultural items have been returned over the past years; therefore, one could argue that 
these returns form the basis of a new common State practice.723 However, as mentioned 
above, this requires the repetitive return of cultural materials by States out of a sense of legal 
obligation. The problem with this line of thinking is the fact that most returns have not been 
made under a sense of general legal obligation, since States repetitively refer to the fact that 
these cases are sui generis and regularly exclude any kind of legal commitment when they 
agree to the ‘transfer’ of cultural materials.  
 
Most interestingly, a 2008 decision of the Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal 
(Consiglio di Stato) has diverged from the traditional understanding of customary 
international law pertaining to restitution and return by indicating that Italy had a legal 
                                                 
720 Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 825.;see, historical overview on the UNGA resolutions 
on Return and Restitution: Fitschen, "30 Jahre Rückführung Von Kulturgut - Wie Der Generalversammlung Ihr 
Gegenstand Abhanden Kam."  
721 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 825. 
722 On the role of the media in the U.S.-Italian agreements, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
723 Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 826. 
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commitment to return the ‘Venus of Cyrene’ to Libya.724 While the return of this marble 
statue from Italy to Libya in 2008 was originally supposed to take place under the auspices of 
the Italian-Libyan Joint Declaration of 1998, the Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal 
ruled that Italy was obliged under customary international law to return the statue to Libya. 
The headless marble statue of the ‘Venus of Cyrene’, which dates back to the Second Century 
A.D., was found nearby the ruins of the old Greek and Roman settlement of Cyrene by Italian 
troops in 1913. The Venus is a Roman copy of an original Hellenistic work that has never 
been found. In 1915, the Venus was removed to Rome, where it was exhibited at the National 
Roman Museum. At the time of the discovery, Italy had already unilaterally annexed Libya 
(Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), in response to the Italian-Turkish War (1911-1912) − territories 
that previously belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Similarly to the archeological site of 
Axum,725 the archaeological site of Cyrene was included in the 1972 UNESCO World 
Heritage List in 1982.726 In 1998, Italy and Libya signed a joint declaration, according to 
which Italy committed itself to the return of all cultural properties taken by Italy “[…] during 
and after the Italian colonization of Libya, pursuant to the 1970 UNESCO Convention”.727 
Consequently, the Venus was removed from the National Roman Museum in 2002 by a 
Ministerial decree and was returned to Libya on 31 August 2008, on the occasion of a visit by 
the Italian Prime Minister in Libya.728 
 
Prior to its return, attempts were made to annul the Ministerial decree before the 
Regional Administrative Tribunal of Latium by a non-governmental organization, Italia 
Nostra (“Our Italy”). According to the plaintiff, the removal of cultural objects beyond State 
borders could be affected only through the creation of a law, since such cultural materials are 
inalienable under the provision of the Italian Civil Code. Furthermore, as the Ministerial 
decree was based on the assumption that it was necessary to return the statue into the cultural 
context to which it belonged, the plaintiff argued that the cultural context is Italy, not Libya, 
because “a Roman copy of a Greek original of the Hellenistic age is more relevant to Italy’s 
                                                 
724 Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal (Consiglio di Stato), 23 June 2008, No. 3154: Associazione 
nazionale Italia Nostra Onlus c. Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali et al. Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale (TAR) del Lazio (Sez. II-quarter), No.3518, 28 February 2007, in Guida al diritto-Il Sole 24 Ore, 
2007, No.21, pp.91-99. This decision was confirmed upon appeal (Consiglio di Stato, No.3154, 23 June 2008). 
725 For details on the return of the Axum Obelisk to Ethiopia, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. 
726 World Heritage List, Archaeological Site of Cyrene, Libya, date of inscription: 1982 (Ref. 190); further 
information is available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/190 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
727 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 360. 
728See: Ibid. 
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artistic context than to the Islamic one.” According to the plaintiff, the return would establish 
a precedent leading to the impoverishment of the Italian artistic and archeological heritage. 
 
The Regional Administrative Tribunal729 dismissed the claim in a judgment issued in 
February 2007, arguing that the Italian domestic legislation protecting cultural goods (Civil 
Code) does not apply to cases falling under the auspices of international treaties such as the 
1998 Italian-Libyan Joint Declaration, which outlines an obligation to return cultural 
materials.730 For the Tribunal, however, the return of the Venus was not only provided for in 
the Joint Declaration, but also under an obligation already existing under two customary rules 
of international law. Firstly, in case of a newly independent State emerging out of State 
succession, all movable cultural property becomes the property of the successor-State (i.e. 
Libya).731 Secondly, cultural objects removed in time of war are to be restored to their 
country of origin, as provided for in the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions, several peace treaties, 
and the 1954 Hague Convention. Consequently, the Tribunal contended that there was no 
need for the creation of a law in order to legalized domestic execution of the 1998 Joint 
Declaration, since rules of customary international law are already self-executing under 
Article 10 of the Italian Constitution. On appeal, the Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal 
(Consiglio di Stato) upheld the judgment of the Regional Administrative Tribunal, thereby 
confirming that Italy was under a legal obligation to return the ‘Venus of Cyrene’ to Libya. 
The Supreme Tribunal found that customary international law provided the obligation to 
return all cultural materials which have been taken as a result of colonization or war. This new 
rule of customary international law has been developed as a result of the prohibition of use of 
force and of the principle of self-determination of peoples.732 
                                                
 
This decision is remarkable because the judges acknowledged the importance of the 
inequalities that had led to the initial loss of cultural materials, and highlighted the importance 
 
729 Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale del Lazio, the Italian Court of First Instance in the Region of Lazio 
(Rome). 
730 Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale del Lazio, February 28, 2007, No. 3518, Associazione nazionale Italia 
Nostra Onlus c. Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali et al., Guida al diritto-Il Sole 24 Ore, 2007, No. 21, pp. 
91-99. 
731 The Tribunal referred to the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, 
Archives and Debts (not yet entered into force). 
732 For further information on both decisions, see Alessandro Chechi, "The Return of Cultural Objects Removed 
in Times of Colonial Domination and International Law: The Case of the Venus of Cyrene," Italian Yearbook of 
International Law (2008): pp. 159. See also: Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal 
Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural Property," p. 363. 
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of redressing past wrongs.733 However, it remains questionable as to whether such an 
obligation currently exists under customary international law. Doubts on this point can be 
raised based on the following three considerations: firstly, it is not commonly accepted that 
the principles of State succession apply to the process of decolonization and the formation of 
sovereign States. Moreover, the 1983 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States (to 
which both tribunals refer) is neither currently in force nor does it apply to cultural objects. 
Secondly, it is not commonly accepted that colonial domination is equivalent to the wartime 
status (and therefore the wartime regime) in international law.734 Thirdly, the assumption of 
an obligation to return cultural objects under customary international law requires, as 
mentioned above, widespread iteration of State practice, namely that States engage in a 
common practice of returning cultural materials out of a sense of legal obligation. Although 
one could argue that recent incidents indicate a growing acceptance of the 1954 Hague and 
the 1970 UNESCO Conventions, most cultural artifacts returned within the context of 
colonial removal have been returned on grounds of political and diplomatic concessions, not 
on the basis of a legal obligation. Thus, the decision of the Italian Supreme Administrative 
Tribunal is quite revolutionary insofar as its ruling does not reflect the common State practice 
pertaining to the restitution of cultural materials removed during the colonial era. 
 
In summarizing, it should be noted that States frequently return cultural materials 
either to foreign States or individuals; if they do so, they act within the framework of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention or multi-or bilateral agreements. In most incidents of return (even 
those that might fall under the provisions of international treaty law), States generally avoid 
referring to any kind of legal obligation to which they might be bound.735 Therefore, a 
common State practice that would confirm the recognition of a customary obligation to return 
cultural materials, which do not fall within the wartime context, cannot yet be identified in 
customary international law. The use of specific terminology by States, as discussed above,736 
is notably here insofar as the more neutral term ‘return’ is most frequently employed, whereas 
the term ‘restitution’ – which implicitly indicated a legal obligation – is rarely used; this 
provides further evidence against the assumption that States act out of legal obligation in 
these matters. Although the return of cultural materials appropriated during wartimes 
                                                 
733 Cf. Chechi, "The Return of Cultural Objects Removed in Times of Colonial Domination and International 
Law: The Case of the Venus of Cyrene," p. 174. 
734 For the discussion on the war time and peace time regime and the relation to the colonial era, see supra 
Chapter Two, Section 4.3. 
735 Cf. Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, pp. 224. 
736 For a detailed discussion on terminology, see supra Chapter Two, Section 3. 
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constitutes customary international law and, within times of peace, consensus has been 
reached by the international community that the threats posed to cultural heritage by illicit 
trafficking should be countered through international cooperation,737 a general obligation to 
return cultural materials has not yet evolved under customary international law in times of 
peace.738 
6.2 International Custom regarding the Reunification of Dispersed Heritage 
The reunification of dispersed cultural objects refers to the re-constitution of the 
physical integrity of fragmented cultural objects, which have been dismembered over time. 
The concept also applies to collections. Therefore, issues pertaining to the reunification 
constitute its own category of legal custom with regard to cultural heritage practices. For 
example, the 1977 ICOM Study739 considers the reassembly of dispersed heritage through 
restitution or the return as an ethical principle. Although ICOM limits its principle to “objects 
of major importance for the cultural identity and history of countries having been deprived 
thereof”, the reassembly of dispersed cultural materials may, at the very least, be understood 
as a ‘moral obligation’.740 It is important to point out that the 1977 ICOM Study assumes that 
the reassembly of dispersed heritage of major importance is already established as an element 
of jus cogens; however, this clearly cannot be presumed. Jus cogens refers to a principle of 
international law so fundamental that no state may derogate from this principle through 
declaration, treaty or others means. Moreover, jus cogens is recognized under peremptory 
norms, including prohibitions against slavery, genocide and crimes against humanity. It is 
quite doubtful that the reunification of dispersed heritage would fall into this category of 
international customary law. Therefore, reunifying or reassembling dispersed objects through 
restitution or return cannot yet be identified as an element of jus cogens, even though it has 
been considered as a moral obligation under international law. 
                                                 
737 For details on provisions pertaining to international cooperation, see, for example, the provisions of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. For a detailed discussion on international 
cooperation, see Chapter Four, Section 2.3. 
738 Cf. Freytag, "Cultural Heritage: Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf "Ihr" Kulturgut?," p. 183. 
739 Study on the Principles, Conditions and Means for the Restitution and Return of Cultural Property in view of 
Reconstituting Dispersed Heritages (1977). This report was prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by 
the Executive Council of ICOM (established 1976); published as UNESCO Doc. CC-78/CONF.609/3 Annex 1 
and in (1979) Museum, Vol. XXXI, no. 1, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 62-66. This report led to the establishment of the 
UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
740 Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 234.; see also: Freytag, "Cultural Heritage: 
Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf "Ihr" Kulturgut?," p. 196. 
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6.3 International Custom regarding Restitution and the Right to Self-determination 
The right to self-determination is a principle of customary international law, which is 
often seen as both a moral and legal right. It was first mentioned in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the 
UN Charter of 1945, and has been further defined through various UN General Assembly 
resolutions starting in the 1960s. During the decolonization era, the right to self-determination 
became fused to the right to development, including cultural development.741 Distinct from 
individual rights, as commonly understood under international law, the right to self-
determination is seen as a specific collective right and therefore it remains disputed as a 
principle of international customary law. According to Article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights742 as well as the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights743 adopted in 1966, self-determination refers to the fact that "all peoples have 
the right [to] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development”. Promoted initially by the newly independent States of the 1950s 
and 1960s, peoples in international administered territories and occupied territories, and more 
recently indigenous peoples and minorities groups, the formulation of the right to self-
determination has remained largely unchanged.744 
 
Most recently, the right to self-determination has been confirmed by the 2007 UNGA 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter UNDRIP),745 which was 
negotiated over a period of more than twenty years between representatives of indigenous 
peoples and States. Although States with large indigenous communities (i.e. Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States), voted against the declaration in 2007, they have 
reversed their positions and now endorse the declaration.746 The UN Declaration recognizes 
                                                 
741 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 10. 
742 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entering into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. For a detailed discussion on human rights obligations under both Covenants, see 
supra Chapter Three, Section 2.8. 
743 International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entering into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
744 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 10. 
745 See Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly 
on 13 September 2007, 61st session, (GA/10612), ILM, 2007, p.1013. 
746 The UNDRIP was adopted by a majority of 144 States in favor, with 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, 
Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine), the voting record is available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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the wide range of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples;747 
without, however, providing a specific legal definition of ‘indigenous peoples’.748 Among the 
recognized rights are (1) the right to unrestricted self-determination, (2) an inalienable 
collective right to the ownership, use and control of lands, territories and other natural 
resources, (3) rights regarding maintenance and development of political, religious, cultural 
and educational institutions, and (4) rights associated with the protection of cultural and 
intellectual property. The declaration emphasizes requirements pertaining to prior and 
informed consultation, participation and consents in State activities of any kind, which may 
have an impact on indigenous peoples, their property or territories. Moreover, and most 
importantly for this thesis, the declaration includes the recognition of a ‘right to redress’.749 In 
this respect, Article 11 of the declaration states that “States shall provide redress through 
effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property 
taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions 
and customs.” Consequently, the declaration creates a reciprocal effect between the ‘right to 
self-determination’ on the one hand, and the ‘right to redress’, on the other. Thus, indigenous 
peoples may make requests for redress against one or more States with the aim of obtaining 
explicit recognition of their right to self-determination.750 This, in terms of restitution and 
return, may comprise claims for ‘material redress’ of appropriated cultural objects and human 
remains. 
 
Moreover, the right to self-determination has been used in attempts to establish a legal 
basis for restitution claims: firstly, based on the assumption that restitution is included in the 
concept of freedom to pursue cultural development;751 and secondly, based on the interplay 
                                                 
747 For an extensive overview of the rights of indigenous peoples, see the 2010 Conference Report of the ILA 
Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (The Hague Conference), available at: http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
748 For details on the debate over the term and the various political and other factors at play, see Henry Minde, 
"The Destination and the Journey: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations from the 1960s through 1985," in 
Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination, Knowledge, Indigeneity, ed. Henry Minde (2008), pp. 49 ff. 
749 See Articles 11 and 28 of the 2007 UNDRIP. 
750 Francioni, "Reparation for Indigenous People: Is International Law Ready to Ensure Redress for Historical 
Injustices?," p. 28. 
751 The argument is based on the wording of Article 1(1) of both covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) that reads: 
“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their economic, 
social and cultural development.” For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.8. 
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between the principle that prohibits the use of force and the right to self-determination.752 
Although the Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal (Consiglio di Stato) affirmed an 
obligation to return cultural materials taken as a result of colonization or war, the 2008 
decision does not reflect the common State practice pertaining to the restitution of cultural 
materials removed during the colonial era.753 
 
Whereas the right to self-determination may be deemed to be a part of customary 
international law, specific legal provisions pertaining to the restitution and return of cultural 
objects that may be derive from the right to self-determination have yet to be established in 
customary international law. This should also be understood in light of the fact that the 2007 
UN Declaration is not legally binding. Furthermore, linking the return of cultural objects to 
the right to self-determination (and the freedom to pursue cultural development) remains 
highly contentious: while human rights are usually held by an individual, the right to self-
determination is exceptional, since it is a collective right under international law.754 
Moreover, the right to self-determination would imply a comprehensive right to restitution 
and return with the consequence that current legal status pertaining to ownership rights would 
be nullified.755 In addition, such an interpretation would interfere with the general principle of 
non-retroactivity in international law. Although the right to self-determination of indigenous 
peoples has gained momentum, and certainly imposes some kind of legal obligations on 
States (i.e. to ensure cultural diversity, cultural participation, and minority rights, etc.); 
however, it cannot yet be considered as a principle of international law associated with an 
obligation to restitution and return under customary international law. 
6.4 International Custom regarding the Protection of Cultural Heritage 
The protection of cultural heritage within the ‘peace time regime’, derived from the 
protection established within the ‘armed conflict regime’, has made substantial progress in the 
                                                 
752 Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal (Consiglio di Stato), 23 June 2008, No. 3154: Associazione 
nazionale Italia Nostra Onlus c. Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali et al. Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale (TAR) del Lazio (Sez. II-quarter), No.3518, 28 February 2007, in Guida al 
diritto-Il Sole 24 Ore, 2007, No.21, pp.91-99. This decision was confirmed upon appeal (Consiglio di Stato, 
No.3154, 23 
June 2008). 
753 For a detailed discussion, see supra Chapter Two, Section 4.3 and Chapter Three, Section 6.1. 
754 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 10. 
755 Rudolf Dolzer, "Kulturgüter Im Friedensvölkerrecht," in Rechtsfragen Des Internationalen 
Kulturgüterschutzes, ed. Rudolf Dolzer, Erik Jayme, and Reinhard Mussgnug (Heidelberg: 1994), p. 150. 
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past decades.756 The general concept of cultural heritage protection is built upon the 
assumption that cultural heritage is an element of the ‘common interest’ of the international 
community.757 Based on this ‘common interest’, acts of violence against cultural heritage 
during armed conflicts as well as the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage in peacetime 
are deemed to be prohibited under customary international law. Since the destruction of any 
nation’s cultural heritage can be considered to be a loss and an injury to the collective 
patrimony of mankind, it can be classified of having erga omnes character. 758 The 
International Court of Justice recognized in its Barcelona Traction case759 these obligations as 
being erga omnes, which should be understood as obligations owed to the collectivity of 
States in the ‘public interest’. These obligations include the prohibition of violence, genocide 
as well as the protection of basic human rights.760 Therefore, the prohibition of intentional 
destruction of cultural heritage can be subsumed under the category of erga omnes obligations 
because of its general and universal importance to the international community and humanity 
as a whole.761 
 
The primary objective of cultural heritage protection is based upon the general interest 
in the preservation and enjoyment as well as the maintenance and protection of this heritage 
for the benefit of succeeding generations. The obligation to protect cultural heritage has been 
confirmed, for example, by the unfettered consensus of the international community, 
including both Western and Islamic governments as well as international organizations, in 
their condemnation of the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001. This consensus 
was subsequently substantiated in the Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 2003,762 as discussed 
earlier in this thesis. Therefore, it can be said that the customary obligation to protect cultural 
                                                 
756 For a detailed discussion, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2 and 4.1. 
757 Francioni, "Au-Dela Des Traites: L'emergence D'un Nouveau Droit Coutumier Pour La Protection Du 
Patrimoine Culturel," p. 33. 
758 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 37. See also: Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 
adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO, 17 October 2003; as well as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission that asserted that the destruction of the Stela of Matara by the military troops of Ethiopia during the 
war in 1998-2000 to be a violation of customary international law. 
759 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium vs. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 
1970, ICJ Reports, 1970, 3, p. 33. 
760 See overview: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ibtsummary700205.htm (accessed 28 
September 2011). 
761 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 34. 
762 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference, 17 October 2003. 
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heritage limits the power that a State has over cultural heritage located within the sphere of its 
territorial sovereignty. This customary obligation exists towards the international community 
as such, and thus, a fortiori, towards all States.763 
 
Several manifestations of international State practice, which confirm the existence of 
such an obligation, can be identified; this has clearly been demonstrated in the previous 
sections of this chapter. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (Art. 46 and 47)764 proclaimed that historic monuments must 
be protected during wartime. In addition to the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention that restate the importance of protecting cultural heritage to the 
international community, several UNESCO recommendations and conventions demonstrate a 
‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage. In particular, the 1972 UNESCO 
World Heritage Convention imposes an obligation on all of its current 188 States parties765 to 
preserve their cultural heritage. As this is almost the entire international community, one can, 
for all practical purposes, speak of a unanimous consensus among States; this is more than it 
is required under customary international law. 
 
Moreover, the obligation to protect cultural heritage also involves in another area of 
international law, namely that of international humanitarian law. In an effort to humanize and 
moderate war to some extent, humanitarian law attempts to limit the impact of hostilities on 
civilian populations as well as on cultural heritage. Although the main principles of 
humanitarian law originally only applied to international armed conflicts, international 
practices have over the last several decades extended the application of these main principles 
of humanitarian law to also include conflicts of non-international character, namely civil wars 
and ethnic conflicts within a State. This trend is apparent in the 1999 Second Protocol to the 
1954 Hague Convention, as well as in the statutes of recently established international 
criminal tribunals, particularly the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
The ethnic conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia led to the establishment of the ICTY 
                                                 
763 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 37. 
764 See Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague, 18 October 1907, full text version: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument (accessed 23 September 2011). 
765 States Parties to the 1972 World Heritage Convention: 188 States by 23 September 2011, list of States parties 
available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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in 1993.766 Under Article 3(d) of the statute of the ICTY, individual persons are legally liable 
for the violations of the laws and customs of war, including the “[…] destruction or willful 
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and the 
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science”. In several decisions, the ICTY 
clearly affirmed that the provisions established in the 1907 Hague Convention as well as the 
1954 Hague Convention have the effect of customary international law;767 specifying in 
Prosecutor vs. Tadic (1995) that the 1954 Hague Convention also applies under customary 
international law to non-international armed conflicts.768 
 
In Prosecutor vs. Strugar (2001), the ICTY convicted the commander of the Yugoslav 
Army Forces and sentenced him to an eight year sentence under the principle of “command 
responsibility” for having ordered attacks on targets in the Dubrovnik region and having 
failed to prohibit attacks on the historic city center of Dubrovnik;769 the court placed 
significant weight on the fact that the historic center of Dubrovnik is inscribed in the World 
Heritage List.770 Moreover, the ICTY also established that the targeting of cultural assets 
belonging to a culturally distinct group constituted an ‘element of crimes against humanity’, 
specifically the crime of persecution, if this act is committed with discriminatory intent. 
Along this vein, the ICTY acknowledged a fundamental connection between the intent to 
destroy a group of people and the destruction of cultural works and religious sites that form 
part of that group’s history, culture, spiritual heritage, and identity.771 Although the deliberate 
destruction of the cultural heritage of a specific ethnic group or minority might constitute 
evidence of the crime of genocide, the ICTY ruled in Prosecutor vs. Krstic (2001) that in 
customary international law, the definition of acts of genocide (as contained in the Genocide 
                                                 
766 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council Resolution 827 on 25 May 
1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
767 See Prosecutor vs. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001, para.206); Prosecutor vs. Strugar (IT-
01-42-PT, 31 January 2005, paras.227, 230), Prosecutor vs. Tadic (IT-94-1-I, 2 October 1995, para.98), and 
Prosecutor vs. Hadžihasanovic & Kubura (IT-01-47, 15 March 2006, paras.57-64). For details on ICTY case 
law see Micaela Frulli, "Advancing the Protection of Cultural Property through the Implementation of Individual 
Criminal Responsibility: The Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.," 
Italian Yearbook of International Law (2005): pp. 196-216. 
768 Prosecutor vs. Tadic (IT-94-1-I, 2 October 1995, paras.127, 268). 
769 Prosecutor vs. Strugar (IT-01-42-PT, 31 January 2005, paras.232, 279, 285, 302). 
770 Old City of Dubrovnik, reference 95bis, inscribed in 1979 on the basis of criteria (i)(iii)(iv), more information 
available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/95 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
771 Prosecutor vs. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001) and Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanovic 
& Kubura (IT-01-47, 15 March 2006). 
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Convention772) is limited to those acts aimed at the physical or biological destruction of a 
group.773 Similarly to the statute of the ICTY, the statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) qualifies as a war crime any attack directed against buildings dedicated to religion, 
educational, and artistic purposes, or historical monuments.774 The customary obligation to 
protect cultural heritage in armed conflict was also confirmed by the 2004 decision of the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC)775 concerning the destruction of the Stele of 
Matara. Eritrea claimed that the site of Matara, one of the most significant archaeological 
sites in Eritrea, was devastated and that the stele was deliberated destroyed by Ethiopian 
troops during their occupation of Eritrea in 1998-2000. The Commission held that Ethiopia 
was liable under customary international humanitarian law for the destruction of the stele, 
regardless the fact that neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia were party to the 1954 Hague 
Convention.776 
 
Against the backdrop of the recent developments in customary international law and 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY, one could speak of the evolution of a custom pertaining to the 
protection of cultural heritage in both international and non-international (internal) armed 
conflicts. As a result, it is possible to argue that due to the customary prohibition against the 
destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflict, it would be incomprehensible to maintain 
the view that similar acts of destruction are permitted in times of peace. Thus, provisions 
pertaining to the protection of cultural heritage valid within the context of the ‘armed conflict 
regime’ should surely be valid within the ‘peace time regime’ as well.777 Furthermore, the 
‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage seems to exclude a conceptual 
differentiation between the ‘wartime regime’ (or broader in terms of internal conflicts: armed 
                                                 
772 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277). 
773 Prosecutor vs. Krstic (IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para.580), confirmed by the Appeals Chamber (19 April 
2004, para.25). 
774 See Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9. 
775 The EECC was established pursuant to Article 5 of the Peace Agreement signed on 12 December 2000 
between the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague) served as 
registry to the Commission. The Commission was directed to “decide through binding arbitration all claims for 
loss, damage or injury” by one government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural and 
juridical persons) of one party against the government of the other party pertaining to violations of international 
humanitarian law and other violations of international law caused by the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
The Commission rendered its Final Awards on Damages in each party's claims on 17 August 2009; for further 
details see: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
776 See “Partial Awards: Central Front – Eritrea’s claim” 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 22, 28 April 2004, ILM, 2004, p.1270, 
paras.112-113. 
777 For the distinction between the wartime and the peacetime regimes, see supra Chapter Two, Section 4. 
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conflict regime) and the ‘peace time regime’.778 In contrast, it seems highly reasonable to 
require higher protective standards during peacetime, since these obligations are naturally 
easier to fulfill during peace than during armed conflict, which generally involves higher 
levels of devastation and destruction. The prohibition on the intentional destruction of cultural 
heritage, which establishes a ‘negative responsibility’ to avoid destruction, also implies an 
oblique ‘positive responsibility’ to protect. In other words, it can be argued that the act of 
intentional ‘non-protection’ establishes nonfeasance, violating the ‘common interest’ of the 
international community in the protection of cultural heritage. Considering both the 
developments in international cultural heritage law and customary international humanitarian 
law within recent years, it is clear that not only the prohibition against the deliberate 
destruction of cultural heritage, but also the protection of the cultural heritage for the sake of 
humankind is a ‘common interest’ of the international community as a whole and, therefore, 
constitutes a binding obligation not only under international treaty law but also under 
customary international law.779 
Summary of the Chapter: 
This chapter provided a critical analysis of the existing legal provisions in 
international cultural heritage law; it has defined the limits and shortcomings of these 
provisions, and explored those provisions that indicate new trends and developments in view 
of the resolution of international cultural heritage disputes. The analysis focused on two 
aspects: firstly, the legal instruments that serve the protection of cultural heritage; and 
secondly, those legal instruments that provide the basis for claims pertaining to the restitution 
and return of cultural materials. Five major categories of instruments have been identified: (1) 
international treaty law and bilateral agreements; (2) soft law instruments; (3) codes of 
conduct and codes of ethics; (4) ethical and historical considerations; and (5) international 
customary law. The chapter explored several non-legal considerations within the restitution 
debate, since, in its attempt to ‘remedy historical injustice’, an analysis of restitution and 
return cannot be limited to mere legal considerations. Against the backdrop of the existing 
international law as well as State practice, it has been demonstrated that the majority of 
restitution disputes either remain unresolved or are resolved through bilateral agreements and 
out-of-court-settlements. It is therefore evident that the purely legal approach does not provide 
                                                 
778 Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," p. 37.  
779 Cf. Francioni, "Au-Dela Des Traites: L'emergence D'un Nouveau Droit Coutumier Pour La Protection Du 
Patrimoine Culturel," p. 33. 
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an adequate solution in restitution disputes, since the ethical and historical dimensions 
intrinsic to issues of restitution and return are not sufficiently taken into account by the 
existing legal provisions. 
 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of current legal instruments, this chapter 
explored the existing legal provisions that indicate the existence of a general responsibility to 
protect cultural heritage, both in the ‘armed conflict regime’ (wartime) and the ‘peacetime 
regime’. Determining a general responsibility to protect cultural heritage prepared the 
conceptual basis of the interest-oriented approach taken by this thesis in terms of a ‘common 
interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage. Due to the variety of stakeholders involved, the 
interests in the resolution of restitution disputes might be competitive (or even mutually 
exclusive); nevertheless, they do overlap in terms of their common interest in the protection of 
cultural heritage. In other words, preservation is a prerequisite to both restitution and 
retention. The analysis in this chapter has illustrated that firstly, most legal instruments (in 
particular those provided in international treaty law) do not include mechanisms that allow for 
cooperative approaches to restitution and return, and secondly, that current legal instruments 
in international law pertaining to restitution and return have difficulty recognizing the various 
interests involved. The national interests of the territorial State and the focus on property 
rights overshadow the fact that a ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage and 
an obligation to protect truly exists in both international treaty law and customary 
international law. 
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CHAPTER IV: The Conceptual and Legal Foundations of the Interest-
oriented Approach 
 
 
Overview of the Chapter: 
This chapter forms the theoretical core of this thesis by elaborating the conceptual and 
legal foundations of the interest-oriented approach. After recalling the three rationales of the 
interest-oriented approach introduced in Chapter One, this chapter continues to contour the 
framework and function of the approach taken by this thesis. It will be argued that within the 
scope of the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage, other interests can be 
identified as being of a ‘common’ nature. Although the analysis of the law in terms of 
interests has found wide-spread recognition, legal provisions pertaining to the resolution of 
restitution disputes predominantly fail to adequately ensure the recognition of the various 
interests involved, since it is primarily States and therefore States’ interests as well as 
property rights arguments over title and possession that dominate international cultural 
heritage law. 
 
The interest-oriented approach argues in favor of balancing interests on the basis of 
general principles. This approach is best illustrated by a strikingly similar legal doctrine: 
namely, the ‘best interest doctrine’ in child custody determinations. While, at first glance, 
child custody law seems to have little in common with international cultural heritage law and 
the resolution of restitution disputes, it does, however, provide several highly illustrative and 
useful conceptual comparisons. Child custody determination is, after all, based on a ‘welfare 
check-list’ of interests, established to protect the best interests of the child. This chapter will 
argue that, for similar reasons, such a ‘welfare check-list’ approach should also be introduced 
in restitution disputes, in order to ensure the best interest of the cultural object in question. 
Such an approach must include an articulation of general principles for the resolution of 
restitution disputes, in a manner which facilitates mutual gain and cooperation. While this 
may sound revolutionary in the context of international cultural heritage law, recently 
developed concepts in other but similar areas of international law (such as international 
environmental law) indicate that the concept of ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural 
heritage finds equivalence in the legal concepts of the ‘common heritage of mankind’, 
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‘common concern’, ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, as well as in the concept of 
‘international cooperation’. This chapter concludes by demonstrating that while limitations on 
property rights are commonly utilized in order to protect of the ‘national patrimony’ of States, 
the protection of the cultural heritage of humankind does not benefit from such nationalistic 
restrictions. Therefore, it will be argued that for the sake of the ‘common interest’ in the 
protection of cultural heritage, limitations on property rights should be extended and apply to 
the resolution of restitution disputes. Similarly to child custody determination, such 
limitations would allow restitution and return to be postponed or even denied, if conditions 
facilitating the common interests in physical and cultural preservation, access, integrity and 
cooperation are not adequately met. 
1. Frame and Function of the Interest-oriented Approach 
The instruments provided in the current legal framework of international cultural 
heritage law often lack specific applicable provisions pertaining to resolving restitution 
disputes (e.g. the 1970 UNESCO Convention) and, if they do, they frequently lack broad 
international acceptance (e.g. the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention). Moreover, no legal 
instruments operate retroactively, and therefore they frequently fail to apply to many current 
restitution disputes. However, as the legal analysis in the previous chapter has demonstrated, 
recent trends have supported the possibility that restitution disputes might be resolved by 
alternative means: firstly, recognizing the impact of ethical and historical considerations;780 
and secondly, by the attempt to employ cooperative and mutually beneficial mechanisms.781 
However, these alternatives are often considered without reference to legal provisions, and, 
most importantly, without reference to general legal principles that might provide a 
framework for determining how restitution disputes should be best settled. This is because 
resolutions frequently occur in bilateral and often unpublished agreements.782 Therefore, this 
thesis argues that the means of resolving restitution disputes can be found in the identification 
of the motives and interests of the parties involved – in particular those of the requesting 
party. The assessment of the interests at stake in restitution disputes will demonstrate that 
while some interests are mutually exclusive, others are not, and these non-exclusive interests 
can provide the basis for agreement in restitution disputes.783 
 
                                                 
780 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 5. 
781 For example the solutions reached in the U.S.-Italian agreements, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
782 See supra Chapter Two, Section 2.9. 
783 For the assessment of the interests at stake, see Chapter Five, Section 3. 
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As outlined in Chapter One, the need for the interest-oriented approach in international 
cultural heritage can be demonstrated on the basis of three interdependent rationales: firstly, 
the conceptual shift in international law from the notion of ‘cultural property’ towards the 
notion of ‘cultural heritage’ necessitates a corresponding shift in the resolution of restitution 
disputes.784 It is time that the negotiations in restitution matters move beyond consideration of 
factors such as title and possession towards the creation of a ‘common interest’ in cultural 
heritage. However, this shift has not yet happened because States and their national property 
interests remain the primary focus of concern in international cultural heritage law. 
 
Secondly, both bilateral agreements among States and agreements between private 
actors and States are contractual in nature. Contracts, however, suffer from the major 
shortcoming insofar that their terms depend, in part, on the bargaining power of the 
negotiating parties.785 This is particularly problematic, when legal provisions are explicitly 
excluded in the bilateral agreements used to settle restitution disputes (as is frequently the 
case). As a result, successful outcomes in restitution disputes often depend to a significant 
extent on the political and diplomatic commitment of States as well as their bargaining power, 
rather than on general principles of law. This, not only affects the final outcome of 
negotiations in terms of mutual gain and cooperation, but also inhibits the development and 
application of a consistent legal framework in restitution matters. Furthermore, restitution 
disputes are often related to difficult issues associated with war, foreign or colonial 
occupation, or significant human rights violations. Attempts made to ‘remedy historical 
injustices’ by addressing the question of restitution and return786 are often hampered by 
unequal bargaining powers as hegemony and dependence tend to persist in international 
relations − dividing the parties into so-called ‘source countries’ and ‘art-market countries’. 
 
Thirdly, as the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘contract’ predominantly fail to resolve 
restitution disputes in a sustainable, cooperative manner, fail to take the interests of both the 
various stakeholders and the common interest in the protection of cultural heritage into 
account, and fail to provide a consistent framework in international cultural heritage law 
pertaining to restitution matters, alternative approaches are very much needed. Although 
international law will never be able to wholly prevent illicit trade in cultural materials, the 
                                                 
784 Rationale One: From ‘Cultural Property’ to ‘Cultural Heritage’, see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.1. 
785 Rationale Two: Contracts and Unequal Bargaining Power, see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.2. 
786 See Chapter Three, Section 5. 
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growing recognition of concepts such as the ‘common heritage of humankind’ and ‘common 
concern’ promote the idea of a common interest in the protection of cultural heritage and 
indicate the need for the development of an interest-oriented approach.787 Therefore, this 
thesis attempts to introduce an alternative approach to currently employed restitution 
practices, in order to both facilitate and accelerate the return of cultural material when 
legitimate and appropriate, and to postpone or even deny the return of a requested object, 
should its return contradict the ‘common interest’. Thus, the interest-oriented approach may 
enhance the cooperation and exchange in restitution matters, while both preserving cultural 
objects and preventing their loss and dispersion. 
1.1 General Principles pertaining to the Resolution of Restitution Disputes 
Generally speaking, law is concerned with the conflict of interests. One of the most 
illustrative examples of a conflict is the biblical narrative of the judgment of Solomon.788 
King Solomon of Israel was asked to make a judgment regarding the fate of a child, when two 
women, both of whom were claiming to be the mother of the same infant, came before him. 
Solomon’s famous declaration that the baby should be ‘split in two’ has become a metaphor 
for a wise judgment. By pretending he would opt for a simple compromise, namely the 
destruction of the subject matter of the dispute, rather than allowing either disputing party to 
win at the expense of the other, Salomon revealed the true interest of the parties: Solomon 
gave the child to the woman who offered to give up her claim to the child in order to spare his 
life, reasoning that the true mother’s instincts were to protect her child, rather than to let him 
die. Although most restitution disputes are not this simple, the narrative illustrates the 
importance of determining the interests involved. Since ‘splitting the baby’ – or, within this 
context, the cultural object in question – is not a viable option, it is essential to facilitate 
alternatives that balance the interests of all the stakeholders involved in order to resolve 
restitution disputes in an adequate and reconciling manner. 
 
The analysis of the law in terms of interests has its methodological antecedents in 
German legal theory (Interessenjurisprudenz)789 and is typical, for example, of doctrinal 
                                                 
787 Rational Three: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as Common Interest, see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.3. 
788 1 Kings 3:16-28. 
789 The analysis of law in terms of interests (Interessenjurisprudenz) has been formed by Philipp von Heck and 
Müller-Erzback; See: Philipp von Heck, Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz (1914), Begriffsbildung 
und Interessenjurisprudenz (1932). 
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writing and legal policymaking in the United States.790 This approach of analyzing the law in 
terms of interests is based on the assumption that every legal doctrine must be understood as a 
decision of the lawmaker in consideration of potential conflicts of interests. It is then the task 
of the judge to identify these interests, and to apply the law according to the interests involved 
in the particular case to be decided.791 However, within the current legal framework of 
international cultural heritage law, the recognition of the various interests of the stakeholders 
involved is not adequately ensured, since it is primarily the State and therefore States’ 
interests as well as property rights arguments over title and possession that dominate in 
international law. As the legal analysis in the previous chapter demonstrated, current legal 
provisions are unable to take into account the various interests involved, nor can they ensure 
that overlapping or competing interests are balanced in the resolution of disputes. Hence, the 
interest-oriented approach proposed by this thesis postulates a conceptual shift away from the 
current approach (which privileges States and their interests in national patrimony) towards an 
approach that can be applied in order to facilitate mutually satisfying resolutions in 
international cultural heritage disputes. 
 
The demand for general principles in the resolution of restitution disputes is rooted in 
two fundamental considerations: firstly, the fact that international conventions and treaties 
often do not recognize the interests of the various stakeholders involved (including the 
‘common interest’ of humanity in the protection of cultural heritage). Secondly, although 
bilateral agreements may be able to better recognize the interests of the parties involved, they 
are frequently unable to actualize their interests equitably, due to the unequal bargaining 
powers of the parties involved in restitution disputes. Therefore, this thesis argues in favor of 
general principles in restitution matters that – on the basis of common interests – may 
facilitate the resolution of restitution disputes regardless the bargaining power of the parties 
involved. These general principles include: the physical and cultural preservation of cultural 
materials; access to and preservation or reestablishment of the integrity of cultural materials; 
as well as cooperation and exchange in cultural matters. Based on these general principles, the 
resolution of restitution disputes might be facilitated through a variety of complementary and 
                                                 
790 Due to the influence of Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) at Harvard, and as restated by Julius Stone (1907-1985) 
in: “Social Dimensions of Law and Justice” (1966); Cf. Prott, Commentary on the Unidroit Convention, to 
Article 5(3), p. 56.; and Lyndel V. Prott, "The International Movement of Cultural Objects," International 
Journal of Cultural Property (2005): p. 240. 
791 Cf. Marietta Auer, "Methodenkritik Und Interessenjurisprudenz. Philipp Heck Zum 150. Geburtstag," 
Zeitrschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, no. 3 (2008): p. 517-33. 
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alternative solutions, with the result that dispute resolutions might avoid zero-sum outcomes 
in favor of fostering a sustainable and cooperative exchange in cultural heritage matters.  
 
While preservation and access, in particular, may be conceptualized differently by 
different stakeholders, all parties involved in restitution disputes have at least an underlying 
investment in the preservation of cultural materials.792 If cultural objects are partially 
damaged or completely destroyed, they can neither be exhibited, studied, nor be enjoyed; 
more importantly perhaps − at least within this context − they cannot be returned.793 This is 
the case even in those situations in which cultural items are claimed in order to let them decay 
and ‘return to the earth’ (as, for example, in the case of the wooden war gods of the North-
American Zuni tribe).794 As the process of natural disintegration generally does not include 
the deliberate or negligent damage or destruction by a third party, but rather a ritual act 
performed by the people who created it, the physical preservation of cultural objects can be 
truly assumed as a fundamental interest, on the basis of which all other interests can be 
constructed. It is essential, however, that these general principles − since they are based on the 
premise of a common interest of humanity in cultural heritage − are flexible enough to 
accommodate the variety of potential restitution disputes. Over time, however, these general 
principles should evolve and, if they are successful and become accepted in restitution 
practices, might become more deeply embedded in legal instruments that regulate restitution 
matters.  
 
The determination of common interests in restitution matters is, however, not a 
novelty in international cultural heritage law. As early as 1983, Nafziger asserted: “[t]he 
claimant State must ensure that the recovered property will be protected by conservation, 
safety and security measures that meet international standards, and that the object will be 
adequately displayed and, normally, accessible to the public.”795 Similarly, Siehr also claims 
that retention of a claimed cultural object should be considered: “[…] until adequate physical 
                                                 
792 Mastalir calls this the “zone of agreement”: Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And 
"Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under International Law," pp. 1064. 
793 Cf. John Henry Merryman, "The Public Interest in Cultural Property," California Law Review 77, no. 2 
(1989): p. 355. 
794 The case of the Zuni war gods will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, Section 3.1.1. 
795James A. R. Nafziger, "The New International Legal Framework for the Return, Restitution or Forfeiture of 
Cultural Property," New York University Journal for International Law and Politics 15(1983): p. 808. 
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preservation of the object is guaranteed in the requesting State of origin”.796 Along a similar 
vein, Merryman argues that the 1970 UNESCO Convention deals primarily with retention of 
cultural property and only briefly addresses the issue of protection – in reference to protection 
against removal – not the protection of the cultural object as such.797 Consequently, 
Merryman advocates for “an object-oriented cultural property policy” based on “preservation, 
truth, and access […] in declining order of importance”.798 “Preservation” in this sense means 
“protecting the object and its context from impairment”; “truth”, in turn, refers to the “quest 
for knowledge, for valid information about the human past, for the historical, scientific, 
cultural and aesthetic truth that the object and its context can provide”; in contrast, “access” 
means “the object [should] be optimally accessible to scholars and to the public”.799 
 
Similar policy considerations have also been introduced in legal provisions. The 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention, for example, identifies four ‘interests’800 in its Article 5(3)(a-d): (a) 
“the physical preservation of the object and its context”; (b) “the integrity of complex object”; 
(c) “the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific or historical character” and; 
(d) “the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community”.801 
Similarly, section eight of the 2006 Principles of the International Law Association (ILA) 
entitled “Considerations for Negotiations Concerning Requests” include the following inter 
alia considerations: (1) “the significance of the requested material for the requesting party”; 
(2) “the reunification of dispersed cultural material”; (3) the “accessibility to the cultural 
material in the requesting State”; and (4) “the protection of the cultural material”.802 As can 
clearly be seen from these examples, various proposals have been made in order to facilitate 
the resolution of restitution disputes; all of these have in common the fact that they refer to 
policy considerations or general principles based on common interests in cultural heritage 
matters. The proposals by Nafziger, Siehr, and Merryman mainly focus on the physical 
                                                 
796 Kurt Siehr, "Öffentliches Recht Und Internationales Privatrecht Beim Grenzüberschreitenden 
Kulturgüterschutz," in Rechtsfragen Des Internationalen Kulturgüterschutzes, ed. Rudolf Dolzer, Erik Jayme, 
and Mussgnug (Heidelberg: 1994), p. 103. 
797 John Henry Merryman, "The Retention of Cultural Property," University of California, Davis Law Review, 
no. 21 (1988): p. 506. 
798 Merryman, "The Nation and the Object," p. 64. Similarly, Jayme speaks of ‘the interests of the artwork’: Erik 
Jayme, "Globalization in Art Law: Clash of Interests and International Tendencies," Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 38(2005): p. 938. 
799 Merryman, "The Nation and the Object," p. 64. In an earlier work, Merryman uses a different “troika” (as he 
calls it), namely that of “preservation, context, and integrity” arguing that these “constitute a set of higher ‘public 
welfare’ values that transcend national interests and boundaries”, see: ———, "The Retention of Cultural 
Property," p.504. 
800 Cf. Article 5(3), Prott, Commentary on the Unidroit Convention, p. 56. 
801 Article 5(3)(a-d) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
802 Number 8 of the 2006 ILA Principles; for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 4.2. 
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preservation of the object, as well as its context and the preservation of access to it, whereas 
both the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and the 2006 ILA Principles also integrate the cultural 
(traditional and ritual) significance of the object for the requesting party into their framework 
for decision-making. 
 
This thesis, however, argues that the issues of the physical preservation and of the 
cultural significance of a requested object should not be considered separately, since they are 
more or less (depending on the circumstances) interdependent. Cultural artifacts have both a 
‘property’ component (physical preservation) and the cultural component (cultural 
significance). The first component is derived from the fact that cultural materials consist of 
tangible, movable objects that can – at least in Western legal tradition – be owned, possessed 
and controlled.803 The second component is derived from the cultural (human) significance, 
its cultural and historical background, and the social nexus with the cultural community that 
created the object in question. Cultural objects cannot be stripped of their cultural 
significance; they are not mere items of ‘property’ any more than children are the property of 
divorcing parents.804 Both components, therefore, must be taken into account in order to 
identify feasible solutions in restitution disputes. 
 
The interest in the preservation of cultural materials consists therefore of both 
components: the physical preservation of the object (e.g. its physical safety and integrity) as 
well as the cultural preservation of the object (e.g. recognition and preservation of its cultural 
significance). The former addresses the necessity of treating cultural heritage as valuable 
unique objects that must be preserved in a way that avoids physical destruction and/or 
deterioration. The second interest is more concerned with the affiliation and cultural 
significance of cultural objects to a certain ethnic or religious group. The recognition of the 
cultural significance of the object is thus an integral part of determining the best means (the 
best interest) of preserving cultural materials. If either of the two components is disregarded, 
the value of the cultural object is diminished, which can subsequently lead to the destruction 
of the physical integrity and/or the cultural significance of the object.805  
 
                                                 
803 Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1037. 
804 Ibid.: p. 1035. 
805 Ibid.: p. 1046. 
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Therefore, it would be a great mistake to presume that the ‘best interest’ of a particular 
cultural object would automatically favor its physical safekeeping in a (Western) museum or 
conditioned storage. Rather, the cultural component of preservation might even trump the 
importance of the physical component, resulting in the return of a particular cultural object; 
even if the conditions for its best physical preservation and access are not (entirely or 
temporarily) met by the requesting party. Since this thesis proposes an interest-oriented 
approach, the general principles (namely physical and cultural preservation, access, integrity 
and cooperation) cannot be completely detached from the interests of the various stakeholders 
in restitution matters. The analysis of the stakeholders and their interests involved in 
restitution matters (Chapter Five) therefore explores the possibilities of parties achieving 
some common ground in restitution matters, and demonstrates that the general principles 
identified are thoroughly based on the ‘common interest’ in cultural heritage matters. By 
recognizing the merit in both individual and group rights, the starting point for the resolution 
of restitution disputes must aim at providing a mechanism for negotiating rivalries and 
recognizing the different interests rather than ignoring them.806 Therefore, this thesis is based 
on an argument in favor of striking a balance between the interests of the stakeholders 
involved. 
1.2 The Best Interest − a Legal Analogy to Child Custody Determination 
The ‘best interest’ of cultural objects claimed for restitution is not easily determined. 
This thesis, however, argues that the application of general principles facilitates the 
determination of the ‘best interest’ in terms of identifying the most appropriate solution in 
restitution disputes. What is meant by the ‘best interest’ of cultural objects subject to 
restitution can be best illustrated by an analogy to a strikingly similar legal doctrine in another 
field of law, namely that of ‘the best interest of the child’ doctrine in child custody law.807 
 
While, at first glance, child custody law may seem to have little in common with the 
cultural heritage law, it does provide several useful and highly illustrative conceptual 
comparisons. One reason that this comparison is so apt is the fact that cultural objects without 
certain provenance are often described as ‘orphaned objects’ – in other words, they lack a 
verifiable origin.808 This metaphor evokes the analogy between a cultural object in a 
                                                 
806 Cf. Barkan, "Introduction: Reparation: A Moral and Political Dilemma," p. 18. 
807 In a similar vein of comparison: Martin, "In the Best Interests of the Art," p. 170-71. 
808 See among many others: Merryman, Elsen, and Urice, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p. 417.; Brodie, "An 
Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities," p. 53.; Clemency Chase Coggins, "A 
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restitution disputes and a child in a child custody determination after a divorce or death, or in 
cases of child abandonment. Regardless of whether the object of contention is a child or a 
cultural object, the parties involved disagree over the right to legitimate custody. Moreover, 
this legal analogy illustrates both the similarities in the evolution of these two separate legal 
spheres and the need for the introduction of an approach that focuses on the interests 
involved. Child custody determination is, after all, based on a ‘welfare check-list’ of interests. 
For similar reasons, this thesis argues that there is a need to introduce such a ‘welfare check-
list’ in restitution disputes as well, based on the fact that there are general interests involved in 
these disputes, as well. 
 
The provisions of modern child custody determination are based on ‘the best interest 
of the child doctrine’ – a doctrine that bears a striking resemblance to the interest-oriented 
approach taken by this thesis. The application of the ‘best interest of the child doctrine’ in 
child custody law (first established in the 1970s) represented, at that time, a fundamental shift 
in policy terms in that particular area of the law.809 This thesis argues that a similarly 
profound shift in policy is necessary in order to deal with restitution matters in the field of 
international cultural heritage law in a fair and effective manner. A brief history of the facts 
related to these changes in child custody determination is necessary to illustrate this point. 
Under Roman law, children were viewed as the property of their fathers. Later, under English 
common law, the father continued to have near absolute power over the child.810 Until the 
early 1900s, in fact, the right of custody was in principle given to the father as he was 
assumed to provide, under a paternal point of view, the basic facilities necessary for the care 
of the child. In a direct parallel to the ‘paternal approach’, until the early 1920s, colonial 
powers often perceived the removal of cultural objects from the colonized territories ad 
libitum as their predetermined right and as in the best interest of the object. 
 
Gradually this ‘paternal preference’ was replaced by a ‘maternal preference’ in child 
custody determination, and by the 1920s, this maternal preference in custody determination 
became as ubiquitous as the paternal preference had previously been. The new preference 
distinctly favored the mother as the primary provider of parental care, both in statutes and in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Proposal for Museum Acquisition Policies in the Future," International Journal of Cultural Property 7, no. 2 
(1998): p. 434. 
809 Mary Ann Mason, From Father's Property to Children's Rights: The History of Child (Columbia University 
Press, 1996), pp. 121. 
810 Joan B. Kelly, "The Determination of Child Custody," The Future of Children - Children and Divorce 4, no. 
1 (1994): p. 121. 
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judicial decision-making.811 This shift to the ‘maternal preference’ in child custody is 
analogous to the process of decolonization in cultural heritage matters in the 1960s, during 
which the newly independent States began to submit claims for the return of cultural materials 
to their ‘countries of origin’. 
 
This maternal presumption in custody determination predominated for many decades 
(from the 1920s onwards), but eventually began to be challenged after divorce rate 
dramatically rose in Western Europe and the United States during the 1960s. The rising 
divorce rate, the growing feminist movement, the entry of large numbers of women into the 
work force, as well as fathers’ claims for the right of contact and access to their children, 
weakened the concept of the mother as primary care-taker, with the result that the ‘maternal 
preference’ was abandoned in the United States by the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 
enacted in 1970.812 This Act introduced the ‘best interests of the child doctrine’. According to 
this doctrine, neither the father nor the mother is to be favored exclusively in child custody 
determination. In the course of their proceedings, family courts have now been directed to 
assess the ‘best interests of the child’ and to identify on an individual basis what may best suit 
each child’s needs. Over the years, the principle of ‘the best interest of the child’ has found 
extensive usage in the domestic law of many countries.813 
 
Furthermore, the ‘best interest of the child’ principle has been incorporated in the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) of 1989,814 which is the 
world’s most widely ratified international treaty to date.815 The convention employs the ‘best 
interest of the child’ as the general criterion for determining whether a child in a custody 
dispute should remain in the current host country or whether s/he should be sent back to 
his/her country of origin.816 The overall principle of the convention is expressed in Article 
3(1), which states that in all actions concerning children “the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration.” The ‘best interest’ is not precisely defined, but the convention 
                                                 
811 Ibid.: p. 122. 
812 Ibid. 
813 Philip Alston, "The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights," in The 
Best Interests of the Child, ed. Philip Alston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 11. 
814 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entering into force 2 
September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3; full text available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
815 By September 2011: 193 State Parties, see United Nations Treaty Collection at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
816 Cf. Martin, "In the Best Interests of the Art," p. 170. 
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identifies a number of – potentially conflicting – rights, including, among others, protection 
and care for the child’s well-being (Article 3); the inherent right to life (Article 6); preserving 
the child’s cultural identity (Article 8); and free movement for the purpose of family 
reunification (Article 10).817 In his analysis of the principle, Alston states that it is a mediating 
principle, which can assist in the resolution of conflicts between different yet equal rights.818 
It is this idea that makes the ‘best interest’ analogy interesting for disputes pertaining to 
cultural objects. The application of the ‘best interest of the child’ doctrine to cultural heritage 
matters can focus attention on the interests at stake in international cultural heritage disputes. 
Although the diversity of interests and the values that accompany them are the most 
commonly given reasons for the indeterminacy of the ‘best interest’ standard in the children’s 
rights on the international level,819 a discussion of ‘best interest’ in cultural heritage matters 
may facilitate the debate pertaining to the development of feasible solutions in restitution 
disputes. While a ‘best interest’ perspective was introduced into domestic family law more 
than thirty years ago, and into international children’s rights more than twenty years ago, it 
has yet to find acceptance within the framework of international cultural heritage law. 
 
In determining the ‘best interest’ of the child, domestic courts may order social 
workers, family court advisors, psychologists and other forensic experts to undertake various 
investigations in order to assess the child’s living conditions as well as those of his custodial 
and non-custodial parents. In order to ensure that the child’s interests are represented, U.S. 
courts often appoint a guardian ad litem to investigate and determine what is in the child’s 
best interests, adding, as Martin points out, a third, more dispassionate voice to what are often 
emotional and contentious debates.820 Several issues – such as the stability of the child's life, 
links with the community, and the stability of the home environment provided by each parent 
– may be considered by a court in deciding the child's residency in custody and visitation 
proceedings. This ‘best interest’ doctrine requires the court to make reference to a so-called 
‘welfare check-list’ in determining the child’s custody provisions. 
 
This thesis argues that such investigations should also be undertaken in conjunction 
with the resolution of restitution disputes pertaining to cultural objects. Similar to the ‘welfare 
                                                 
817 Ibid. 
818 Alston, "The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights," p. 16. 
819 Stephen Parker, "The Best Interests of the Child - Principles and Problems," in The Best Interests of the Child, 
ed. Philip Alston (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), p. 39. 
820 Martin, "In the Best Interests of the Art," p. 170. 
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check-list’ in child custody law, the abstract interests of the cultural object in question should 
be taken into consideration in determining how a restitution dispute could be resolved. 
Similarly to child custody determination, this might involve asking the requesting party to 
meet certain requirements prior to return. When determining the welfare of the child, the court 
must consider certain pertinent facts relating to the child. These will be briefly outlined, as 
they serve to demonstrate the similarities between child custody considerations and those 
pertaining to cultural materials. The welfare checklist includes: (1) the ascertainable wishes 
and feelings of each child concerned (given their age and understanding); (2) physical, 
emotional and/or educational needs of the child, now and in the future; (3) the likely effect of 
any change in custody on the child; (4) the likelihood of any harm to the child or risk of 
suffering resulting from a change in custody; (5) the capabilities of each parents and related 
persons to meet the child's needs.821 Summarizing, this ‘welfare checklist’ considers the 
needs, wishes and feelings of the child. Although this check-list cannot be applied directly to 
restitution disputes, it nevertheless expresses several major concerns that, if slightly modified, 
can be applied to cultural objects. In defining the interests of a cultural object, one can 
similarly speak of an interest in protection, physical and cultural preservation, maintenance of 
integrity and context, as well as reasonable conditions for access and scientific research. 
Martin summarizes the object’s interests in a concise trilogy: firstly, an interest in not being at 
risk, secondly, an interest in being whole, and, thirdly, an interest in being known and having 
its background understood.822 
 
Apart from the ‘best interest of the child’ doctrine, which is concerned with the 
physical and psychological integrity of the child, this historic shift to the standards that 
considering the ‘best interest’ of the child have also paved the way for a new type of custody 
arrangement to emerge, namely that of ‘joint child custody’.823 In the same way that the 
‘welfare check-list’ corresponds with a framework of ‘policy objectives’ in international 
cultural heritage law, the concept of ‘joint custody’ in child custody determinations also 
corresponds remarkably well with the concept of ‘joint ownership’ or ‘return without transfer 
of ownership’. Similarly, this provides a model for possible arrangements between the parties, 
                                                 
821 Mason, From Father's Property to Children's Rights: The History of Child pp. 121. 
822 Martin, "In the Best Interests of the Art," p. 171. 
823 Kelly, "The Determination of Child Custody," p. 122. 
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including temporary or long-term loans as well as the fabrication of replicas,824 something 
that is not possible in child custody law. 
1.3 Unequal Bargaining Power and Negotiations – Options for Mutual Gain 
Despite the flexibility that bilateral agreements bring in contrast to international treaty 
law, they suffer from a major shortcoming insofar as their terms depend, in part, on the 
bargaining power of the negotiating parties.825 Whereas in the context of child custody 
determination, the bargaining power among the parties claiming for custody might be equally 
distributed (at least theoretically), the parties involved in restitution disputes are generally 
rather unequal in their bargaining powers. This is mostly due to the fact that the appropriation 
of cultural material that is now being claimed has frequently occurred in the context of war, or 
foreign or colonial domination. Although one could argue that unequal bargaining power is a 
given fact in almost all relations of contractual nature, bargaining power seems to be 
particularly unequal in many restitution disputes. 
 
Moreover, the former colonial dominance frequently continues to be perpetuated by 
the unequal political and economic power of the respective parties involved in restitution 
disputes. This affects not only the final outcome of negotiations, but also inhibits the 
development and application of a consistent legal framework. It goes without saying that 
parties with strong bargaining power will always prefer individual agreements rather than 
general obligations pertaining to restitution and return. This, for example, can be detected in 
the general reluctance of major art-market countries to ratify international conventions. This 
has certainly been the case for years with regard to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and 
continues to be the case with regard to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.826 The 1970 
UNESCO Convention has been ratified by 120 States; however only in recent years have 
several States with major art and antiquities markets become party to the convention; these 
include, France (1997); United Kingdom (2002); Japan (2002); Switzerland (2003); Germany 
(2007); Belgium and the Netherlands (both 2009). Although the United States ratified the 
convention earlier than many other major art-market players (1983), the U.S. implementation 
act (CPIA) places specific conditions on parties entering into bilateral agreements that 
                                                 
824 For details on complementary and alternative mechanisms, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
825 Rationale Two: Contracts and Unequal Bargaining Power, see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.2. 
826 For details on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2; for details on the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
 190
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
effectively enacts import restrictions of cultural materials.827 The 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention, in turn, still lacks general recognition in major art-market countries (e.g. none of 
the States mentioned above have yet ratified UNIDROIT).828 
 
The cases presented above in Chapter Three, in which Italy was both the requesting 
and requested party, pointedly illustrate the importance of bargaining power in negotiations. 
In the case of the return of the Axum obelisk, Italy dithered for almost sixty years before 
returning the obelisk to Ethiopia, even though the 1947 Peace Treaty required restitution 
within eighteen months.829 In contrast, when acting as a requesting State, Italy has been able 
to conclude bilateral agreements with major U.S. museums following tough negotiations in 
less than three years.830 Although Italy could rely on the existence of compelling evidence 
that the objects in question had been illicitly exported, allowing the Italian authorities to 
support their negotiations with plausible threat of civil action, this threat was extensively 
bolstered by diplomatic resoluteness and the extensive involvement of the international 
media, especially with regard to the negotiations with the Getty Museum. This reflects the 
substantial bargaining power of Italy, and contrasts starkly with Ethiopia, which did not have 
such bargaining power at its disposal during its negotiations with Italy, even though it was in 
possession of legal entitlement to the return of the obelisk on the basis of the 1947 Peace 
Treaty. 
 
Without a doubt, the bilateral U.S.-Italian agreements can be perceived as an 
international success story in cultural restitution disputes, on the basis of both the resolute 
nature of the negotiations and the cooperation and exchange of cultural material found in the 
final accords. Nevertheless, they provide an excellent illustration of the impact of bargaining 
power differentials, which have generally proved to be the most influential factor in the final 
outcome of negotiations. If equal bargaining power is uncertain in the case of bilateral 
negotiations among States, it is even less assured in case of negotiations between States non-
State actors (e.g. private entities, indigenous peoples, and minority groups). Less bargaining 
power is typically attributed to indigenous peoples and minority groups, since they generally 
                                                 
827 For details on bilateral inter-State agreements with regard to import regulations, see supra: Chapter Three, 
Section 2.9.2. 
828 For details on the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.4; for the status of 
ratifications see the list of State parties, available at: http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-main.htm 
(accessed 23 August 2011). 
829 For details on the case of the return of the Obelisk of Axum, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1.  
830 For details on the U.S.-Italian agreements, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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have difficult establishing standing before national governments. However, the power 
differentials in negotiations between States and non-State actors do not necessarily always 
favor States. In particular, leading art institutions and museums might have strong bargaining 
power as well; the power differential between the British Museum and the Greek government 
in the case of the Parthenon Marbles is a case in point; a similar dynamic existed in the 
negotiations between Italy and several U.S. museums (including Boston Museum of Fine 
Arts, Metropolitan Museum, the Getty, and the Princeton Art Museum). If Italy had not been 
one of the world’s richest countries in terms of its art holding, and at the same time an 
economically developed country, but instead a country without the facilities to offer “objects 
of equivalent beauty and artistic/historical significance” to loan in return,831 the agreements 
would most likely have turned out differently or not been reached at all. Because of Italy’s 
ability to suspend future exchanges in cultural objects as part of its negotiation strategy, the 
U.S. museums could not simply ignore Italy’s requests without risking the enactment of these 
countermeasures, which had already been threatened by Italian authorities832 − a threat that no 
art institution can afford ignore, especially if the negotiation partner holds a significant 
proportion of the entire world heritage of Etruscan, Roman, Greek and Renaissance art. In 
cases where no such material resources are available for bargaining purposes, diplomatic or 
legal pressure cannot be used at all − or at least not as effectively − as was done by the Italian 
authorities in 2005-2008. This statement should not be understood as criticism of the 
strategies employed by the Italian governmental authorities, as this approach clearly facilitates 
negotiations and favors cooperative resolutions of restitution disputes; rather, it is a criticism 
of the inequality of bargaining power, which is generally found in bilateral agreements.833 
 
If bilateral agreements were to be widely employed in restitution disputes, another 
difficulty would certainly arise; namely, it is not clear whether bilateral agreements would 
contribute to or detract from efforts to achieve a consistent framework in international cultural 
                                                 
831 See the text of  the agreement between the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Republic of Italy, 
concluded 21 February 2006, reprinted in: International Journal of Cultural Property (2006) 13, p. 427-434. The 
agreements with the other U.S. museums have not yet been published to the best of the author’s knowledge. 
832 For example, see: Christopher Knight, “The grandstand erected by Italy – Why is its culture minister trying to 
rough up the Getty? Politics for the home crowd”, in: Los Angeles Times, 25 July 2007, available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/25/entertainment/et-getty25; “Rutelli contro il Paul Getty Museum – Non 
possono esporre opera rubate”, in: La Repubblica, 23 November 2006, available at: 
http://www.repubblica.it/2006/11/sezioni/spettacoli_e_cultura/getty-museum-polemiche/parla-rutelli/parla-
rutelli.html; Lee Rosenbaum, “Italy’s Rutelli Threatens Getty with Sanctions”, in: Artsjournal, 11 July 2007, 
available at: http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2007/07/italys_rutelli_threatens_getty.html (accessed 12 
August 2011).  
833 For details on contracts and unequal bargaining power (Rationale Two), see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.2. 
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heritage law. On the one hand, it can be argued that these bilateral agreements facilitate the 
resolution of restitution disputes and strengthen efforts in fighting illicit trafficking in cultural 
materials. On the other hand, reliance on individualized diplomatic negotiations seems likely 
to lead to further fragmentation within this field of law; this fragmentation, at least to some 
degree, has been demonstrated above in the analysis of the existing legal framework.834 While 
international cultural heritage law at present is by no means uniform,835 common standards in 
restitution disputes are in fact needed, not only to reduce the risks associated with unequal 
bargaining power, but also to provide legal and diplomatic certainty to the resolution of 
restitution disputes. In this way, the interest-oriented approach proposed by this thesis 
contributes to the development of international law in this field, as it provides an alternative 
approach aimed at balancing the various interests in restitution disputes. Moreover, 
identifying general principles based on the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural 
heritage may allow negotiations in restitution disputes to proceed in a manner that facilitates 
problem-solving. Eventually, these general principles − preservation, access, integrity and 
cooperation − may create standards that lead to the formation of a legal framework, which 
depends less on the bargaining power of one or the other party in the resolution of restitution 
disputes, and more on equity since they would be based on common interests. 
 
The crucial impact of unequal bargaining powers on the issue of restitution and return 
has been assessed by other scholars, including, for example, Scovazzi.836 Whereas this thesis 
approaches the issue of unequal bargaining powers at the stage where claims for restitution of 
cultural materials are being made, Scovazzi considers unequal bargaining powers at the earlier 
stage − that of removal. He argues that the appropriation of cultural materials has often been 
the result of the inequality in bargaining powers and the former state of dependency on one of 
the involved parties. As a legal consequence, he argues that this inequality of bargaining 
powers calls for a “[…] principle of non-exploitation of the weakness of another subject to get 
a cultural gain” in international cultural heritage law.837 According to Scovazzi, this principle 
should apply to cultural objects that were arbitrarily appropriated regardless of the means of 
appropriation, including apparently legal transactions, which only occurred because of the 
existing inequality in the bargaining powers between the parties at the time of the transaction. 
                                                 
834 For details, see supra Chapter Three. 
835 Cf. Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 405. 
836 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 369 ff. 
837 Ibid.: p. 370. 
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In particular, he refers to the UNESCO draft Declaration of Principles relating to Cultural 
Objects Displaced in Connection with WWII,838 which concerns cultural artifacts “transferred 
pursuant to a transaction apparently, but not actually legal, or vitiated for whatever reason, 
even when the transaction purports to have been voluntarily effected” (Principle Two (iii)). 
Similar considerations have been adopted in the 1943 London Declaration regarding Nazi-
looted art, which emphasize the fact that these transactions – even those “apparently legal in 
form, even when they purport to be voluntarily affected” might be declared invalid.839 On this 
basis, Scovazzi argues that the principle prohibiting the exploitation of unequal bargaining 
power should be enlarged to encompass questions regarding the removal of cultural objects 
removed from peoples subjected to colonial or foreign occupation, as well as from indigenous 
peoples in similar circumstances.840  
 
Although this principle cannot yet be seen as a general principle in customary 
international law, due to the lack of a respective State practice,841 the argument that inequality 
of bargaining powers decisively influences negotiations and their outcome is an essential one. 
In order to overcome the inequity caused by unequal bargaining powers, this thesis argues that 
it is necessary to introduce general principles that facilitate the resolution of restitution 
disputes. Unequal bargaining power between the parties will never be completely eliminated; 
however, similar to any other area of law, inequality in restitution disputes could be 
minimized through general principles that shape the general conditions on whose basis 
restitution disputes could be resolved. Therefore, taking into account the interests of the 
various stakeholders involved and evaluating restitution claims on the basis of preservation, 
access, integrity and cooperation may serve the purpose of minimizing current inequalities 
between the requesting and the requested party, which, in turn, may facilitate mutually 
satisfying outcomes in international cultural heritage disputes. 
 
                                                 
838 See: UNESCO Draft Declaration of Principles to Cultural Objects Displaced in Connection with the Second 
World War, doc. 34 C/22 Annex I, adopted 5 September 2007. These Principles are of “a non-binding character 
and are intended to provide general guidance for bilateral or multilateral interstate negotiations in order to 
facilitate the conclusion of agreements related to cultural objects” (Principle One). For a detailed discussion, see 
supra Chapter Three, Section 3.1.  
839 For details to the 1943 Declaration of London, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2; for details on the 1998 
Washington Principles on Holocaust-Era Materials, see supra: Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
840 Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 369.See also: Vrdoljak, "Reparations for Cultural Loss," p. 197. 
841 For details on customary international law, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6. 
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In practical terms, by addressing the issue of unequal bargaining powers in 
negotiations, attention should be paid to the specific interests and motives of each party rather 
than their entrenched and often persistent negotiation positions. This focus on bargaining 
power must replace the current focus, which is on complete ‘restitution’ versus complete 
‘retention’.842 It is exactly these entrenched positions, which frequently sustain the 
misunderstandings in and confrontational nature of restitution disputes, and which perpetuate 
existing inequality in bargaining power. In other words, arguing over positions does not result 
in mutually beneficial solutions, since disputes over positions are inherently zero-sum 
situations (such as those frequently produced in current restitution disputes). Rather, by 
arguing over interests, the parties involved might discover common ground that could lead to 
a possible ‘win-win’ outcome, ideally satisfying the interests and needs of all parties involved 
in the dispute. In particular, restitution disputes pertaining to the appropriation of cultural 
materials during foreign or colonial domination are frequently overshadowed by 
confrontational interactions that reiterate the former colonial power’s long-held positions with 
its former colony. Therefore, it is essential to form an understanding of the interests and 
motivations upon which these positions are based and upon which restitution claims are 
brought, since they indicate the nature of likely outcomes of the negotiations.843 If, however, 
attention is primarily paid to the parties’ positions in the negotiation, less attention will be 
devoted to addressing the underlying concerns (and interests) of the parties, or to identifying 
the common interests that could provide the basis for a mutually satisfactory outcome. In sum, 
three essential considerations facilitate the ability of the parties involved to achieve mutual 
gains in negotiations pertaining to restitution and return: 844 firstly, the focus on the parties’ 
interests and potential common ground (rather than on their adversarial positions that produce 
‘all-or-nothing’ solutions and thus mainly end in deadlock); secondly, the use of an approach 
that focuses on the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage; and thirdly, 
careful consideration of a variety of options in terms of complementary or alternative 
mechanisms that extend beyond the mere restitution of the object. 
                                                 
842 Cf. Roger Fischer, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes - Negotiating an Agreement without Giving 
In (1997), p. 5. 
843 On the discussion regarding motive-based categories of claims, see supra: Chapter One, Section 3.2. 
844 Cf. Fischer, Ury, and Patton, Getting to Yes - Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In, p. 11. 
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2. The Legal Foundations of the Interest-oriented Approach 
The approach taken by this thesis exceeds current restitution practices and, therefore, 
cannot be limited to the legal analysis of international law currently in force (lex lata);845 
rather, it must extend its considerations to recent normative developments and evolutionary 
trends in international law (lex ferenda).846 Recent developments in international law, which 
have already been discussed above, include: human rights obligations in the context of 
restitution and return;847 the recognition of ethical and historical considerations;848 the right to 
self-determination;849 and the relevance of erga omnes obligations pertaining to the protection 
of cultural heritage (responsibility to protect).850 The following section will complement this 
analysis by exploring the emerging concepts in international law that indicate the existence of 
a ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage, and from which further obligations 
pertaining to the protection of cultural materials can be deduced. 
2.1 Common Heritage of Humankind 
While cultural objects may constitute the cultural heritage of a particular group, 
community, nation, or State, many of these objects have also been regarded as a testimonial to 
the common history of mankind. The history and development of humankind is of universal 
importance to all nations. Thus, archaeological and skeletal remains of the earliest traces of 
mankind, and the knowledge derived from their examination, are not only important to the 
State in which they are found, but to all peoples.851 The same is true for unique and 
outstanding examples of human civilization, such as the pyramids of Egypt or the Maya 
temples. The recognition of ‘cultural heritage’ as having universal importance was first 
established in the 1954 Hague Convention and was further developed as a concept by the 
1972 UNESCO Convention.852 The 1972 UNESCO Convention is based on the premise that 
“parts of the cultural and natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be 
preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole”853 and that the destruction or 
                                                 
845 For legal analysis, see supra Chapter Three. 
846 Cf. Scovazzi, "Diviser C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural 
Property," p. 341. 
847 For details on human rights obligations, see supra: Chapter Three, Section 2.8; for details on customary 
international law, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6. 
848 See supra Chapter Three, Section 5. 
849 See supra Chapter Three Section 6.3. 
850 See supra Chapter Three Section 6. 4. 
851 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 11. 
852 Ibid., p. 406. See also supra Chapter Two, Section 5.1. 
853 See sixth recital of the 1972 UNESCO Convention; for details on the convention, see supra Chapter Three, 
Section 2.3. 
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deterioration of the cultural heritage “constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of 
all the nations of the world”.854 In a similar vein, the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural 
Heritage Convention855 refers to underwater cultural heritage as “an integral part of the 
cultural heritage of humanity”.856 Although these and several other conventions857, in some 
form or another, contain notions such as ‘world heritage of mankind’ (1972 UNESCO 
Convention), ‘cultural heritage of all mankind’ (1954 Hague Convention), or ‘cultural 
heritage of humanity’ (2001 UNESCO Underwater Convention), the concept of ‘common 
heritage of humankind’ first emerged in a different area of international law, namely in the 
context of the Law of the Sea in the 1960s and 1970s with regard to access to and exploitation 
of the deep seabed.858 The concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’ follows the 
supposition that the resources of the deep seabed can neither be appropriated, nor fall under 
the sovereign control of a single State or group of States. The presumption behind this 
concept is that certain areas and resources solicit the interest of the wider international 
community, and are thus beyond the national jurisdiction and sovereign control of any State, 
because they serve the interest of humanity. In light of this, the concept of a ‘common 
heritage of humankind’ has therefore been described as one of the most developed 
conceptions of ‘trusteeship’ in international law.859 As a consequence, this common heritage 
should fall under the ‘stewardship’ of the international community as a whole, in the interest 
of present and future generations.860 On this basis, it was hoped that the application of the 
concept would create a more equitable basis for sharing limited areas and resources – above 
and beyond the recognized territorial claims of States and their national interests.861 Thus, the 
concept of a ‘common heritage of humankind’ was subsequently applied in other emerging 
areas of international law,862 in particular, the outer space, the moon,863 the Antarctica,864 and 
the protection of the human genome.865  
                                                 
854 See second recital of the 1972 UNESCO Convention. 
855 For details on the 2001 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.5. 
856 See first recital of the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention. 
857 For example, the 1954 European Cultural Convention speaks of a ‘common cultural heritage of Europe’. The 
European Cultural Convention was launched by the Council of Europe, (1954, CETS No.18), signed on 19 
December 1954, entering into force 5 May 1955; full text version available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/018.htm (accessed 23 August 2011). 
858 In 1956 the United Nations held its first conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), followed by 
UNCLOS II in 1960, and UNCLOS III in 1967. UNCLOS III resulted in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed on 10 December 1982, entering into force 16 November 1994, (1982, 21 ILM 
1261). 
859 Cf. Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2002), p. 144. 
860 Nuhaila Carmouche, "The New Concept of International Responsibility in International Environmental Law " 
Report written for the British Institute for International and Comparative Law December 9(2005): p. 31. 
861 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, pp. 143. 
862 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 407. 
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In the field of maritime law, the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)866 led 
to the establishment of the International Seabed Authority;867 in contrast, the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention did not lead to the establishment of an autonomous authority, which, for 
example, would have managed the World Heritage sites, since the territorial sovereignty of 
the State in which these sites are located is not abridged by the convention. Although early 
attempts in 1960s and 1970s were made to establish a ‘World Heritage Trust’, which would 
exercise extra-territorial control over the designated sites under international custody,868 the 
fact that such proposals impinged on the territorial sovereignty of States led to their rejection. 
Thus, it is questionable whether and to what degree the concept of ‘common heritage of 
humankind’ as developed in international law can be employed in cultural heritage matters 
and what obligations might be imposed upon States. Although – as shown above – concepts 
such as ‘world heritage of mankind’ (1972 UNESCO Convention), ‘cultural heritage of all 
mankind’ (1954 Hague Convention), or ‘cultural heritage of humanity’ (2001 UNESCO 
Underwater Convention) are employed within the framework of international cultural heritage 
law, the 1970 UNESCO Convention (with its emphasis on the protection of movable cultural 
materials), follows a different path, since it views ‘cultural heritage’ predominantly in terms 
of national cultural property. The bond to a particular State, as assumed by the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, is based on the concept of ‘country of origin’, namely the State from 
which the cultural material was stolen or illicitly exported in breach of its national export 
regulations. Thus, the question arises of how the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’ is 
given content in the above mentioned conventions on cultural heritage. 
 
The two different approaches in international cultural heritage disputes – namely the 
nation-State approach and the ‘cultural heritage of all mankind’ approach − have been 
described by Merryman as irreconcilable because they pit ‘nationalism’ versus 
                                                                                                                                                        
863 United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted by the UNGA, 19 December 1966, entering into 
force 10 October 1967), 610 UNTS 205; The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (known also as ‘Moon Treaty’), (signed 5 December 1979, entering into force 11 July 
1984), 1979, 1363 UNTS 3. 
864 See Antarctic Treaty (signed 1 December 1959, entering into force 23 June 1961), 402 UNTS 71. 
865 See Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (signed 11 November 1997), available 
at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001096/109687eb.pdf (accessed 8 August 2011). 
866 See supra n. 858. 
867 The International Seabed Authority (ISA), created in 1994, is an autonomous international organization 
established under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Part XI) with its headquarters in 
Kingston, Jamaica, see http://www.isa.org.jm/en/home (accessed 23 August 2011). 
868 Preliminary Study, UNESCO Doc. 16 C/19 (Annex No. 50). 
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‘internationalism’.869 ‘Nationalism’ in this sense refers to national constraints on the trade in 
cultural artifacts, in protection of the integrity of national patrimony; in comparison, 
‘internationalism’ refers to a preference for free trade in cultural artifacts and against national 
restrictions. This division has been criticized, for example by Nafziger, as a contrived 
dichotomy870 in cultural heritage and as uni-dimensional, since it primarily substantiates a 
free trade-approach, which exclusively fosters the interests of the so-called art-market 
countries. What the ‘internationalists’ seem to have in mind, according to Nafiziger, is a 
general free trade in cultural materials, unfettered by mutual cooperation among States.871 As 
this mutual cooperation in cultural heritage would be, as a matter of fact, truly ‘international’, 
the rational for ‘cultural internationalism’ turns out not to be international but rather 
commercial in nature, as Nafziger points out in his criticism on Merryman’s approach. 
Merryman, in turn, reaffirms his ‘internationalism’ approach with regard to the protection of 
underwater cultural heritage by advocating for an unconstrained freedom of the seas.872 
However, in doing so, Merryman ignores, in particular, the international legal developments 
within the framework of the Law of the Sea and the adoption of UNCLOS,873 which opposes 
the traditional principle of unconstrained exploitation. 
                                                
 
As demonstrated above, the concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’ is used in 
different areas of international law; it remains, however, a rather broad conceptual framework 
and therefore does not produce any specific legal implications.874 Thus, the questions of what 
this concept effectively comprises and what legal obligations are to be derived from it are 
questions still to be answered. Generally, discussions of the concept of ‘common heritage of 
humankind’ are more or less centered on the question of composition – namely what this 
heritage should encompass – rather than what actual legal consequences would be derived 
from the application of this concept. Moreover, the notion of ‘humankind’ as legal entity is 
still not commonly asserted and questionable in practice, giving that there is currently no 
 
869 John Henry Merryman, "Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property," American Journal of International 
Law (1986). 
870 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 244. 
871 Ibid., p. 246. 
872 Merryman argues that the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Heritage 
exemplifies cultural nationalism because it expresses an “anti-market bias” prohibiting commercial exploitation 
of underwater heritage, John Henry Merryman, "Cultural Property Internationalism," International Journal of 
Cultural Property, no. 12 (2005). For details on the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, 
see supra: Chapter Three, Section 2.5. 
873 See supra n. 858. 
874 Cf. Janet Blake, "On Defining the Cultural Heritage," International &Comparative Law Quarterly (2000): p. 
83-84. 
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exclusion of State sovereignty in cultural heritage matters, as demonstrated by the 1972 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention, and since nation States are generally still considered 
as the major actors in international law. 
 
Despite all of these shortcomings, the international awareness of the importance of 
protecting cultural heritage in the interest of humankind has increased tremendously over the 
last several decades, and, as mentioned above, the legal emphasis shifted from the notion of 
‘cultural property’ to ‘cultural heritage’,875 thus broadening the framework of international 
cultural heritage law.876 Moreover, the concept of ‘cultural heritage’ has also facilitated a shift 
in the legal obligations associated with cultural heritage, from a ‘negative’ responsibility of 
States to avoid destruction of cultural heritage in times of armed conflicts – as expressed by 
the 1954 Hague Convention – towards a ‘positive’ responsibility to protect cultural heritage 
not only in war but also in times of peace. This assumption is based on the recent re-appraisal 
that, firstly, it is in the interest of the international community to preserve cultural heritage for 
future generations of humanity, as articulated in several international conventions, 
declarations and recommendations pertaining to cultural heritage877 and as expressed in the 
2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage878 in 
response to the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001.879 Secondly, it has been 
generally recognized that cultural heritage is threatened not only during times of war but also 
in times of peace through the illicit trafficking in cultural objects, mass tourism, 
environmental pollution, clandestine excavations, and underwater expeditions, and that these 
threats have developed in a way that requires international responses in order to protect the 
common interest of humankind.880 Consequently, the protection and preservation of cultural 
heritage in both war and peace time is no longer considered to be a matter of exclusive State 
sovereignty, but rather a matter of common concern to the international community as a 
whole.881 
                                                 
875 For details, see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.1. 
876 Francioni, "A Dynamic Evolution of Concept and Scope: From Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage," pp. 
221. 
877 For analysis of the legal instruments, see supra Chapter Three. 
878 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference, 17 October 2003, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17718&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 August 2011). 
879 Cf. Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," pp. 28. 
880 Cf. Schorlemer von, Internationaler Kulturgüterschutz - Ansätze Zur Prävention Im Frieden Sowie Im 
Bewaffneten Konflikt, pp. 101. 
881 For details see supra Chapter Three, Section 1.2. 
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With regard to the matter of restitution disputes, the concept of ‘common heritage of 
humankind’ does not imply that cultural materials may be retained by certain States or private 
entities, which purports to safeguard cultural heritage for the collectivity of humankind. 
Rather, it implies recognition of a common concern by the international community, and thus 
a common interest in the protection of cultural heritage.882 The exclusive State sovereignty 
approach and the predominance of nation States’ interests in current restitution practices 
contradicts − at least partially − the concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’, which 
focuses on the international community rather than on single States. Although the concept of 
‘common heritage of humankind’ does not provide a specific normative basis creating an 
obligation to protect or to return cultural materials, it does, however, clearly indicate, a 
general responsibility of the international community as a whole to protect cultural heritage 
and functions as a premise for further developments in international cultural heritage law.883 
As a result of this new conceptualization the following considerations should be included in 
the resolution of restitution disputes: firstly, defining common (minimum) standards and 
practices pertaining to the preservation of cultural heritage; secondly, burden-sharing in the 
attempt to preserve the cultural heritage of humankind for future generations; and thirdly, 
establishing common responsibilities and benefits derived from this cultural heritage in terms 
of public and scientific access, sustainable management and cooperation.  
 
The answers to these questions cannot currently be found in the legal framework of 
international cultural heritage law. Legal developments, which might facilitate answers to 
these questions, can however be found in a related field of international law, particularly that 
of international environmental law. Interestingly, international environmental law introduces 
different concepts, namely that of a ‘common concern of mankind’ and that of a ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’. Thus, the following section will discuss whether and how these 
concepts might be applied to and foster the debate on the resolution of international cultural 
heritage disputes. 
2.2 Common Concern and Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
In recent years, international environmental law has probably been the most 
progressive area of international law. This is due in part to the trans-boundary nature of 
                                                 
882 Freytag, "Cultural Heritage: Rückgabeansprüche Von Ursprungsländern Auf "Ihr" Kulturgut?," p. 197. 
883 Nafziger, "The Present State of Research," p. 245. 
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pollution and climate change, which has, in turn, facilitated new normative developments. In 
contrast, the area of international cultural heritage law is still primarily understood against the 
backdrop of exclusive State sovereignty and State territoriality.884 Recently developments in 
the area of environmental law have established concepts that are not only prolific and 
applicable in environmental issues, but also highly relevant within the context of international 
cultural heritage law. This is because both areas of law pertain fundamentally to the interplay 
between limited ‘resources’ and concepts pertaining to territory, State sovereignty and 
property rights. Consequently, the two areas of international law are comparable to a certain 
extend.885 The differences between cultural heritage law and environmental law pertain to the 
nature of the ‘resource’: the latter deals with ‘resources’ of natural origin, such as water, oil or 
carbon, whereas cultural heritage refers to a different kind of ‘resource’, namely man-made 
works of art. Despite this essential difference, both areas of the law understand the 
international community as a collective and relevant actor and recognize the ‘common 
interest’ in the protection of limited resources.886  
 
Based on these similarities, the recently developed concepts in international 
environmental law are particularly well-suited to problems in international cultural heritage 
law: firstly, the global interest in the protection of cultural heritage and the aim of preventing 
illicit trafficking in cultural materials is not confined exclusively to States, since non-State 
actors and their interests are increasingly recognized on the international level; secondly, and 
similarly to environmental issues, States no longer have the ability or actual capacity to 
protect cultural heritage on their own, since the protection of cultural heritage constitutes a 
shared interest of humanity.887 In addition to the concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’, 
two other concepts take this ‘common interest’ into account and facilitate the development of 
legal instrument with regard to establishing common obligations in international law. The first 
concept which implements the idea of a ‘common interest’ is the concept of the ‘common 
concern of mankind’. This concept has been incorporated in several international treaties, 
                                                 
884 For example the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
885 Along this vein, Mastalir, who draws a comparison between the measures to protect the ozone layer with 
those necessary to protect cultural property: Apples and Oranges? – Is there a Basis for Analogy between the 
Resolution of Environmental and Cultural Property Problems? in: Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The 
"Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under International Law," pp. 1075. 
886 Cf. Rudolf Dolzer, "Die Deklaration Des Kulturguts Zum 'Common Heritage of Mankind'," in Rechtsfragen 
Des Internationale Kulturgüterschutzes, ed. Rudolf Dolzer, Erik Jayme, and Reinhard Mussgnug (1994), p. 21. 
887 Francioni, "Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity," 
pp. 1209. 
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such as the protection of biodiversity,888 as well as to the issue of climate change (1992 Rio 
Declaration).889 The concept of ‘common concern of mankind’ is based on three fundamental 
assertions: firstly, the recognition of the immediacy and global dimension of environmental 
problems; secondly, the belief that global and sustainable solutions can only be accomplished 
through cooperative means; and thirdly, that the common concern leads to global 
responsibilities. These global responsibilities may have an erga omnes character, similar to 
human rights norms, which are owed not just to States, but rather to the international 
community as a whole. Although these global responsibilities are held in common by all 
States, obligations conferred upon developed and developing parties are differentiated in 
various ways, thereby incorporating elements of ‘equitable balancing’.890 On the basis of 
these three assertions, the concept of ‘common concern’ portends “the goal of establishing a 
new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among 
States, key sectors of societies and people” and calls for “an international agreements which 
respect the interest of all”.891  
 
The proposed establishment of an “equitable global partnership”, as expressed in the 
1992 Rio Declaration, highlights the second concept in international environmental law 
relevant in this context. The concept of a ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ includes 
both an understanding of the general equity of States in international law (traditionally linked 
to State sovereignty), as well as the existence of a ‘common concern’ pertaining to the 
protection of the environment.892 This normative concept surfaced in 1992 at UN Conference 
on Environmental and Development (UNCED) and was included in its closing communiqué, 
namely the Rio Declaration, which affirms in Principle 7 that “[…] States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities; the developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that 
they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the globe environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command”. Similarly, the 2001 Kyoto Protocol includes the concept of ‘common but 
                                                 
888 For example, Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM (1992) 818, adopted 5 June 1992, entering into 
force 29 December 1993. 
889 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, launched at the UN Conference on Environmental and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, full text version 
available at: http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/rio20/pages/Download/Rio_Declaration-E.pdf. (accessed 
24 August 2011). 
890 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, p. 99. 
891 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (pp 2 and 3). 
892 Cf. Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge1995), p. 101. 
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differentiated responsibilities’ in Article 10.893 In practical terms, this concept of an 
“equitable global partnership” requires developed countries to recognize the economic 
development aspirations of lesser developed countries, and the lesser developed countries to 
recognize the threat that continued development poses to the global environment. Thus, the 
concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ can be seen as an attempt to achieve 
an equitable balance between developed and developing States in environmental terms. When 
translated into the field of international cultural heritage law, this can be understood as the 
relation between the so-called ‘source countries’ and ‘art-market countries’. Similarly to the 
common concern for the global environment, the protection of cultural heritage for the sake of 
humanity constitutes a common concern, or positively expressed: a common interest.894 The 
concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ spills over into another concept of 
international law, namely that of ‘international cooperation’. 
2.3 International Cooperation and Assistance 
Although the idea of ‘international cooperation’ does not appear to be a particularly 
recent phenomenon, it was, in fact, not until the second half of the nineteenth century that the 
concept of ‘international cooperation’ emerged in international law. The idea of ‘international 
cooperation’ subsequently led to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences (with the 
adoption of the early Hague Conventions),895 the establishment of the League of Nations in 
1920, and, following WWII, the establishment of the United Nations.896 Until that point, 
international law was primarily ruled by what Friedman described as ‘international law of 
coexistence.’897 Since, however, the maintenance of peace and security, the protection of 
human rights and the environment, as well as the protection of cultural heritage require more 
than the mere peaceful coexistence of States (and other stakeholders), Friedman coined the 
recognition of common concerns as a shift from ‘international law of coexistence’ to an 
‘international law of cooperation’.898 Unlike the law of coexistence, the law of cooperation is 
based on the assumption of common interests that cannot be protected or served except 
                                                 
893 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted 11 
December 1997, entering into force 16 February 2005. The Protocol sets binding target for 37 industrialized 
countries and the European Union for reducing greenhouse gas emissions; full text version available at: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (accessed 23 September 2011). 
894 For a detailed analysis of the various interests, see Chapter Five, Section 3. 
895 For details on the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, see supra Chapter 2, Section 2. 
896 Cf. Georges Abi-Saab, "General Conclusions," in Standard-Setting in Unesco, ed. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf 
(2007), p. 397. 
897 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), p. 36 and 297. 
898 Ibid. See also: ———, "National Sovereignty, International Cooperation, and the Reality of International 
Law," University of California UCLA Law Review, no. 10 (1962-63): pp. 739 ff. 
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through collaborative endeavors.899 Thus, the concept of ‘international cooperation’ can be 
defined as States proactively working together in order to achieve objectives that cannot be 
attained by a single actor acting alone.900 As a consequence, cooperation goes beyond the 
passive obligation of non-interference in the territorial and functional spheres of other 
sovereign States, by prescribing a positive obligation to act – or rather to act cooperatively – 
in service of the common interest of humanity.901 
 
Similarly to the UN Charter, whose fundament and guiding principle is that of 
cooperation,902 several international treaties, resolutions, recommendations, and declarations 
have reaffirmed the imperative need for international cooperation in order to facilitate the 
protection of the cultural heritage.903 Moreover, recently developed concepts, such as the 
concept of the ‘common heritage of humankind’, ‘common concern of mankind’, and 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ discussed above demonstrate that the traditional 
function of international law to accommodate the interests of States has become inadequate in 
light of these common interests. Notably, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention states in its 
preamble that “this Convention will not be itself provide a solution to the problem raised by 
illicit trade, but that it initiates a process that will enhance international cultural cooperation 
and maintain a proper role for legal trading and inter-State agreements for cultural 
exchanges.”904 In order to provide an operational basis for the international cooperation in 
cultural heritage issues among States and other non-State actors, UNESCO, as a specialized 
agency within the UN system, as well as several international bodies (such as ICOM,905 
ICCROM,906 and Interpol907) have been established. 
 
Despite the recent developments towards a positive obligation to cooperate in the 
protection of cultural heritage in international law, most legal instruments that contain 
provisions on international cooperation either fulfill simply declarative functions or must be 
                                                 
899 Abi-Saab, "General Conclusions," p. 397. 
900 Rüdiger Wolfrum, "International Law of Cooperation," in Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Epil), 
ed. Rudolf Bernhardt (1995), pp. 1242. 
901 Abi-Saab, "General Conclusions," p. 397. 
902 See Article 1 para. 3; Articles 11 and 13 as well as Chapter IX of the UN Charter. 
903 For legal analysis, see supra Chapter Three, Sections 2 and 3. 
904 Preamble, pp. 7 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. For details on the convention, see supra Chapter Three, 
Section 2.4. 
905 International Council of Museums. For information on the ICOM Code of Ethics, see supra Chapter Three, 
Section 4.1. Further information available at: http://icom.museum/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
906 International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, information 
available at: http://www.iccrom.org/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
907 Interpol stands for International Criminal Police Organization, information available at: 
http://www.interpol.int/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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considered to be ‘soft law’ provisions. Moreover, these provisions mainly refer to cooperation 
as a function of ‘capacities’, namely an obligation on States to make their ‘best efforts’ 
according to their ‘capacity’;908 needless to say, this frequently limits ‘cooperation’ in 
practical terms and inhibits concrete results. However, there is one example of international 
cooperation in cultural heritage matters that has led to the development of a specific 
obligation for States, namely the ‘World Heritage Fund’, established by Article 15 of the 1972 
UNESO World Heritage Convention.909 The fund is supplied by compulsory and voluntary 
contributions from States parties to the 1972 Convention, as well as from private donations,910 
and provides about U.S. $4 million annually to support activities requested by States parties in 
need for international assistance in preserving world cultural heritage.911 The World Heritage 
Committee allocates funds to States parties on the basis of the urgency of their request, in 
order to help them protect the World Heritage sites located on their territory, which are 
designated as protected sites either on the World Heritage List, the List of World Heritage in 
Danger, or on the States’ Tentative List. In the case of the Temple of Preah Vihear (whose 
inscription as World Heritage in 2008 sparked the border dispute between Cambodia and 
Thailand),912 the Director-General of UNESCO Bokova stated that "World Heritage sites are 
the heritage of all humanity and the international community has a special responsibility to 
safeguard them. Further, she indicated that this responsibility “requires a collective effort that 
must be undertaken in a spirit of consultation and dialogue."913 Thus, it should be noted that 
World Heritage sites constitute not only an obligation of the State in which the site is located, 
but an additional twofold obligation of the international community: to protect and to 
cooperate for the sake of the protection of the common heritage of humankind. 
 
With the adoption of the 1972 UNESCO Convention, the ‘World Heritage Fund’ was 
established in order to support World Heritage sites; however, no such fund was established 
within the framework of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. In 1999, the UNESCO General 
Conference decided to create a voluntary fund to enable the Intergovernmental Committee 
                                                 
908 Abi-Saab, "General Conclusions," p. 397. 
909 For details on the 1972 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.3. 
910 States parties with major voluntary contribution to the regular budget of 2010/2011 include, for example: the 
United States (1.43 million dollar), Germany (523.000 dollar), France (400.000 dollar), Brazil (105.000 dollar), 
and Norway (56.000 dollar). A list of all compulsory and voluntary contributions is available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/world-heritage-fund/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
911 Further details are available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/world-heritage-fund/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
912 See also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia vs. Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 
6. 
913 UNESCO News, UNESCO to send mission to Preah Vihear, 8 February 2011, available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/708 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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(ICPRCP) to function effectively within its mandate.914 The purpose of the fund is to support 
UNESCO Member States in their efforts to pursue the restitution and return of cultural 
materials, particularly with regard to the verification of cultural materials by experts, 
transportation, exhibition facilities, and training of museum professionals in source 
countries.915 However, despite a small contribution made by Greece shortly after its 
establishment, no major contributions have been made to the fund so far. 
 
Whereas these UNESCO funds are examples of cooperation on the international level, 
the provisions of financial assistance for the protection of cultural heritage can also be found 
on the national level. One example is the U.S. Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation. 
Created in 2001 by the U.S. Congress, the fund has provided financial support to more than 
640 cultural preservation projects in more than one hundred countries.916 Recent examples 
include: the documentation and assessment of buildings and sites in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
affected by the January 2010 earthquake; support for the conservation of a shipwreck 
collection at the National Museum of Namibia; and the restoration of an early 17th-century 
brick fort in Pakistan.917 Since its creation, nearly U.S. $26 million have been spent 
worldwide on the preservation of cultural heritage.918 Similar to the U.S. Ambassadors Fund, 
the Swiss government grants “financial assistance for the benefit of maintaining cultural 
heritage”. The provision of financial support is legislated through Article 14 of the national 
act implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention. It provides three different types of 
financial assistance: firstly, museums in Switzerland may apply for funding “for the 
temporary fiduciary custody and conservatory care of cultural property that is part of the 
cultural heritage of another State and is in jeopardy in that State due to exceptional events”;919 
secondly, funding may be granted for projects aimed at preserving the movable cultural 
heritage of other States parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention; and thirdly, funding may be 
                                                 
914 For details on the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
915 For details see: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/movable-heritage-and-museums/return-of-
cultural-property/fund-of-the-international-committee/(accessed 23 September 2011). 
916 Kouroupas, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Die Erfahrungen Der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 154. 
917 The fund is called Ambassadors Fund since U.S. ambassadors in developing countries can apply for funding 
on specific projects (each year around 70 % of U.S. ambassadors make use of this possibility). For further details 
on the fund and the annual reports, see http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/afcp.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
918 Ibid. 
919 An example of such a temporary fiduciary custody is the establishment of the ‘Afghanistan Museum-in-Exile’ 
in Bubendorf, Switzerland (1999-2007); for more details on this case, see Chapter Five, Section 3.7. 
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granted in order to facilitate the restitution and return of cultural objects to States parties.920 
Interestingly, some examples of recently funded projects include direct cooperation, such as 
projects pertaining to the conservation of movable cultural objects between the Musée 
d’Ethnograpie in Geneva and a museum in Peru, and between the Museum Rietberg in Zurich 
and a museum in Cameron.921 
 
In summary, it is notable that both the U.S. and the Swiss funds have been created in 
order to protect the cultural heritage of foreign States as part of the cultural heritage of 
humankind. Consequently, both States have recognized the importance of (and, one could 
argue, their responsibility in) protecting cultural heritage beyond their own borders, and thus 
to act in accordance with the concept that States have a ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ to protect cultural heritage. The concepts of a ‘common heritage of 
humankind’, a ‘common concern of mankind’ as well as the concept of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ have heralded new normative shifts in international law. The 
development of these concepts illustrates two major issues pertaining to international cultural 
heritage law: firstly, the existence of a ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage 
and the responsibility of States to cooperate in order to facilitate this interest; and secondly, 
the acknowledgement of the fact that the concept of State sovereignty no longer constitutes 
unfettered domination; rather, State sovereignty must be ‘functional’ to the ‘common 
interest’. This applies to environmental and cultural issues, as both have an impact on the 
common heritage of humankind. Although the problems associated with climate change differ 
from those associated with the loss or destruction of cultural heritage, the necessity of 
deploying a cooperative approach is the same in both areas of the law.922 International treaty 
law as well as resolutions, declarations, recommendations and other soft law instruments, all 
acknowledge the fact that threats to cultural heritage caused by deliberate destruction, looting, 
and the illicit trafficking in cultural material cannot be solved without international 
cooperation;923 the same logic must be valid in the resolution of restitution disputes. 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that obligations pertaining to the protection of cultural 
heritage are emerging in a way which requires States to take on joint responsibilities that 
                                                 
920 Article 14 of the Swiss Cultural Property Transfer Act (CPTA), full text available at: 
http://www.bak.admin.ch/themen/kulturguetertransfer/01104/index.html?lang=en (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
921 Benno Widmer, "Das Kulturgütertransfergesetz Und Seine Umsetzung in Der Schweiz," KUR, no. 5 (2010): 
p. 149. 
922 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1079. 
923 For legal analysis, see supra Chapter Three. 
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extend beyond the traditional perceptions of State sovereignty and the interests of single 
States. Since all the concepts discussed refer to a ‘common interest’ and thus aim at 
strengthen international cooperation, they all underpin the interest-oriented approach taken by 
this thesis. 
2.4 Limitations on Property Rights 
The subject of restitution disputes is inevitably linked to the issue of property rights. 
The decision to return (or to retain) cultural materials results in the loss or gain of title to that 
object by the parties involved – these rights include rights of control, access, use and disposal 
of the cultural object in question. The transfer of property rights is based on an assumed or 
clearly proven title held by the party claiming restitution of their stolen property or the return 
of illicitly exported cultural objects. The question of valid title is, however, much more 
complex when the circumstances surrounding the object’s appropriation remain ambiguous or 
can no longer be established. These problems are only multiplied when legal proceedings are 
not accessible, property rights are forfeited due to national provisions on statutes of 
limitations, or the bona fide purchaser is entitled to compensation with the consequence that 
the claiming party might be forced ‘to purchase the object twice’ in order to obtain the object 
and the property rights associated with it.924 
 
Limitations on property rights might, however, not only occur in the restitution 
context, but also because of national legal restrictions on the preservation and the export of 
cultural materials. Whereas placing limitations on property rights is generally an uncommon 
practice in international law, it is, nonetheless, widely used and recognized when it comes to 
the protection of ‘national cultural heritage’ or ‘national cultural patrimony’. Specifically, it is 
generally assumed on both the national and international level (through the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention) that national export regulations serve to 
protect cultural heritage. With regard to the protection of the ‘common heritage of 
humankind’, however, specific protective regulations are lacking in international law. Given, 
however, the recent developments in international cultural heritage law and the recognition of 
the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage, this thesis argues that the rationale 
of limiting property rights in favor of protection should be applied within a wider framework 
of protecting cultural heritage. It seems rather logically inconsistent for the law to protect 
                                                 
924 For a detailed discussion on the legal obstacles that impede the resolution of restitution disputes, see Chapter 
Six, Section 1. 
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cultural heritage on the basis of ‘national patrimony’, but not on the basis of rationales 
associated with the ‘common interest’ in protecting cultural heritage, namely preservation, 
access, integrity and cooperation.925 However, it is self-evident that any intervention in 
property rights within the context of law can only be undertaken with good legal reasoning. 
Therefore, the following section will explore the current mechanisms that limit property rights 
on the basis of protecting national patrimony. Subsequently, the extent to which the rationale 
of limiting property rights can be further developed and be shifted into a broader framework 
of general principles that can be used in order to facilitate a wider protection of cultural 
heritage will be discussed. 
 
Restriction of the export of cultural materials is widespread: around 140 States 
worldwide have adopted comprehensive export control laws aimed at protecting ‘national 
cultural patrimony’ through the partial or complete ban of exports.926 Such national export 
regulations are based on either an enumerative system of items, specific categories of 
materials, or general classifications of objects not to be exported.927 These systems vary 
largely from State to State in terms of scope, value and age of the object.928 Many 
archaeologists and source countries favor strict export regulations, fearing that an unrestricted 
trade in cultural objects endangers knowledge about the past and harms efforts aimed at the 
protection of cultural heritage. On the other hand, most collectors, dealers and some museums 
question the legitimacy of these concerns, claiming that source countries exaggerate the risks 
they face, and by doing so only fuel the illicit trafficking in cultural materials.929 For many 
States however, particularly those in Africa and parts of Oceania, the existence of such laws is 
itself largely irrelevant because most objects of any major significance from both a cultural 
and artistic perspective have already been taken abroad prior to the constitution of any 
national export laws.930 For many other developing States, these export controls face serious 
enforcement problems, since many source-countries simply lack resources to protect their 
cultural heritage; the realization that objects have been stolen or illicitly exported usually 
                                                 
925 Cf. Janna Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," Journal of Applied Philosophy 20, no. 3 
(2003): p. 257. 
926 The acts of national legislation pertaining to cultural heritage of UNESCO Member States are collected in the 
UNESCO Cultural Heritage Laws Databases, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/index.php?&lng=en (accessed 23 September 2011). 
927 Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, pp. 27. 
928 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 172. For details on export regulations, see 
supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
929 Cf. Merryman, "Protection of the Cultural Heritage?," p. 513.; For details on the various interests of the 
stakeholders involved, see Chapter Five, Section 1 and 3. 
930 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 172. 
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occurs only as a consequence of these objects being offered for sale on the international art 
and antiquities market.931 
 
National export regulations are generally approved of on the international level, 
through the treaties of several international organizations, such as the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA); the World Trade Organization (WTO); the South American Economic 
Organization (Mercosur), as well as the European Union.932 All of these international trade 
organizations allow restrictions to the principle of free movement of goods when trade applies 
to cultural objects. While the extent to which such restrictions are efficient remains unclear,933 
illicit trafficking in cultural materials continues to be a severe problem. Most export 
regulations are constituted in a way that they restrict the owner’s ability to freely export or 
sell cultural property outside of national borders. Therefore, in economical terms (cultural 
materials as goods of trade), the owner is limited to the national (or even regional) market, 
which precludes the possibility that the owner will be able to receive the highest market price 
that could be obtained through sale or auction on the international art and antiquities market. 
Consequently, one could argue that this results in a devaluation of the intrinsic economical 
value of cultural materials. 
 
It was precisely this argument that was brought in the case of Beyeler vs. Italy.934 In 
1977, the Swiss art dealer and collector Ernst Beyeler acquired the Van Gogh painting 
“Portrait of a Farmer’s Boy” (1889) through an intermediary Italian agent. This painting had 
been declared by the Italian authorities in 1954 as being a work of “historical and artistic 
interest” and thus part of the “cultural patrimony of the nation” (Law No. 1089 of 1939). The 
law obliges the owner of cultural objects declared as being “cultural patrimony” to inform the 
Italian authorities of any intended transfer of title, since the law establishes a pre-emptive 
right for the Italian State to purchase the item. However, the Italian authorities were not 
informed of the purchase of the piece in 1977; it was only in 1983 that Beyeler informed the 
Italian authorities that he intended to sell the Van Gogh to the Peggy Guggenheim Collection. 
Years of negotiations between Beyeler and the Italian government followed, however, without 
any decision by the Italian government as to whether it would exercise its pre-emptive right of 
                                                 
931 See in this regard the First Report of the Committee on Cultural Heritage Law of the International Law 
Association (ILA), London Conference (2000), p. 6. 
932 See the provisions of Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 EC Treaty). 
933 Siehr, "Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends toward a Liberal Exchange of Cultural Objects," p. 
1079. 
934 Beyeler vs. Italy (ECtHR, Application No.33202/1996, 5 January 2000). 
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purchase. Presumably in order to speed up the decision, an Italian middleman associated with 
Beyeler applied in 1988 for an export license of the Van Gogh painting; Italy denied the 
request and decided to exercise its pre-emptive right of purchase. However, Italy compensated 
Beyeler only in the amount of the 1977 sale without taking into account the painting’s market 
value in 1988. Beyeler challenged the amount paid, but lost in Italian courts, even upon 
appeal. In 1996, Beyeler brought his claim to the European Commission of Human Rights, 
arguing that the decisions of the Italian courts violated his right to “peaceful enjoyment of 
ownership rights”, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).935 In 2000, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Italy had indeed violated Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1. The ECtHR described the Italian proceedings as a matter of unjustified 
enrichment, firstly, due to the small amount paid to Beyeler as compensation in connection 
with the exercise of the pre-emptive right, and secondly, due to the delay associated with the 
decision of whether or not to exercise the pre-emptive right. On the basis of these two 
arguments, the ECtHR decided that Italy has failed to strike a fair and reasonable balance 
between the right to peaceful enjoyment of property on the one hand, and the national interest 
in preserving national patrimony on the other. Italy was ordered to compensate Beyeler 
adequately. 
 
Interestingly, Beyeler challenged another aspect of the law in his case, namely the 
determination of what constitutes the ‘cultural patrimony’ of a nation; he argued that the 
painting, which was made by the Dutch artist Van Gogh who mainly worked in France, had 
no genuine link to Italian cultural heritage. Italy, in turn, justified its classification of the Van 
Gogh as national patrimony on the basis of public interest, namely the scarcity of Van Gogh 
paintings in Italian museums. The ECtHR dismissed Beyeler’s argument and fully upheld the 
right of States to determine their national cultural heritage.936 Thus, the ruling of the ECtHR 
confirmed the sovereign right of States as expressed in Article 4 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention. Article 4 lists various very broadly defined categories that may constitute the 
cultural heritage of States, among them: (a) cultural property created by the individual or 
collective genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural property created within the 
territory of that State by foreign nationals; and (b) cultural property found within the national 
                                                 
935 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the Council of 
Europe, 4 November 1950, entering into force 3 September 1953, CETS No. 005. 
936 Cf. Merryman, Elsen, and Urice, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, pp. 122. 
 212
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
territory. Thus, Italy – just like any other State in whose territory a Van Gogh is found – may 
declare Van Gogh paintings as their national patrimony. The French Conseil d’Ètat, for 
example, once classified an antique Chinese Yuan vase as inalienable French property; 
Germany did the same with a painting by Caravaggio; and the famous portrait of the Duke of 
Wellington by the Spanish painter Velasquez has been classified as national patrimony in 
Great Britain.937 The examples mentioned above as well as Article 4 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention demonstrate that the decision of what constitute the cultural patrimony of a nation 
(which can consequently limit the object’s ability to be exported and thus limit the property 
rights associated with it) is left to the determination of the sovereign State, and as such it is 
not subject to review either by foreign States or international courts (as the ECtHR).  
 
In the context of restitution disputes, the classification of an object as ‘national 
patrimony’ might interfere with the decision to return, since the classification prohibits its 
export. An example of such a case is the decision of the city of Rouen to return sixteen 
tattooed and mummified Maori warrior heads to New Zealand.938 Since the Maori-heads were 
classified as French national patrimony and as such inalienable and banned of being exported, 
the City Council’s decision to return the Maori heads was stopped by the French Ministry of 
Culture and subsequently challenged in French courts. In the end, the return was only made 
possible because the French parliament passed a specific law overruling the court’s decision 
and ordering the restitution.939 
 
From this discussion, one can draw two conclusions: firstly, the classification of an 
object as being part of the cultural patrimony of a nation is the exclusive decision of State 
authorities; although the classification may sometimes appear to be random, it is not subject 
to review by other States or international courts. Secondly, despite this exclusive right of 
States, the decision of the ECtHR in the Beyeler case makes clear that limitations on property 
rights can, in turn, be limited, and may require compensations equal (or nearly equal) to the 
current market price. Given the arguments put forward by this thesis, the fact that the concept 
                                                 
937 Kuitenbrouwer, "The Darker Side of Museum Art: Acquisition and Restitution of Cultural Objects with a 
Dubious Provenance," p. 600. 
938 Law No. 2010-501 of May 18, 2010: “Loi visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes maories à la 
Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections”, NOR: MCCX0914997L, legislation available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed 23 September 2011). 
939 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 9. For more details on the case see also: BBC News, “France votes to return Maori heads 
to New Zealand”, 5 May 2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8661231.stm (accessed 23. September 
2011). 
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of limitations on property rights has thus far only been applied in the context of ‘national 
patrimony’ seems short-sighted, given that such limitations might also be used in order to 
protect the cultural heritage of humankind, by linking such limitations with assurances 
associated with preservation, access, integrity and cooperation. 
 
This question of whether limitations on property rights might be extended for other 
reasons highlights a much more fundamental question in cultural heritage matters: namely 
whether cultural material should be treated like any other ordinary good with the consequence 
that the laws that govern the treatment of ordinary property apply to cultural property without 
any restrictions,940 or if cultural material constitutes a unique category of its own with the 
consequence that the ordinary legal regime designed for commodities does not (or not 
entirely) apply and distinctive legal provisions are reasonable and justified.941 This latter 
understanding is linked to concepts that associate the ownership of cultural material with 
certain obligations connected with notions such as ‘qualified ownership’, ‘public trust’ or 
‘custody’. Such concepts are based on the assumption that cultural materials are not mere 
objects but have an inherent cultural value to a certain people, community, or humankind with 
the consequence that ordinary private dominion over such objects cannot sufficiently take the 
immanent importance of cultural heritage into account.942 
 
Current limitations on property rights are primarily based on the traditional concept of 
national patrimony and are invoked on the basis of State sovereignty. This thesis, however, 
argues that as a consequence of the conceptual shift from ‘cultural property’ to ‘cultural 
heritage’943 and the recent developments in international law that move States towards a 
general responsibility to protect cultural heritage,944 limitations on property rights should also 
be invoked in order to protect cultural heritage. As a consequence, the concept of limitations 
on property rights pertaining to the export of cultural objects should also be applied to 
restitution, if the protection of the cultural object offered by the current holder of the object or 
the requesting party is not adequate. A similar approach has been reflected, as discussed 
above, in the 2006 ILA Principles as well as in Article 5(3) of the 1995 UNDIDROIT 
                                                 
940 Cf. Eric Posner, "The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations," Chicago 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, no. 141 (2006). 
941 Examples of distinctive legal provisions include: the classification as national patrimony or the status as being 
inalienable. For details on the discussion, see supra Chapter Three, Section 1. 
942 Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures (1999), p. 197. 
943 For details on the shift from ‘cultural property’ to ‘cultural heritage’, see supra Chapter Two, Section 5.1. 
944 For details on the responsibility to protect, see supra Chapter Three, Section 1.1. 
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Convention. Both instruments introduce general principles pertaining to preservation, access, 
integrity and cooperation that should be recognized in the resolution of restitution disputes. 
Similarly, the criteria pertaining to preservation have also been introduced in national law, as, 
for example, through the 2005 Swiss Cultural Property Transfer Act (CPTA).945 The CPTA 
implements the 1970 UNESCO Convention into national law and thus regulates the import, 
transit and export, as well as the return of cultural materials, to and from Switzerland. In 
Article 9(2), the CPTA establishes that the Swiss court is responsible for determining whether 
the return of a claimed object can be suspended until such time as the cultural object in 
question would no longer be in jeopardy, should it be returned. Although the CPTA 
presumably refers to situations of war, civil riots, natural disasters, or similar incidents, the 
provision could easily be extended to situations in which, for example, the physical 
preservation and the integrity of the object to be returned cannot be guaranteed.  
Summary of the Chapter: 
This chapter introduced the conceptual and legal foundations of the interest-oriented 
approach proposed by this thesis. It began by recalling the three rationales that demonstrate 
the need to balance the various interests of the stakeholders involved, in order to adequately 
resolve restitution disputes. Against the backdrop of a legal analogy to child custody 
determinations as well as recently developed concepts in other but similar areas of 
international law (such as the ‘common heritage of humankind’; ‘common concern’; 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, and ‘international cooperation’), it has been 
demonstrated that the interest-oriented approach taken by this thesis finds legal equivalence in 
these concepts that are based on ‘common interests’. 
 
In the current state of play, international treaty law fails to account for the interests of 
the stakeholders involved; at the same time, bilateral agreements pertaining to restitution and 
return are frequently unable to actualize these interests evenly, due to unequal bargaining 
powers between the parties involved in restitution disputes. Therefore, this thesis argues in 
favor of the development of general principles that – on the basis of the ‘common interest’ of 
humanity in the protection of cultural materials – may facilitate cooperative solutions in 
restitution disputes. As a result, the decision to return (or to retain) cultural materials may not 
necessarily result in the complete lost or gain of title and/or possession. Moreover, it has been 
                                                 
945 Federal Act on the International Transfer of Cultural Property (CPTA), passed 20 June 2003, entering into 
force 1 June 2005. Article 9(2) reads: “The court can suspend the execution of repatriation until such time as the 
cultural property is no longer in jeopardy during repatriation.” 
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noted that limitations on property rights are currently made exclusively on the basis of State 
sovereignty, as expressed through the concept of national patrimony. In contrast, the 
‘common heritage of humankind’ and the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural 
heritage are currently not protected by such restrictions. Therefore, it has been argued that, for 
the sake of the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage, the concept of 
limitations on property rights (and thus on the right to free disposition) should be extended to 
include the resolution of restitution disputes with the consequence that restitution and return 
might be postponed or refused outright, should the common interests in physical and cultural 
preservation, access, integrity and cooperation not adequately be met. 
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CHAPTER V: The Stakeholders and Their Interests in International 
Cultural Heritage Disputes 
 
 
Overview of the Chapter: 
Having explored the legal framework of international cultural heritage law in Chapter 
Three, and having subsequently introduced the conceptual and legal foundations of the 
interest-oriented approach in Chapter Four, this chapter begins with an analysis of the various 
stakeholders who might be involved in international cultural heritage disputes. Determining 
the relevant stakeholders and their respective interests is a precondition for identifying what 
interests these parties may or may not have in common. The following six groups of 
stakeholders can be identified: (1) States; (2) private entities (namely art dealers, collectors, 
and auction houses); (3) public and private museums; (4) scientific and epistemic 
communities; (5) indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious groups; and (6) the international 
community as a whole. 
 
The second part of this chapter consists of an assessment of the potential motives and 
interests involved in restitution matters. Of particular interest to this study is the fact that 
motives shape not only the nature of the request for restitution and return, but also serve as an 
early indicator of the likelihood that the negotiating parties might consider alternative 
solutions to ‘barren’ restitution and return. In addition, the interests of the stakeholder 
involved also determine the general basis and framework for alternative solutions. While 
some interests might be divergent and potentially incompatible, others might not be mutually 
exclusive. The chapter will demonstrate that certain interests may be considered ‘common 
ground’ and therefore reflect the ‘common interest’ in the protection cultural heritage. The 
assessment undertaken by this chapter will focus on the interests of the various stakeholders 
with the overall attempt to counterbalance and reconcile these interests in order to resolve 
restitution disputes in an adequate and cooperative manner. 
 
Without claiming to be exhaustive, the following interests can be identified: (1) 
physical and cultural preservation; (2) public access; (3) integrity and the context; (4) access 
for scientific research; (5) economic interests; (6) political interests, including the aspect of 
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affiliation and the symbolic value of cultural objects; and (7) preventing the reappearance of 
returned objects on the illicit art and antiquity market. Although not strictly an interest, this 
list is incomplete without the inclusion of an additional consideration: (8) a digression 
regarding the problem of so-called ‘orphaned objects – cultural objects of uncertain 
provenance. Therefore, a discussion of how these objects deprived of their cultural context 
should be dealt with and whether (and whereto) they should be returned will be included in 
this analysis.  
1. Stakeholders in International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
Within the context of cultural heritage matters, conflicts of interest are almost 
inevitable, since cultural materials are unique and irreproducible artifacts attracting the 
interest of many, thus leading to a multitude of interests. In comparison to other limited 
resources of natural origin (such as water, oil or carbon), cultural materials are of cultural 
origin, and are therefore linked to a certain cultural context: a people, a group of creators, or a 
single creator. Although international cultural heritage law is still mainly driven by States and 
their interests (as reflected in concepts such as ‘national cultural heritage’ and ‘national 
patrimony’), States are no longer the exclusive stakeholder in cultural heritage matters.946 
Other, non-State actors play an increasingly important role in cultural heritage matters, 
particularly in the context of restitution disputes. Despite the traditional dominance of States 
in international law, many disputed cultural objects are held in museums and private 
collections, which are not directly controlled by national governments.947 This alone 
demonstrates that States (i.e. their governments) cannot be the only stakeholder to be 
recognized in cultural heritage matters. As will be demonstrated, the emergence and 
establishment of new sovereignties in addition to States lead to a process in which traditional 
heritage values and interests are being constituted or reconstituted in a way that consequently 
might trigger the need for alternative means of obtaining resolution in restitution disputes.948 
 
Through the application of the interest-oriented approach, this thesis argues that the 
different interests of the various stakeholders must be balanced in order to overcome the 
current dilemmas in restitution disputes. According to Merryman, interests in preservation 
                                                 
946 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 147. 
947 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1084. 
948 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 7. 
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and accessibility for study, as well as use and enjoyment, can be divided into matters of public 
and private concern; he points out that nations treasure cultural objects, living cultures use 
them, museums collect and exhibit them, scholars study them, and individuals enjoy 
possessing and viewing them.949 Other scholars, for example Prott, argue that such distinction 
between public and private concerns is defective, since public (or social) interests continue to 
be the interests of individuals – just as individual interests may be looked upon as public (or 
social) interests.950 Thus, the subject of restitution and return in particularly evokes an 
assortment of overlapping, competing or even colliding interests. The analysis of the various 
stakeholders and their interests in the following section will illustrate that there are competing 
but also widely shared interests in cultural heritage matters that might be consolidated on the 
basis of ‘common interests’. 
1.1 States 
One of the essential elements of statehood is the occupation of a territory within which 
the laws of that State operate.951 Under the concept of territorial sovereignty, jurisdiction is 
exercised by the State over persons and property to the exclusion of all other States. Thus, it is 
the principle of territoriality that establishes the link between cultural objects within a certain 
territorial area and that particular State. Consequently, it is the general assumption under 
international law that cultural objects are a resource that States have a right to control, 
similarly to any other resource found on or in the State’s soil.952 This principle gives States 
almost exclusive rights over cultural materials situated in their territory. Therefore, it is 
usually States that claim the right of ownership over cultural objects, monuments, sites, or 
other archeological and cultural relics. Moreover, claims for the return of appropriated 
cultural objects are based on the assumption that what has been found within a State’s 
national borders inevitably belongs not only to its territory but also to its ‘national cultural 
heritage’. 
 
This assumption, however, is questionable based on two specific considerations: 
firstly, the fact that modern State borders were mainly drawn in the nineteenth or early 
twentieth century and often do not correspond to the boundaries of the ancient civilizations 
that produced the cultural materials undermines the supposition that all such objects 
                                                 
949 Merryman, Elsen, and Urice, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p. 113. 
950 Prott, "The International Movement of Cultural Objects," p. 240. 
951 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
952 Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 252. 
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inherently belong to a current State’s territory. State boarders of most African States, for 
example, are drawn on the basis of the haphazardly colonial apportionment. Other regions, 
such as the current State borders in Central Asia, were intentionally divided into a patchwork 
of States whose borders were designed to fracture races and smash nationalism under the 
Soviet regime. Thus, in the 1920s, Stalin not only succeeded in preventing ethnic groups from 
uniting against him, but also ensured that each State is a hotbed of ethnic rivalry.953 Secondly, 
it might be argued that the substantiation of a claim for the return of a cultural object to its 
‘country of origin’ may weaken over time. This is because cultural identities and cultural 
symbols may change as time elapses, since the idea of a nation as a primeval community with 
an essence that remains the same through time is more-or-less a myth.954 Nonetheless, the 
principle of territoriality is widely recognized in international law and forms the basis of most 
legal instruments in international cultural heritage law.955 Based on the principle of 
territoriality, most States have adopted cultural patrimony laws (also called State ownership 
laws) that vest ownership of archaeological and cultural resources in that State. States claim 
that both their ownership laws and their export control laws956 serve to protect sites from 
destruction and that keeping objects within their national borders assists in the preservation of 
these objects in their original cultural context.957 States also confirm this by reciprocally 
enforcing other States’ patrimony laws, as thought the 1970 UNESCO Convention or bilateral 
inter-State agreements.958 Although the principle of territoriality gives States almost exclusive 
rights over cultural objects within its present boarders, it does not include the right to destroy 
them deliberately – as seen in the case of the demolition of the Buddhas of Bamiyan959 − 
since (at this time) international cultural heritage law constitutes a general responsibility to 
protect cultural heritage.960 
 
Most claims for restitution and return by States are made against another State in order 
to accomplish their return to the State’s territory – rather than for the return of the object to a 
                                                 
953 See: Stalin’s latest victims, in: The Economist, June 19, 2010, p. 13, giving the example of Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
954 Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 257. 
955 For legal analysis, see supra Chapter Three, Section 1. 
956 For bilateral inter-State agreements with regard to Import restrictions see, supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.2. 
957 Alexander A. Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Antiquities Trade Debates," Fordham International Law Journal 31(2008): p. 700. 
958 For details on the 1970 UNESCO Convention and national export restrictions, see supra Chapter Three, 
Section 2.2. 
959 Cf. Francioni and Lenzerini, "The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From 
Bamiyan to Iraq," pp. 28. 
960 For legal analysis on a general responsibility to protect cultural heritage, see supra: Chapter Three, Section 
1.1; on customary international law, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6.4. 
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particular ethnic or religious group that might correspond to the actual originators. Thus, 
restitution and return of a cultural object might result in the object being as removed from its 
true cultural context as it was while being held by a foreign museum.961 This is particularly a 
problem in cases of items pillaged from archaeological sites, since these objects have been 
deprived of their original context and can therefore almost never be re-integrated into that 
context, even if this context had not already been destroyed at the time of the removal. Even if 
the original site can be identified, the preservation of the object requires conditions that are 
rarely available at the original site. As a consequence, returned cultural objects often end up in 
the national museum in the State capital (possibly quite far away from the original site), or in 
local museums (which are closer to the original site, but often less equipped to preserve the 
object, and to provide opportunities for study and general public access). 
 
Although this chapter’s analysis treats States as a single stakeholder, they are not a 
homogenous group. Traditionally, States have been divided into so-called ‘source and art-
market countries’. The former group consists of States which are ‘rich’ in cultural materials 
(‘source countries’), but are developing economically (e.g. Columbia, Egypt, Ecuador, 
Nigeria, Peru, Syria and many others), whereas the latter consists of States ‘poor’ in ancient 
cultural artifacts but economically well-developed and thus attracting the art and antiquity 
market (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Switzerland). Although some 
States may fit in neither (or both) of these categories (e.g. Italy, Greece, China), the two 
categories accurately reflect current international market realities. Several interests of States 
may therefore be divided along the lines of ‘source’ and ‘art-market countries’; other 
interests, however, can be seen to coincide and may provide common ground (e.g. in the 
common market area of the European Union that includes States in both categories). 
Moreover, problems like illicit excavations of archaeological artifacts and illegal metal 
detecting (also known as ‘nighthawking’) is a concern to all States, since effectively guarding 
every archeological site is impossible, given the limited financial resources even in most 
developed countries for such activities. 
 
For source countries, the first interest (or concern) is to avoid the removal of cultural 
materials from the culture and territory in which they are embedded (an interest generally not 
                                                 
961 Coggins, "A Proposal for Museum Acquisition Policies in the Future," p. 434. 
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shared with art-market countries).962 Second, there is an archaeological interest in preventing 
the destruction of artifacts associated with ancient civilization, as well as an interest in 
preventing the dismemberment and physical deterioration of archeological sites (an interest 
shared with art-market countries). A third interest is the economical value of cultural objects, 
measured in terms of the price the object would bring on an open (licit) market (also known as 
its intrinsic value), and the marketing value in terms of attracting tourism (extrinsic value) 
generated by the presence of cultural objects (an interest shared with art-market countries).963 
Four is the so-called distribution interest – cultural objects may demonstrate to the world 
community the achievements of the culture of a nation, should it be disseminated (this is a 
disputable interest − not shared by all source countries). Fifth, there is an interest in terms of 
the mere retention, or ‘hording’, of one’s own cultural heritage (an interest not shared with 
most art-market countries).964 Sixth, there is an interest in preserving the national patrimony 
as a matter of pride and identity, as well as intrinsic and extrinsic economic value (an interest 
mainly shared with art-market countries).965 
 
The interests of art-market countries include, first of all, an interest in the preservation 
and the physical safekeeping of cultural objects (an interest generally shared with source 
countries, even if interests in the conditions of preservation may differ). Secondly, there is the 
interest in the protection of one’s own nationals and national institutions that are deemed to be 
‘bona fide purchasers’ insofar as their property rights should not to be unjustly infringed upon 
– at least not without compensation (an interest not shared with source countries).966 Thirdly, 
art-market countries have an interest in enriching their own ‘cultural patrimony’ through the 
acquisition of cultural objects from external sources (an interest not shared with source 
countries).967 Fourthly, there is an interest in maintaining access to cultural objects (an 
interest partially shared with source countries). A fifth is avoiding the dismantlement of 
established museum collections (an interest not shared with source countries).968 Sixthly, art-
market countries support the idea that cultural objects have artistic value independent of its 
                                                 
962 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1044. 
963 Ibid. 
964 Ibid. 
965 Bator, "An Essay on the International Trade in Art," p. 302-06. 
966 John Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, "Hot Art: A Reexamination of the Illegal International Trade in 
Cultural Objects," Journal of Arts Management, no. 12 (1982): p. 8-11. 
967 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1044. 
968 Ibid. 
 222
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
cultural significance (an interest only partially shared with source countries). A seventh 
interest is historically originated: the interest among colonial powers and victorious powers in 
times of conflict in the humiliation of a conquered people by dispossessing them of their 
cultural and artistic treasures.969 This historic interest – which under current human rights 
norms is considered a crime rather than an interest under international law – should be 
transformed on the basis of ethical and historical considerations into an interest in ‘remedying 
historical injustices’ through the acknowledgment of past injustice, compensation, and 
restitution and return.970 
                                                
 
Legal concepts that attempt to combine the interests of both source and art-market 
countries are the concepts of ‘common concern’ and ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ that are, as discussed above,971 derived from recent developments in 
international environmental law.972 These concepts find their roots in the general assumption 
of the equity of States in international law.973 The heart of this concept consists of the idea 
that, while all State may have a common concern in the protection of the environment (or 
analog in the context of this study: a common concern in the protection of cultural heritage), 
normative responsibilities between States can be differentiated on the basis of factors such as 
the economic development and the special needs of a State, since its historic contributions to 
environmental degradation (or similarly its historic contributions to cultural heritage) might 
differ.974 
 
Applying the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ to cultural heritage 
matters means that developed States (‘art-market countries’) have differentiated obligations 
pertaining to the protection of cultural heritage than developing States (‘source countries’). 
Examples for the acknowledgment of such ‘differentiated responsibility’ in protecting cultural 
heritage are the ‘emergency actions’ issued by the United States under Article 9 of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention: in circumstances when a certain category of archaeological or 
ethnological materials is being threatened, the U.S. State Department may decide to impose 
import restrictions on that particular category of cultural material based upon a request made 
 
969 Ibid. 
970 For details on ethical and historical considerations in restitution disputes, see supra Chapter Three, Section 5. 
971 For details, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2.2. 
972 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, at p. 100-09.; Sands, Principles of International 
Environmental Law, at p. 286-89. 
973 Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, p. 101. 
974 Carmouche, "The New Concept of International Responsibility in International Environmental Law ": p. 15. 
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by a State that is party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention.975 Notably, the State requesting 
such ‘emergency action’ does not only have to demonstrate that its cultural patrimony is in 
jeopardy; however, – as a trade-off in terms of mutual obligations – it must take measures to 
protect its cultural patrimony itself. Along a similar vein, the U.S. ‘Ambassadors Fund for 
Cultural Preservation’ provides financial support to foreign cultural preservation projects as 
well as the Swiss fund that specifically grants financial assistance for movable cultural 
heritage.976 Both funds were created in order to protect cultural heritage of foreign States as 
part of the cultural heritage of mankind, thus recognizing the need (and responsibility) to 
protect cultural heritage beyond one’s own State borders. The intention to protect cultural 
heritage for the sake of mankind was also the driving force in the decision made by the UN 
Security Council to pass Resolution 1483/2003977 that prohibits the import, export of, or trade 
in Iraqi cultural objects (similarly to EU Council Regulation No. 1210/2003).978 
 
While measures imposing import restrictions and providing financial support within a 
wider frame of international cooperation are helpful, the concept of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ could also be used to foster the attempt to ‘remedy historical 
injustice’ between ‘source countries’ and ‘market countries’ in terms of resolving restitution 
disputes. The legal and practical consequences of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
in not only environmental issues, but also in cultural heritage matters is articulated in the 
proposal made by this thesis, namely to address restitution disputes through alternative 
solutions in terms of loan agreements, the fabrication of replicas, transfer of expertise, joint 
custody and shared management programs.979 
1.2 Private Entities − Art Dealers, Collectors and Auction Houses 
For States, the link to cultural materials is established by the principle of territoriality; 
for individuals, this link is established by property rights achieved through purchase or 
derived through inheritance. Thus, it is property rights that make a potential claimant for 
                                                 
975 See Section 2602 U.S. CIPA. The so-called ‘emergency actions’ might be expanded to bilateral agreements, 
which might not only impose import restrictions but also provisions on cooperative programs, such as cultural 
exchange and loan agreements. For further details on the specific requirements under the CIPA, see supra 
Chapter Three, Section 2.2 and Section 2.9.2. 
976 For details on international cooperation and assistance, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2.3. 
977 UNSC Resolution No. 1483/2003, (22 May 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1483, ILM, 2003, p.1016 ff; See: 
paragraph 7; full text version available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1465505.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
978 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic 
and financial relations with Iraq and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2465/96, (Official Journal 2003, L 169/6). 
979 For details, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
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restitution and return legitimate. Based on the assertion of ownership and title, individuals are 
the legal entities that are, next to States, most commonly recognized by the law. Generally, 
there is no fundamental distinction between State ownership and private ownership; States 
and individuals alike have full and complete ownership rights, including the right of exclusion 
of use and access − the only difference lies in who takes decisions pertaining to use and 
access.980 Although title normally guarantees the comprehensive right over property, this is 
not entirely the case for cultural materials, since most States exercise some degree of control 
over private owners. This is not only the case when it comes to export regulations (limiting 
the owner of a certain item to sell it only nationally and not on the international market, thus 
limiting sales revenue),981 but also, to a much lesser degree, when it comes to provisions in 
which public authorities retain certain rights pertaining to preservation (mainly pertaining to 
architectural monuments and less to movable cultural objects). The general lack of legal 
provisions that limit property rights for the benefit of the preservation of cultural heritage has 
been criticized, for example, by Sax, with the highly illustrative caption: “Playing Darts with 
a Rembrandt”. He claims a general interest in the preservation of cultural materials and 
declares that the larger community has a legitimate stake (namely a common interest) in 
cultural materials because they embody ideas, or scientific and historic information of 
importance.982 Nevertheless, most national legal regimes provide export restrictions, but not 
for restrictions on the destruction of privately owned cultural objects – like a painting by 
Rembrandt. Although destruction and intentional damage of privately owned works of art 
might generally not be preventable, such acts could at least be sanctioned by criminal 
provisions under national law. 
 
The primary interest of private dealers, auction houses, and collectors is the 
authenticity and integrity of cultural objects, including the ability to own such objects (or pass 
title). Secondly, these actors have an interest in the preservation of cultural objects, since 
without preservation these objects lose both its aesthetic and its economical value. Thirdly, 
they have an interest in relatively unfettered access to cultural objects for disposal and 
acquisition.983 Fourthly, in contrast to other stakeholders (particularly to archeologists and 
scientists), the activities of private dealers, auction houses, and collectors – in addition to 
                                                 
980 John Carman, Against Cultural Property - Archaeology, Heritage, and Ownership (2005), p. 29. 
981 For details on limitations on property rights, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2.4. 
982 Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures, p. 9. 
983 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 708. 
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aesthetic, scholarly, or merely possessing purposes – are primarily of a commercial nature, 
involving the buying and selling of cultural objects; thus, these actors have a strong interests 
in the recognition of title, possession, and bona fide purchase.984 In some instances, the 
activities of private collectors are entwined with other kinds of non-state actors, such as when 
they donate objects or even entire collections to museums or other art holding institutions.985 
Therefore, private dealers, auction houses and collectors generally do not favor any kind of 
national or international restrictions on property rights and the free movement of cultural 
objects. Instead, they usually support an open and legitimate international art and antiquity 
market in cultural objects of interest to them.986 This interest, however, is limited in most 
States, as discussed above, in view of national export regulations that restrict the right to 
unfettered disposal of cultural objects.987  
 
Against the backdrop of the commonly imposed limitation to property rights and in 
light of the concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’,988 one could argue that private 
owners of cultural objects that have a “significant cultural importance” (for humankind)989 are 
merely ‘trustees’ or ‘custodians’, and their right to act in this capacity presumably depends on 
their ability to care for the objects that are entrusted to them. In these cases, the primary 
consideration should be based on the ability to guarantee preservation and access, determining 
how an object should be treated or where it should be located.990 This argument, however, is 
frequently used by art dealers and collectors in order to justify their purchases of objects with 
dubious provenances: they argue that by purchasing these illicit items, they are actually 
rescuing cultural materials that would have otherwise been destroyed as a result of negligence 
and/or improper care in their country of origin.991 
 
This type of argumentation is problematic because it legitimates the idea that ‘private 
rescue through purchase’, even though it deprives the objects of their original context and 
sustains illicit trafficking: as mentioned, without private demand for antiquities, there would 
                                                 
984 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 147. 
985 Ibid. 
986 Ibid. 
987 For details on export restrictions, see supra: Chapter Three, Section 2.2 and Chapter Four, Section 2.4. 
988 For details on the concept, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2.1. 
989 Article 5(3) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention refers to “the significant cultural importance for the 
requesting State”. 
990 John Leslie King, "Cultural Property and National Sovereignty," in The Ethics of Collecting Cultural 
Property, ed. P. M. Messenger (1999), p. 199.  
991 Cf. Ibid. 
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be no profitable illicit trafficking (the same can be said for other goods, such as drugs and 
weapons). An audit of the sales of Egyptian antiquities at Sotheby’s from 1998 to 2007 
showed, for example, that 95 percent of the objects offered for auction could not be traced 
back to the place where they had been excavated. While not all these pieces were necessarily 
looted, it is likely that many of them probably were.992 In recent years, however, lawsuits and 
criminal proceedings against art dealers and private collectors who traffic in illicit objects 
have been increasingly successful. One such an example is the famous United States vs. 
Schultz case in 2002.993 Starting in the early 1990s, U.S. citizen Frederick Schultz994 
smuggled through the help of middlemen more than 3,000 highly valuable antiquities from 
Egypt to the United States by covering them with liquid plastic and paint to make them look 
like cheap souvenir reproductions. Schultz was convicted of conspiring to receive, possess 
and sell stolen property in violation of the U.S. ‘National Stolen Property Act’.995 Since the 
1983 Egyptian Antiquity Law996 conveys ownership of all undiscovered antiquities to the 
national government, the unauthorized excavation, removal and export of such antiquities is 
considered to be theft under Egyptian law. The New York court based its sentence on the so-
called McClain doctrine, established in United States vs. McClain, a similar case involving 
stolen and smuggled Mexican antiquities.997 The McClain doctrine says that U.S courts 
recognize foreign national vesting law if that law is sufficiently clear to U.S. citizens in terms 
of what conduct is prohibited. Schultz claimed that the U.S. government had failed to prove 
that he knew or believed that he was engaging in theft. The court, however, concluded that a 
dealer may not purposefully remain ignorant of either the facts or the law in order to escape 
the consequences of the law. Thus, a sophisticated art and antiquity dealer who chooses to do 
business by entering into the market for antiquities from countries with national ownership 
laws cannot consciously avoid being aware of that law. Schultz was sentenced to 33 months 
in prison, fined $50,000, and ordered to return objects still in his possession to the Egyptian 
government. Both the McClain (1979) and Schultz (2002) cases set legal precedent in the 
                                                 
992 Bennett Drake, “Finders, keepers – As museums ship ancient treasures back to the countries where they were 
found, some are now saying: Enough”, in: The Boston Globe, 10 February 2008. 
993 United States vs. Frederick Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d445 (S.D.N.Y. 3 January 2002), affirmed 333 F.2d 393 
(2d Cir. 10 June 2003). 
994 Frederick Schultz is owner of the Schulz Art Gallery in Manhattan, New York. 
995 National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2315 (2006). The National Stolen 
Property Act (18 U.S.C. §2315) makes it a crime to receive, possess, sell, or dispose of any goods, wares, or 
merchandise of the value of $ 5,000 or more, which have crossed a State or United States boundary after being 
stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, or if the object is known to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or 
taken. 
996 Egyptian Law 117 of 1983 declares all antiquities to be public property and forbids private ownership of 
possession of, transfer of, and trade in antiquities. 
997 United States vs. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); 593 F.2d (5th Cir. 1979). 
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recognition of foreign export restrictions and in the conviction of antiquities dealers of 
conspiring in illicit trafficking. 
 
Similar criminal proceedings against art dealers, collectors and curators include the 
conviction of the Italian art dealer Giacomo Medici,998 the indictment of Marion True (former 
curator of antiquities at the Getty) and Robert E. Hecht (Swiss art and antiquity dealer) in 
2005 in Rome.999 Consequently, it has become an increasingly dubious proposition for art 
dealers and curators to acquire cultural objects without acting in due diligence and in 
reference to national export restrictions. As an immediate result of the indictment of Getty’s 
former curator Marion True and subsequent to the bilateral negotiations with Italy about 
returning several artifacts,1000 the Getty Trust revised its acquisition policy in 2006.1001 This 
new policy established stronger criteria for potential acquisitions – applying equally to 
purchases, gifts, bequests, exchanges, or any other method by which objects may enter the 
collection.1002 
 
That said, strict acquisition policies and adequate provenance research do have major 
advantages particularly for art dealers, collectors and auction houses: firstly, cultural artifacts 
obtained licitly and with sufficient information about their legal provenance do not run the 
risk of being involved in criminal proceedings; secondly, artifacts of ‘clean’ provenance are 
immune to accusations of inauthenticity (an issue of substantial importance to dealers, 
collectors and auction houses in terms of the object’s authenticity and price); thirdly, licitly 
obtained objects are immune from seizure, which means that the owner of objects with a 
documented provenance does not have to fear that the object is seized while being on loan.1003 
Fourthly, licitly acquired objects are also of greater value due to the information on context 
and origin associated with them and, presumably even more important to dealers, collectors 
                                                 
998 Giacomo Medici was sentenced in 2004 in Rome to ten years in prison and a fine of 10 million Euro. 
999 For details on the Getty case, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1000 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1001 Press Release, J. Paul Getty Museum announces revised acquisition policy, 26 October 2006, press release 
available at: http://www.getty.edu/news/press/center/revised_acquisition_policy_release_102606.html (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
1002 Point 3 of the conditions of the ‘Policy Statement’ on the acquisitions by the J. Paul Getty Museum, adopted 
by the Board of Trustees of the J. Paul Getty Trust on 23 October 2006, states that “no object will be acquired 
that, to the knowledge of the Museum, has been stolen, removed in contravention of treaties and international 
conventions of which the United States is a signatory, illegally exported from its country of origin or the country 
where it was last legally owned, or illegally imported into the United States”. Full text version of the policy 
statement is available at: http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/pdfs/acquisitions_policy.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1003 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 710. 
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and auction houses, of greater economical value, since they achieve higher prices on the 
international art and antiquities market. Whereas the economical value of cultural objects 
might be obvious to art dealers, collectors and auction houses, the cultural value might be of 
particular importance to private collectors: one could argue that a holder of cultural material 
who fails to appreciate the object’s significance to the culture and the context from which it 
was taken, who does not understand its continuing relevance to the identity of that (living) 
culture, and who dismisses as mere sentimentality the affinity between the object and the 
culture is an inappropriate custodian of that cultural material.1004 
1.3 Public and Private Museums 
Although claims for the restitution and return of cultural material are mainly addressed 
to national governments (e.g. through the 1970 UNESCO Convention), it is primarily public 
and private museums that must deal with the consequences of restitution disputes. Hence, 
museums have generally the tendency to be more reluctant to concede to restitution claims, 
fearing the integrity or even the entire loss of their collections.1005 Although legal certainty in 
restitution disputes is far from given (due to the various and frequently not well-known 
circumstances of purchase, donation, or pillage during war and colonial domination),1006 
museums have made profound changes in the way in which they handle requests for 
restitution and return in recent years. This is mostly due to new understanding and growing 
awareness (as well as political pressure) from outside the museum community regarding 
restitution disputes that have gradually infiltrated the consciousness of museum 
administrations, rather than a sudden appreciation by trustees or senior staff members of the 
legal arguments as well as ethical and historical considerations pertaining to restitution and 
return.1007 Moreover, museums have increasingly modified their acquisition policies, 
established their own codes of conduct, and/or join national, regional or international code of 
ethics, such as the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums.1008 The ICOM Code defined 
                                                 
1004 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1065. 
1005 Cf. the concerns expressed in the Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums 
(December 2002), signed by major European and North-American Museums (the British Museum; the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York; the Louvre, Paris; the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg; State 
Museums, Berlin; the Prado Museum, Madrid, et al), reprinted in ICOM News No. 1 (2004), available at: 
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/ICOM_News/2004-1/ENG/p4_2004-1.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1006 For details, see supra Chapter Two, Section 4. 
1007 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 5. 
1008 ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, 1986, amended 2001, 2004, available at: 
http://icom.museum/ethics.html (accessed 23 September 2011). For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 
4.1. 
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museums as “non-profit, permanent institutions in the service of society and its development, 
open to the public, which acquire, conserve, research, communicate and exhibit the tangible 
and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study 
and enjoyment.”1009 Museums, in consequence, must act as safe repositories for the world’s 
most important cultural objects, and thus should provide access and education for all its 
visitors.1010 Along this vein, museums have also been described as ‘universal museums’,1011 
‘encyclopedic museums’, or even ‘cosmopolitan institutions’.1012 
                                                
 
Despite these mainly Western attributions, museums have, nevertheless, a certain 
function within society: namely the collection, preservation, exhibition, and stimulation of 
appreciation for and knowledge of works of art in the service of the public. These functions, 
however, transcend the State boundaries within which the museum is located, as museums 
collect not only objects associated with national heritage, but also collect foreign objects that 
reflect the culture of different regions and peoples. Hence, museums have a collective 
responsibility to protect the culture heritage of mankind. However, a clear idea of what this 
collective responsibility means and requires has not yet been established in legal instruments: 
museums, surprisingly, still play a minor role as a group of stakeholders in their own right 
within international cultural heritage law. Nonetheless, museums act in the public interest and 
therefore have a responsibility to encourage the preservation, study, education and exchange 
of and access to cultural materials. This is, despite the fact that in most current acquisitions 
the financial pace of the international art and antiquity market is set by private collectors, 
rather than public museums. The extent to which this responsibility can be fulfilled depends, 
on one hand, on the facilities of the State where the museum is located, and, on the other, on 
the people or ethnic groups whose heritage is being preserved. While the interests of the latter 
are frequently overlooked, they should be adequately taken into consideration in exhibition 
practices and museum management. Moreover, the responsibilities of private and public 
institutions holding cultural objects of ‘significant cultural importance’1013 should be 
articulated within the framework of international cultural heritage law, not only in order to 
promote and ensure the preservation of and access to cultural materials for the sake of 
 
1009 See Article 3 Section 1 of the ICOM Statue. 
1010 Cf. Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 700. 
1011 See Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums (December 2002). 
1012 Bennett Drake, “Finders, keepers – As museums ship ancient treasures back to the countries where they were 
found, some are now saying: Enough”, in: The Boston Globe, 10 February 2008. 
1013 See the terminology used in Article 5(3) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
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mankind, but also to allow for adequate supervision and control over the acquisition policies, 
provenance research, and preservation activities of museums. 
 
Generally, museums share an interest in preservation, as conceived of archaeologists. 
Whereas most archaeologists place equal if not greater emphasis on the preservation of the 
archaeological context, many museums tend to be primarily concerned with the preservation 
of the object itself, and the best way to display in order to attract the public’s interest. 
Although the information supplied by the archaeological context is highly valuable for both 
archaeologists and museums, the object qua object for display is essential for museums, since 
museums have (in addition to the other interests already mentioned) an economic interest in 
these objects; after all, both private and public museums are enterprises. This is demonstrated 
by the increasing importance of bookshops and souvenir merchandising in museums as well 
as by the general trend in staging “blockbuster” exhibitions for a greater public (depending on 
the funding of museums).1014 
 
Recent years have increased outside scrutiny of museums’ acquisitions policies and 
some museums have agreed to new arrangements with other museums or foreign States, 
which emphasize reciprocal loans and cooperation over new purchases of material.1015 While 
such agreements limit the avenues for continued acquisition and put an end to the 
colonialism-facilitated era of acquisition,1016 they open up new avenues for cooperation and 
exchange, which depend more on maintaining relationships and good will, than on defending 
traditional collecting patterns.1017 
1.4 Scientific and Epistemic Communities 
Although the three major groups of stakeholders mentioned above (namely States, art 
dealers, collectors and auction houses as well as private and public museums) are the main 
addressees of restitution claims the essential scientific knowledge associated with the object 
can be primarily found with another group of stakeholders, namely scientific and epistemic 
communities associated with art and antiquities. Most institutions holding cultural materials 
                                                 
1014 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 705. 
1015 For example the agreement between Italy and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, signed on 21 February 2006, 
reprinted in 13 Int’l J. Cultural Prop. 427-34, 2006; for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1016 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 718. 
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do not have sufficient capacity to deal adequately with restitution claims and the parties 
involved. The most frequent objection made by institutions to restitution claims is that they 
have neither sufficient financial and technical resources nor the personnel to conduct the 
requisite and appropriate research necessary to adequately reply to these claims. Moreover, 
expertise and insight can now be quickly and easily shared within the well connected, 
specialized international community of scientists. This heterogeneous group of scientists and 
other experts is comprised of, inter alia, curators, archaeologists, anthropologists, 
practitioners, technical experts, researchers and educators. Along with NGOs, the epistemic 
communities associated with restitution matters have become increasingly active and 
important in providing special expertise and data-sharing that no other international actor 
could possibly compile and disseminate. 
 
Such communities have exercised considerable influence on decision- and 
policymakers at the national and international level, based on their technical expertise and, 
moreover, independent status, given that they are insulated from political considerations and 
dedicated to their work. In comparison, international and intergovernmental organizations, 
are, above all else, State-oriented and thus must work diplomatically in achieving 
consensus.1018 In contrast, special experts and associations of experts, such as for example 
ICOM (having obtained consultative status with UNESCO), can act within a larger frame of 
scientific independence.1019 If, for example, no consensus can be reached at the international 
inter-State level, an issue might be delegated to a group of experts or specialized associations, 
which can provide suggestions based on scientific consideration rather than political 
imperatives. Although it is States that eventually must adopt or dismiss such proposals or 
draft recommendations, information provided by scientific and epistemic communities can be 
a crucial factor in such decision-making, especially in terms of identifying alternative 
mechanisms or policies when no decision on political or judicial grounds might have 
previously been attainable. 
 
As anthropologists and archaeologists compose a major and essential group within this 
group of scientists and epistemic communities, it is particularity worthwhile looking at their 
interests. The professions of anthropology and archaeology are both concerned with culture in 
its context by preserving and recording it; as a result – public access is not one of their 
                                                 
1018 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
1019 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 150. 
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primary concerns. Moreover, they usually oppose both illicit and licit trade in excavated 
material that disturbs its context or otherwise creates risks to knowledge about its place of 
origin, its content and character.1020 Since the preservation of context, the relation of objects 
to other objects in situ, as well as the significant features in the earth and the surroundings of 
the site are essential, these interests have been codified in several archaeological ethics 
statements.1021 The World Archaeological Congress, founded in 1985 as an international non-
governmental organization, has recently asserted itself with a special commitment to social 
justice for indigenous peoples as it relates to the practice of archaeology.1022 
 
In strong contrast to the principles established by these organizations, clandestine 
excavations aimed at finding rare and valuable artifacts often leave archeological sites in ruin, 
moreover, such excavations prevent the creation of the documentation and detailed excavation 
records that accompany cultural materials unearthed in legal excavations. In these 
circumstances, contextual information is often intentionally undocumented – or worse 
destroyed or falsified – in order to minimize the evidence of the clandestine origin of objects 
and its true provenance. In addition to their interest in preserving the context of excavated 
objects, many archaeologists strive to support the interests and rights of the local communities 
in which they work; this interest presumably derives from the general sympathy that any 
researcher might develop with a host community.1023 In some extreme cases, archaeologists 
may advocate for the suspension of all trade in cultural objects.1024 This is because the key 
interest for archaeologists is always to avoid the loss of information; as a result, they often 
care little for the economic value of cultural materials.1025 
 
However, this extreme approach fails to take into account the realities of international 
cultural heritage trade: cultural objects that can move do move, even under the strictest export 
control bans; cultural objects have always been exchanged among people and across borders. 
                                                 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 For example, see the ‘Principles of Archaeological Ethics of the Society for American Archaeology’, 
available at: http://www.saa.org/aboutsaa/committees/ethics/principles.html (accessed 27 August 2011). Other 
important international associations of archaeologist include, among others: the International Union of 
Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences (IUPPS), founded in 1931 and based in Belgium at the University of 
Ghent; the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) based in Boston; the Society for American Archaeology 
(SAA) in Washington; as well as the Institute of Field Archaeologists (IFA) at the University of Reading, UK. 
1022 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 151. 
1023 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 703. 
1024 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 151. 
1025 Carman, Against Cultural Property - Archaeology, Heritage, and Ownership, p. 19. 
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This is especially true when the objects are prized as having special or unique qualities, such 
as aesthetic, prestige-oriented, or other value-added characteristics; thus such cultural objects 
will be desirable for traders, whether that trade is licit or illicit.1026 Moreover, the 
‘commodification of cultural heritage’1027 does not necessarily contradict the interest in the 
preservation of cultural heritage. The complementarily of economic and cultural aspects of 
development has, for example, recently been acknowledged by the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which 
states: “since culture is one of the mainsprings of development, the cultural aspects of 
development are as important as its economic aspects, which individuals and peoples have the 
fundamental right to participate in and enjoy.”1028 
 
In sum, scientists and epistemic communities, although not directly addressed within 
restitution claims, are, nonetheless, an crucial stakeholder in the process, as they have the 
necessary expertise and political independence in cultural heritage matters needed to resolve 
key aspects of the dispute between parties; this is particularly true in terms of issues such as 
the promotion of professional standards and ethics, scientific and technical expertise 
pertaining to preservation, study, education and international cooperation in cultural heritage. 
1.5 Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic and Religious Groups 
Whereas the concept of ‘one State − one people − one nation’ is a rather nineteenth 
century European concept, most (non-European) States are comprised of several peoples and 
minority communities, whose interests are often not adequately respected (or in some cases 
even utterly ignored and treated with disdain) by their national State. While modern State 
borders were often drawn arbitrarily, separating peoples and communities in order to facilitate 
colonization, State governments, nevertheless, commonly use cultural heritage as a means to 
integrate disparate ethnic groups into a more cohesive and harmonious national entity.1029 
While from a State’s point of view, this might be understandable, in too many cases 
governments have used selective versions of the ‘national cultural heritage’ to force 
indigenous peoples as well as minority groups within their own territory or occupied foreign 
                                                 
1026 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 696. 
1027 Commodification refers to the conceptualization of cultural heritage in terms of its economic value. 
1028 Principle 5 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, (adopted 20 October 2005, entering into force 18 March 2007). 
1029 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 7. 
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territories to adapt to the dominant cultural paradigms, effectively eliminating minority 
cultural identity through policies of oppression, assimilation and centralization.1030 
 
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that indigenous peoples have gained a voice 
on the national and international level. The traditional assumption that States are the exclusive 
actors in international law has increasingly been challenged by the claims and assertions made 
by indigenous peoples for economic, social and cultural development.1031 The driving force in 
this development has been the claim for the recognition of the ‘right to self-
determination’.1032 It is this concept of self-determination that “has set in motion a 
restructuring and redefinition of the world community’s basic ‘rule of the game’.”1033 As a 
result, indigenous peoples (as well as ethnic and religious minority groups) have become 
increasingly active on their own behalf as stakeholders in restitution cases, independent of the 
State in which they live, in order to make claims for the return of cultural materials 
appropriated during colonial domination, foreign occupation, or acts of assimilation and 
oppression. Consequently, it is not only States that are challenged by these restitution claims 
in legal and ethical terms, but also museums, anthropologists, and archaeologists that are 
required to reconsider current professional assumptions and positions.1034 Thus, the protection 
of and the access to cultural materials have gained a human rights dimension;1035 however, for 
many museums and art-holding institutions confronted with restitution claims, the issue 
mains one of property rights. 
 
thirdly, that the right to self-determination entails a right to the non-exploitation of cultural 
                                                
re
The restitution claims brought by indigenous peoples against both their own 
governments and foreign States are primarily based on three arguments: firstly, that human 
rights and the right to self-determination entail a ‘right to participation in cultural life’;1036 
secondly, that this, in turn, necessitates the recovery of appropriated cultural materials; and 
 
1030 William Logan, "Closing Pandora's Box: Human Rights Conundrums in Cultural Heritage Protection," in 
Cultural Heritage and Human Rights, ed. Helaine Silverman and D. Fairchild Ruggles (2007), p. 42. 
1031 Cf. Matthias Ahrén, "Protecting Peoples’ Cultural Rights: A Question of Properly Understanding the Notion 
of States and Nations?," in Cultural Human Rights, ed. Francesco Francioni and Martin Scheinin (2008), pp. 
102. 
1032 For details on the development of the concept of self-determination, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
1033 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995), p. 1. 
1034 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 151. 
1035 Derek Gillman, The Idea of Cultural Heritage (2006), p. 125. 
1036 The right to free participation in the cultural life has been expressed in Article 27 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, both Covenants (ICESCR and ICCPR), as well as in the 2007 UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.8 and 6.3. 
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heritage of indigenous peoples for commercial purposes.1037 In comparison with claims made 
by States and individual owners, restitution claims by indigenous peoples are almost always 
linked to questions of cultural identity, collective rights, and ‘cultural heritage rights’ – 
concepts traditionally not addressed in international law.1038 Most restitution claims aim at the 
recovery of paleontological, ethnographic or ritual (spiritual) cultural materials; human 
remains being a specific category distinct from claims for cultural materials. Cultural 
materials subject to restitution claims might be associated with several types of claims (of 
both a separate and/or cumulative nature): for example, an object might be conceptualized as 
a symbol of collective ideas; a source of identity for its members; a ceremonial object; as 
focus of historical meaning; an expression of their past achievements; and/or as a cultural link 
with founders or ancestors.1039 Against this backdrop, three major rationales for claims 
brought by indigenous peoples or ethnic groups can be identified: (1) as a means through 
which to reestablish the cultural identity destroyed or lost over time due to colonialism and 
appropriation; (2) as a means through which a cultural legacy may be passed on to the 
descendants or successors of the particular group strengthening the present status of the 
community; and (3) as a means to eradicate the symbolic defeat of a indigenous people by the 
former colonial masters responsible for the appropriation of cultural materials.1040 
 
Within the context of current politics, restitution claims might not only be motivated 
by the cultural or religious significance of the requested object, but might also be politically 
motivated, since restitution claims of indigenous peoples and minority groups are frequently 
associated with claims for cultural rights.1041 These claims might therefore provoke national 
(or even nationalistic) policies by States, especially in multi-ethnic States without democratic 
minority-participation. In turn, national governments might tend to claim cultural materials 
that fit their national (or nationalistic) purposes, whereas cultural materials, which would 
strengthen minority groups through the highly symbolic impact of cultural objects once 
                                                 
1037 Article 31 of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples specifically articulates the right 
“to maintain, control, protect and develop […] the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, 
including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral 
traditions, literature, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the 
right to […] their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural 
expressions”. 
1038 Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1039. 
1039 Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 252. 
1040 Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, p. 299. 
1041 ———, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 10. 
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returned, are less likely to be claimed. In many cases, therefore, the interests of minorities 
may operate in conflict with those of their national government.1042 
 
In addition to the disadvantage that indigenous peoples and minority groups are not 
yet fully recognized as actors in international law, they often have neither the necessary 
capacities nor the financial resources to address and substantiate their claims. Even if States 
act as formal claimants on behalf of a people or local community living within their national 
State borders, these groups are often unable to rely on the support of their national 
government in two particular aspects of restitution and return cases: firstly, sustaining a 
restitution claim against a foreign State over the long-term; and secondly, returning the object 
to the minority group in question, should the State be successful in their suit. The subsequent 
return of successfully obtained objects is frequently problematic, since the objects in quest 
may be kept in the capital-based national museum without any connection to the relevant 
indigenous community. As a consequence, the returned objects might be just as far removed 
from its cultural creators following a successful return as it was in the museum or institution 
that held the object before its return. This might even perpetuate previous attempts at 
assimilation and centralization in line with the national narrative of a State, which may fail to 
reflect or serve local community interests.1043 While local communities may share their 
government’s goals to protect archaeological resources and to claim lost cultural objects, they 
may feel that the relocation of cultural objects after the excavations in a local community’s 
territory or after their restitution to a national museum or repository is unsatisfactory, as it 
does not allow them to reap neither the economical benefits, through tourism, nor the cultural 
and symbolic benefits through proximity. Therefore, the foremost interest of indigenous 
peoples, as well as ethnic and religious groups, is often the actual return of and the immediate 
proximity to the cultural objects in question. 
 
The role of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups is, however, not only important in 
respect to restitution claims but also in respect to the illicit trafficking in cultural materials. 
Although one should assume that illicit excavations and illicit trade in cultural objects are 
actively seeking to undermine the interests of local communities, since they target and 
endanger their cultural heritage, the lack of economic development among local communities 
                                                 
1042 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 712. 
1043 Ibid.: p. 713. 
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often facilitates the illicit trafficking in cultural materials. This is because clandestine 
excavations and illicit trade in cultural objects can bring a modest measure wealth to the 
community through the activities of local chicleros (Central America) or tombaroli (Italy).1044 
Sometimes the looting of archaeological artifacts is not only tolerated, but seen as an 
important subsistence strategy, which is justified by the view that antiquities are gifts in the 
ground given to the people by their ancestors.1045 This demonstrates that even local 
community interests are complex and may sometimes result in contradictory practices. While 
there is often great desire for archaeological material to reside in or be returned to such 
communities, local economic needs may prevail even these cultural interests. When cultural 
heritage does not meet economic needs by staying in situ, communities may endeavor to sell 
them, whether illegally or legally. Any successful strategy for combating illicit trade and 
avoiding the (re)appearance of returned material on the illicit art and antiquity market must 
take the economical situation of the respective region into consideration, and must offer 
solutions in which the benefits of preserving material in situ outweigh those of looting and 
illegal resale.1046 These latter aspects clearly show that the response to restitution disputes 
cannot be limited to the simple return of objects.1047 
 
Another important aspect of restitution disputes is a temporal one: namely, the amount 
of time that has elapsed since the appropriation of the requested object. Although the 
symbolic value of requested cultural materials is frequently asserted by the claiming 
community, one might question the extent to which the significance of cultural materials 
might decline over time, or whether the significance of cultural material is fairly persistent, 
and therefore does not weaken substantially regardless of the amount of time that has elapsed 
since appropriation.1048 This question is particularly relevant in those cases in which 
restitution is claimed on the grounds of self-determination and cultural identity, even though 
the requested object was inaccessible for decades or centuries and therefore unable to serve its 
currently claimed function An answer to this question might be found in the distinction 
                                                 
1044 Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 158. 
1045 Elazar Barkan, "Amending Historical Injustices: The Restitution of Cultural Property - an Overview," in 
Claiming the Stones, Naming the Bones: Cultural Property and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity 
ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (2002), pp. 16. 
1046 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 714. 
1047 This concept will be further discussed in relation to the prevention of the reappearance of returned materials 
on the illicit art- and antiquity market following the restitution of the object, see Chapter Five, Section 3.7. 
1048 Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 254. 
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between objects belonging to a living culture and those that belong to a lost culture.1049 On 
the one hand, it could be argued that an object is more important to a living (and practicing) 
community than that of a cultural tradition which has been lost. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that an object belonging to a lost tradition has an even higher significance, since it 
might be the only material object remaining to commemorate a lost culture or tradition. While 
both perspectives are certainly valid, the former might be more important to the group of 
stakeholder analyzed in this section: namely, indigenous people and ethnic or religious groups 
claiming for the return of their cultural materials. 
 
However, a third important scenario is also imaginable: there are cases in which the 
requested material may have gained symbolic importance only during the process of 
decolonization from the 1950s onwards, even though at the time of appropriation, the object 
had no symbolic significance or there was no awareness of the potential significance of the 
object to future generations. This argument is frequently employed by Western museums 
arguing against returning cultural materials from periods of colonial domination. They point 
out that certain items would have been irrecoverably lost if the appropriation, the collection 
and early safekeeping in museums had not taken place; therefore, they argue, that the act of 
preservation by Western archeologists during the period of colonial domination should be 
acknowledged rather than undermined by subsequent restitution and return. The question 
whether the collection and thus the preservation of cultural material, which otherwise might 
have been lost over time had it remained in its place of origin, justify continued possession by 
Western museums remains highly controversial: the British Museum, for example, argues that 
the exposure to the elements and severe pollution in Athens would have heavily damaged the 
Parthenon Marbles if it had remained in Athens; opponents argue that the British Museum 
itself damaged the Marbles through inadequate treatment in early years (the Marbles have 
been on display in the British Museum since 1816).1050 
 
Although indigenous people are still among the least empowered actors in restitution 
disputes, their stake in cultural heritage matters has been increasingly recognized, particular 
on the national intra-State level: States with large indigenous communities (e.g. Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States) have made substantial efforts to grant access to 
                                                 
1049 Wyss, "Rückgabeansprüche Für Illegal Ausgeführte Kulturgüter," p. 205. 
1050 Cf. William St Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, 3 ed. (1998), p. 256. 
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cultural materials or to facilitate their return.1051 Specific national legislation, such as the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)1052 in the United States, 
or the Protected Objects Act1053 in New Zealand, have strengthened the rights of indigenous 
peoples. These national acts are, however, the exception rather than the rule. On the 
international level, international organizations, such as UNESCO, are limited by their State-
represented intergovernmental status and must necessarily operate on the inter-State level and 
through State consensus. They often can do little to secure trans-, or sub-national minority 
rights if the State(s) in which the ethnic group is located is opposed to strengthening the 
cultural rights of these groups, or demonstrate little political commitment to indigenous 
peoples and minority groups. 
 
While UNESCO makes efforts to safeguard the cultural heritage of indigenous 
peoples, as articulated in the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,1054 this convention clearly limits itself to the State 
level, thereby providing no recognizable legal status for sub-national groups.1055 The same 
problem arises, as shown above, with respect to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, since 
national antiquity laws regularly declare undiscovered cultural material upon its finding to be 
State property, rather than the property of a specific community that can prove the strongest 
tie to the object.1056 Hence trans-national communities frequently lack a voice on both the 
domestic and the international level; that said, efforts have been made to give them a voice 
through the creation of non-governmental organizations, such as the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples; the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, the Survival 
International, based in London,1057 and the ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.1058 Despite these recent efforts to empower indigenous peoples on the international 
                                                 
1051 Paterson, "The "Caring and Sharing"Alternative," p. 65. 
1052 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 101-601 of 16 November 
1990. The Act prescribes the process of returning Native American Indian human remains as well as related 
cultural objects found on federal land to culturally affiliated tribes. The full text of the act available at: 
http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/MANDATES/25USC3001etseq.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1053 Protected Objects Act 1975, 1975 S.R. No. 41. 
1054 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, (adopted 20 
October 2005, entering into force 18 March 2007), 2440 UNTS 311. 
1055 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 704. 
1056 See 1970 UNESCO Convention and National Export Provisions, supra, Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
1057 Cf. Nafziger, "Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime," p. 151. 
1058 The ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples works under its current mandate on the 
development of an Expert Commentary on the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP). For an extensive overview of the rights of indigenous peoples, see the 2010 Conference Report of 
the ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (The Hague Conference), available at: http://www.ila-
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level, local communities are often left in a paradoxical situation: since international law does 
not recognize the collective ownership rights of indigenous peoples or ethnic minority groups, 
restitution claims can usually only be made through their respective State.1059 This, however, 
becomes problematic if peoples and communities are at odds with the agenda of their State; 
they, nevertheless, are forced to seek mediation and redress from their national government in 
order to lay claim to their cultural rights or the return of cultural materials. 
 
The problem is only exacerbated in case of foreign occupation. There is, however, a 
remarkable case in which the return of appropriated cultural material has been facilitated 
despite opposition from the foreign authority. In the case of the Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus vs. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts (known as Goldberg 
case),1060 the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus requested the return of Byzantine mosaics 
from an U.S. art dealer. The mosaics were stolen from a Greek Orthodox Church in the 
Turkish-controlled part of Cyprus. Although the mosaics were the property of the church, the 
Turkish government had allowed the removal and export of these mosaics, which were (after 
having been sold in the Freeport of Switzerland) ultimately imported into the United States by 
the Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc., in 1988. The Greek Orthodox Church, a legal entity 
in the Greek part of Cyprus, learned of the presence of the mosaics in the United States and 
sought the return of the mosaics as their rightful owner. The church argued that Turkey had no 
right to certify the export of the mosaics. Turkey, however, had no interest in recovering the 
mosaics on behalf of the church. In early 1989, the church offered Goldberg the 
reimbursement of the price paid in exchange for the return of the mosaics. Goldberg refused 
and the church filed a suit in order to recover the mosaics. The U.S. Court of Appeals decided 
in 1990 on the basis of the substantive law of replevin (i.e. possessory legal action for the 
recovery of unlawfully detained property) that the mosaics were the property of the 
Autocephalous Church and had to be returned.1061 
 
In sum, the rationale for returning cultural materials to indigenous people, ethnic and 
religious groups is the link between people, land and cultural heritage. The appropriation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024 (access 23 September 2011). For details on the right to self-
determination, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
1059 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 10. 
1060 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus vs. Goldberg & Feldman Fine 
Arts, Inc. and Peg Goldberg, 717 F.Supp.1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989); 917 F2d 278 (7th Circuit 1990). 
1061 Cf. Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - 
Entwicklung, p. 140. 
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cultural materials was often the visual representation of the relationship between the occupiers 
and the occupied during the colonial period and later periods of occupation; the removal of 
cultural objects often symbolized the dispossession of an indigenous peoples’ identity and 
cultural heritage.1062 Hence the interests of indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious groups 
are – next to spatial proximity, integrity, and physical and cultural preservation – the 
recognition and acknowledgement of cultural rights within the concept of ‘self-
determination’.1063 Therefore, it is essential to address these latter aspects in restitution 
practices, since they clearly extend beyond the simple return of cultural materials. 
1.6 International Community 
With the end of WWII and the creation of the United Nations in 1945, a new 
stakeholder began to emerge in international law: the international community.1064 Although 
the United Nations, as an assembly of States, was divided until 1990 by the Iron Curtain, the 
international concern for human rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948,1065 gave rise to the recognition that certain threats are a matter of common 
concern to all States. Over time, several areas of international law have been recognized as 
being of universal concern, including the prevention of armed conflict; the non-proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction; the protection of refugees; environmental protection; and – 
within the scope of this thesis – the protection of cultural heritage. Consequently, the 
recognition of common concerns demonstrates an increasing awareness of the fact that the 
international community as a whole has common interests at stake – interests that go beyond 
individual States’ interests and beyond the individual State’s capacity to promote and protect 
these interests. 
 
Nonetheless, the notion of ‘international community’ remains rather vague; it has yet 
to be clearly defined in terms of rights and obligations under international law. The notion of 
‘international community’ can be interpreted in a twofold manner: either restrictively or 
broadly. The restrictive approach limits the international community to its collectivity of 
                                                 
1062 Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, p. 299. 
1063 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
1064 Cf. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, "The Concept of International Community in International Law: Theory and 
Reality," in International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation. Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard 
Hafner, ed. Isabelle Buffard, et al. (2008), p. 93. 
1065 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UNGA, Resolution 217 A (III), 10 
December 1948, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), full text available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
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States, as, for example, expressed in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention1066 or, within the 
cultural heritage context, as expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 1483/2003,1067 
which refers to the ‘international community of States’. This assumption corresponds to jus 
cogens that defines the ‘international community’ as ‘States as a whole’ and has as such 
repeatedly been used in resolutions and recommendations by the UN General Assembly or the 
UN Security Council as well as in several UNESCO conventions, most eminent in the 1972 
World Heritage Convention. Moreover, the ICJ has repeatedly referred in its judgments to the 
international community in this manner.1068 In contrast, the broader approach defines the 
‘international community’ as a stakeholder beyond the level of States, including both States 
and non-State entities, such as non-governmental organizations or private actors. Such a 
broader understanding, however, has not yet found common recognition in international law, 
due to the wide range of potential actors other than States. Additionally, States have been 
reluctant to extend the concept of international community in any way that undermines their 
dominant position within the international system. Consequently, the understanding of the 
notion ‘international community’ as recognized by current international law allows for the 
identification of the common concerns and interests of the international community, but not 
the international community as such. This is also reflected in practical terms of international 
politics, since the main actors that might intervene for the enforcement of erga omnes 
obligations and jus cogens reflecting common interests are States. States, however, are bound 
by their political and economic interests that motivate decisions in favor of action and non-
action. 
 
In line with the explanation above pertaining to the maintenance of sovereign States 
dominance within the notion of the international community, the legal basis of the concept of 
the ‘international community’ comprises both universal as well as fragmented (national or 
regional) legal provisions. The fragmented aspect refers to the State or regional supra-State 
level with, for example, laws controlling national export regulations. The universal aspect, in 
turn, refers to the ‘common interest’ of the international community embedded in concepts 
                                                 
1066 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969; entering into force 27 January 1980), 
1155 UNTS 331. 
1067 UNSC Resolution No. 1483/2003, (22 May 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1483, ILM, 2003, p.1016 ff. on the 
condemnation of the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, full text version available at: http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/1465505.html (accessed 27 August 2011). 
1068 See, for example, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), 
24 May 1980, ICJ Reports, 1980, p.43 and Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports, 1970, p.3. 
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such as ‘public interest’, ‘common public goods’, ‘common heritage of humankind’, or 
‘common concern of humanity’.1069 However, States often do not favor the expression of 
common values, since these might conflict with national interests. Nevertheless, within the 
scope of this thesis, two major interests of the international community can be identified: 
firstly, the interest in the protection of cultural heritage wherever it may be located; and 
secondly, the access to cultural heritage as broadly understood. The interest of ‘access to 
culture’ is, foremost, an individual right as affirmed in Art.15 ICESCR.1070 It is therefore 
questionable whether the individual right to access can subsequently evoke a ‘collective right’ 
applying to the international community.1071  
 
The concept of collective rights derives from the right to self-determination and the 
interest of minorities and communities to enjoy their own culture in community with other 
members of their group.1072 While collective rights are highly controversial in the human 
rights discourse, the area of international environmental law, for example, is more amenable 
to the concept of collective approaches.1073 The concept of ‘common concern’ portends “the 
goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels 
of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people, working towards 
international agreements which respect the interests of all”.1074 Consequently, ‘cooperation’ in 
this context might evoke a common responsibility to respect the interests of all, ultimately 
constituting an erga omnes character, similar to human rights norms, which are owed to the 
international community as whole, not just to States. With regard to cultural heritage, this 
might trigger further developments towards ‘qualified ownership’, which is founded on the 
consideration that some objects are constituent of a community, and that ordinary private 
dominion over them insufficiently accounts for the community’s rightful sake in them.1075  
 
                                                 
1069 For details, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2. 
1070 International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entering into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
1071 Roger O'Keffe, "World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as a Whole?," 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2004): p. 189.  
1072 Kuitenbrouwer, "The Darker Side of Museum Art: Acquisition and Restitution of Cultural Objects with a 
Dubious Provenance," p. 600. 
1073 See International Environmental Law as a Blueprint, supra: Chapter Four, Section 2.2. 
1074 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (pp 2 and 3), launched at the UN Converence on 
Environmental and Development (UNCED), also known as the ‘Earth Summit‘ in Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 
1992, full text version available at: 
http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/rio20/pages/Download/Rio_Declaration-E.pdf. 
1075 Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures, p. 197. 
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As a consequence, the concept of collective rights also engaged with the question 
whether the interest of one local community might prevail over the interest of another local 
community that also has a stake in the object in question. A former cultural link does not 
exclude the possibility that, over time, another local community or a nation-State may have 
adopted a cultural or national site, monument, or object into their cultural heritage – 
especially as borders, religions, rituals, or identities might have changed over time. In 
restitution disputes arising from such cases, a stakeholder such as the international community 
might broaden the perspective on the issue and facilitate the development of additional 
solutions. Moreover, inclusion of the international community as a stakeholder might permit 
other stakeholders to focus less on title, ownership and location and more on preservation, 
access, integrity and cooperation – particularly in those cases, in which the legitimate title 
cannot be determined or more than one group or community legitimately claims the cultural 
material in question. Hence, the international community might function as a mediator 
between claimants, by emphasizing parties’ common interest in the protection of cultural 
heritage for the sake of mankind. 
2. Assessment of the Motives in Claiming for Restitution and Return 
The previous section dealt with the analysis of the stakeholders involved in restitution 
disputes. Before scrutinizing the various interests of these stakeholders, it is essential to 
examine another aspect of restitution disputes. In addition to the stakeholders and their 
interests, the frame of reference in which a certain claim is made for return and restitution 
plays an important role in the process – in other words, the cultural perspectives as well as the 
motives driving restitution disputes, might impact not only the nature of the request and the 
progression of the negotiations, but also the eventual outcome. Therefore, the subsequent 
section discusses the motives and perspectives that trigger claims for the restitution and return 
of cultural materials. 
 
The analysis of restitution disputes made in the previous chapters has shown that such 
disputes are shaped not only by the question of what substantiates a legal claim but also by 
the interests at stake. Moreover, the motives behind a claim have a decisive impact on the 
course of restitution disputes. Interests and motives might overlap and might not always be 
precisely distinguishable from each other. The analysis undertaken by this thesis would be 
incomplete without at least briefly touching on the potential motives behind claims. 
Understanding the rationale behind a claim is essential to the identification of likely avenues 
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for negotiations and possible outcomes. Being aware of the motives involved might allow 
negotiations to surpass presumed zero-sum solutions or to avoid exhausting and expensive 
judicial proceedings. The identification of motives early in the negotiations not only facilitates 
the negotiations as such, but also assists in identifying claims that might be more amenable or 
more resistant to alternative solutions.1076 While making no claim pertaining to the 
completeness of this list, three categories of motives can be distinguished: (1) the object as 
such and the value associated with possession; (2) the monetary value and ownership rights; 
and (3) the symbolic value and the recognition of rights. 
2.1 The Object as such and the Value associated with Possession 
The first category includes claims that exclusively focus on the actual return of the 
claimed cultural object. Therefore, the claimant might not insist on receiving title and 
ownership, if he can obtain the physical return of the object. Thus, the emphasis of such 
claims lies mainly, if not exclusively, on the re-location and the actual possession of the 
claimed object – ultimate and only goal of the claim is therefore physical return. The motives 
for such claim have various foundations. First and foremost, the imbedded symbolic value of 
the claimed object requires its actual possession, if it is, for example, linked to a personal or 
collective memory or identity. Moreover, the monetary value of such claims might not be 
important to the claimant. In other words, claimants might not object to costly proceedings, 
even if they exceed the monetary value of the claimed object. Claims falling in this first 
category are likely to be more resistant to (or even reject outright) the alternative solutions 
proposed by this thesis. The success of such claims, however, often lacks a great deal of 
certitude, and they are more likely to result in long-lasting proceedings or, in the worst case 
scenario, ultimately unsuccessful negotiations. 
2.2 Monetary Value and Ownership Rights 
The second category of motives includes claims that are partially or exclusively 
initiated because of the monetary value associated with cultural materials. This, however, is 
by no means an illegitimate concern, since one aspect of cultural property is ownership and 
thus also the protection of financial interests. Therefore, claims for the return and restitution 
of cultural materials may involve at – least partially – the protection of financial interests.1077 
                                                 
1076 Detailed discussion on complementary and alternative solutions, see below, Chapter Five, Section 1. 
1077 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 52.; Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines 
Ebenenübergreifenden Normensystems p. 427  
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Depending on the object in question, the possible amount obtained through sale or auction on 
the international art and antiquity market can easily exceed several million dollars. Recent 
cases of returned objects that were subsequently auctioned, such as the auction of the five 
Klimt paintings returned from the Belvedere museum in Vienna to the legal heir Maria 
Altmann in 2005 (Altmann case),1078 demonstrate the high monetary value of cultural 
materials subject to restitution and return. Both the media and market speculations only 
exacerbate the inflation of monetary value of such objects in many cases. 
 
In this category, therefore, it is not only the physical return to the claimant that is the 
essential motive behind the claim. While no claim for the restitution or return is expressly 
articulated in this manner, it may be possible to substantially ease negotiations towards 
alternative solutions, if the motives behind the claim in such cases are clearly understood and 
introduced into the negotiations at an early stage. Such an opportunity, for example, was 
squandered by the Austrian authorities in the Altmann case. The legal heir Maria Altmann was 
initially most willing to sell the paintings to the Belvedere museum, which had the paintings 
since 1938 subsequent to Nazi confiscation (one Klimt painting had already been donated to 
the Belvedere museum in 1936). However, since both the museum and the Austrian 
government refused Maria Altmann’s request, she brought her claim to U.S. courts. Only as a 
result of subsequent to court litigation (1999-2004) were the parties able to settle the matter 
through arbitration (2005). The arbitration tribunal ordered the return five of the six paintings 
to the heir. Altmann again offered the paintings for purchase to the Austrian government; 
however, due to the lack of funding, the negotiations with the Austrian government failed. In 
2006, the Klimt paintings went on auction in New York achieving a record market price.1079 
 
By identifying this type of claim at an early stage of the negotiations, the risk of 
speculation on the art and antiquity market can also substantially be reduced. Therewith, 
costly auctions or cost- and time-consuming court litigations can be avoided and 
                                                 
1078 Altmann vs. Republic of Austria 142 F.Supp.2d 1187 (C.D.Cal. 1999), aff’d, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), as 
amended, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), 541 US 677 (2004). The Altmann case involved six painting of Gustav 
Klimt held by the Belvedere museum in Vienna, Austria. Subsequent to U.S. court litigation and arbitration five 
of the six paintings were returned to the heir Maria Altmann. The Klimt paintings went on auction in New York 
in 2006: ‘Adele Bloch-Bauer I’ (known as the ‘Golden Adele’) was bought by Ronald Lauder for the Neue 
Galerie for $135 million; ‘Adele Bloch-Bauer II’ was sold for $87,9 million; ‘Birch Forest’ for $40,3 million; 
‘Houses at Unterach on the Attersee’ for $31,4 million; ‘Apple Tree I’ for $33 million. 
1079 The portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I by Gustav Klimt (1907) was purchased by auction for the Neue Galerie 
in New York by Ronald Lauder for a U.S.$135 million. See, BBC News, 19 June 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/5093650.stm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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straightforward negotiations in terms of the partial or entire re-purchase of the object by the 
currently holding institution can be initiated. Thus, museums, art holding institutions or 
private collectors that delay, or undertake protracted research on objects of ambiguous 
provenance in their collections often end up provoking the auctioning of the artifact. This is 
because after costly research and court litigations, the claimant must often pay the lawyers out 
of the proceeds of the sale of the object. Therefore, museums and archives that invest in the 
research of provenance (for example with regard to Nazi-confiscated art) with the aim of 
being cooperative early in negotiations are much more likely to achieve solutions that are 
more satisfactory to all parties involved.1080 
2.3 Symbolic Value and the Recognitions of Rights 
Claims falling under the third category of motives might be more amenable to 
alternative solutions than in the first two categories. This third category, however, is much 
more complex, since ethical and historical considerations play a much greater role here than 
in the categories previously discussed. The claimant in this category is typically not the single 
individual (as in the previous category) but rather an ethnic minority group or indigenous 
peoples. The motives of this category are mainly based on the fact that the claimants’ rights to 
and perspectives on their cultural heritage have been (or still are) largely ignored by the 
current possessor.1081 Such a possessor, be it a private collector or public museum, often 
discounts the claimants’ arguments regarding the cultural significance of the materials, since 
their appreciation of the object primarily rests on its aesthetic value rather than on its cultural 
and ethnic provenance. 
 
While this scenario is most likely to play out in relation to museums’ collections that 
benefited from the period of colonial domination, it occurs in other historical contexts as well, 
albeit to a lesser degree. For example, museums throughout Europe benefited from Nazi-
confiscated art and the unclear proveniences of thousands objects. Although many objects 
were returned to the owners or their heirs, many others were placed into the custody of 
governments until the rightful owner might be found. Provenance research, however, was 
often not sufficiently carried out in the past, partly due to the fact that archives in Eastern 
Europe were not accessible until the 1990s, but also due to the prevalent attitude that unclear 
provenance might favor the museum commissioned to exercise custody and research. 
                                                 
1080 Cf. Regina Mönch, Beutekunst – Kunst unter Vorbehalt, FAZ, 12 December 2008. 
1081 Nason, "Beyond Repatriation: Cultural Policy and Practice for the Twenty-First Century," p. 293. 
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Fortunately, the attitude towards Nazi-confiscated art has gradually changed over past years – 
especially since the adoption of the 1998 Washington Principles and their affirmation in the 
2009 Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets.1082  
 
However, the historical legacy of this mentality, in which the circumstances of 
acquisitions are disregarded during times of war and occupation, is frequently still evident in 
the manner in which museums and collectors tend to handle restitution claims. For example, 
many private museums and collectors still disregard their obligation to provide clear 
provenience. As a result, alternative solutions to return and restitution – such as loan 
agreements, the fabrication of replicas, or shared management – are frequently not considered. 
Claims in this third category often fail to be initiated, not because of the lack of title or 
ownership, but rather because possessors fail to recognize three aspects of the claims in 
question: firstly, the cultural and historical context of the object; secondly, the object’s 
cultural or ritual significance; and thirdly, the often tragic circumstances of its removal. 
Therefore, more than in any of the other categories discussed above, this category of claims 
deals with values pertaining to the cultural identity and the dignity of those who created the 
disputed cultural object, and/or those who lost possession of the object due to large-scale 
human rights violations. 
 
Whereas the second category of this typology is mainly driven by the monetary value 
of cultural objects, this third category is emotionally driven: the cultural object is both 
emotionally and symbolically charged. The reaction of the current owner to the claim may 
also color the nature of the further negotiations between the parties. An evasive and 
deprecating response, for example, may result in the intensification of the emotional 
involvement of the claimant. Such an ‘emotional escalation’ may result in situations in which 
the withdrawal of the claims or an outcome other than the return to the claimant might be 
equated with a loss of face. Moreover, a refusal to return a claimed object may be perceived 
as confirmation of the contempt held by the current possessor for the claimant’s cultural or 
religious identity. At an early stage of negotiations, however, this third category is likely to 
offer excellent promise in terms of resolution through complementary and alternative means, 
as the physical return of the object might be only of secondary importance. Recognition and 
cooperation might eventually attain primary importance in the negotiations, and perhaps even 
                                                 
1082 For details on both the 1998 Washington Principles and the 2009 Terezin Declaration, see supra, Chapter 
Three, Section 3.5 
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in the final outcome. Cooperation in preservation and management, provision of exhibition 
facilities, access or replicas, as well as the exchange of information might correspond to the 
interests of the parties involved to a much higher degree. 
3. Assessment of the Interests at Stake 
Analyzing the various stakeholders involved in the restitution debate is the first step in 
determining the overall interest in cultural heritage matters. The second step, however, is 
defining the interests that are at stake, since these interests might have a specific impact on the 
success of the negotiation and the final outcome of restitution disputes. If the involved 
interests and motives that drive a claim are not properly understood, an appropriate solution to 
the dispute cannot be found.1083 Conflict of interests with regard to the same cultural object 
can be manifold: whereas scientific interests can conflict with the interest of public access, 
access can conflict with the interest in preservation. Preservation, in turn, can conflict with the 
interest in displaying the object in its original context, with research matters, as well as with 
cultural or religious interests. Identifying the various interests involved is not an easy task 
since cultural materials can be of cultural, historic, artistic, religious, scientific, political, 
economic or symbolical value – or all of the above.1084 
 
Thus, the following section aims at identifying the several interests involved in 
cultural heritage matters that can have an impact on the resolution of restitution disputes. 
While it will be demonstrated that different stakeholders might have different interests with 
regard to the same object, it is also possible to identify common interests which might 
facilitate alternative solutions to current restitution practices. 
3.1 Physical and Cultural Preservation as Linked Components 
The core of concern and of common interest to all stakeholders, as this thesis argues, 
is the interest of preserving cultural heritage. Preventing physical destruction, damage, and 
deterioration is thus the primary objective when dealing with cultural materials regardless of 
type.1085 If cultural materials are partially damaged or completely destroyed, they can be 
                                                 
1083 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 46 ff. For details and categories of motives in restitution claims see supra Chapter Five, 
Section 2. 
1084 Cf. Carman, Against Cultural Property - Archaeology, Heritage, and Ownership, p. 20. 
1085 Cf. Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 406.; Frank Fechner, "Prinzipien Des Kulturgüterschutzes, Eine Einführung," in Prinzipien 
Des Kulturgüterschutzes, Ansätze Im Deutschen, Europäischen Und Internationalen Recht, ed. Frank Fechner, 
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neither exhibited, studied, nor enjoyed; more importantly, perhaps in this context – they 
cannot be returned to the claimant.1086 Thus, even within the context of restitution disputes, 
preservation can generally be considered to be ‘common ground’ and is within the zone of 
agreement between the opposing parties.1087 Moreover, this is even valid in those cases, in 
which cultural materials are claimed in order to allow them decay and ‘return to the earth’. 
Decaying in this context generally does not include the deliberate or negligent damage or 
destruction by a third party, but rather a ritual act or ceremony performed by a certain people 
(usually the tribe or indigenous community that created the object in question). Thus 
preservation can truly be assumed as being the prerequisite and fundamental interest on the 
basis of which all other interests are constructed. 
 
With regard to restitution disputes, preservation interests have frequently been used in 
order to deny the return of the objects claimed. Repeatedly, museums and other art holding 
institutions have argued that returned objects would not be as well protected in the claimant’s 
possession as it is in its current place of residence. A prominent example is, once again, the 
case of the Parthenon Marbles: until the completion of the new Acropolis Museum in June 
2009, the British Museum has long argued that Greece could not safeguard the artifacts as 
well as the British Museum. However, as this thesis will argue, preservation interests must go 
beyond the mere safeguarding of cultural materials from physical destruction or damage to 
include the following two components: namely both physical preservation of the object’s 
material substance from deterioration, and cultural preservation. Cultural preservation refers 
to the recognition of the cultural significance and affiliation of the object with a certain 
people, group or community. Both components must be considered if the ‘best interest’ of the 
object is to be identified in restitution disputes. 
3.1.1 Physical Preservation 
Most of the various interests associated with cultural materials are served by its 
physical preservation.1088 The physical component of preservation refers to the material safety 
and integrity of cultural materials. Thus, physical preservation requires that measures are 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thomas Oppermann, and Lyndel V. Prott (Berlin: 1996), p. 26.; Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural 
Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - Developments, p. 47. 
1086 Merryman, "The Public Interest in Cultural Property," p. 355. 
1087 Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1071. 
1088 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 14. 
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taken against the destruction, mutilation, vandalism, or division of sets and collections;1089 in 
addition, measures must be taken to prevent the deterioration of the cultural object resulting 
from neglect or environmental damage.1090 However, some cultural materials were never 
intended to be persevered: many objects were originally devised for the purpose of 
consumption or to be returned to the earth through a process of deterioration.1091 Such objects 
include those often found in graves and tombs; in these cases, physical preservation may 
stand in stark contrast to the religious beliefs or rituals of a certain group or community within 
contemporary society.1092 Consequently, this necessitates an evaluative comparison of the 
countervailing interests involved. 
 
While it can generally be assumed in most restitution disputes that physical 
preservation might be a common ground between parties rather than a source of disagreement, 
conflicts of interests might arise over the protective standards utilized to ensure the physical 
integrity of the object. Specifically, high standards of care employed by museums or of 
archeologists may conflict with the interests of the party claiming for return (e.g. in case of a 
return to indigenous peoples). Therefore, parties involved in restitution disputes must 
determine whether restitution should be granted, if the claimant is not able to provide 
sufficient proof that its facilities actually guarantee the preservation and safekeeping of the 
object to be returned. Particularly in cases in which the claimed object represents a significant 
piece of the ‘cultural heritage of mankind,’ the capacity to preserve might play a major role in 
restitution disputes. However, the argument of capacity is not any longer one exclusively 
favoring Western museums as museums and art-holding institutions in so-called ‘source 
countries’ continue to become better equipped and organized; this has been facilitated by 
growing international cooperation between museums and, to a certain degree, by the 
establishment of museum branches.1093 Nevertheless, in specific instances, the argument that 
the receiving institution cannot guarantee the preservation of cultural objects has been used as 
a justification for not granting their restitution.1094 The Royal Museum in Tervuren, Belgium, 
as mentioned above, opposes restitution following its experiences subsequent to the return of 
ethnographic works into the custody of the Kinshasa Museum in 1976, only to see a large 
                                                 
1089 Bator, "An Essay on the International Trade in Art," p. 295, 98. 
1090 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1045. 
1091 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 14. 
1092 Ibid. 
1093 For details on the role of museums, see Chapter Six, Section 4.1. 
1094 Hallman, "Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist Approach," p. 215. 
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number of them stolen amidst subsequent political turmoil in what is now the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (between 1971 and 1997 known as Zaire). Such disappointing results 
convinced the museum that wholesale return of objects collected during the colonial era is not 
a viable option.1095 If, however, restitution is denied on the grounds of safekeeping, the 
holding institution must demonstrate that the artifact in question is best served by keeping it 
where it is – even if this is far away from the object’s place of origin and original context.1096 
In contrast, the question of preservation and safekeeping measures could be actively 
addressed by the parties involved during their negotiations. As a result, the parties might be 
able to agree on complementary and alternative solutions to restitution that, for example, 
might comprise the exchange of expertise, technical assistance and/or shared management.1097 
 
The issue of adequate safekeeping is particularly crucial in claims made for the return 
of ritual objects and sacred artifacts. Such objects were created for specific purposes and were 
often intended only to be seen by a restricted group of people, at particular times, or exposed 
only in a specific place. Moreover, some ritual objects are traditionally destroyed after their 
ceremonial use.1098 An example of the conflict between physical preservation and destruction 
upon return is the case of the wooden war gods created by the North-American Zuni tribe.1099 
The Zuni tribe claimed their wooden war gods in order to let them decay and ‘return to the 
earth’. These carved figures (called Ahayu:da or Zuni War Gods) were placed in shrines 
where their power were invoked to protect the tribe; each war god serves as guardian for the 
tribe until it was relieved by a new one. According to Zuni custom, the older figures must 
remain in place, lending their strength to the tribe, until they decay. The war gods are meant 
to be exposed to the weather so that they can do their work as religious objects; the 
disintegration under the forces of the elements is necessary to their function. Several of these 
figures were stolen in the course of the 19th and early 20th century, and made their way into 
museums and private collections. For the Zuni, the absence of the Ahayu:da in their shrines 
may provoke war, violence and natural disasters.1100 Furthermore, these war gods cannot be 
                                                 
1095 Guido Gryseels, "Assuming Our Responsibilities in the Present," ICOM News 1(2004): p. 8. Available at: 
http://icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p8_2004-1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1096 Cf. Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 260. 
1097 For details on complementary and alternative mechanisms, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
1098 Merryman, "The Public Interest in Cultural Property," p. 356. 
1099 Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1038. 
1100 Cf. T.J. Ferguson, Roger Anyon, and Edmund J. Ladd, "Repatriation at the Pueblo of Zuni: Diverse 
Solutions to Complex Problems," in Repatriation Reader: Who Owns American Indian Remains?, ed. Devon A. 
Mihesuah (Lincoln/London: 2000), p. 240 ff. 
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treated as property in the usual sense as, according to the Zuni, nobody, not even a Zuni, has 
the right to own them individually. Despite their inevitable destruction through decaying, 
around eighty of these carved figures were returned to the Zuni tribe between 1978 and 
1995.1101 Thus, in the case of ritual artifacts, the return might prevail over other relevant 
interests if that culture is still alive and practiced in contemporary society – even if this 
includes the physical destruction of the object.1102 In practical terms, this is justified when the 
physical preservation of the object in question is diametrically opposed to its cultural (ritual) 
function. In a sense, one could say that restitution and return facilitates the preservation of the 
culture at the expense of the physical preservation of the object.1103  
 
In summarizing, it can be said that the physical preservation is an overall concern in 
the protection of cultural heritage and is essential to both parties in restitution disputes: the 
current holding institution that is generally reluctant to return cultural materials, as well as the 
claimant arguing for the return. Destruction of or damage to cultural artifacts diminishes 
property rights and the economical value intrinsic to cultural materials. Moreover, destruction 
also diminishes the cultural value of the object in terms of its affiliation with a particular 
group or community.1104 That said, significant cultural and ritual affiliation might not only 
conflict with the common interest of physical preservation but might override it,1105 as shown 
in the Zuni War Gods case. As a percentage of the overall number of restitution disputes 
initiated since 1945, those in which the intended destruction and ritual decaying constitute a 
conflict of interest between parties represents a very small minority, since, in most cases, 
claimants generally do not intent destroying the cultural objects they claim.1106 
3.1.2 Cultural Preservation 
The issue of cultural preservation attempts to address the fact that cultural materials 
are not merely property, but rather material witnesses of a particular cultural heritage of 
humankind.1107 The denial or distortion of ‘cultural preservation’ have been a contributing 
                                                 
1101 Cf. Ibid., p. 242. 
1102 Moore, "Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market," p. 467. Alike: Merryman, "The 
Public Interest in Cultural Property," p. 356. 
1103 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1038. 
1104 Ibid.: p. 1064.  
1105 Wyss, "Rückgabeansprüche Für Illegal Ausgeführte Kulturgüter," p. 205. 
1106 Cf. Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 260. 
1107 Cultural materials comprise objects of unique and irreplaceable value, which distinguishes the field of 
international cultural heritage law from other legal fields, such as commercial law. For details, see supra Chapter 
Three, Section 1. For details on the shift of notion from ‘cultural property’ to ‘cultural heritage’, see supra 
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factor in genocide, in ethnic cleansing, and in instances of extreme oppression and forced 
assimilation.1108 Consequently, cultural preservation refers to the cultural context of a 
particular object in view of cultural and human rights principles − namely, a collective right to 
cultural participation and self-determination.1109 Therefore, cultural affiliation and the 
recognition of the contextual importance of cultural objects play an important role in 
restitution disputes and therefore must be included in the search for alternatives to the barren 
return of cultural materials. 
 
In brief, cultural preservation refers to the affiliation of a particular people, group of 
peoples, or communities with a certain object. Whereas property rights reinforce an 
individual’s affiliation to a certain cultural object, the affiliation of a people or group to 
cultural materials is generally not protected by property rights. Although they are much less 
developed than property rights, the concept of collective rights attempts to include within its 
scope the collective interests and cultural affiliation of a group. The assertion of collective 
rights, however, requires collective manifestation by a certain collectivity of individuals. 
Whereas international law aims at embracing collective rights (e.g. in the right of self-
determination1110 or the concept of common heritage of humankind1111) some national law 
provisions also work with the notion of ‘cultural affiliation’. One such example is the 1990 
U.S. Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)1112. This act regulates the return of Native 
American cultural materials, including human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, or 
objects of cultural patrimony. In order for a restitution request to be submitted under the act, 
the claim must be made by the “competent representatives” of the community with a 
“sufficiently close cultural affiliation to the object”. In section 1(2), the act defines “cultural 
affiliation” as the “relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced 
historically or prehistorically between a present day group and an identifiable earlier 
group”.1113 A “competent representative” refers to either “lineal descendants” or “any 
                                                                                                                                                        
Chapter Two, Section 5.1. For further information see, among many others, Prott and O'Keefe, "'Cultural 
Heritage' or 'Cultural Property'?," pp. 307-20. and Francioni, "A Dynamic Evolution of Concept and Scope: 
From Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage." 
1108 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 7. 
1109 For details on the right to self-determination, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
1110 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6.3. 
1111 For details, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2.1. 
1112 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 101-601 of Nov 16, 1990, 
full text of the Act available at: http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/MANDATES/25USC3001etseq.htm 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1113 See NAGPRA, U.S. Code, Title 25, Chapter 32, 3001, Section 2. 
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organization which […] serves and represents the interests of that people, has as a primary 
and stated purpose the provision of services to that group, and has expertise in the group 
affairs”.1114 Consequently, the claimant must provide evidence of close demonstrable 
affiliation or, among multiple requesting parties, the closest demonstrable affiliation with the 
object in question. 
 
The significance of a provision requiring proof of affiliation for claims made for the 
return of cultural materials calls into question the supposition that affiliation in a permanent 
state of being. It might be argued that affiliation can change over time and that possession of 
heritage may be the result of many factors, including physical residency, blood genealogy, 
memory, or perhaps the simple desire to link an ancient culture with a current one.1115 History 
provides several examples of how cultural affiliation might be modified and manipulated; not 
only have governments and political leaders frequently refused to acknowledge cultural 
heritage that does not accord with the official political and ideological understandings. 
Similarly, evidence has also been deliberately emphasized or downplayed in restitution 
disputes in order to reinforce a particular claim to cultural heritage. It is this idea of selecting 
a certain heritage that, in its extremes, lead to the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by 
the Taliban – in order to erase the Buddhist past of Afghan history in favor of an Islamic one. 
 
Although cultural affiliation might be difficult to substantiate in claims for return, it is 
– nevertheless – an essential interest that must be considered in restitution disputes. The 
implementation of a cultural affiliation requirement in restitution claims – as was done in the 
United States (NAGPRA) – demonstrates the effectiveness of this Act: several cultural and 
ritual objects have been returned to Native American tribes by U.S. museums in the past 
decades. What works on the national intra-State level should also work on the international 
level between States.1116 Thus, if cultural affiliation can be demonstrated, the interest in the 
cultural preservation must be evaluated in light of the other interests; moreover, it might, as 
was shown in the Zuni case, even prevail over the physical preservation of a particular 
cultural object. As mentioned above, in such instances, one could say that restitution and 
                                                 
1114 This definition refers to “Native Hawaiian Organization” and “Indian tribes” in the NAGPRA Act, U.S. 
Code, Title 25, Chapter 32, 3001, Section 11 A and B. In detail: Cf. Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The 
"Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under International Law," p. 1074. 
1115 Helaine Silverman and D. Fairchild Ruggles, Cultural Heritage and Human Rights (2007), p. 8. 
1116 For the distinction between the inter-State and intra-State level, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. 
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return facilitates the preservation of the culture at the expense of the physical preservation of 
the object.1117  
 
To conclude, although a certain cultural object might appear to be complete in its 
physical substance and appearance, it inherently remains incomplete if the cultural context of 
the object is disregarded. Thus, both physical and cultural preservation are essential to cultural 
materials. In terms of the employed analogy to child custody law,1118 cultural context 
represents the maternal providence; without this maternal link the child, as well as the object, 
remains incomplete. Should the cultural context and hence the provenience of a cultural 
object partially or completely unknown, the problem of ‘cultural preservation’ is further 
exacerbated. The particular problems associated with so-called ‘orphaned objects’ resulting 
from illicit excavations will be discussed separately.1119 The desire to preserve the integrity of 
the cultural context of cultural materials is deeply rooted in the nature of cultural heritage 
politics, since it is this context in particular that transforms property into cultural property. 
3.2 Public Access and Civil Society 
Access by the general public as such does neither contribute to the physical 
preservation nor to the cultural preservation of cultural materials. On the contrary, one could 
argue that general public access might jeopardize cultural objects by increasing exposure of 
the object to daylight and human perspiration. Access, however, is of essential importance to 
the cultural impact and relevance that a cultural object has among a certain people, group or 
nation – even more than availability of objects for research and scientific inquiry.1120 Granting 
access to cultural sites and objects shapes the cultural, ritual or religious importance of the 
particular site or object and contributes to the longevity of cultural heritage.1121 Access in its 
general terms includes both the provision of general access to the public through physical 
admission and publication, as well as to the continued ability of museums, private dealers and 
collectors to enrich collections through purchase, bequest, and long- or short-term loans.1122 
                                                 
1117 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1038 and 46. 
1118 For details on the legal analogy to child custody law, see supra Chapter Four, Section 1.2. 
1119 For the discussion on ‘orphaned objects’ see Chapter Five, Section 3.8. 
1120 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 424. 
1121 Patrick J O'Keefe, "Formulating General Principles by Reference to International Standards," in Prinzipien 
Des Kulturgüterschutzes, Ansätze Im Deutschen, Europäischen Und Internationalen Recht, ed. Frank Fechner, 
Thomas Oppermann, and Lyndel V. Prott (1996), p. 292. 
1122 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 706. 
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This ability, however, might be limited by export and import restrictions for certain objects or 
all archeological items, as foreseen in several national antiquity acts. Access – both 
unconditional and limited – has not only been a common practice amongst many tribes and 
religious groups throughout history; nowadays access has become the general policy of all 
public and private museums. Some museums support the concept of public access to such an 
extent that they do not even charge admission fees.1123 Simply said, access is about “not 
closing off” cultural materials from the general public.1124 This is in particular true if the 
museum or art holding institution is entirely or partially publicly funded. 
 
Since cultural heritage can be conceptualized as a medium through which humanity 
may gain intellectual and cultural exchange, in some ways, all peoples also should have a 
right to claim access to it.1125 In legal terms, access to cultural heritage is provided as a 
fundamental principle as, for example, included in the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage 
Convention (Art. 5a), the Granada Convention of 1985 (Art. 12, 15), and the 2001 UNESCO-
Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention (paragraph 6 of the preamble, Art. 2 No. 10, Art. 
20). Access to cultural heritage is also an aspect within the framework of human rights, 
cultural rights, and cultural diversity as, for example, highlighted by the Human Rights 
Council of the United Nations, which stresses the importance of participation, access and 
contribution of cultural life.1126 
 
Despite the fact that granting access to cultural heritage is common practice, public 
access in particularly is frequently discussed in the context of restitution disputes. The matter 
often arises if restitution claims concern objects that are currently on public display, but, 
either directly or through subsequent auction or sale, would be in the hands of a private 
collector or a private institution that might limit public access to the object in question. Thus, 
discussions are often colored by public sentiment that has frequently been uneasy with the 
return of cultural objects on public display.1127 Examples include: the Altmann case, in which 
                                                 
1123 For example, admission to the British Museum is free of charge to all visitors, see: 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/visiting/admission_and_opening_times.aspx (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1124 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 424. 
1125 Sharon A. Williams, The International and National Protection of Movable Cultural Property a 
Comparative Study (1978), p. 53. 
1126 Human Rights Council of the United Nations, Report of the independent expert in the field of cultural rights 
submitted pursuant to resolution 10/23 of the Human Rights Council, 22 March 2010, A/HRC/14/36.  
1127 Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - Entwicklung, p. 
54. 
 258
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
five Klimt paintings were returned to the legal heir Maria Altmann by the Austrian Belvedere 
museum, and subsequently auctioned in New York in 2006;1128 the return and subsequent 
auction of the Kirchner painting entitled ‘Berliner Strassenszene’ (‘Berlin Street Scene’) by 
the Brücke Museum in Berlin in 2006; and discussions in the Netherlands over the return of 
paintings from the Goudstikker collection. Within the public debate, the main proponents for 
access by the general public are naturally the museums.1129 
 
In the same way that physical and cultural preservation concerns might conflict with 
other interests in restitution disputes, concerns over public access might also conflict with the 
interest of the parties involved. First of all, public access might conflict with the conditions 
required for the proper preservation of cultural materials. In addition to preservation, the ritual 
or religious purpose of a certain object might require that the object is hidden from the general 
public, or only displayed on specific occasions. Furthermore, public access might conflict 
with the privacy and/or rights of the artist or owner of cultural materials.1130 Unrestricted 
public access cannot be the primary interest, and it certainly must be counterbalanced with the 
other interests involved; it should therefore only be guaranteed to the extent to which it does 
not substantially harm the cultural material. That said, regulating public access has always 
been part of general preservation and safekeeping provisions. Although public access should 
therefore be a secondary consideration among the interests related to cultural heritage1131, it is 
nevertheless a legitimate factor that should be taken into account in restitution negotiations. 
This is because access is a public interest aspect that might be placed at risk in restitution 
disputes: in the majority of restitution disputes, cultural objects generally tend to be less 
accessible to the general public after their return. The reason is that (in cases of Nazi-
confiscated art, for example) only public museums are forced to comply with the 
requirements of provenance research (as established by the 1998 Washington Principles) that 
eventually might lead to the return of cultural artifacts from public collections.1132 Private 
collectors and art holding institutions are much less frequently the focus of restitution claims, 
                                                 
1128 The Belevedere museum in Vienna, Austria, returned five of the six disputed paintings to Maria Altmann, 
including Adele Bloch-Bauer I (known as the Golden Adele, 1907), Adele Bloch-Bauer II (1912), Apple Tree I 
(1912), Birch Forest (1913), Houses at Unterach on the Attersee(1916). 
1129 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 49. 
1130 Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems p. 424. 
1131 Fechner, "Prinzipien Des Kulturgüterschutzes, Eine Einführung," p. 28. In the same vein: Odendahl, 
Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines Ebenenübergreifenden Normensystems p. 424. 
1132 For details on the 1998 Washington Principles, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
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for two reasons: firstly, as mentioned above, private parties are not bound by the 1998 
Washington Principles, and, secondly, the exact contents of private collections are frequently 
simply not known. 
 
Furthermore, while the return of cultural materials to their places of origin (for 
example the return of carvings and reliefs to a remote temple or church from which they were 
appropriated) would enhance their integrated character and aesthetic value, the return would 
simultaneously make them much less accessible to scholars and the general public. This does 
not mean that public access trumps concerns regarding context and integrity,1133 which will 
be discussed in the following section. It simply means that the access to cultural materials by 
the general public is an essential aspect of cultural heritage. Whenever the return of a certain 
cultural object would restrict or end public access to the object in question, and should there 
be no other concerns (such as preservation, property rights, contrary ritual usage) to take into 
consideration, the general interest in the public access to cultural heritage should prevail. 
3.3 Integrity and Context − Unity of Finds, Collections and Dispersed Fragments 
In addition to the interest in the physical preservation and safety from the object’s 
deterioration, the interest of preserving its integrity and context is an essential concern, since 
cultural materials possess not only an aesthetic value, but also impart several other values, 
such as being a pivotal bearer of cultural and historical information. The integrity of a cultural 
object means, first of all, that it should not be dismembered: fragments of an object or a set of 
objects composed of pieces should be kept together. The object’s integrity might have been 
dismembered by acts of destruction, such as the beheading of sculptures, removal of facades 
(in their entirety or in parts), dispersion of frescoes, division of triptychs, or stripping interiors 
from historic buildings.1134 If dismemberment has occurred, efforts should be made – if 
feasible – to reverse such acts of destruction by reassembling dispersed materials. This might 
be pursued through (re-)purchase, temporary or long-term loan, as well as through the 
voluntary return of dispersed pieces of cultural materials.1135 
 
As has been indicated above, a simple concept such as that of physical integrity might 
be complicated by historical circumstances. However, issues pertaining to physical integrity 
are incredibly straight-forward in comparison with the issues associated with the cultural and 
                                                 
1133 Cf. Thompson, "Cultural Property, Restitution and Value," p. 261. 
1134 Cf. Prott, Commentary on the Unidroit Convention, to Art. 5(3)(b), p. 57. 
1135 For details on such options, see Chapter Six, Section 3. 
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historical context of cultural materials. First of all, ascertaining context requires scientific 
information about the age, origin, purpose and function of the objects in question. This 
information might be revealed by the objects itself or, in case of archeological finds, by the 
soil or location in which it had been found. Too often, such information is partly or 
completely lost through unprofessional or clandestine excavations. Thus, preserving an object 
in situ – as stipulated, for example, by the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Convention – can 
contribute to the preservation of associated scientific information about the object for future 
generations. 
 
More broadly understood, however, the context of a cultural object does not merely 
refer to scientific information associated with it, but also to the location of its creation, 
erection, or discovery: namely its so-called ‘place of origin’. The concept of ‘place of origin’ 
goes beyond the archeological information and refers to the object’s cultural significance as a 
record of civilization within a certain culture or region. This is also the reason why it is 
sometimes easier to orient a cultural object within a locality rather than a nation State.1136 The 
cultural and regional aspect might be more strongly linked, if the particular group or 
community that created the object in question still continues to exist in contemporary society. 
In turn, cultural context may be weakened if the peoples or communities associated with the 
object no longer exist or the specific background of an object simply cannot be identified. In 
cases of underwater cultural heritage (namely ship wrecks of war, commerce or slavery), the 
preservation in situ does not refer to the ‘place of origin,’ which – literally – could only be the 
place of departure; rather, in such cases, in situ is defined as the place of a vessel’s destruction 
and/or final resting place.1137 
 
Whereas generally ‘context’ in terms of preserving scientific information is a 
commonly shared interest among professionals in the field of cultural heritage, concepts such 
as ‘country of origin’ or ‘re-contextualization through restitution and return’ remain highly 
controversial. The interest in the ‘re-contextualization’ of cultural materials has emerged over 
the last decades and can mainly be found in the argumentations associated with claims for the 
return of cultural materials appropriated during the period of colonial domination. Terms like 
‘place of origin’ or ‘country of origin’ are employed by the UNESCO Intergovernmental 
                                                 
1136 Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 147. 
1137 For details on the 2001 UNESCO Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, see supra Chapter Three, 
Section 2.5. 
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Committee1138 as well as by several UN declarations and UNESCO recommendations, thus 
promoting the idea of ‘re-contextualization’. Whereas preservation in situ and thus ‘re-
contextualization’ in situ is often not feasible due to reasons of safety, research or access, 
preservation ex situ in a museum close to the area of the findings is quite common: the 
movable finds of Pompeii, for example, are not kept in situ but in the Museo Archeologico 
Nazionale in Naples. Along the same vein, the original statue of Michelangelo’s David in 
Florence had already been removed from its original place in Piazza della Signoria by 1882; 
and since then, it has been kept in the Galleria dell’ Accademia, which is in walking distance 
to its original location (a replica has been placed in the Piazza della Signoria at its original 
location). 
 
The preservation ex situ, close to the original place of erection or discovery, is 
however the exception. Most archeological findings, such as those preserved by the British 
Museum, the Louvre, the Metropolitan Museum, or the Museum Island Berlin, are far 
removed from the ‘place of origin’ for purposes of collection, preservation, and public access. 
Since ‘re-contextualization’ is a phenomena of recent decades, the question arises whether 
and to what extent this concept should and/or could apply retroactively to collections 
established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and whether or not such 
collections might have established a ‘new context of its own’ over time. The British Museum 
has made such a ‘new context’ argument for its collection, by claiming the universal character 
of its collections as “an encyclopedia of knowledge and a material record of human 
history”.1139 
 
Despite the associated controversy, the interest in the integrity and the context of 
cultural materials is an essential one. Thus, integrity and context become the third element in 
restitution matters – in addition to the elements of preservation and access. Whereas 
preservation and access are often used to argue against restitution, especially by holding 
museum or art institution, arguments pertaining to integrity and context might be used by both 
sides (although they tend to favor restitution and return based on the idea of ‘country of 
origin’ and ‘re-contextualization’). That said, returning cultural materials to their ‘place of 
origin’ or ‘country of origin’ does not necessarily reconstitute its former spatial integrity, 
                                                 
1138 For details on the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
1139 Cf. the Director’s foreword by Nel Mac Gregor, Director of the British Museum, in: Ian Jenkins, The 
Parthenon Sculptures in the British Museum (The British Museum Press, 2007), p. 7. 
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since the site of origin might have been destroyed, cannot be concretely identified, or is 
simply not feasible as place of safekeeping. Contrary, ‘re-contextualization’ might dismember 
a established unity, if the object in question is part of a collection that has created a ‘new 
context’ of its own by being a resource for comparing world cultures, as the British Museum, 
founded in 1753, has done since for over two hundred years. 
 
In fact, one of the restitution disputes par excellence is the case of the Parthenon 
Marbles, displayed in the British Museum since 1816. This case illustrates the complexity of 
dispersed cultural materials: since 1983, Greek authorities have submitted claims to three sets 
of sculptures (the metopes, the frieze, and the pediments) from the British Museum. Since 
1984, the request has been pending with the UNESCO Committee and remains 
unresolved.1140 The British Museum refuses to return these sculptures, and several British 
governments have been unwilling to pass the necessary legislation that would force the 
trustees of the British Museum to relinquish these objects (since an Act of Parliament could 
allow for the de-accession of works to British museums).1141 At the same time, the trustees of 
the British Museum would also need to amend the statute of the museum, since the current 
British Museum Act tightly constrains de-accessioning of its collections.1142 To support its 
request, Athens has even expressly built a new Acropolis Museum, completed in June 2009, 
in order to house all of the remaining Parthenon sculptures in a way that allows the public to 
simultaneously view the remains of the Parthenon.1143  
 
An examination of the case of the Parthenon Marbles within the context of concern 
over integrity and context illustrates the complexity inherent within the concept of ‘re-
contextualization’. The fate of the Parthenon Marbles will not be decided based merely on the 
resolution of the dispute between London and Athens; other fragments of the Parthenon are 
located at the Louvre in Paris; two heads from a metope in the British Museum are currently 
in Copenhagen; further fragments of the frieze are located in Palermo and the Vatican 
(although they were temporarily on loan in Athens in 2009 and 2010), the Kunsthistorisches 
Museum Vienna, the Glyptothek in Munich, the University of Würzburg (Germany), and the 
Strasbourg University. The dispersion of the Parthenon Marbles across Europe demonstrates 
                                                 
1140 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
1141 Fitz Gibbon, "The Elgin Marbles – a Summary," pp. 109. 
1142 With further details: Gillman, The Idea of Cultural Heritage, p. 127. 
1143 See for example: http://www.parthenonuk.com/DynaLink/ID/206/newsdetail.php (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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that the resolution of matters pertaining to ‘re-contextualization’ and return might involve 
several places and collections. Whereas in some cases, location seems to make no difference 
at all to the aesthetical and cultural value of certain objects, in other cases, the value of an 
object is inextricably linked to its spatial integrity – that is its ‘place of origin’ and integrity of 
its dismembered pieces. With regard to the Parthenon Marbles, the interest of integrity clearly 
calls for the reassembly of the entire collection in Athens – not only the fragments from the 
British Museum, but all dispersed fragments in Europe. A first step was taken by the 
Heidelberg University’s Museum of Antiquities, which returned its piece of the Parthenon to 
Athens in 2006, in recognition of the significance of the Parthenon as part of the world’s 
cultural heritage.1144 In exchange, the German university received another work of art from 
the Greek authorities as a donation. On the occasion of the return in January 2006, the 
university’s vice rector Angelos Chaniotis (German professor of Greek origin) stated that the 
return of the piece had been “guided by the scholarly aim of promoting the unification of the 
Parthenon as a unique moment of world culture.”1145 
3.4 Access for Scientific Research 
While in the case of public access, some might argue that common access is best 
assured by the great museums of New York, London, Paris, Rome or Berlin, and by 
internationally touring exhibitions. Generally speaking, however, access to cultural heritage 
for scientists and researcher remains independent of common access considerations. For the 
scientific community (including, historians, art historians, archaeologists, anthropologists or 
paleontologists),1146 it is utterly irrelevant to whom the title of ownership is assigned, or 
where the cultural materials are located, so long as access to and exchange of information 
about the cultural materials is guaranteed. In particular, new methods of access, including 
online publication and online provisions of museum catalogs, foster data exchange within the 
scientific community. With regard to restitution and return of Nazi looted art, for example, the 
use of internet databases has been deployed as a tool to allow individuals and institutions to 
search internationally for the provenance and the rightful owners of cultural artifacts.1147 
Nevertheless, in certain cases, scientific research still requires direct and physical access to 
the cultural object itself. Although the great Western museums often have the financial and 
                                                 
1144 For details, see supra Chapter Three, 2.10. 
1145 Martin Bailey, Parthenon fragment returned to Greece, The Art Newspaper, 20 February 2006. 
1146 For details on the scientific community as stakeholder, see supra Chapter Five, Section 1.4. 
1147 For example, the privately run database on looted cultural property 1933-45, available at: 
http://www.lootedart.com/; or the official ‘Lost Art Internet Database’ of the German government, available at: 
http://www.lostart.de/Webs/EN/Start/Index.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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technical facilities to provide such access, large parts of their collections are kept in storage. 
Consequently, access not only for the public but also for scientific purposes is often not (or 
not adequately) guaranteed. While there might be cases in which the interest of scientific 
access might interfere with other interests, as a general rule, one can say that there is normally 
no clash between scientific interests and preservation interests.1148 Moreover, scientific 
interests often go hand in hand with the interest of public access for research purposes, since 
scientific research usually results in publication and thus public access to information 
regarding the object in question. 
3.5 Economic Interests in Cultural Objects 
The value of cultural objects is not determined merely by cultural, historical, or 
aesthetic qualities; rather, most cultural objects are also associated with an economic value. 
This is simply due to the fact that many cultural objects are made from materials that in 
themselves are highly valuable, such as gold, silver, or precious stones.1149 Even in cases 
where the material value of the object is of little account, the value of a cultural object may be 
derived from the rarity of the object, its aesthetic qualities, as well as its historical or 
archaeological importance. Thus, the material value of cultural artifacts is usually only a 
fraction of what determines the object’s market value;1150 it is the intrinsic value of the 
object’s cultural and historical authenticity that makes it valuable, in terms of economic 
interests. These economic interests are clearly indicated by the steadily growing art and 
antiquity market, as well as by the fact that the purchase of cultural artifacts is frequently 
considered to be a firm capital investment. Therefore, the protection of economic interests 
might, among others, be one rationale behind restitution claims.1151 Economic interests should 
not be considered within this context as reprehensible, nor should they be neglected or 
ignored as a motive for restitution disputes; rather, economic interests should be taken into 
account as a matter of fact in the analysis of the interests involved. 
 
                                                 
1148 Likewise: Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 48. and: Odendahl, Kulturgüterschutz, Entwicklung, Struktur Und Dogmatik Eines 
Ebenenübergreifenden Normensystems p. 424. 
1149 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 5. 
1150 Ibid. 
1151 For details, see supra Chapter Five, Section 2.2. 
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Although property rights are usually claimed by individuals, property is also a matter 
of public interest.1152 This is, for example, demonstrated by the fact that theft is prohibited 
anywhere in the world, and that property rights are guaranteed as fundament rights by most 
legal regimes – either directly in national constitutions or through civil and penal law 
provisions. In turn, other rights pertaining to private owners (such as the right of free 
disposition) might conflict with public interests. Such public interests include, among others, 
the interest in preservation and public access. Whereas most national legal regimes impose 
specific legislation on the import and export of cultural objects, thus limiting the owner’s 
right to disposition,1153 national legislation regulating preservation and access is notable by its 
general absence.1154 In addition to legislation that restricts the export of certain cultural 
objects (mainly defined through minimum age and/or economic value),1155 some national 
legal regimes, particularly many States rich in archeological materials, declare certain 
categories of cultural objects, regardless whether privately or publicly owned, as res extra 
commercium – being inalienable and un-merchantable.1156 Consequently, these national 
regulations undermine the economic interests usually associated with property. 
 
However, economic interests in cultural objects are not limited to property rights and 
the right of disposition: within the scope of economic interest, a broader public dimension of 
economic benefit associated with the larger cultural heritage industry, particularly as a tourist 
resource, must also be taken into account. Tourist attractions, such as historic monuments and 
sites (for example, the Inca site of Machu Picchu in Peru), or single artifacts in museums (for 
example, the Mona Lisa at the Louvre in Paris), are linked to an entire industry, which 
benefits from the marketing of cultural heritage materials. Thus, cultural heritage is, in many 
cases, no longer a burden to national budgets, but rather an essential industry both in itself and 
to other industries, such as product merchandising, tourism, sustainable agriculture, and even 
                                                 
1152 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 53. 
1153 For details on limitations on property rights, see supra Chapter Four, Section 2.4. 
1154 Cf. Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures, p. 9. 
1155 See, for example, Annex I (Categories of cultural objects covered by Article 1) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the export of cultural goods (codified version), (Official Journal L 39/1, 
10 February 2009). 
1156 Cultural materials of specified categories fall under specific export restrictions and can neither be acquired in 
good faith nor be acquired by adverse possession. See, for example, the legislation in France with regard to 
cultural materials classified as “trésors nationaux” or “monuments historiques mobiliers”, Art. L 111-1 Code du 
patrimoine, available at: www.legifrance.gov.fr; or in Italy, with regard to “dominio culturale”, Art. 54 Legge 
No. 42 of 22 January 2004 (Code of the Cultural and Landscape Heritage), available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/italy/it_cult_landscapeheritge2004_engtof.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
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biomedicine (in case of using certain plaints that are part of a cultural tradition).1157 In this 
regard, it is possible to refer to “the re-interpretation and packaging of existing heritage 
resources as new heritage products to be used by contemporary society.”1158 If managed 
properly, this can have a major positive impact, particularly on the economies of less 
developed regions or developing States. Thus, the economic interest in cultural heritage (and 
its intangible value) may have a considerable impact on the efforts of States and local 
authorities to preserve and manage cultural heritage sites. For example, it is the economic 
interest that explains the overall success of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention: 
the right to label a site designated as UNESCO World Heritage has a direct marketing impact. 
Consequently, the economic value in cultural heritage is far from an unwanted side effect; 
rather, it represents an important part of the management planning required as a condition for 
the inscription of a site in the World Heritage list. Nonetheless, the economic aspects of 
cultural heritage sites – and their movable attachments – are frequently prioritized at the 
expense of the integrity of the site and/or the well-being of the communities in which these 
sites are situated. Bauer, for example, 1159 distinguishes between “commodification” (wanted) 
and “commercialization” (not wanted) and refers to UNESCO instruments that seem to 
distinguish between these notions as well: on the one hand, the 2001 Underwater Convention 
expressly forbids “commercial” activities regarding underwater heritage, whereas, on the 
other, the notion “commodification” of culture for the economic development is at the heart of 
the 1972 World Heritage Convention as well as of the 2005 Diversity Convention.1160 
 
In summarizing this section, it should be emphasized that the economic interests in 
cultural materials are twofold: on the one hand, there is the economic value of the cultural 
object as such (in terms of its ‘intrinsic value’ on an open or, due to export restrictions, on the 
more limited domestic market); and, on the other hand, there is the economic value of the 
object in terms of its ‘extrinsic value’, which refers to the revenues generated by the presence 
of cultural heritage (monuments, museums and archeological sites).1161 Although this 
                                                 
1157 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 7. 
1158 Ibid. 
1159 Bauer, "New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates," p. 697. 
1160 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (adopted 20 
October 2005, entering into force 18 March 2007), full text available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1161 Mastalir, "A Proposal for Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law," p. 1044.; for the danger of mass tourism, see: Sabine Von Schorlemer, Internationaler 
Kulturgüterschutz - Ansätze Zur Prävention Im Frieden Sowie Im Bewaffneten Konflikt (1992), p. 110 ff. 
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distinction is quite reasonable in theory, it might be difficult to distinguish in practical terms. 
The same problem exists when assessing the impact of economic interests in restitution 
disputes: the interests in preserving ‘national patrimony’ as a matter of national pride and 
identity – reasons on which restitution claims are often made – can frequently not be clearly 
distinguished from the economic interests of the State, region, as well as the respective ethnic 
or religious community that submit claims for restitution and return.1162 Since, however, the 
economic interests in cultural objects – be it in terms of protection, management, or the claim 
for an object’s return – play an important role in cultural heritage matters, they may have a 
critical impact on the outcome of restitution disputes. This may result in creative problem-
solving in terms of loan agreements or shared management agreements that could be in the 
mutual economic interest of both parties involved.1163 
3.6 Political Interests, Affiliation and the Symbolic Value of Cultural Objects 
Throughout history, cultural objects have been instrumental in the exercise of power 
of all kinds, including economic, cultural and political power. The creation of cultural 
artifacts, the erection of monuments, and the preservation (as well as destruction) of cultural 
sites, all involve political interests in the object as such, and its cultural and historical 
interpretation, (i.e. the symbolic value of cultural heritage). Albeit to a different degree, both 
preservation and destruction of cultural materials make the same assumption about the danger 
of rival interpretations and thus of the political dimension of cultural heritage – as does the 
question of restitution and return.1164 
 
Unsettled restitution disputes, like the ongoing claim regarding the return of the 
Parthenon Marbles;1165 the dispute between Germany and Russia with regard to war-
spoliation during and shortly after WWII;1166 or the border disputes between Thailand and 
Cambodia with regard to the UNESCO World Heritage site of Preah Vihear;1167 illustrate the 
                                                 
1162 For details of monetary value in restitution disputes, see supra Chapter Five, Section 2.2. 
1163 For detailed discussion on alternative solutions, see Chapter Six, Section 1. 
1164 Cf. Sarah Harding, "Cultural Property and the Limitations of Preservation," Law and Policy 25, no. 1 (2003): 
p. 30. 
1165 See supra Chapter Five, Section 3.3. 
1166 See supra Chapter Two, Sections 2 and 4.1. 
1167 The Temple of Preah Vihear was inscribed on the request of Cambodia as UNESCO World Heritage in 
2008. The site, however, is located in the borderland between Cambodia and Thailand still creating conflicts 
regarding access and the management of the site. For details on the border conflict see: Modern conflict near 
ancient ruins, 15 October 2008, by Jonathan Head, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7672506.stm 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
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high controversial nature and the political dimension of cultural heritage.1168 Efforts to control 
cultural heritage are often undertaken on the basis of disputes regarding property rights (who 
can tell the story); historical and cultural considerations (whose and what story is told); 
considerations pertaining to location (where is the story told); and economic considerations 
(who gets the profit from telling the story). Although there might be restitution disputes in 
which these considerations can be well distinguished from one another, in most restitution 
disputes, however, they are intertwined. 
 
Most cultural materials have an intrinsic symbolic value and therefore function as a 
source of identity or pride. With regard to States, this intrinsic symbolic value is described as 
‘national heritage’ by a particular people or State – or by more than one people or State. If a 
cultural object with a strong symbolic value and thus of identity is in the possession of 
another State or regional community – as a legacy of war, occupation, or colonial domination, 
for example – it is frequently considered as a perpetual symbol of defeat and humiliation. It is, 
however, especially States that may seek to retain certain cultural objects in order to control 
the discourse about history and to suppress objectionable narratives. This might particularly 
be the case in which human rights violations and suppressed minorities are involved. The 
simple fact that history requires symbols and tangible narratives is materially illustrated by 
memorials and monuments erected to celebrate victory or freedom. 
 
With regarding to restitution and return of cultural materials, the symbolic value and 
the political importance of claimed objects should not be underestimated by the parties 
attempting to solve restitution disputes. Entering into negotiations pertaining to restitution 
disputes without pre-defined goals, acknowledging the cultural, historical and political 
function of cultural heritage, and taking into consideration the motives and interests involved 
in the dispute can have a positive effect on negotiations by the opportunity for an overall 
satisfying solution between the parties that facilitates reconciliation that goes beyond the mere 
return of cultural materials.1169 
                                                 
1168 See also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia vs. Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 
6. 
1169 In the same vein also: Daniel Shapiro, "Repatriation: A Modest Proposal," New York University Journal for 
International Law and Politics, no. 31 (1998): p. 105-07. 
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3.7 Preventing the Reappearance of Returned Objects on the Illicit Market 
It has been argued that there is no merit in returning cultural materials if they are 
subsequently likely to be destroyed or deteriorate irreparably.1170 The same reasoning applies 
if the object returned (re)-appears on the illicit art and antiquities market and finds its way 
into a private collection. The interest to prevent the recurrence of cultural materials on the 
illicit market gains even further importance in cases in which the object was returned based on 
careful ethical and historical considerations,1171 rather than because it had been the object of 
theft (i.e. return based on property rights). Under such circumstances, the intention to return 
and thus to ‘remedy historical injustice’ would be heavily impeded by the object’s recurrence 
on the illicit market. Moreover, such incidents would have a negative impact on the resolution 
of other restitution disputes. Consequently, preventing the recurrence of returned objects on 
the illicit art and antiquities market is in the interest of both the requesting and the requested 
party in restitution disputes – and, as such, it is a matter of common interest. 
 
Whereas in most cases of restitution and return the recurrence on the illicit market is 
not at risk, other cases raise concerns regarding whether immediate return or return without 
additional safekeeping conditions is inopportune. The return of cultural materials from the 
Royal Museum of Central Africa in Tervuren (Belgium), to the Museum of Kinshasa 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo, back in the 1970s Zaire), and their subsequent loss is an 
example of one such case. In the early 1970s, and again in 1977, both museums agreed on the 
return of over one hundred ethnographic works and several thousand additional cultural 
objects, which were removed by Belgian troops during the colonial period. Subsequent to the 
return of these objects to Kinshasa, a large number were stolen amid political turmoil during 
this period. These objects are reported to have reappeared on the international antiquity 
market.1172 As a result, the Belgian Royal Museum has since opposed any further restitution 
to the DRC given their conviction that the wholesale return of cultural objects is not a viable 
option.1173 
 
Although the 1970 Belgian-Congolese agreement is remarkable long-sighted in its 
formal terms – it was concluded directly between the museums without governmental 
                                                 
1170 This is true unless the ritual decaying of the objects returned is part of the agreement, as in the case of the 
Zuni war gods; for details on the Zuni case, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.1.1. 
1171 For details on ethical and historical consideration, see supra Chapter Three, Section 5. 
1172 Cf. Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures, p. 371. 
1173 Gryseels, "Assuming Our Responsibilities in the Present," p. 8. also available at: 
http://icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p8_2004-1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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involvement from the Belgian side and therefore far ahead of its time1174 – it failed in 
practical terms. This negative outcome can only be avoided if the return of objects is 
embedded in a broader frame of safety considerations. This concern links directly the interests 
discussed in the previous sections, namely that of preservation and access. Generally, safety 
considerations include the following: sufficient precautionary measures against theft and 
fraud within museums; the existence of inventories that provide sufficient documentation 
should an object be stolen; and the presence of technical preservation equipment as well as 
alarm devices. Possible strategies to prevent the recurrence of returned cultural objects on the 
illicit market must take into consideration the more general question of how cultural artifacts 
are to be protected and preserved when institutions face financial and technical shortcomings. 
The problem of protection is only multiplied when it comes to the difficulty associated with 
effective surveillance of archeological sites and the prevention of clandestine excavations. As 
long as the illicit market is fueled with newly excavated materials, illicit trafficking in cultural 
materials will continue.1175 The problem of illicit trafficking in cultural materials and its 
possible prevention is its own subject matter and well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is important to mention here that preventing the recurrence of illicit sale of a 
returned object is a pertinent concern that should be addressed by the parties negotiating a 
restitution dispute. 
 
A legal provision that specifically addresses the aspect of safe return is the Swiss 
legislation implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention: Article 9(2) of the 2003 Swiss 
Cultural Property Transfer Act’ (CPTA)1176 states that the court can suspend the execution of 
the return until such time as the cultural object in question is no longer in jeopardy. It seems 
likely that the following incident acted as a role model for the Swiss legislation: under the 
aegis of UNESCO, the ‘Afghanistan Museum-in-Exile’ was established in 1999 at the Swiss 
Afghanistan Institute in Bubendorf, which served as a repository for 1,400 Afghan artifacts 
between 1999 and 2007.1177 Following civil riots and the plundering of the National Museum 
of Afghanistan in Kabul in 1996, the conflicting parties (including the Taliban) agreed in 
1999 to the exile repository in Switzerland; major parts of the artifacts were on display at the 
                                                 
1174 For details on agreements between States and non-State actors, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1175 Cf. Bator, "An Essay on the International Trade in Art," p. 317. 
1176 Swiss Federal Act on the International Transfer of Cultural Property, issued 20 June 2003, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/switzerland/ch_actintaltrsfertcultproties2005_engtno.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1177 See UNESCO overview of “Recent examples of successful operations of cultural property restitutions”, 
available at: http://www.unesco.org/en/movable-heritage-and-museums/features/recent-examples-of-successful-
operations-of-cultural-property-restitutions-in-the-world/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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exile museum. In March 2007, the artifacts were returned to Kabul. The establishment of a 
temporary museum for safekeeping the cultural goods of another State by agreement of the 
conflicting parties is possibly one of the most unique project worldwide in preserving cultural 
heritage. 
 
Similarly to the 2003 Swiss legislation, the German ‘Act on the Return of Cultural 
Property’ of 20071178 provides for in Article 6, paragraph 2(a) that “if, due to civil 
commotion, armed conflict or comparable circumstance, the requesting State is prevented 
from initiating the classification or designation or publishing notice of such initiation within 
the period specified1179 […], the period shall not begin to run until these circumstances have 
ceased to exist.” Although the Swiss legislation does not define the “jeopardy” to which it 
refers, the provision in the German implementing Act names the circumstances that warrant 
that the requesting State be granted an exception: civil commotion, armed conflict and 
comparable circumstances. Comparable circumstances might include condition such as 
natural catastrophes. Whereas the German provision only postpones the time limit for 
fulfilling the preconditions for bringing a claim to court, the Swiss Act goes further by giving 
the court the option of suspending the execution of the return as such. 
 
Both the Swiss and German national cultural property laws demonstrate that the 
particular circumstances of the requesting State, the safety of the cultural materials to be 
returned, as well as the safety of those materials after their return must be taken into account 
into a court’s decision to return requested cultural materials. The considerations pertaining to 
the timing of the return should be supplemented by further considerations of the technical 
assistance needed to protect the returned objects and possibly joint management of the objects 
to be returned; such considerations could be set out as conditions in the agreement settling the 
restitution dispute. In this way, dispute resolving could be accompanied by a wider frame of 
protective measures, including the interest of preventing the recurrence of cultural materials 
on the illicit market subsequent to their return. 
                                                 
1178 German Act implementing the UNESCO Convention of 14 November 1970 and implementing Council 
Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993, issued 18 May 2007, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/germany/germany_actconv1970_2007_engtof.pdf. (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
1179 Article 6 of the German Act provides for a period of one year. 
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3.8 Excursus: Orphaned Objects – Cultural Materials of Uncertain Provenance 
Cultural materials of uncertain provenance might be complete in terms of their 
physical integrity; however, they remain incomplete if they lack a cultural context and 
identity. In terms of the applied analogy to child custody law, orphaned objects are missing 
the ‘maternal component’.1180 Many archaeological finds as well as antiquities are sold 
without a proper certificate of provenance, which means that illegally and legally obtained 
material becomes mixed on the international market. Many archaeologists today take the 
pragmatic stance that if an artifact has no provenance, it is probably looted.1181 Illicit 
excavations of archaeological items are, however, not merely a violation of national export 
laws, but also a violation of the common interest of protecting cultural heritage, since as a 
result of such excavations, important information about the object and its context is inevitably 
and irretrievably lost. 
 
Therefore, stolen or illicitly exported items are similar to ‘orphans’ without verifiable 
provenance. If the place of origin can be traced, the looted objects may be returned. Thus, 
cultural materials without documented provenance are a potential risk in particular to public 
museums, since such undocumented objects might eventually generate restitution disputes. 
Nevertheless, the object remains orphaned; moreover, looters often destroy or disguise 
evidence of objects’ background. Cultural materials retrieved through clandestine excavations 
presented as coming from a region other than that where they were found, or may be ascribed 
to a much earlier collection of similar objects in order to obliterate their illicit source. 
Archeological finds illicitly exported from Iraq are – as in the case of a miniature golden 
vessel seized in Germany in 2004 – offered as being of ‘Mediterranean origin’ in order to 
evade the strict import, export and trade restrictions for Iraqi artifacts.1182 Specific provisions 
on Iraqi cultural artifacts have even been passed by the Security Council1183 and the European 
Community1184 in reaction to the massive looting subsequent to the Iraq War in 2003. 
Moreover, objects deprived of their true cultural and historical context may enter the market 
as replicas, only to be ‘recognized’ as genuine later. It even may serve the interests of 
                                                 
1180 For details on the analogy to child custody law, see supra Chapter Four, Section 1.2. 
1181 Brodie, "An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities," p. 53. 
1182 Lucian Harris, German court orders return of ancient vessel to Iraq, The Art Newspaper, published online 18 
November 2009, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/German-court-orders-return-of-ancient-
vessel-to-Iraq/19796 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1183 Security Council Resolution 1483/2003 of 22 May 2003, see: paragraph 7; full text version: http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/1465505.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1184 Council Regulation No 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic and 
financial relations with Iraq, See full text version: Official Journal 2003, L 169/6. 
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antiquity dealers to flood the market with fakes and replicas so that illicit originals may be 
‘lost in the crowd’ and thereby gain a false provenance.1185 
 
Even if restitution were granted, it will never be possible to place illicitly excavated 
cultural materials back into their original context. They can be returned to their assumed place 
of origin, but, as objects without provenance, they are usually as meaningless there as they 
would be in any foreign country.1186 In these cases, restitution claims can either not be made 
at all, or if made, the claim can generally not be adequately proven by the potential claimant. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether such ‘orphans’ should be ignored (i.e. neither studied 
nor exhibited) in an effort to limit further pillage, or if these objects should, nevertheless, be 
subject to sale, exhibition and research. On the one hand, simply keeping these objects and 
displaying them within collections would not be a stimulus to reduce illicit excavations and 
illicit trafficking. On the other hand, however, the exclusion of these materials from the licit 
international art market and exhibition practices does not make sense either. Looted artifacts 
are perhaps not as useful as artifacts recovered by scientifically guided and monitored 
excavations. However, these items are still objects of cultural heritage and thus valuable as 
such,1187 even if they can only be displayed as ‘art objects’ with little or no scientific data 
about the history, function, or significance linked to them. Aesthetically speaking, these 
cultural materials are left to speak for themselves without revealing their past. Nevertheless, 
these objects should not be neglected; rather, they should be displayed, and their ‘non-
identity’ and tragic past as a victim of illicit trade should be publicized. Furthermore, these 
objects could serve the international exchange in cultural artifacts; while restitution to the 
rightful owner is mostly not possible, loans and shared ownership are viable alternatives. 
Summary of the Chapter: 
This chapter provided an analysis of the relevant stakeholders in restitution disputes, 
namely: (1) States; (2) private entities, such as art dealers, collectors, and auction houses; (3) 
public and private museums; (4) scientific and epistemic communities; (5) indigenous 
peoples, ethnic and religious groups; and (6) the international community. It was shown that – 
despite the predominance of States in international law – other non-State actors play an 
increasingly important role in the matter of restitution and return. 
 
                                                 
1185 Cf. Carman, Against Cultural Property - Archaeology, Heritage, and Ownership, p. 20. 
1186 Coggins, "A Proposal for Museum Acquisition Policies in the Future," p. 434. 
1187 Brodie, "An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities," p. 59. 
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While, as a matter of fact, conflicting interests of these stakeholders exists, due to 
divergent and potentially incompatible assumptions, other interests do not have to be mutually 
exclusive and might actually be the sources of common ground between stakeholders. In 
particular, interests in preservation, access, integrity and cooperation can serve as common 
ground between the parties involved in a restitution dispute. These common interests – or 
common concerns – of all stakeholders involved are the basis of the interest-oriented 
approach of this thesis. A cooperative approach, balancing these interests for both the physical 
and cultural components of cultural objects, is what broadens the possible ‘win-set’ in the 
resolution of restitution disputes. Taking this into account, the second part of this chapter 
assessed not only the relevant cultural, economic and political interests, but also the potential 
motives for bringing a restitution claim. The understanding of the motives behind a claim is 
essential as motives, which might differ from interests as shown, shape not only the nature of 
the claim, but also serve as an early indicator of the character of the restitution negotiations, 
and thus the likelihood of parties reaching alternative solutions. These alternative solutions in 
resolving restitution disputes will be discussed in terms of both mechanisms and 
consequences in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI: Implementing the Interest-oriented Approach – Law and 
Policy Issues 
 
 
Overview of the Chapter 
Thus far, this thesis has completed the following tasks: firstly, it outlined the current 
dilemmas in restitution disputes and demonstrated on the basis of three rationales that an 
alternative approach to current restitution practices is required (Chapter Two); secondly, it 
analyzed the international legal regime and highlighted in particular the shortcomings of 
current legal instruments in international law (Chapter Three); thirdly, it introduced the 
conceptual and legal foundations of the proposed interest-oriented approach (Chapter Four); 
and, fourthly, explored the various stakeholders in restitution disputes and discussed their 
interests (Chapter Five). This chapter explores law and policy issues associated with the 
interest-oriented approach taken by this thesis. As seen in the previous chapters, the necessary 
legal components for a new approach – an interest-oriented approach – are at hand. It is now 
the task of this chapter to integrate these components in light of the relevant law and policy 
considerations in order to illustrate the means through which the interest approach can be 
implemented in international cultural heritage law. 
 
This chapter will begin by summarizing – on the basis of the legal analysis in Chapter 
Three – the major obstacles that generally preclude claimants from taking legal action in 
restitution disputes. The following three major obstacles in legal proceedings can be 
identified: firstly, the non-retroactivity of international treaty law; secondly, the protection of 
the bona fide purchaser and the burden of proof; and thirdly, the lapse of time and general 
time limits. Because of these obstacles, the purely legal approach is not a viable option in 
many restitution disputes. As a result, the development of complementary and alternative 
mechanisms that are primarily focused on the interests of the parties involved might facilitate 
the resolution of restitution disputes – in spite of these legal obstacles. 
 
The chapter continues by illustrating a variety of alternative solutions that aim at 
going beyond the simple or ‘barren’ return. It is important to note that in some cases, the 
application of just one of the solutions presented below might provide a feasible solution; in 
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others, however, a combination of various complementary options might be called for, in 
order to appease all the parties involved. With no claim to completeness, six major categories 
of complementary and alternative mechanisms are identified: (1) voluntary returns; (2) 
temporary loan agreements, the fabrication of replicas, and the exchange of cultural objects; 
(3) permanent loan agreements and the return of cultural artifacts without transfer of 
ownership; (4) joint custody and shared management, as well as transfer of expertise; (5) the 
re-purchase of objects claimed for return and the establishment of compensation funds in 
order to do so; and (6) mechanisms concerned with the international reputation of museums 
and other art holding institutions. As indicated above, these six categories do not form an 
exhaustive list of options; nonetheless, they encapsulate the overall set of currently available 
alternative solutions in restitution disputes. 
 
In addition to the discussion of the complementary and alternative mechanisms that 
might be available in the resolution of restitution disputes, policy considerations with some 
proposals for institutional improvements on both the international and national level will be 
discussed. These include: (1) the role of museums and the general function of stewardship; (2) 
amendment of the current mandate of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee; (3) the 
establishment and strengthening of national advisory committees; and (4) the role of World 
Heritage sites in the context of the restitution debate. It will be demonstrated that, although 
the interest-oriented approach proposed by this thesis does not approximate legally binding 
provisions, it can, nonetheless, facilitate the development of general principles in a broader 
legal framework, thus allowing parties to avoid formal litigation and to be more flexible in 
resolving restitution disputes. 
1. Legal Obstacles impeding the Resolution of Restitution Disputes 
The legal analysis in Chapter Three has shown that several multi-lateral conventions 
and bilateral agreements have been established in order to provide legal grounds for dealing 
with the matter of restitution and return. In many restitution disputes, however, major 
obstacles frequently preclude the claimant from taking effective legal action. One of the major 
reasons is that many restitution disputes now surfacing regard incidents of appropriation that 
occurred before national and international instruments prohibiting such appropriation were 
established during the course of the second half of the twentieth century.1188 Despite the 
general principle of non-retroactivity of international treaty law, States are legally bound by 
                                                 
1188 For the historical background of international cultural heritage law, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
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the obligations pursuant to such instruments only upon their ratification – a process that might 
take years or decades following the adoption of a particular treaty.1189 Moreover, the exact 
circumstances of the appropriation of cultural materials are frequently unclear and thus the 
interpretation of these circumstances is also frequently disputed, since they often occurred 
during periods of war, foreign or colonial occupation, or other periods of political unrest. 
Clandestine excavations, which continually occur, only exacerbate the problem. In addition to 
these factual uncertainties, the perception and valuation of not only one’s own cultural 
heritage, but also the culture of others has changed tremendously over time. Whereas most 
cultures have produced cultural materials since the existence of humankind, archeology and 
the idea of conservation is a rather recent approach to cultural heritage. Thus, the following 
question arises: how far back in time should one extend efforts to reverse former removals of 
cultural materials. The following section attempts to structure this debate by discussing the 
three major legal obstacles in restitution disputes. 
1.1 The Principle of Non-retroactivity in International Treaty Law 
The debate on restitution and return of cultural materials is inseparably from the 
question of whether current legal standards could or should be retroactively applied to 
incidents of prior removal.1190 This question arose particularly in the context of de-
colonization and the attempt of the newly independent States in the 1950s and 1960s to claim 
cultural materials removed during the period of colonial domination.1191 Although, 
international treaty law clearly states that a convention’s provision will not apply to any facts, 
acts or situations that arose prior to the coming into force of the convention for that State,1192 
the question of retroactivity was a major point of debate during the negotiations pursuant to 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention.1193 A number of newly independent States considered that 
the Convention would be of no use if not applied retroactively, since the vast majority of their 
cultural heritage had already left the State. Nevertheless, the retroactive application of the 
conventions would have had profound implications on the rights of property holders in 
several States, giving rise to numerous insurmountable constitutional and human rights issues, 
                                                 
1189 A good example is the ratification process for the 1970 UNESCO Convention. For details see, supra Chapter 
Three, Section 2.2. 
1190 See the debate on ethical and historical considerations, supra Chapter Two, Section 5. 
1191 See supra Chapter One, Section 4.3. 
1192 See Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969; entering into force 
27 January 1980); 1155 UNTS 331; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6 ed. (2008), p. 926. 
1193Cf. Edouard Planche, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Anwendung Auf Internationaler Ebene," Kunst 
und Recht, no. 5 (2010): p. 146. 
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which would have effectively rendered it impossible for the relevant States (namely the 
former colonial powers) to ratify the 1970 UNESCO Convention.1194 
 
It was therefore clear that, due to the common rules relating to treaty interpretation, 
any legal instrument adopted by the State community would have no retroactive effect. The 
principle of non-retroactivity originates from the Roman principle which states that there is no 
punishment except in accordance with the law (nulla poena sine lege). It incorporates the idea 
that the law cannot retroactively change the legal consequences (or status) of actions 
committed prior to the enactment of that law. The principle of prohibition of retrospective 
(penal) laws has found wide acceptance, for example in the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen of 17891195 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
19481196 and is considered one of the fundamental principles of customary international 
law.1197 With respect to treaty law, Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of 
Treaties1198 establishes that the provisions of an international treaty “do not bind a party in 
relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.” 
 
Consequently, the legal provisions found in international treaties only apply upon the 
ratification of the treaty by the signatory States. The same principle applies if States decide to 
revise the provisions of a convention. In this regard, Article 25 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention states that “any revision shall bind only the States which shall become Parties to 
the revising convention”.1199 Within the context of submitting a claim for the restitution and 
return of cultural objects on the basis of the 1970 UNESCO Convention (respectively the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention), such a claim would only fall under the terms of the 
conventions if the removal of the object occurred after the date of ratification (and entry into 
force) of the treaty in both the requesting and requested State. Thus, the principle of non-
retroactivity is twofold: on the one hand, it guaranties the predictability of legal decisions and 
                                                 
1194 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 41. 
1195 See Article 8 of the Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, approved by the National Assembly of 
France, August 26, 1789, available at : http://www.constitution.org/fr/fr_drm.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1196 See Article 11, para. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on December 10, 1948 available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
1197 See supra, Chapter Three, Section 6. 
1198 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entering into force 27 January 1980), 
1155 UNTS 331. 
1199 See Article 25 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, in detail supra, Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
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sound legal protection (e.g. for the possessor of cultural artifacts), on the other hand, it 
constitutes a major obstacle in restitution matters pertaining to cultural objects stolen or 
illicitly exported prior to the ratification of States. This is also why the Preamble and Article 
10 (3) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention provides that the principle of non-retroactivity 
does not – in any way – legitimize past wrongs. Moreover, Article 10 (3) invites States Parties 
to make use of remedies available outside the framework of the Convention. However, it must 
be noted that ratification is generally only the first of two steps, since most international 
treaties (like the 1970 UNESCO Convention) have to be implemented into national law in 
order to enforce the rights and obligations designated in the international treaty.1200 One of the 
few exceptions to this general mechanism is the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention,1201 which is 
self-executing and thus has immediate impact on national law. 
1.2 Bona fide purchase and Burden of Proof 
Most civil law regimes protect the bona fide purchaser. Generally, it is the claimant, 
who has to prove that the current possessor acted without due care and attention in purchasing 
the object in question, regardless if that object is a bicycle or ancient pottery. However, while 
it may be just for ownership rights to favor the possessor,1202 these civil law regimes create a 
significant barrier for the claimant who wishes to refute the bona fide assumption.1203 
Whereas the possessor is usually well aware of the circumstance surrounding the purchase of 
the object, the requesting party usually is not. This, however, can become even more 
complicated if the current possessor acquired the cultural object through inheritance, 
donation, or public auction. Frequently, the clear presentation of the circumstances of removal 
simply is not possible, due to the passage of time or the conditions of removal, especially if 
removal took place during war or as part of a clandestine excavation. 
 
Even the question of who is entitled to bring a claim for restitution and return can be 
quite problematic, especially if the origin of a cultural object is not or only vaguely known. 
This is particular the cases in archeological finds that can frequently only be identified as 
                                                 
1200 See for further details, supra: Chapter Six, Section 1.2.The Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Alain de 
Montbrison, Paris Court of Appeal, judgment of 5 April 2004, upheld by the Court of Cassation, judgment of 20 
September 2006; cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative 
Means of Dispute Resolution," p. 2. 
1201 See supra Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
1202 See, for example, civil law provisions in: France (Article 2276, Section 1 Code Civil); Germany (§ 1006 
BGB); Switzerland (Art. 930 ZGB); Austria (§ 323 ABGB). 
1203 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 99. 
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being of ancient origin (e.g. ‘Mesopotamian’ or ‘Pre-Columbian’) and therefore do not 
correspond with current State borders. Without any further designation of origin, however, the 
claimant’s attempts will be unsuccessful. Thus, the protection of the bona fide purchaser and 
the burden of proof constitute major obstacles in making claims for the restitution and return 
of cultural materials. 
 
This type of obstacle can, however, be corrected either through the issuance of 
legislation modifying current civil law provisions or through legally non-binding 
declarations.1204 In terms of the first option, this might be accomplished in three ways: firstly, 
through the introduction of specific civil law provisions declaring particular cultural objects to 
be res extra commercium and thus precluding them from any bona fide purchase.1205 
Secondly, provisions pertaining to bona fide purchases might be limited by increasing the 
requirements for exercising due diligence when purchasing cultural materials. Thus, the 
purchaser of a cultural object would be responsible for proving that he exercised due care 
when acquiring the object (thus, having the effect of shifting of the burden of proof onto the 
purchaser).1206 Thirdly, and most far reaching, bona fide purchase provisions could simply be 
eliminated and/or revised to require simple compensation, as provided for in the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention, which states that “the possessor of a cultural object which has been 
stolen shall return it”.1207 Under the provisions of this convention, if the purchaser can prove 
due diligence, he is entitled to compensation, even though he still must return the claimed 
object. If he cannot demonstrate due diligence, he forgoes his entitlement to compensation 
(Article 4 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention). 
 
While the first option of modifying current civil law provisions might be highly 
desirable, it would be difficult to achieve. States generally tend to be reluctant to make such 
modifications – as is illustrated by the small number of States which have as yet ratified the 
                                                 
1204 Cf. Ibid., p. 236. 
1205 Cultural materials of specified categories fall under specific export restrictions and can neither be acquired in 
good faith nor be acquired through adverse possession. See, for example, the legislation in France with regard to 
cultural materials classified as “trésors nationaux” or “monuments historiques mobiliers”, Art. L 111-1 Code du 
patrimoine, available at: www.legifrance.gov.fr; or in Italy with regard to “dominio culturale”, Art. 54 Legge 
No. 42 of January 22, 2004 (Code of the Cultural and Landscape Heritage), available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/italy/it_cult_landscapeheritge2004_engtof.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1206 A good definition of due diligence is provided by the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention in Art. 4, section 4 in 
reference to “the circumstances of the acquisition, including the character of the parties, the price paid, whether 
the possessor consulted any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant 
information and documentation which it could reasonably have obtained”. 
1207 UNIDROIT Convention with regard to stolen cultural objects in Article 3, section 1. 
 282
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention (although the convention itself is self-implementing, national 
civil law provisions have to be amended accordingly in order to avoid incompatible legal 
provisions that might result from the direct impact of the convention on national law). 
Moreover, such modifications have the disadvantage of being non-retroactive, and thus not 
applicable to current restitution disputes. Therefore, the second option of introducing legally 
non-binding instruments (e.g. recommendations, principles, codes of conduct, guidelines, etc.) 
might be more feasible and easier to achieve, at least to some degree. Moreover, legally non-
binding instruments address the problem of the burden of proof differently and, more 
importantly, open the scope of negotiations to ethical and historical considerations as well as 
the interests of the parties involved. 
 
The legally non-binding 1998 Washington Principles, for example, do not shift the 
burden of proof onto the current possessor of a disputed item (as this would conflict with 
existing civil law provisions in many States); rather, they address the problem in a twofold 
manner. Firstly, they require research into provenance and access to research results 
(Principle 1-3).1208 Along the same vein, the U.S. Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)1209 oblige museums and federal agencies to inventory their 
collections (e.g. the cataloging of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of 
cultural patrimony).1210 Thus, research into provenance and access to the results of this 
research results constitute an important part of practical support for restitution and return.1211 
Secondly, they require that the general problem of proof be taken into account particularly 
with regards to the requirements pertaining to the evaluation of evidence. This commitment is 
expressly contained in Principle Four of the Washington Principles, which states that 
“considerations should be given to unavoidable gaps or ambiguities in the provenance in light 
of the passage of time and the circumstances of the Holocaust era.” Interestingly, NAGPRA 
takes a similar approach, as it does not require the proof of legal title, but links the return of 
human remains and burial offerings to evidence of a specific cultural affiliation between the 
claimant and the requested cultural object.1212 In this way, at least a theoretical attempt is 
                                                 
1208 See supra in detail, Chapter Three Section 3.5. 
1209 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 101-601 of 16 November 
1990. The Act prescribes the process of returning Native American Indian human remains as well as related 
cultural objects found on federal land to culturally affiliated tribes, full text of the Act available at: 
http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/MANDATES/25USC3001etseq.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1210 See section 6 NAGPRA. 
1211 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 236. 
1212 See section 3 NAGPRA. 
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made to confront the difficulties associated with evidence, which is partially caused by the 
clash between Western and indigenous ways of thinking.1213 
 
These latter examples have demonstrated that several different means can be 
employed to overcome the legal obstacles associated with a bona fide purchase and the 
burden of proof. This is very important, particularly in those cases in which instruments 
allowing for legal proceedings are not available, and yet ethical and historical considerations 
call for appropriate solutions.1214 Mitigating the bona fide objection and easing the burden of 
proof are important options in defining appropriate solutions. Since, however, the current 
possessor of the cultural object in question (e.g. a public museums – since the provisions of 
both the 1998 Washington Principles and NAGPRA do not apply to private entities) might be 
deprived of its possession if the return of the object is recommended, corrective measures are 
needed to mitigate the effects this has on the rights associated with bona fide protection under 
national law. Whereas the 1998 Washington Principles do not automatically grant restitution, 
but rather demand “just and fair” solutions in consideration of the particular circumstances of 
the confiscation, the provisions of NAGPRA require the evidence of a specific “cultural 
affiliation”. Both regulations, however, apply exclusively, on the one hand, to Nazi-
confiscated art, and on the other, to human remains and sacred objects. In arguing for a 
broader framework for resolving restitution disputes, the interest-oriented approach taken by 
this thesis requires that corrective measures take into account the common interests of all 
parties in preservation, access, integrity and cooperation. Although common State practice 
might still be lacking in this respect, similar attempts to take the interests involved into 
account are mirrored in the provisions of both the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention1215 as well as 
the 2006 ILA Principles.1216 
                                                 
1213 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 237. 
1214 See supra, Chapter Three, Section 5. 
1215 See Article 5, Section 3 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention that states: “The court or other competent 
authority of the State addressed shall order the return of an illegally exported cultural object if the requesting 
State establishes that the removal of the object from its territory significantly impairs one or more of the 
following interests: 
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its context; 
(b) the integrity of a complex object; 
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific or historical character; 
(d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community, 
or establishes that the object is of significant cultural importance for the requesting State.” For further details on 
the UNIDROIT Convention, see supra, Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
1216 See supra Chapter Three, Section 4.2. 
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1.3 Lapse of Time and General Time Limits 
In addition to the issues pertaining to bona fide purchase and the burden of proof, 
questions pertaining to the passage of time in terms of the validity of potential claims are of 
great importance, and form the third significant obstacle to restitution matters.1217 Two 
different aspects of this problem can be identified: firstly, the legal issues pertaining to 
statutes of limitations as provided for in legal provisions; and secondly, the moral issues 
pertaining to the development of a general time limit that can be utilized as an absolute 
benchmark for restitution claims. While the legal issues associated with national statutes of 
limitations are more straightforwardly related to the application of the law, the moral issues 
are more complex. When it comes to the question of how to deal with the removal of cultural 
materials during periods of colonization and belligerent occupation, the issue of time limits is 
not just a matter of applying the law; it is rather a question of how far back in time it is 
necessary to extend the application of remedies to historical injustices through restitution and 
return. In short, this amounts to the question of whether there might be a feasible absolute 
benchmark for restitution claims. The subsequent section attempts to address both the legal 
and the moral aspects of time limits. 
 
Legally, provisions on statute of limitations serve the general need for legal security 
between parties; simply speaking, each party must be certain of whether its current legal 
position might be contested by others. Thus, provisions that enact statutes of limitations exist 
in all legal systems. With regard to property rights, such limitations are usually developed in 
conjunction with regulations pertaining to bona fide acquisition and adverse possession – both 
of which usually have the effect of altering the status of ownership.1218 German civil law, for 
example, provides that legal action pertaining to the recovery of property (actio in rem) may 
be undertaken within thirty years of the loss of that property; after this period, the original 
owner cannot initiate any legal action for the recovery of his property, regardless of the type 
of property in question. Whereas the 1970 UNESCO Convention does not provide any 
specific provisions on the nature of statute of limitations pertaining to the return of cultural 
objects, national legislations implementing the Convention (the Swiss and German 
implementation Acts, for example) establish an absolute time limit of thirty years, in order to 
                                                 
1217 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 222. 
1218 Cf. Ibid. 
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harmonize the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention with their national provisions.1219 
Similarly, Directive 93/7/EEC1220 of the European Community establishes an absolute time 
limit of thirty years. In comparison, the relatively short time limit of one year for the 
collection of sufficient evidence in claims pertaining to the return of illicitly exported cultural 
objects in front of a foreign court seems rather inadequate. 
 
The more generous provisions of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention extent the relative 
time limit for the collection of evidence and bringing a claim to three years, starting from the 
time when the claimant knew about the location of the cultural object and the identity of its 
possessor; however the absolute time limit on placing claims is limited to fifty years from the 
time of the theft or the date of the illegal export.1221 Interestingly, for stolen cultural objects 
that form “an integral part of an identified monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a 
public collection”, there is no absolute time limit.1222 Since this obligation to return – as 
mentioned above – cannot be denied on the basis of either acquisition in good faith or adverse 
possession, this represents a major time extension, in comparison with the traditional 
regulations of many continental legal systems;1223 as such, it has become one of the reasons 
that States oppose the ratification of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.1224 Despite the 
relatively short time limit for bringing a claim (either one or three years), the restitution and 
return of cultural materials appear to be subject to a kind of general benchmark among 
national legal systems in the form of the thirty-year absolute limit, with UNIDROIT being an 
exception with its fifty-year time limit.1225 In cases of stolen and illegally export cultural 
objects such clear statute of limitations are quite reasonable, and serve to balance the rights of 
the requesting party and the general need for legal security with respect to property rights. 
However, such time limits fail in cases when the removal of cultural materials occurs in 
                                                 
1219 Cf. provisions in the implementation Acts of Germany: Section 11 para 1 of the Federal Act on the Return of 
Cultural Property (German: Kulturgüterrückgabegesetz); and Switzerland: Art. 9 section 4 of the Federal Act on 
the International Transfer of Cultural Property (German: Kulturgütertransfergesetz), both available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/index.php?&lng=en (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1220 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of March 15, 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from 
the territory of a Member State, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0007:EN:HTML (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1221 See 1995 UNDIDROIT Convention, Article 3, para. 3 on stolen cultural objects; Article 5, para. 5 on 
illegally exported cultural objects. For details on the UNIDROIT Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 
4. 
1222 See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, Article 3, para. 4. 
1223 Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 222. 
1224 See supra Chapter Three, Section 4. 
1225 In the same vein, Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to 
Restitution - Developments, p. 222. 
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conjunction with massive human rights violations. For this reason, the 1998 Washington 
Principles does not impose any time limits. 
 
Turning now to the question of setting an absolute benchmark time limit for restitution 
and return, it is important to recall that the looting and plundering of cultural materials have 
taken place throughout history, and were originally assumed to be the privilege of the 
victorious party.1226 Thus, any absolute benchmark of fifty, hundred or five hundred years 
might be challenged as being random. The following case illustrates the dilemma in 
attempting to establish a time limit benchmark for restitution. The four bronze Horses of Saint 
Mark in Venice were originally part of a monument depicting a quadriga (a four-horse 
carriage). Although their exact origin cannot clearly be traced, they are thought to have been 
made in Greece and brought to Rome at some point in antiquity and placed on the triumph arc 
of Trajan. In the early Byzantine period, they were taken to Constantinople and were 
displayed, along with the quadriga, at the Hippodrome of Constantinople for several 
centuries. In 1204, they were looted by Venetian forces in conjunction with the sacking of the 
capital of the Byzantine Empire during the Fourth Crusade. The fate of the rest of the 
quadriga is unknown. The horses were sent to Venice, where they were installed on the 
terrace of the facade of St Mark’s Basilica in 1254. In 1797, they were removed to Paris by 
Napoleon, where they were used in the design of the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel together 
with another quadriga. The justification for the removal offered by the French was that the 
horses had been looted from Constantinople by the Venetians, and therefore Venice was not 
their proper home. In 1815, however, the horses returned to Venice under terms set out at the 
treaty signed at the Congress of Vienna1227; they were subsequently removed again to Rome 
for safeguarding during WWI.1228 While today they still stand – albeit for the sake of 
preservation as bronze replicas – over the entrance to the Basilica San Marco (the original 
statues are on display in the St Mark’s Museum inside the basilica since the early 1980s). 
Against the backdrop of this case, no one would presumably be able to lay a serious claim for 
the return of the horses. However, if, the question were to arise, where would they go: to 
Greece, presumed the place of origin; to Rome, as the place of residence prior to Venice; or to 
Istanbul, from whence the Venetian looted the horses more than seven hundred years ago? 
 
                                                 
1226 Siehr, "International Art Trade and the Law," p. 109. 
1227 See supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
1228 For further information, see Marilyn Perry, "Saint Mark's Trophies: Legend, Superstition, and Archaeology 
in Renaissance Venice," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 40(1977): pp. 27-49. 
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The case of the Horses of Saint Mark, like many others, demonstrates that a discussion 
centered on the unlawfulness of such removals usually leads nowhere.1229 Either the removal 
of the cultural objects in question was lawful or at least not prohibited under the law 
applicable at the time, or – quite arguably – any wrongfulness has been obliterated by the 
passage of time. Therefore, an absolute benchmark for restitution claims would be 
counterproductive in addressing the question of ‘remedying historical injustice’. Nevertheless, 
if current possession is challenged by a claim for return, adequate reasoning pertaining to the 
injustice to be remedied must be taken into consideration, in order substantiate the claim. 
Since such a claim would be made beyond any legal statute of limitations, a corrective 
measure is need. A benchmark of an absolute time limit is – as illustrated – neither adequate 
nor feasible. However, such a corrective measure – once again – could be instigated through 
application of the approach taken by this thesis, which requires that the interests of the 
stakeholders involved are taken into account. Of equal importance to the obstacles discussed 
above,1230 consideration of the interests at stake is much more solution-oriented than the 
establishment of any absolute time limit in restitution matters. 
2. Soft Law Mechanisms: between Law and Policy 
The previous section has demonstrated that claimants in restitution disputes are 
frequently exposed to major obstacles that preclude any legal action. In the awareness of the 
non-applicability of legal instruments, States and international bodies have set out several 
legally non-binding instruments, such as recommendations, declarations and general 
principles in recent years.1231 These soft law instruments have the advantage of being flexible 
by providing general grounds and conditions for negotiations under which a solution might be 
reached. Yet, the major disadvantage of soft law instruments is self-evident: they function on 
a non-legally binding basis; they do not contain directly enforceable rights; nor do they create 
a basis for criminal prosecution.1232 Therefore, by definition, soft law instruments do not 
provide any provisions allowing for legal entitlement to claim for restitution and return. The 
following section will discuss the relationship between law and policy in restitution disputes 
on the basis of two different case scenarios: firstly, national legislation passed in order to 
resolve a particular restitution dispute that would have been more effectively embedded in a 
                                                 
1229 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 15. 
1230 See supra Chapter Six, Section 1. 
1231 For details on soft law provisions, see supra Chapter Three, Sections 3. 
1232 Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 229. 
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broader policy framework; and, secondly, bilateral agreements that utilize general policy 
considerations pertaining to return, exchange and cooperation, which, in turn, circumvent the 
application of legal instruments that might have been available in legal proceedings. 
 
The first scenario can be illustrated through the example of the French legislation 
passed in May 2010 ordering the return of sixteen tattooed and mummified Maori heads from 
the Natural History Museum of Rouen, France to New Zealand.1233 As the Maori-heads had 
been classified as ‘French national patrimony’ and were therefore considered inalienable (res 
extra commercium), the City Council’s decision to return the Maori heads was blocked by the 
French Ministry of Culture and subsequently challenged by French courts. In the end, the 
return was only made possible because the French parliament passed a specific law overruling 
the court’s decision and ordering restitution to New Zealand.1234 Although the legal term 
employed by the French Maori law was ‘restitution’, the legally correct term would have been 
‘return’, since no legal obligation pertaining to restitution was given in that case. It is, 
however, questionable as to whether it is the role of the legislative body (the parliament) to 
resolve specific restitution disputes. This method obviates the need to debate the general 
merits of cultural heritage disputes and to strike a balance between competing interests, when, 
as is most often the case, there are admittedly legitimate arguments on both sides.1235 One 
might argue that it is the task of a generalized piece of legislation to cover a variety of 
restitution cases, or at least a limited set of similar cases, rather legislation on a case-by-case 
basis. Alternatively, the task could have been achieved by a law amending the provisions 
regarding the inalienability of French patrimony. Such a law might have been more 
appropriate insofar as it would have provide a general (policy) framework that could deal 
either with all cultural materials, with the specific category of human remains, or the specific 
issue of Maori heads (including ones outside of Rouen). 
 
The second scenario includes restitution disputes in which legal instruments might 
have been available, but are intentionally not deployed by the parties – either because both 
                                                 
1233 Law No. 2010-501 of 18 May 2010: “Loi visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes maories à la 
Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections”, NOR: MCCX0914997L, legislation available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1234 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 9. For more details on the case see also: BBC News, “France votes to return Maori heads 
to New Zealand”, 5 May 2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8661231.stm (accessed 23. September 
2011). 
1235 Ibid.: p. 11. 
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parties actively chose to forgo the use of legal instruments, or because one party insisted that 
legal instruments not be utilized. Although legal proceedings – either on grounds of 
international treaty law and their national implementing acts or national criminal and civil 
grounds – might be applicable, parties are rather reluctant to use them in the resolution of 
restitution disputes for a variety of reasons. Primarily, the burden of costly and long-lasting 
court litigations with uncertain outcomes generally deters parties from taking legal action. 
While this might account for many international disputes in various areas of the law, the 
reluctance of claimants to engage in legal proceedings in restitution disputes is generally 
much greater, since the circumstances of the appropriation often remain rather unclear, and 
the legal obstacles of non-retroactivity and lapse of time only add to this reluctance. 
Moreover, political and diplomatic issues might deter national governments from taking risky 
legal actions with uncertain outcomes. Thus, the advantage of avoiding the length and the 
excessive expenses associated with court trials are readily apparent. Prominent examples are 
the bilateral agreements between Italy and the major U.S. museums.1236 As previously 
mentioned, Italy had acquired compelling evidence that several of the objects held by the U.S. 
museums were of quite dubious provenance – most likely obtained from illegal excavations in 
Southern Italy in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, civil and criminal charges were initially 
made against the former curator of the Getty Museum (Marion True) in order to place 
political pressure on the Getty Trust. Whereas the civil charges against Marion True were 
later dropped as part of the bilateral agreement, the criminal charges against her were 
dismissed – officially due to lapse of time.1237 It is, however, likely that dropping the criminal 
charges was informally agreed upon in the bilateral agreement. Quite surprisingly, the U.S.-
Italian agreements did not refer to any legal instruments and thus contained no ‘choice of 
law’: the lack of such a clause seems unusual in such rather sophisticated international 
agreements.1238 As posited by Cornu and Renold, the deliberate silence most likely indicates 
the failure by the parties to agree on that legal point.1239  
 
In summarizing, it can be noted that although legal instruments were at hand in the 
example of the U.S.-Italian agreements, legal proceedings were not utilized in making this 
                                                 
1236 For details on the bilateral agreements, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1237 For details see CBC News, “Antiquities case vs. ex-Getty curator dismissed”, 13 October 2010, available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/arts/artdesign/story/2010/10/13/antiquities-looted-getty-true-marion.html (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1238 Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 20. 
1239 Ibid. 
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claim, nor were any reference made in the bilateral agreements with regard to the legal 
classification of the removals, which had most likely been exported illicitly and purchased 
under dubious circumstances. In these particular cases, Italy abstained from legal action and 
relied, quite successfully, on its diplomatic channels and the political pressure used.1240 In 
contrast, case-by-case legislation (as illustrated through the example of the return of the Maori 
heads held by the city of Rouen) might resolve individual cases, but similar cases remain 
unaffected and unresolved. More importantly, the case-by-case approach fails to contribute to 
the merits of the overall debate on restitution and return, and fails to provide a broader 
framework of legal instruments.1241 Nevertheless, both contribute to the total number of 
restitution disputes resolved; more important in this context, both illustrate the need for a 
combination of law and policy issues in the realm of soft law mechanisms: that is general 
principles that incorporate the common interests of all parties in preservation, access, integrity 
and cooperation. Despite the fact that it is neither beneficial in political terms to pass 
legislative acts for the resolution of individual restitution disputes (as in the French Maori 
case), nor beneficial in legal terms to omit any legal reference in the solution reached (as in 
the case of the U.S.-Italian agreements), both cases provide examples of problem-solving 
mechanisms in restitution disputes. 
3. Complementary and Alternative Mechanisms beyond Restitution 
The previous chapters have shown that the current context of the restitution debate is 
changing in terms of legal and moral grounds, in terms of the recognition of various 
stakeholders and their interests, and in terms of the recognition of common interests in 
cultural heritage. The question now is how these recent developments in international law 
might impact the resolution of restitution dispute. Thus, this section will illustrate that – 
despite all obstacles that might impede alternative solutions in restitution disputes – various 
complementary and alternative mechanisms to the simple (barren) return of cultural objects 
are at hand. It will be demonstrated that through alternative mechanisms aimed at resolving 
restitution disputes in a non-adversarial and cooperative manner, the ‘common interests’ in 
cultural heritage can be best served. There is a great need for such alternative mechanisms, 
since simply saying that a certain object is of ‘importance for mankind’ and thus does not 
exclusively belong to a State or one nation, leaves the question of custody unanswered. While 
                                                 
1240 For details on the analysis of unequal bargaining power, see supra Chapter Four, Section 1.3. 
1241 In the same vein, Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative 
Means of Dispute Resolution," p. 11. 
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the return of cultural materials might satisfy a set of interests in some cases, in others, 
complementary and alternative mechanisms might foster a whole new set of interests. 
 
Moreover, alternative mechanisms might avoid long-lasting judicial proceedings and 
excessive expenses caused thereby.1242 It will be shown that there are various solutions in a 
wide range of alternative solutions. Within this win-set, the question of whether the object is 
returned or not loses importance, since reflections on the interests of the parties involved as 
well as on the possible conditions of alternative arrangements outweigh the question of return. 
Thus, returns might be made on a voluntary basis, associated with additional considerations, 
such as transport, reconstruction and restoration costs1243, or might be subject to certain 
conditions with regard to exclusive or shared ownership rights, the exchange of other cultural 
materials, the fabrication of replicas, and/or further scientific or technical cooperation 
between the parties involved. 
3.1 Voluntary Return 
The term ‘voluntary return’ or ‘informal return’ indicates that the restoration of 
cultural materials takes place under three premises: firstly, the return is made without the 
request of financial compensation (as provided for example in the case of bona fide purchase); 
secondly, the return is conducted without any formal (legal) procedure; and thirdly, the return 
was not facilitated by the mediation of a third party.1244 Therefore, voluntary return takes 
place most often when the parties involved in a dispute deal directly with each other.1245 
However, voluntary returns are still controversial, since some fear these initiatives may create 
legal precedence and would empty museums’ collections.1246 Despite these concerns, several 
cases, in which the voluntary return of cultural objects has been undertaken, have occurred in 
recent years.1247 
 
                                                 
1242 In the same vein, Ibid.: p. 13. 
1243 See supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1: In the case of the return of the Axum obelisk to Ethiopia, Italy 
covered the expenses of the return, restoration and erection of the obelisk. 
1244 Cf. Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - 
Entwicklung, p. 275. 
1245 ———, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - Developments, p. 
249. 
1246 Such concerns, for example, have been expressed in the 2002 Declaration on the Importance and Value of 
Universal Museums, signed by major European and North-American Museums, stating: “We should, however, 
recognize that objects acquired in earlier times must be viewed in the light of different sensitivities and values, 
reflective of that earlier era.”; reprinted in ICOM News No. 1 (2004), available at: 
http://icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p4_2004-1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1247 Cf. Siehr, "Vereinheitlichung Des Rechts Der Kulturgüter in Europa?," p. 816. 
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The return of the ‘Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt’ is an example of such voluntary 
returns.1248 In 1999, the Kelvingrove Museum in Glasgow, Scotland, returned a shirt to the 
Wounded Knee Survivors’ Association (hereinafter: WKSA) in South Dakota (U.S.) that is 
thought to have been taken from a warrior’s corpse after the U.S. Army massacre of two 
Lakota tribes of the Sioux Nation at Wounded Knee in 1890. The ‘Ghost Dance Movement’, 
which preceded the massacre, was based on the belief that the ritual use of these shirts would 
result in the invulnerability of the Lakota Indians.1249 Only thirteen months after the massacre 
of Wounded Knee, the Glasgow Museum purchased some items from the Buffalo Bill’s Wild 
West Show that are thought to have been obtained after the massacre (the traveling production 
has displayed these items as articles of virtue). Other items, such as the ‘Ghost Dance Shirt,’ 
had been given as bonus items as part of the original purchase. Since 1892, the ‘Ghost Dance 
Shirt’ had been on display in the Glasgow museum. In 1995, however, the WKSA learned 
about the shirt and requested its return based on the argument that the removal of the shirt 
from the warrior’s corpse contradicted the traditions and rituals of the Lakota, as traditional 
burial rites require a warrior to be fully dressed. The Glasgow Museum refused the request, 
arguing that it has received the shirt in good faith and that the ‘Ghost Dance Shirt’ is the sole 
example of its kind in Great Britain or even in Europe.1250 Rejecting this argument, the 
WKSA filed an objection with the Glasgow City Council. Even though subsequent research 
by the ‘Repatriation Working Group’ of the Council demonstrated that the museum had acted 
in good faith, the Glasgow City Council decided to solicit the opinion of the city taxpayers 
and to debate the return of the requested shirt at a public hearing held in November 1998. 
Following the hearing, during which public opinion strongly supported the return of the shirt, 
the City Council voted to return the object to the WKSA. As part of the decision, the Council 
emphasized the fact that it did not act out of legal obligation, but rather on the basis of ethical 
and humanitarian considerations.1251 
 
                                                 
1248 Memorandum regarding the return of the Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt, submitted by Glasgow City Council to 
the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, reprinted in Art, Antiquity and Law, vol. 15 (2000), p.371. 
1249 Over two-hundred Lakota warriors died at the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee.  
1250 For the detailed argumentation, see the Memorandum submitted by the Glasgow City Council (above n. 
1248) and the general Memorandum submitted by the Museums Standing Advisory Group on Repatriation and 
Related Cultural Property Issues to the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Minutes of Evidence, 
June 6, 2000, available at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/371/0051007.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1251 Schönenberger, Restitution Von Kulturgut: Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - Entwicklung, p. 
16. 
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Following the Council’s decision, the return process took almost a year, during which 
time international export licenses were approved and arrangements were made for the 
transport and associated ceremonies. The WKSA Association made a commitment to 
guarantee the preservation of and the access to the ‘Ghost Dance Shirt’ in a museum 
commemorating the ‘Ghost Dance Movement’.1252 The nature of the return facilitated the 
development of an ongoing relationship between the WKSA and the museum in Glasgow: the 
museum was recently given a replica of the ‘Ghost Dance Shirt’ made by a Lakota 
descendant.1253 As a consequence of the return process, the Glasgow City Council developed 
their own ‘return policy’ in 2000, which takes three key elements into account: firstly, 
whether the requesters truly represent their group; secondly, the cultural and religious 
importance of the objects for their community; and, thirdly, the conditions for conservation in 
the case of return.1254 Applying those criteria, the Glasgow City Council has denied the return 
in other cases, including a later claim made by the WKSA, and a claim made by Benin for 
bronzes and ivories held in Glasgow. In both cases, the Council argued that the value of the 
requested items to the museums outweighed the importance of their return. 
 
As demonstrated in the case of the ‘Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt’, voluntary return can 
result in a commitment by the acquiring party to guarantee the preservation of and access to 
cultural materials. Moreover, returns of this type can facilitate the establishment of 
cooperation and exchange between previously antagonistic parties − such as by through the 
creation of replicas for the returning party in exchange for the original. Within the last years, 
claims for restitution and return made by indigenous peoples have been addressed in various 
ways; however, cooperative solutions − similar to the one in the ‘Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt’ 
case − are preferred by States with large indigenous populations, as illustrated by the 
outcomes of intra-State agreements on the return of cultural materials (and human remains) to 
indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.1255 The 
cooperative solution approach has often fostered fundamental change in the policies of 
museums and art-holding institutions, resulting even in the reorganization of museum 
management and policies in order to include indigenous peoples in museum activities, such as 
                                                 
1252 Ibid. 
1253 Cf. Memorandum submitted by the Museums Standing Advisory Group on Repatriation and Related Cultural 
Property Issues (March 2000); available at: www.publication.parliament.uk (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1254 Memorandum submitted by Glasgow City Council to the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, 
reprinted in 5(4) Art, Antiquity and Law (AAL), 15 (2000), p.371. 
1255 For details on intra-and inter-State agreements, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. 
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the presentation of displays, access and conservation of cultural items, and general museum 
policy matters.  
 
Moreover, the recognition of ethical and historical considerations in restitution matters 
might broaden the scope of solutions, in a way that frequently satisfies the interests of the 
parties involved to a much higher degree than could be achieved through simple return.1256 
Such cooperative solutions have sometimes even boosted tribal morale and a strengthened 
cultural identity in requesting indigenous communities which had previously begun to 
wane.1257 In other cases, a cooperative solution approach might lead to the outcome, in which 
the requesting party even consents to the disposition of the item in question by the holding 
museum, because of common concerns regarding preservation. Since claims for restitution of 
cultural materials are repeatedly based on the fact that the cultural rights of the claiming party 
have been largely ignored (either in the past or present),1258 the acknowledgment of these 
rights through a cooperative solution approach is an essential element in the resolution of 
restitution disputes, given the nature of the interests involved. 
3.2 Temporary Loan Agreements, Replicas and the Exchange of Objects 
A viable and attractive alternative to the return of cultural materials is the endorsement 
of loan agreements of either a long-term or short term nature, depending on the preferences of 
the parties. Such agreements – involving loan, barter, simple exchange or the fabrication of 
replicas – might cooperatively solve restitution claims while fostering two of the general 
interests discussed in Chapter Five: access and preservation. The interest of access is served 
because public display is one of the main purposes of loan agreements; the interest in 
preservation is served because loan agreements frequently include arrangements concerning 
the physical preservation and restoration of the object in exchange for the loan. Such 
arrangements have the advantage of being flexible, as they can be adjusted in terms of both 
duration and supplementary provisions, depending on the parties’ capacities, interests and 
needs. 
 
                                                 
1256 Cf. Maier, "Overcoming the Past? Narrative and Negotiation, Remembering, and Reparation: Issues at the 
Interface of History and the Law," p. 297. 
1257 Cf. with reference to the return of objects to the North-American Zuni tribe: Mastalir, "A Proposal for 
Protecting The "Cultural" And "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under International Law," p. 1039. 
1258 Nason, "Beyond Repatriation: Cultural Policy and Practice for the Twenty-First Century," p. 28. 
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When considering complementary and alternative solutions, the question of when it is 
justifiable to retain a certain object should constantly be reconsidered. Whereas certain unique 
objects should be preserved for future generations, other items that might have an emotional 
or a ritual importance to a living tribe or minority should certainly be returned and left to 
them. This is in particular the case when a plausible claim has been made, several dozen 
similar objects are known to be in existence, and the object has been carefully and extensively 
studied, registered, and photographed. Under these (or similar) conditions, a replica might 
prove adequate in fulfilling the same function as the original in ‘telling the story’ of the 
culture and/or peoples it represents. An example in which the historical significance of the 
object was complemented by a new chapter in that history is the case of the ‘Lakota Ghost 
Dance Shirt’: the original was returned to the claimant – on the basis of a voluntary return – 
but a replica was given in exchange as an act of gratitude, which provided the foundation for 
an ongoing relation between the museum and the Indian tribe.1259 In a similar case in 2006, 
the Stockholm Ethnographic Museum required the requesting Haisla Frist Nation in British 
Columbia (Canada) to make a copy of the requested totem pole as part of the terms of the 
return; the tribe agreed, and the Swedish museum now exhibits the replica in place of the 
original.1260 
 
In a different scenario, a restitution dispute was not solved through return but through 
the arrangement of a loan agreement between the two parties involved. In 2004 Nigeria 
claimed the return of three Nok and Sokoto statuettes, which had been illegally exported from 
Nigeria and acquired by the French State from a Belgian dealer in 1998. Nigeria based its 
claim for return on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, ratified by France in 1997. The 
acquisition of the statuettes is not unlawful under French law if the possessor has acted in 
good faith;1261 Nigeria, however, argued that under Nigerian law no antiquities may be 
exported from the country without the permission of the ‘National Commission for Museums 
and Monuments’ and that the three objects were on the ICOM Red List of African Cultural 
Objects at Risk. The claim by the Nigeria government, however, was rejected by the French 
Court of Appeal because the 1970 UNESCO Convention1262 is non-self-executing and 
therefore not directly applicable, since no implementing legislation had been enacted by the 
                                                 
1259 See case study on voluntary return, supra Chapter Six, Section 3.1. 
1260 Paterson, "Resolving Material Culture Disputes: Human Rights, Property Rights, and Crimes against 
Humanity," p. 381. 
1261 Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 14. 
1262 For details on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
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French parliament.1263 Since this outcome was unsatisfying, both parties entered into 
negotiations upon the intervention of ICOM;1264 these negotiations precluded recourse to 
litigation. As a result, France and Nigeria completed in 2006 a joint agreement that both 
acknowledged Nigeria’s ownership of the objects, but simultaneously granted a renewable 
twenty-five year loan to the Quai Branly Museum in Paris.1265 This pragmatic approach might 
be unsatisfying in legal terms; however, it still guarantees, on the one hand, preservation, 
access and research in a public museum in France for a period of twenty-five years and, on 
the other, Nigeria’s legal title to its cultural property. 
 
With regard to the international exchange of cultural objects, UNESCO contemplated 
in its Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property1266 the 
inclusion of provisions to encourage the temporary exchange and barter of cultural objects as 
early as 1976. Over the past thirty years, however, barter has not played a significant role in 
restitution cases, mainly due to legal or political constraints, or simply the lack of interest 
among museums. Long-term loans, in turn, have quite frequently been negotiated and set out 
in joint agreements. Examples of successfully negotiated restitution disputes that provide for 
temporary loan provisions include the bilateral agreement between the National Library of 
France and the Republic of Korea reached in May 2011 pertaining to historic manuscripts,1267 
and the bilateral agreements between Italy and major U.S. museums concluded in 2006-2008, 
discussed above.1268 The latter agreements are particularly remarkable because of their 
twofold nature: they resulted in the return of most of the requested artifacts to Italy – but only 
in exchange for temporary and periodic loans to the U.S. museums. The agreement with the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, for example, outlines the return of the famous Euphronios 
Krater to Italy, but also provides that “cultural materials of equal beauty and historical and 
                                                 
1263 The Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Alain de Montbrison, Paris Court of Appeal, judgment of 5 April 2004, 
upheld by the Court of Cassation, judgment of 20 September 2006; cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments 
in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution," p. 2. 
1264 Kwame Opoku, Revisiting Looted Nigerian Terracotta Sculptures in Louvre/Musée du Quai Brainly, Paris, 
14 July 2011, available at: http://www.myweku.com/2011/07/revisiting-looted-nigerian-nok-terracotta-
sculptures-in-louvre-musee-du-quai-branly-paris/(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1265 Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 3. 
1266UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property, 26 November 1976, 
See; http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/exchange/html_eng/page1.shtml (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1267 The so-called ‘Korean manuscripts’ include 75 volumes of illustrated manuals on royal protocol written 
during the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910). French troops appropriated the manuscripts in 1866, which 
subsequently were held by the National Library of France in Paris. The legal term of the bilateral loan agreement 
is five years and is renewable indefinitely, see: Secretariat Report (April 2011) to the 17th session of the 
Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 June-1 July 2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF.208/COM.17/2, p. 1, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001927/192728e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1268 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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cultural significance to that of the Euphronios Krater” will be made available to the 
Metropolitan Museum for a four-year loan.1269 The agreement goes on to list in detail specific 
objects that are to be lent to the Metropolitan Museum as part of the bilateral arrangements. 
Furthermore, the Italian authorities promise future loans, in particular of archeological objects 
found during missions financed by the museum.1270 The term of the agreement is long – it is 
scheduled to remain in force for forty years.1271 Although the agreements with the other U.S. 
museums have not been made public, it can be assumed that the agreements with the other 
U.S. museums contain similar provisions.1272 
 
Frequently the practice of barter, loan and exchange of cultural objects is hampered by 
national cultural patrimony laws, which may prevent loans that last longer than a few months 
or years. In contrast to the minimal international impact of barter and long-term exchange, 
short-term loans on the occasion of special exhibitions have proven to be an immensely 
popular forum for international exchange of cultural objects. However, loaned works come 
with substantial limitations in terms of legal provisions, costs, concerns by curators and 
sponsors, international politics which can restrict loan availability, and, of course, the 
condition of a work of art (which may preclude any or frequent travel).1273 In addition, States 
and museums are often reluctant to engage in loan programs, fearing the non-return of the 
loaned objects resulting from legal and political uncertainties. In order to address this concern, 
legal provisions on the immunity from seizure of cultural objects are often provided in order 
to legally enforce guarantees for the return of loaned objects to the lender. Such provisions are 
increasingly introduced into national laws, although the specific provisions vary from State to 
State.1274 On the international level, the UN-Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property1275 provides in Article 21, Section 1(e) that “no post-judgment 
measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest or execution may be taken against property 
of a State” if that property, among others, forms “part of an exhibition of objects of scientific, 
                                                 
1269 The Agreement between Italy and the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art, concluded 21 February 2006, 
has been reprinted in: International Journal of Cultural Property (2006) 13, p. 427-434; See there Article 4 (1). 
1270 See Article 7 of the agreement. 
1271 See Article 8 (1) of the agreement. 
1272 For details on bilateral agreements between States and non-State-actors, see supra Chapter Three, Section 
2.10. 
1273 Cf. Hallman, "Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist Approach," p. 214. 
1274 Overview of national provisions on the immunity from seizure: cf. Kerstin Asmuss and Robert Peters, 
"Freies Geleit Von Kulturgut Im Internationalen Leihverkehr - Rechtsvergleichende Und Völkerrechtliche 
Überlegungen," in Kulturgüterschutz, Kunstrecht, Kulturrecht - Festschrift Für Kurt Siehr Zum 75. Geburtstag, 
ed. Kerstin Odendahl and Peter Johannes Weber (2010), pp. 101. 
1275 UNGA Resolution A/RES/59/38, adopted 2 December 2004. 
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cultural or historical interest and is not placed or intended to be placed on sale”. This 
Convention could help ease the discomfort of States in making use of international loan 
agreements, out of fear of seizure of the cultural objects while on temporary loan abroad; 
however, this Convention has not yet entered into force, due to failure to meet ratification 
thresholds.1276 
3.3 Permanent Loan Agreements and Return without Transfer of Ownership 
Despite the variety of possible alternative solutions that might be available in 
resolving restitution disputes, some parties claiming for restitution and return might not be 
satisfied without the actual return of the object in question. In certain cases, the ‘physical 
presence’ of the object claimed for might be desired for ritual purposes, or because of the 
ascetic value of viewing the original (rather than a replica) in a certain context or location. 
Moreover, the physical presence of the claimed object might be desired in order to reunite the 
original component parts of an artifact; to demonstrate a certain cultural identity linked to the 
object; or for the purposes of training and inspiration of artists and craftsmen in the cultural 
context, in which the object in question was created. These needs, however, do not necessarily 
involve the transfer of the title of ownership.1277  
 
Therefore, separating the question of return from the question of title and ownership 
might provide a practical solution in several restitution disputes. Such a pragmatic approach 
has proven to be quite an effective tool in resolving these disputes and is frequently used by 
parties involved in negotiations pertaining the restitution and return.1278 Examples of the use 
of this ‘pragmatic solution’ include, among many others, the “donation” of the Makondé mask 
from the Barbier-Müller Museum of Geneva to Tanzania in 2010,1279 or the “permanent loan” 
of a fragment of the Great Zimbabwe bird from the Ethnological Museum in Berlin to 
Zimbabwe in 2003.1280 The situation involving the permanent loan of the stone-carved Great 
                                                 
1276 Article 30 of the Convention requires thirty States Parties, currently eleven States Parties; see for status of 
ratifications: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
13&chapter=3&lang=en. (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1277 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 877. 
1278 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 3. 
1279 See supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. The case of the Makondé mask was brought before the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee (ICPRCP) in 2006 and resolved through a bilateral agreement in May 2010, see 
for further information: Press File of ICOM, Paris, 10 May 2010 on the Agreement for the donation of the 
Makonde Mask from the Barbier-Müller Museum of Geneva to the National Museum of Tanzania, 
http://icom.museum/press/MM_PressFile_eng.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1280 Cf. with details: Dawson Munjeri, "The Reunification of a National Symbol," UNESCO Museum 
International 61, no. No. 241-242 (2009): p. 16. 
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Zimbabwe bird is particularly interesting, because the returned fragment of the bird (namely 
the pedestal of the sculpture) has been returned twice: taken in 1906 by the British colonizer 
Cecil Rhodes, the pedestal made its way into the hands of a German missionary who sold it to 
the Ethnological Museum in Berlin in 1907. In 1945, the fragment was taken by the Russian 
army as spoils of war1281 and deposited in the Museum of Ethnography and Anthropology in 
St. Petersburg. Even though an agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Germany for returning the fragment in the 1970s, the pedestal was not returned to Berlin until 
1992. In 1999, however, the Berlin Museum agreed to restore the fragment to Zimbabwe on 
the condition that it is given “on permanent loan” in order to avoid establishing a precedence 
that would indicate an obligation to return such artifacts. Zimbabwe agreed, and the fragment 
returned in 2002. The fragment was officially re-united with the upper part of the bird 
sculpture in May 2003. Other stone-carved birds remain at Cecil Rhodes’s former home in 
Cape Town, South Africa and negotiations pertaining to their eventual fate have yet to be 
undertaken.1282 
 
Such practical solutions, which leave the question of property and ownership aside, 
may solve several difficulties of both legal and political nature. First of all, the legal transfer 
of ownership might conflict with domestic law provisions of the State in which the object 
claimed for is located. Transfer of ownership may require official authorization and is 
sometimes simply prohibited.1283 Generally, the power to dispose of property lies with the 
owner. If, for example, the object in question is in private hands, bona fide purchase 
provisions or the statue of limitations might inhibit any action against the current 
possessor.1284 Moreover, constitutional guarantees pertaining to private property rights 
prohibit States from simply expropriate the current possessor. If, in turn, the object is in the 
hands of a private or public museum due to donation or purchase, any removal from the 
current collection is subject to the statues of that institution, which grants few if any rights of 
disposition to the board of trustees. This is, for example, the case as regards the statutes of the 
British Museum,1285 and other national museums in the United Kingdom. If, however, the 
object in question is classified as public domain or ‘national patrimony’ and thus inalienable 
                                                 
1281 For further details on so-called ‘trophy art’, see supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
1282 See: BBC news, “Zimbabwe bird ‘flies’ home”, 14 May 2003, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3028589.stm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1283 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 8. 
1284 The problem of bona fide purchase provisions was addressed by the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention; for 
details on the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
1285 British Museum Act of 1963. 
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by national law, transfer of ownership may not be possible or only by a decision granting an 
exception to the inalienability of that particular object.1286 Such an exception was made in 
France in May 2010 in the case of the return of sixteen Maori heads through the passage of 
legislation specific to that particular case.1287 The tattooed and mummified Maori warrior 
heads had become part of the collection of the Natural History Museum in Rouen in 1875 by 
private donation during the trade boom in the late 19th century. The decision of the Rouen 
Museum and the Rouen City Council to return the Maori heads to New Zealand was 
dismissed by the Administrative Tribunal of Rouen in October 2007 as it was challenged by 
the French Ministry of Culture. The tribunal argued that the return would be an “unjustified 
damage to French national heritage”. In May 2010, however, the tribunal’s decision was 
overruled by the French National Assembly passing a specific law to return the sixteen Maori 
heads from Rouen to New Zealand.1288 
 
In addition, States and museums do not want to take the risk of establishing precedents 
that might indicate a legal obligation to the restitution and return of cultural material, as 
shown in the case of the Zimbabwe bird. If, however, the question of legal ownership is 
excluded by returning the requested objects through ‘donations’ or ‘permanent loans’, the 
issue of legal precedence – a grave concern of most States when they are confronted with 
restitution claims – can be circumvented. Moreover, such agreements do not interfere – or 
interfere less – with the private domestic as well as constitutional provisions of the holding 
State. 
 
In contrast to the difficult question of legal title and ownership, the Western concept of 
“ownership” simply does not exist in several non-Western cultures. Indigenous people, like 
the Australian Aboriginals, to give only one example, regard themselves as having been 
entrusted with the land by their spirit ancestors – they belong to the land and the culture, 
rather than the land and culture to them. Thus, the right to exploit, the right to alienate, and 
the right to exclude others – the three cardinal aspects of Common Law ownership in Western 
                                                 
1286 Cf. Cornu and Renold, "New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of 
Dispute Resolution," p. 9. 
1287 See for further information: BBC News, “France votes to return Maori heads to New Zealand”, 5 May 2010, 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8661231.stm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1288 Law No. 2010-501 of 18 May 2010: “Loi visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes maories à la 
Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections”, NOR: MCCX0914997L, legislation available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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law – do not exist in other legal traditions.1289 In the same vein, cultural materials are 
regarded as belonging to the tribe, community, or people, given by the ancestors – cannot 
belong to an individual within the framework of property rights. This understanding, 
however, is at least partially recognized by Western legal traditions as well, since certain 
objects are classified as national patrimony or ‘trésors nationaux’ – thus being inalienable and 
associated with ‘joint ownership’ in its broadest sense of a (Western) nation State.1290 
                                                
 
The polar opposite option of transferring not the object but the legal title is yet another 
possible solution that might be acceptable in other cases of claimed cultural materials. In this 
situation, the cultural object in question remains where it has been for a certain period of time 
– for the sake of preservation, scientific research, public access, or other interests of the 
parties involved. In turn, title of ownership is transferred to the claiming party. Thus, the both 
parties recognize the legal title of the claimant. Although the legal title without the actual 
possession of the object might be of less importance to some claimants or cultures, as 
presumably in the case of the Aborigines, transfer of ownership functions as legal recognition 
of the “rightful owners” who were deprived of their property through inappropriate removal. 
This approach, for example, was taken in the abovementioned case between Nigeria and 
France, in which France recognized Nigeria’s ownership of three Nok and Sokoto terracotta 
statuettes.1291 Recalling the legal categorization of claims for restitution and return defined in 
the beginning of this work,1292 the latter solution might particularly work in those cases in 
which the claimant – States, individuals, indigenous or ethnic minority groups – request 
restitution based on the fact that their rights to and perspectives on their cultural heritage have 
been largely ignored in the initial removal of the object.1293 Moreover, this type of solution 
might be especially attractive to indigenous and ethnic minority groups that might struggle 
with providing appropriate preservation facilities. If legal property rights are recognized, the 
institution currently holding the object in question can do a great deal of good, in terms of 
recognition of rights, physical and cultural preservation, as well as returning the ‘control’ over 
the historic narrative to the creators of the particular cultural object. If the people, group, or 
community believe that the recognition of their cultural rights is sufficient, the participation in 
the fate of the object (e.g. guaranteeing privileged access or specific rights by shared 
 
1289 Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 877. 
1290 Cf. for example the French Code du patrimoine, L 1 CP, available at: www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1291 For details, see supra Chapter Six, Section 3.2. 
1292 For legal categorization of claims, see supra Chapter Two, Section 4. 
1293 For details on the symbolic value and the recognition of rights, see supra Chapter Five, Section 2.3. 
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management, shareholding in financial profits etc.), decision to leave the object in the 
physical possession of its currently holding institution might be in the interest of all parties. 
3.4 Joint Custody and Shared Management, Transfer of Expertise  
The previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated that several alternative 
mechanisms to resolve restitution disputes are at hand: they include voluntary return, 
temporary or permanent loans, the fabrication of replicas or the exchange of cultural 
materials. Excluding the question of ownership (as discussed in the Makondé mask and the 
Great Zimbabwe bird case) can also assist the parties in reaching a mutual agreement. 
However, in cases in which the concept of separating the question of return from the question 
of ownership rights is not a viable option, joint custody through shared or fractional 
ownership might provide a feasible solution. The option of joint custody might be particularly 
interesting in those cases in which the question of ‘rightful ownership’ cannot be answered for 
various reasons. The reason for this legal uncertainty may be unclear provenance, or lack of 
legal evidence on the side of the claiming party. In terms of the analogy to child-custody 
determination made earlier in this thesis,1294 joint custody of cultural objects may also prove 
mutually beneficial in some circumstances. 
 
The advantages of joint custody include benefits gained through mutual cooperation 
and exchange of preservative and cultural expertise. This is especially true, if expertise 
concerning the physical preservation (coming from the ‘father’, namely the Western museum) 
and the cultural preservation (coming from the ‘mother’, namely the source country) of a 
cultural object can be synchronized. In practical terms: upon the consent of the parties 
involved, the claiming party could have the right to determine the ritually appropriate 
safekeeping as well as the care and use of the particular object, should the claimed object 
remain in its current location.1295 Special conditions, such as preferential access, prior consent 
regarding changes to preservation techniques deployed by holding institutions, or consent to 
the marketing strategies pertaining to the cultural object in question, could accompany the 
bilateral agreement in such cases. 
 
                                                 
1294 For details, see supra Chapter Four, Section 1.2 
1295 Cf. Memorandum submitted by the Museums Standing Advisory Group on Repatriation and Related Cultural 
Property Issues in the United Kingdom (March 2000), available at: www.publication.parliament.uk (accessed 21 
September 2011). 
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Depending on the particular circumstances of a claim, joint custody or shared 
ownership might satisfy the claimant as an act of partial compensation and recognition; 
additional monetary compensations may also be considered as part of the solution. It is 
important to note that the concept of shared ownership is not a recent phenomenon: Roman 
law established the equal division of ownership pertaining to findings, namely objects that 
have lain hidden for so long that the owner can no longer be established. The so-called 
Hadrian rule pertaining to ‘treasure troves’, introduced by the Roman Emperor Hadrian in the 
Corpus iuris civilis in 533, and is still today considered a valid principle of civil law in several 
States.1296 This principle grants equal ownership rights to both finder of the treasure and the 
owner of the land in which the treasure was discovered. Whereas the Hadrian rule applies to 
goods in general terms, many States passed specific legislation in order to exempt 
archaeological finds from this Roman rule. Thus, with regard to archeological finds, most 
national antiquity laws provide that it is the State who has an immediate right to possession. 
Even though the Hadrian rule is at this time generally obsolete with regard to archeological 
finds in most States, it, nevertheless, articulates the fundamental idea of sharing in cases of 
unknown or uncertain ownership. 
 
Shared management, in turn, refers to the international cooperation between museums 
and other art-holding institutions, including the exchange of expertise and technology, data-
exchange, joint research, and the exchange of cultural materials. It has been argued that 
temporary exchanges should replace the acquisition of antiquities, and that much more effort 
should be spent on exchanges between collections and meaningful loan programs.1297 An 
example of international cooperation, in which the question of ownership has been set aside in 
order to develop an exhibition of dispersed cultural materials, is an exhibition on the 
Merovingian dynasty, jointly organized between Russia and Germany in 2007.1298 This joint-
exhibition between the Prehistoric Museum in Berlin, the Pushkin Museum in Moscow and 
the Eremitage in St. Petersburg temporarily reunited the former Berlin collection of 
Merovingian antiquities. Large parts of the collection were taken by the Soviet army in 1945, 
                                                 
1296 For example in France: Art. 716 Code Civil; Germany: § 984 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code); and 
Spain: Art. 351 Código Civil Espanol. 
1297 Hallman, "Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist Approach," p. 214. 
1298 See: Press release No. 90 of the Federal German Government: “The Merovingian dynasty – Europe with 
frontiers” – exhibition inaugurated in Moscow, 9 March 2007, available at:  
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2007/03/2007-03-09-
merowingerzeit-europa-ohne-grenzen-ausstellung-in-moskau-er_C3_B6ffnet.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
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and restitution disputes regarding the removed objects remain unresolved.1299 While the 
temporarily reunited collection was on display to the general public in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, it was not possible to send the exhibition to Germany, however, because of the 
legal position of the German government, which legally entitles the State to seize the part of 
the collection held by Russia, should they reappear on German soil, since these objects were 
removed from Germany in violation of customary international law.1300 Despite the unsolved 
question of ownership, joint cooperation rendered possible the temporary unification of a 
collection that had been dispersed for more than seventy years. In addition to granting public 
access, both parties agreed on preservative measurements, documentation as well as 
references in the catalogue and on the labels next to the displayed objects explaining the 
historical controversy. Similar exhibitions are planned for 2012/2013.1301 
3.5 Re-Purchase of Objects, Compensation Funds 
In addition to the previous options, the purchase of the claimed object by a public 
institution or the re-purchase by the holding museum or institution might provide yet another 
type of solution in the resolution of restitution disputes. If feasible, this option is ideally 
introduced in an early stage of negotiations, well before the option of auctioning is put 
forward by the claimant. Re-purchase is an interesting option in particular in such cases in 
which, firstly, the object is currently on display in a public museum, and return would 
eliminate or minimize public access to the object; secondly, in cases in which the physical 
return of an object would result in the dismemberment of a collection; or, thirdly, in cases in 
which the current possessor has the legal title, for example due to bona fide provisions, but is 
willing to sell at a reasonable price. If sensible negotiations had happened at an early stage of 
the negotiations, for example, in the Altmann case, the five Klimt paintings might still be on 
display in the Belvedere Museum in Vienna, since the heir to the paintings (Maria Altmann) 
was initially very willing to sell the paintings to the Belvedere. However, since both the 
museum and the Austrian government initially refused to negotiate with Altmann with regard 
to her claim, she later brought her claim before a U.S. court.1302 The parties only agreed to 
                                                 
1299 Out of the 1.300 objects on display, 700 belong to the part removed by the Soviet Army in 1945. 
1300 See supra, Chapter Three, Section 6.1. 
1301 See: Press release No. 263 of the Federal German Government: “Federal Government Commissioner for 
Culture and the Media signs agreement for the German-Russian exhibition: Bronze Age – Europe without 
frontiers”, 15 July 2010, available at: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2010/07/2010-07-15-bkm-
europa.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1302 Altmann vs. Republic of Austria, 142 F.Supp.2d 1187 (C.D.Cal. 1999), aff’d, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), 
as amended, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), 541 US 677 (2004). 
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settle the matter through arbitration in 2005, subsequent to five years of court litigation (from 
1999 to 2004). The arbitration tribunal required the Belvedere to return five of the six 
disputed Klimt paintings to Maria Altmann. Subsequent this final settlement Altmann again 
offered the paintings for purchase to the Austrian government; however, due to the lack of 
funding, the negotiations with the Austrian government pertaining to repurchase failed. In 
2006, the Klimt paintings went on auction in New York in 2006 attaining a price of several 
million dollars each.1303 
 
A different example illustrates that the re-purchase of restituted works of art by the 
holding institution can be successfully negotiated between parties. In May 2010, the painting 
“Sleeping Diana” (1877) by Swiss artist Arnold Böcklin (1827-1901) was jointly purchased 
by the City of Düsseldorf, the region, and the federal German government – thus ensuring 
continued public display.1304 Until his emigration in 1939, the painting belonged to George 
Eduard Behrens, son of the Jewish banker and art-collector Eduard Ludwig Behrens. Through 
forced sale by the Nazi, the painting became part of the collection for the “Führermuseum” in 
Linz. During WWII, evidence affirming ownership was lost. After spending some time in one 
of the so-called “Central Collecting Points” established by the Allies for Nazi-looted art of 
unknown provenance, the painting was given into the custody of the German government. In 
1966, the government lent the painting to the Museum Kunst Palast Düsseldorf for public 
display. In 2006, the rightful heirs submitted a claim for the return of the painting. The 
German government decided to return the painting on grounds of the Washington Principles 
of 1998,1305 and started negotiations with the Behrens family on the re-purchase of the 
returned work of art. While the return of this particular object represents a great success in the 
resolution of a claim for Nazi-looted art, the subsequent exhibition of the painting tainted this 
process: the museum celebrated the joint re-purchase of the painting “Sleeping Diana” with a 
                                                 
1303 Prices achieved through auction: the painting ‘Adele Bloch-Bauer I’ (known as the ‘Golden Adele’) was 
auctioned for U.S. $ 135 million – in 2006 the highest reported price ever paid for a painting; Adele Bloch-Bauer 
II for U.S.$87,9 million; Birch Forest for U.S.$40,3 million; Houses at Unterach on the Attersee for U.S.$31,4 
million; Apple Tree I for U.S.$33 million. The portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I by Gustav Klimt (1907) was 
purchased by auction for the Neue Galerie in New York by Ronald Lauder for a US $135 million. See, BBC 
News, 19 June 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/5093650.stm (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
1304 See: Helga Meister, Ankauf:Bleiberecht für “Diana” von Arnold Böcklin, in Westdeutsche Zeitung newsline, 
Mai 5, 2010, available at: http://www.wz-newsline.de/?redid=824268 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1305 For details on the Washington Principles, see supra, Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
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special exhibition entitled: “Purchase: the right to stay for Diana”1306. The title’s awkward 
phrasing left a bitter taste in the mouth of those who were familiar with the case, as it 
disregarded the simple but important fact that the museum had never legal title to the painting 
since: firstly, the painting was looted by the Nazi; secondly, the German government only had 
temporary custody over the object; and thirdly, it was only on loan to the Düsseldorf museum 
waiting to be claimed by its rightful owner. 
 
The re-purchase of claimed works of art is not only a viable solution in cases in which 
the parties wish to guarantee public display; it can also be an option in cases in which the 
parties are concerned with the physical integrity of the cultural object. This might be best 
illustrated with the following example: In 1996, the painting “The wedding night of Tobias 
and Sarah” (c. 1660) by Jan Steen was reunited by restorers after the discovery that – for still 
unknown reasons – it was cut into two pieces in the nineteenth century.1307 The smaller right 
half of the painting (which depicts the Archangel Raphael) belongs to the Bredius Museum of 
the city of The Hague, and the left half to the Centraal Museum of Utrecht.1308 The left half of 
the restored painting was part of the Jacques Goudstikker collection, which had been seized 
by the Nazi for Goering’s private collection. After WWII, this part of the painting was 
returned by the Allies to the Dutch government in order to pass it on to the rightful owners. 
Those paintings not returned immediately after WWII, as for example most parts of the 
Goudstikker collection, became part of the Dutch national collection.1309 It was not until 
2006, that the Dutch government decided to return 202 paintings to Goudstikker’s sole heir 
(his daughter-in-law Marei von Saher), the Jan Steen painting among them.1310 Since the 
Bredius Museum of The Hague that holds the restored and reunited painting, is neither 
entitled to sell the right half of the painting, nor does it intend to cut the restored painting in 
                                                 
1306 Title in German: „Ankauf. Bleiberecht für Diana von Böcklin“, information on the exhibition available at: 
http://www.museum-kunst-palast.de/UNIQ128194965331494/doc3681A-page2.html (accessed 23 September 
2011). 
1307 Art historians in The Hague noticed that on the left side of the Steen painting, which belonged to 
Goudstikker, the tips of the archangel’s wings are visible in the top right corner. This proved that the two 
fragments belonged to the same painting. It is assumed that both pieces are probably still only the center of a 
much larger painting. 
1308 Details on the restoration of the reunited painting available at: http://www.museumbredius.nl/reconstr.htm 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1309 Catherine Hickley „Heir Awarded $ 1.43 Million by Hague for Goering-Looted Part of Old Master”, 15 
August 2011, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-15/heir-awarded-1-43-million-by-hague-
for-goering-looted-part-of-old-master.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1310 The restitution has been carried out on the recommendation of the ‘Advisory Committee on the Assessment 
of Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War’ (Restitutions Committee), 
Cf. Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change, pp. 227. For details on the Dutch Restitutions 
Committee, see http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/rc_1.15/samenvatting_rc_1.15.html (accessed 23 
September 2011); see also and Chapter Six, Section 4.3. 
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half again, it is required to purchase the left side from the Goudstikker heirs; negotiations 
were reported to be discussing a purchase price of up to two million Euros for the left side of 
the painting.1311 Since both parties had agreed that they did not want to see the painting 
divided again, the city of The Hague agreed in August 2011 to pay 1 million Euros (U.S. $ 
1.43 million)1312 to the Goudstikker heir in order to keep the reunited painting in the Bredius 
Museum of The Hague.1313 
                                                
 
The cases mentioned in this section have illustrated that the purchase or re-purchase of 
the object to be returned to rightful owners can be a successful alternative to the physical 
return, if the parties involved agree to pursue this option. Such a solution, however, requires 
that: firstly, restitution and return is to be made, for example on the basis of the 1998 
Washington Principles; and secondly, that the concept of re-purchase is introduced at an early 
stage in the negotiations, and conceived of as a part of the process of achieving a ‘just and fair 
solution’.1314 Thirdly, this option presupposes that museums and national authorities have 
financial resources readily available. With particular reference to the common interests 
identified in Chapter Five, the option of re-purchase and compensation funds serves not only 
to guarantee preservation and public access, but also to maintain the physical integrity of the 
object, as in the case of the Bredius Museum of The Hague. Both governmental funding and 
private sponsorship are necessary in such circumstances. As restitution disputes are generally 
of great public interest, public awareness should strongly be utilized in raising necessary 
funds in order to resolve restitution disputes for the public benefit. 
3.6 International Reputation of Museums as an Effective Mechanism in Disputes 
Although the act of taking into account the reputation of museums and other art 
holding institutions is not an alternative mechanism as such, public reputation does play a 
substantial role in determining viable alternative means for the resolution of restitution. This 
section explores the impact international reputation has on both parties in restitution disputes, 
and demonstrates the extent to which public reputation has become an issue of increasing 
importance to both States and museums within the wider frame of restitution mechanisms. 
 
1311 Art Magazine (German edition), No. 6, August 2010, p. 130. 
1312 The Dutch government and the Mondrian Foundation contribute 400,000 Euros toward the settlement, the 
Rembrandt Association pays 200,000 Euros, the city of The Hague funds 92,000 Euros and 308,000 Euros 
comes from insurance money for the loss of two other paintings. 
1313 Catherine Hickley „Heir Awarded $ 1.43 Million by Hague for Goering-Looted Part of Old Master”, 15 
August 2011, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-15/heir-awarded-1-43-million-by-hague-
for-goering-looted-part-of-old-master.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1314 Cf. Washington Principles, principle No. 8; for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
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One recent example is the impact that media coverage had on the U.S.-Italian agreements.1315 
The bilateral negotiations between Italy and the Getty Museum in particular were bolstered by 
an international media campaign, including interviews with the Italian Minister of Culture in 
both the U.S. and Italian media. While media attention in restitution disputes is certainly not 
in the interest of the museum or institution holding the object in question, it can bolster the 
claimant’s position. That said, the importance of international reputation to entities involved 
in restitution disputes is often neglected in current legal and scholarly appraisals of restitution, 
even though it certainly affects the attitudes of museums involved in such disputes, given 
their fear of bad publicity; therefore, it should also have an effect on the likelihood of fruitful 
negotiations. 
 
Depending on one’s perspective, the fact that restitution matters are of high interest to 
the media in most States can be either advantageous or disadvantageous. In the case of the 
bilateral U.S.-Italian agreements, some of the world’s most famous museums were involved; 
the Getty’s reputation in particular was highly threatened during the dispute. Even 
governments use wide media attention in order to increase the pressure on other States and 
individuals for the return of certain items. More than any other, Zahi Hawass, Egyptian 
archaeologist, former Vice Minister of Culture and, at last, Minister of the Antiquities in 
Egypt, draws high media attention by interviews, books and articles, and by appearance on 
television. He even participated in several episodes of the U.S. television show “Digging for 
the Truth” in order to fortify his mission to return cultural materials to Egypt.1316 In July 
2003, Hawass, in his role as Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Antiquities in 
Cairo, told the press with regard to the Rosetta Stone in the British Museum: “If the British 
want to be remembered, if they want to restore their reputation, they should volunteer to 
return the Rosetta Stone because it is the icon of our Egyptian identity.”1317 Notwithstanding 
the intense media coverage of this story, Egypt has not yet made an official claim for the 
return of the Rosetta Stone, nor did it make an official claim in the case of the Nefertiti in 
Berlin. Moreover, making a claim for return unofficially (and not official via a note verbal 
between State governments) appears to be a strategy employed at least by some States, 
namely Egypt. Similarly, at a Conference in Cairo in April 2010, Egypt suggested that 
                                                 
1315 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1316 See the personal homepage of  Zahi Hawass, available at: http://www.drhawass.com/ (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1317 Charlotte Edwardes and Catherine Milner, Egypt demand return of the Rosetta Stone, The Telegraph, 20 July 
2003, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/1436606/Egypt-
demands-return-of-the-Rosetta-Stone.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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requesting States should establish a “wish list” of objects of particular importance that they 
wished to be returned. Among other considerations, the 2010 ‘Cairo Communiqué on 
International Cooperation for the Protection and Repatriation of Cultural Heritage’ approved 
by the conference declares: “Ownership of cultural heritage by the country of origin does not 
expire, nor does it face prescription,” and that “Cultural property is irrevocably identified with 
the cultural context in which it was created. It is this original context that gives it its 
authenticity and unique value”.1318 
                                                
 
The days in which museums could purchase artifacts on the illicit art-and-antiquities 
market regardless of their provenance have fortunately passed. Such purchasing practices 
were, however, common amongst even major museums until only a few years ago. This is 
illustrated by the recent criminal trial against the former curator of the J. Paul Getty Museum, 
Marion True, and the subsequent return of several objects owned by the Getty Foundation to 
Italy.1319 Nowadays, major museums at least must abstain from dubious acquisitions in order 
to protect their reputation. Within this context reputation is not only a matter of how a 
museum is perceived by the public, but also a matter of professionalism in terms of 
international loan agreements, exchange of information and research, and general cooperation. 
In other words, only reliable and professionally run museums are trusted to partake in 
international loan agreements. Furthermore, it is the right of interested members of the public 
and the tax payer to be informed about the provenance of collections in public museums. Art 
holding institutions and museums have an obligation to inform the public about the historical 
and cultural background of their collections, since museums fulfill not only an aesthetic but an 
educational function through the preservation and display of cultural heritage. Part of the 
story of an artifact is not only its original purpose and context, but also the story of how it 
made its way into the museum. As in the case of the “Glasgow Ghost-Shirt”, an entirely new 
story has become part of the history of the museum with regard to this object, and this in itself 
enhances the narrative associated with it. One could hone this contention even further by 
arguing that in the particular case of the Glasgow Shirt, the display of the replica enhances the 
narrative and adds to the history of the object due to the story of return, more than the original 
Ghost Shirt ever could have, had it remained in Glasgow. 
 
1318 Cairo Communiqué on International Cooperation for the Protection and Repatriation of Cultural Heritage’ of 
30 June 2010, released in connection with the Cairo Conference (7-8 April 2010), p. 1 (general principles); full 
text available at: http://www.sca-egypt.org/eng/pdfs/RST_ICHC_SA%20Communique_2010-08-20.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1319 For details on the Getty case, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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In summarizing, awareness of the importance of public reputation and public interest 
cannot be neglected by museums and institutions confronted with restitution claims. It can be 
argued that public reputation is both a critical and most effective mechanism in shaping the 
the way in which museums conduct their acquisitions as well as the way in which they 
approach claims for restitution and return. Public and private museums are highly dependent 
on their international reputation, because of their public and collective function. This is also 
true for private collectors to some extent, albeit to a lesser degree. Therefore, it can be said 
that public reputation is an effective and comparably inexpensive mechanism to counter illicit 
trade in cultural materials. International reputation as a side-effect of a globalized world has 
an impact on the protection of cultural heritage, and more specifically, on the development of 
means through which museums confront restitution claims. The true success of museums is 
not measured by the tangible quantity of objects that they store, but rather by hard-to-quantify 
intangibles like the quality of research and education, the study, care and maintenance of 
collections, and – last but not least – the level of public reliance and trust. 
4. Institutional and Policy Considerations 
In addition to the legal obstacles discussed in the previous section, it is also necessary 
to explore the means through which the interest-oriented approach can be implemented in 
terms of policy matters. On the basis of complementary and alternative mechanisms explored 
in the previous sections,1320 the following section: (1) focuses on the role of museums and the 
general function of stewardship; (2) discusses possible amendments to the mandate of 
UNESCO’s intergovernmental committee on restitution and return, and (3) analyses the 
possible role of national advisory commissions in resolving restitution disputes. As a last step, 
the role of World Heritage sites in the context of the restitution debate will be discussed. 
4.1 The Role of Museums and the Function of Stewardship 
The great tangible cultural treasures of mankind are primarily held by museums. It is 
for this reason that publicly or privately owned museums and other art-holding institutions 
fulfill a particular social function: they not only preserve, research, and safeguard cultural 
objects, but also educate the public and pass on materials and information to future 
generations. Since museums function as the guardians of the cultural heritage of humankind, 
one can speak of a common responsibility of stewardship, which is independent of a 
                                                 
1320 See supra Chapter Six, Section 3. 
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museum’s location, legal status, or international importance. However, a clear idea of what 
this common responsibility means and might require has not yet been articulated, since 
museums still appear to be dominated by national concerns. Attempts to articulate these 
responsibilities by international bodies have, in turn, ended up defending current positions of 
property rights; this is evident in the concept of ‘universal museums’ supported by several 
Western museums.1321 
 
Museums face a difficult quandary: on the one hand, they have to act accordingly to 
the needs and interests of the State in which they are located, and – depending on their legal 
status – the dictates of their board of trustees (or any other type of governing body); on the 
other hand, they should be scientifically and morally obliged to respect the culture or religion 
of the community whose heritage they preserve. It is, however, particularly the latter 
obligation that often fails to receive sufficient prioritization when it comes to cultural objects 
of minority groups or indigenous peoples. Moreover, legal requirements pertaining to national 
export and loan requirements have to be met, and this adds to the difficulty museums have in 
developing common exchange and exhibition policies. Therefore, codes of conducts and 
similar standards for museums should be actively incorporated into the framework of 
international law; this would not only promote and improve the preservation of and access to 
cultural materials, but also provide assistance as well as means to monitor museums, given 
that they have a fundamentally crucial role as cultural stewards of objects that act as material 
witnesses of the development of mankind. 
 
With regard to the matter of restitution and return, identifying alternative solutions to 
current restitution practices goes hand in hand with rethinking the traditional collection and 
ownership paradigm of museums and other art-holding institutions.1322 As mentioned earlier, 
museums are interested in preservation, research and public access to cultural materials, 
whereas ownership and title are generally not of fundamental importance.1323 With regard to 
museums and their general function in terms of stewardship, three main issues must be 
                                                 
1321 See the Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums (December 2002), signed by major 
European and North-American Museums (the British Museum; the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York; the 
Louvre, Paris; the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg; State Museums, Berlin; the Prado Museum, Madrid, 
et al), reprinted in ICOM News No. 1 (2004), available at: http://icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p4_2004-1.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1322 Cf. Maxwell Anderson, Ownership isn’t everything, in: The Art Newspaper, issue 216, September, 2010, 
published online 15 September 2010, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Ownership-isn-t-
everything-The-future-will-be-shared/21425 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1323 See supra Chapter Five, Section 1.3. 
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considered: firstly, the legal aspects of purchasing cultural artifacts; secondly, the financial 
aspects of steadily increasing prices on the international art and antiquity market; and thirdly, 
the practical aspects of exacerbating the general shortage in cultural objects available licitly. 
 
With regard to the first issue pertaining to legal matters, it can be said that nowadays 
museums are required to carefully scrutinize their acquisitions, donations, or bequest in order 
to ensure the object’s provenance. If museums fail to do so, they risk civil and criminal 
proceedings, as well as the possibility of being obliged to return the object in question with or 
without compensation. In this respect, the Getty case once again provides a good illustration 
of the consequences of dubious acquisition practices.1324 Within recent decades, the 
obligation to conduct research into the provenance of an object has been codified in both 
national and international instruments,1325 as well as national and international self-obligating 
codes of conducts.1326 Moreover, within recent years, the media and the general public have 
increasingly become interested in the provenance research of public collections pertaining to 
Nazi-looted art and other types of illicit appropriation.1327 Although both public and private 
museums can no longer risk purchasing black market art and antiquities, there remains a gray 
zone in which private museums and collectors in particular operate, since, for example, the 
legally non-binding 1998 Washington Principles apply only to publicly owned museums and 
other art-holding institutions. 
 
Secondly, with regard to financial costs, the escalation of private collecting – 
particularly in emerging markets such as China, Russia and Arab States – has increased 
international market prices to such an extent that (Western) public museums are effectively 
excluded from the art and antiquities market.1328 It is only a small proportion of the museum 
community that consists of actual purchasers and institutions that are still actively able to 
collect cultural artifacts from beyond the borders of their home country. For the rest of the 
museum community, including smaller national, local or poorly funded museums, 
                                                 
1324 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1325 See, for example Article 7 (a) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention that states: “To take the necessary 
measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions within their 
territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally 
exported”; for details on the 1970 Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
1326 See supra Chapter Three, Section 4. 
1327 See supra Chapter Six, Section 3.6. 
1328 Cf. Anderson, Ownership isn’t everything, in The Art Newspaper, issue 216, September, 2010, published 
online 15 September 2010, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Ownership-isn-t-everything-
The-future-will-be-shared/21425 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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international acquisitions are a non-issue.1329 Thirdly, import and export constraints as well as 
improved security facilities of archeological sites limit the availability of cultural materials on 
the licit international art and antiquities market. Thus, the growing scarcity of cultural artifacts 
on the licit market puts an end to the idea of perpetual acquisition activities by museums.1330 
 
Traditionally, museum’s collections were based on artifacts that had been removed 
and alienated from their historic site; the concept of placing museums next to archeological 
sites is rather recent. Besides archeological excavations, which often resulted in the partition 
of excavation finds (partage),1331 the disentanglement of cultural objects from their original 
context and their eventual appearance in a museum had been justified based on one of the 
following reasons: armed conflict and occupation, colonial domination, secularization, and 
compulsory auctioning of private property.1332 The great museums in Paris (Louvre), London 
(British Museum), Berlin (Museumsinsel), and New York (Metropolitan Museum) 
established in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century, emphasized colonial 
power and cultural curiosity of the unknown, either through the collection of artifacts of 
ancient powers such as ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and Egypt, or through the 
collection of objects from conquered cultures in the Americas, Asia, Africa and the Pacific 
islands. In particular, ritual items and human remains from the latter regions were often 
collected out of semi-scientific curiosity. It was only later, mainly in the late nineteenth the 
twentieth century, that it became important to collect one’s own national cultural heritage. 
Traditional concepts, such as the idea of removing cultural objects from their original context 
and the idea associated with the establishment of universal collections, have fundamentally 
changed. 
 
Nowadays, major museums are part of a global network of loans and exchanges. 
Museums expand by creating local and satellite branches. At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, several museums have established branches all around the globe: The Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Foundation, for example, has had its headquarters in New York since 1959, but 
has external branches in Venice (since 1976), Bilbao and Berlin (both since 1997). A further 
branch, offshore to the city of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, is scheduled to be 
                                                 
1329 Hallman, "Museums and Cultural Property: A Retreat from the Internationalist Approach," p. 203. 
1330 Cf. Anderson, Ownership isn’t everything, in The Art Newspaper, issue 216, September, 2010, published 
online 15 September 2010, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Ownership-isn-t-everything-
The-future-will-be-shared/21425 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1331 See supra Chapter Two, Section 2. 
1332 Beat Wyss, Ein Leitbild überwundener Macht, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 April 2007, p. 13. 
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completed in 2013.1333 Other Guggenheim branches, however, like Las Vegas in cooperation 
with the Hermitage of St. Petersburg have been closed (2000-2008),1334 or have not yet been 
realized (including those planned for in Hong Kong or Guadalajara, Mexico) due to financial 
constraints.1335 Similarly, the Centre Pompidou (Paris) has opened a branch (Centre 
Pompidou-Metz in 2010)1336 and organizes special exhibitions abroad in Shanghai, Tokyo and 
Hong Kong. On a much larger scale, The Hermitage (St. Petersburg) has established branches 
in London (Hermitage Rooms in London’s Somerset House since 2000); the Netherlands 
(Hermitage Amsterdam since 2004);1337 in Russia (Hermitage-Kazan Exhibition Center since 
2005); and in Italy (Ermitage Italia in Ferrara since 2007).1338 
 
As these examples illustrate, the establishment of branches and joint projects allow 
both private and public museums to position themselves internationally, to cooperate joint 
exhibitions, and, of course, to make profit from these exchanges. Along a similar vein, the 
French government signed a thirty-year agreement with the authorities of Abu Dhabi in 2007, 
providing $747 million in exchange for temporary art loans, special exhibitions and 
management advice, and an additional $520 million exclusively for the concession of the 
name ‘Louvre Abu Dhabi’. The museum is scheduled to be opened in 2012 on the man-made 
island of Saadiyat, offshore to the city of Abu Dhabi.1339 The bilateral agreement, which was 
approved by the French Parliament in 2007,1340 also provides for the creation of the 
‘International Agency for French Museums’ in order to facilitate the international art 
exchanges and transactions such as the one with Abu Dhabi. This deal, however, is not 
uncontroversial, and critics charge that the French government is “selling” its museums.1341 
Museum experts, archeologists and art historians have objected to the agreement, claiming not 
only that this is a sell-out of ‘national cultural heritage’, but also that the new museum would 
                                                 
1333 Further details available at: http://www.guggenheim.org/abu-dhabi/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1334 Kristen Peterson, Vegas, say goodbye to Guggenheim, in Las Vegas Sun, 10 April 2008, available at: 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/apr/10/vegas-say-goodbye-guggenheim/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1335 Jason Edward Kaufman, Why the Guggenheim won’t open a branch in Guadalajara, The Art Newspaper, 1 
June 2008, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Why-the-Guggenheim-won-t-open-a-branch-
in-Guadalajara%20/8576 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1336 Further details available at: http://www.centrepompidou-metz.fr/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1337 Further details available at: http://www.hermitage.nl/en/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1338 See the list of external branches of the Hermitage at: 
http://www.hermitagemuseum.org/html_En/13/hm13_1.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1339 Alan Riding, The Louvre’s Art: Priceless. The Louvre’s Name: Expensive, in: New York Times, 7 March 
2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/arts/design/07louv.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1340 AFP, Feu vert du parlement français au futur musée "Louvre Abou Dhabi", 8 October 2007, available at: 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i5X29Np917I-YpiaA_XWq8oiGDZg (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1341 Beat Wyss, Ein Leitbild überwundener Macht, in: SZ, 13 April 2007, p. 13. 
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reject loans or exhibitions from France including Christian religious art or art depicting 
nudity. Others pragmatically argue that if the Louvre had not made the deal, other museums 
would have certainly done so.1342  
 
Despite financial profits, many museums simply need more storage and exhibiting 
space. As a matter of fact, the Centre Pompidou in Paris exhibits barely 0.5 per cent of the 
58,000 pieces it has in storage;1343 the British Museum in London displays only 75,000 of the 
seven million items in collection each year.1344 Thus, one could almost argue that the large 
un-displayed portions of these collections constitute a ‘hidden cultural heritage’. Museums 
generally only exhibit a small percentage of their holdings, and preserve the major part of 
their collections in storage (partly even in unopened packages with unregistered contents).1345 
Despite such incidents of unregistered contents, large portions of registered objects are kept 
by museums in order to preserve them; a display of all of these objects would simply have no 
value for the public: a museum exhibition is always the selection of small parts out of a much 
larger collection. Nevertheless, several artifacts may not be shown to the public for the simple 
reason that museums lack funding, personnel, and exhibition space. It is, however, also the 
lack of international cooperation in the exchange of cultural artifacts that contributes to this 
problematic state of affairs.1346 Moreover, this reference to a ‘hidden cultural heritage’ also 
reflects the fact that the hidden parts of these collections may be of unclear or dubious 
provenance. Museums continue to fail to invest enough financial resources and are still not 
sufficiently committed to the examination of the provenance of works of art in their 
collections in order to determine whether or not they may have been subject to looting or 
other improper transactions prior to their acquisition by the museum. In recent years, 
however, many public museums have voluntarily – or under pressure from their national 
governments – begun to engage in more active provenance research. Particularly in cases of 
Nazi-confiscated art, public museums are obliged by the 1998 Washington Principles to 
conduct provenance research (Principles 1-3).1347 Nonetheless, requirements pertaining to 
                                                 
1342 Alan Riding, The Louvre’s Art: Priceless. The Louvre’s Name: Expensive, in: New York Times, 7 March 
2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/arts/design/07louv.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1343 Liebs, Aus dem Depot nach Tokio, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 January 2007, p. 11. 
1344 Alberge, Curators rubbish minister’s vision of ‘hidden heritage’, in: The Times, 27 January 2005, p. 1. 
1345 Alberge, Curators rubbish minister’s vision of ‘hidden heritage’, in: The Times, 27 January 2005, p. 1.  
1346 Siehr, "Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends toward a Liberal Exchange of Cultural Objects," 
p. 1091. 
1347 For details on the 1998 Washington Principles, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
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provenance research should apply to all kinds of cultural materials, not only to Nazi-
confiscated art. 
 
Highlighting the problems associated with the notion of ‘hidden cultural heritage’ and 
endorsing the importance of public access, the 2006 Principles of the International Law 
Association (ILA) make a distinctive proposal in the light of restitution matters: among other 
provisions, the principles state that cultural objects “seldom or never on public display or 
otherwise inaccessible should be lent or otherwise made available to the requesting party, 
particularly to a party at the place of origin”.1348 Though this proposal might sound simple 
and self-evident, it is, nevertheless, groundbreaking in view of current restitution practices in 
which such considerations do not play any role whatsoever. 
 
In summarizing this section on the role of museums, it can be said that the role of 
museums has fundamentally changed in the last several decades. Museums are not any longer 
a mere cabinet of curiosities dedicated to preserving cultural, natural and human rarities. This 
characterization of museums belongs to past centuries – even if some museums still believe 
themselves to be compelled to engage in this type of preservation and ownership.1349 As 
‘telling the story’ and putting artifacts in their historical and cultural context becomes more 
important, the single ‘beautiful’ piece partially loses its pride of place as a prominent 
singularity. The idea that museums must own cultural artifacts and that they must constantly 
collect new pieces is more than outdated.1350 In terms of training and educational purposes, 
replicas may be both a more efficient and effective means of fulfilling a museum’s mission, 
since preservation and security measures are not – or at least not to the same extend – needed 
when replicas (rather than originals) are on display. Moreover, replicas made of plaster or 
other suitable material (leather, fabrics etc.) can perhaps better demonstrate the historical use, 
original coloring, and significance of an object through the addition of parts which have been 
lost in the originals. 
                                                 
1348 Section Three (iii) of the 2006 ILA Principles. For details on the ILA Principles, see supra Chapter Three, 
Section 4.2. 
1349 Anderson, Ownership isn’t everything, in The Art Newspaper, issue 216, September, 2010, published online 
15 September 2010, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Ownership-isn-t-everything-The-
future-will-be-shared/21425 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1350 Cf. Anderson, Ownership isn’t everything, in The Art Newspaper, issue 216 (September 2010), published 
online 15 September 2010, available at: http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Ownership-isn-t-everything-
The-future-will-be-shared/21425 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
 317
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
4.2 Amending the Mandate of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee 
The establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of 
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation 
(ICPRCP) by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1978 was primarily initiated in order to 
fulfill two objectives: firstly, to fill some of the gaps left by the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
(in particular with regard to the non-retroactivity of the Convention);1351 secondly, to 
complement the process of decolonization with regard to the removal of cultural objects from 
formerly colonized territories.1352 The intention of the UNESCO General Conference in 
creating this intergovernmental body was to establish a forum for the discussion of restitution 
matters. However, it was clear that this intergovernmental body would be established without 
any binding decision-making capabilities.1353 Thus, the Committee’s mandate is to seek 
“ways and means of facilitating bilateral negotiations” between States and to takes an 
advisory role in restitution disputes.1354 However, since its establishment in 1978, no more 
than eight cases have been submitted to the Committee.1355 Out of these, only six have been 
resolved – the latest resolved in May 2011 through bilateral negotiations is the case of the 
Sphinx of Bogazköy between Turkey and Germany (which had been submitted to the 
Committee in 1987).1356 Currently only one request remains pending before the Committee: 
the case of the Parthenon Marbles between Greece and the United Kingdom,1357 and another 
case is suspended due to national court litigations: namely, the case of the archaeological 
objects from the Necropolis of Khorvin between Iran and Belgium (submitted to the 
Committee in 1985, suspended in 1987).1358 
 
The small number of pending cases seems to indicate that States are rather reluctant to 
engage the services of an intergovernmental body in restitution matters and prefer instead to 
engage in bilateral negotiations, if they engage at all, without consultation of the UNESCO 
                                                 
1351 For details on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
1352 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 11. 
1353 Cf. O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 9. 
1354 See Article 4 of the Committee’s Statute. 
1355 For details on the establishment of the UNESCO Committee, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
1356 See Recommendation No. 3, adopted at the 17th session of the UNESCO-Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 
June-1 July 2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF. 208/COM.17/5, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001937/193720E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1357 See Recommendation No. 2 (above n.1356). 
1358 See Secretariat Report (April 2011) to the 17th session of the Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 June-1 July 
2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF.208/COM.17/2, p. 1, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001927/192728e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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Committee.1359 Strangely enough, the Committee itself has requested the UNESCO-
Secretariat to prepare an Annex to its report entitled: “Examples of cultural property returned 
or restituted without action by the Committee”.1360 This illustrates the extent to which an 
insufficient amount of work has been delegated to the UNESCO Committee, since all cases 
listed by the Secretariat have been resolved bilaterally between the States involved, without 
any action on the part of the Committee.1361 Even the cases under the aegis of the UNESCO 
Committee have often been resolved without the further assistance of the Committee or the 
UNESCO Secretariat, such as the case of the Sphinx of Bogazköy, which was settled through 
bilateral negotiations between Turkey and Germany.1362 
 
Recalling the small number of requests submitted to the Committee and the increasing 
numbers of cases resolved outside the Committee through bilateral and often informal 
negotiations between States (and non-State actors),1363 the Committee’s mandate has been 
broadened in 2005 by the UNESCO General Conference. The new mandate includes 
additional mechanisms, such as mediation and conciliation, which can now be employed to 
facilitate the work of the Committee.1364 Mediation involves a third party that seeks to assist 
the disputing States in their negotiations. Although mediation falls short of adjudication, it 
involves the generation of suggestions, alternative proposals and attempts at reconciling the 
conflicting positions, with the objective of assisting the parties in coming to an agreed 
settlement. Conciliation, in contrast, is more formalized and often involves the appointment of 
a conciliation commission by the disputing parties. Although this might resemble an arbitral 
or judicial proceeding, the outcome of the mediation and conciliation is not binding on the 
parties involved (Article 4.1. of the Statutes) and therefore takes the form of recommendations 
or opinions rather than of a binding determination.1365 If, however, no solution can be found 
in the mediation and conciliation proceedings, the request remains before the Committee, 
                                                 
1359 As, for example, in the cases discussed above between Ethiopia and Italy regarding the return of the Axum 
obelisk; for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. For details on the case of the U.S.-Italy agreements, 
see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
1360 See Recommendation No. 6 op. 4 (above n. 1356). 
1361 See Annex entitled “Examples of cultural property returned or restituted without action by the Committee”. 
Annex to the Secretariat Report (April 2011) to the Committee (above n. 1358) 
1362 See list of cases of return and restitution under the aegis of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, 
available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/movable-heritage-and-museums/return-of-cultural-
property/committes-successful-restitutions/ (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1363 Ibid. 
1364 See: Article 4 (1) of the Statutes of the Intergovernmental Committee, CLT/CH/INS-2005/21, adopted by the 
General Conference of UNESCO at its 20th session (1978), last amended in October 2005, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145960e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1365 Vrdoljak, "History and Evolution of International Cultural Heritage Law - through the Question of the 
Removal and Return of Cultural Objects," p. 15. 
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similar to other unresolved question submitted to the Committee (Article 4.1. of the Statutes). 
The rules of procedure on mediation and conciliation were finalized and adopted by the 
UNESCO Committee in September 2010.1366 Nevertheless, it is questionable as to whether 
these procedural measures alone will increase the numbers of cases lodged with the 
Committee. 
 
Considering what can be done in order to improve the function of the UNESCO 
Committee, some areas for possible modifications can be identified. The two objectives that 
led to the establishment of the Committee provide a starting point for such an analysis. 
Whereas the first objective – to fill the gaps of the 1970 UNESCO Convention – remains 
valid as the convention in its existing form will never have retroactive effect;1367 the second 
objective seems to have altered since the Committee’s establishment in 1978. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the second objective (namely accompanying the process of decolonization) 
lost its immediacy over the last thirty years. Although many cases of appropriation of cultural 
materials during the period of colonial domination have neither been brought to the 
Committee, nor have otherwise been resolved, the emphasis in the debate has shifted both 
substantively and geographically over the past several years, from a focus on decolonization 
in Africa to trafficking in Latin America. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the restitution debate surrounding cultural objects 
appropriated during the period of colonization had mainly been initiated by the newly 
independent African States (a famous 1978 plea for return was made by the Director-General 
of UNESCO M’Bow,1368, a Senegal national); today, however, Latin American States have 
now taken the lead in the restitution debate. This trend is also illustrated by the number of 
ratifications of the 1970 UNESCO Convention: while most Latin American States have 
ratified the UNESCO Convention, many African and Asian Pacific States have yet to do 
so.1369 This geographical shift has also led to a shift in the debate: namely, away from the 
                                                 
1366 Rules of Procedure for Mediation and Conciliation in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Statutes 
of the Intergovernmental Committee, CLT-2010/CONF.203/COM.16/7, adopted at the 16th session of the 
Committee (21-23 September 2010), full text available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001925/192534E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1367 Amending the convention, e.g. by creating a protocol to the convention that introduces a provision on the 
convention’s retroactivity, would require the (unlikely) ratification of all States Parties of such a protocol. 
1368 A Plea for the Return of an Irreplaceable Cultural Heritage to those who Created It, 7 June 1978, by 
Director-General of UNESCO Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow; See: UNESCO Doc. SHC-76/CONF.615.5,3. 
1369 Cf. Planche, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Anwendung Auf Internationaler Ebene," p. 145. See the 
number of ratifications and list of States Parties to the convention: 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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colonial appropriation of cultural materials, and more towards the illicit trafficking in cultural 
artifacts, particularly in view of the illicit trafficking in archeological objects. Although 
archeological objects are explicitly mentioned in Article 1 (c) and (e) of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, the major problem associated with archeological artifacts – namely that of 
clandestine excavation – was not addressed at all by the Convention, since the provision on 
the return of cultural objects (Article 7 b ii) applies only to inventoried cultural property.1370 
Archeological objects stemming from clandestine excavations are by definition not 
inventoried, and as such not covered by the return provisions of the convention.1371  
 
Consequently, States which are frequently confronted with the problem of illicit 
trafficking in archeological objects have called for international action in this matter. In this 
respect, such action encounters two specific legal obstacles related to the provisions of the 
1970 UNESCO Convention, since the convention covers neither the matter of illicit 
excavations, nor does it have – like many other international conventions – a States Parties 
conference as a permanent forum of discussion. Therefore, States may only lodge complaints 
regarding specific problems in implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention by lobbying for 
their discussion as a part of the agenda of the General Conference of UNESCO, or by 
addressing these problems in front of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, which as, 
of late, seemed to be filling the gap left in the convention by the absence of a proper States 
Parties conference. As a third option, States might address the topic of illicit trafficking in 
cultural objects in international fora other than UNESCO. This trend has lately given rise to 
an increase in the activities of ECOSOC as well as UNODC in Vienna as they pertain to the 
trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons.1372 Although the UNESCO Committee was 
initially established for other purposes, namely dealing with the non-retroactivity of the 1970 
Convention (first objective) and the process of decolonization (second objective), it now 
might gain a third objective: namely, as a body dealing with aspects of restitution and return 
not covered by the 1970 UNESCO Convention, such as the matter of trafficking in 
archeological objects obtained through illicit excavation. The small number of cases lodged 
with the Committee and the lack of a proper States Parties conference to the Convention seem 
to have fostered the necessity of this development. 
 
                                                 
1370 For details on the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
1371 Cf. O'Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 Unesco Convention, p. 59. 
1372 For details on ECOSOC Resolutions and the work of UNODC, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.4. 
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Along this vein, the recommendations adopted by the UNESCO Committee in 
September 2010 underline the importance of reflecting on “the effectiveness of the current 
international legal framework, taking into account that it might be insufficient in the fight 
against illicit trafficking in cultural property […], in particular to archaeological and 
paleontological objects coming from illicit excavations and looting of archaeological and 
paleontological sites”.1373 Although whether this kind of reflection falls within the mandate of 
the UNESCO Committee may be questionable, it, nevertheless, has become an issue in the 
Committee’s discussions. Moreover, the recommendations of the Committee emphasize, 
amongst other issues, the importance of “the consideration of basic principles in the field of 
restitution and return of cultural objects which could enrich the work of the Committee as 
well as the function of the 1970 UNESCO Convention”.1374 It is this latter objective, in 
particular, for which this thesis is arguing: namely, the necessity of identifying principles in 
restitution matters. While, generally speaking, such principles might take into account a 
variety of possible considerations, this thesis argues that any set of basic principles must 
incorporate the common interests of all parties in preservation, access, integrity and 
cooperation as the fundamental basis for restitution and return. Thus, considering these 
interests in combination with the complementary and alternative mechanisms could decisively 
improve the work of the UNESCO Committee and its newly established proceedings, which 
allow for mediation and conciliation. 
 
In addition to these general considerations on how to improve the work of the 
UNESCO Committee, some technical amendments should also be made, in order to improve 
the functioning of the Committee and to increase the number of cases brought before it. It is 
notable that the current requirements for bringing a case to the UNESCO Committee do not 
provide claimants with a clear procedure, nor do they clearly define the steps to be taking by 
the requesting State. Article 3 of the Statute of the Committee very broadly states that “a 
request for restitution and return” can be brought “by any Member State or Associate Member 
of UNESCO” if the cultural object in question has a “fundamental significance from the point 
of view of the spiritual values and cultural heritage of the people” of that State and the object 
“has been lost as a result of colonial or foreign occupation or as a result of illicit 
                                                 
1373 See Recommendation No. 7 (para. 3 a) adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee (ICPRCP) in its 16th 
session in Paris, 21-23 September 2010, CLT-2010/CONF.203/COM.16/5, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001896/189639E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1374 Ibid, Recommendation No 7 (para. 3 c). 
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appropriation”.1375 Article 4 of the Statute continues by saying that “the Committee shall be 
responsible for seeking ways and means of facilitating bilateral negotiations for the restitution 
and return.” Therefore, it can be assumed that bilateral negotiations should have already been 
initiated by the respective parties prior to engaging the services of the Committee. Although it 
is aware of the shortcoming in the instructions pertaining to both the requirements and the 
procedure associated with restitution cases, the UNESCO Committee did not amend its 
statute; rather it developed a so-called ‘Standard Form concerning Requests for Return or 
Restitution’,1376 in 1986 outlining how States should submit requests for return and restitution 
to the UNESCO Committee.1377 However, even this standard request form remains rather 
unclear since it requires that “the form is to be used only in cases where negotiations already 
have made unsatisfactory progress”.1378 Whether this “unsatisfactory progress” has to be 
confirmed by one or all parties involved in the negotiations, or whether the bilateral 
negotiations have to be completely failed or suspended before engaging the Committee 
remains unclear, however. 
 
Therefore, the statute of the Committee should be amended in order to clearly specify 
the requirements for lodging a request before the UNESCO Committee, and this amendment 
should focus on two particular issues: firstly, the evidence required for a comprehensive 
request to be dealt with by the Committee;1379 and secondly, the appropriate stage of the 
bilateral negotiations at which the parties can engage the Committee. Generally, it can be 
assumed that it is preferable for the Committee to become involved earlier rather than later, 
since previously abortive negotiations between the parties essentially reduce the likelihood of 
rapid and/or mutually satisfactory outcomes. In this way, the Committee could also have a 
positive impact on the unequal bargaining power between the respective parties, which 
frequently exists between parties, and has been identified as a major obstacle in bilateral 
negotiations.1380 Thus, instead of requiring “unsatisfactory progress” in the bilateral 
negotiations, the Committee could simply opt for a fixed-term solution: a request for 
                                                 
1375 See: Article 3 (2) of the Statutes of the Intergovernmental Committee, CLT/CH/INS-2005/21, adopted by the 
General Conference of UNESCO at its 20th session (1978), last amended in October 2005, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145960e.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1376 ICPRCP Standard Form concerning Requests of Return or Restitution (January 1986), available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/pdf/formulario_retorno.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1377 Prott, "The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage," p. 191. 
1378 ICPRCP Standard Form (1986), see: Notes on completing the form, p. 1. 
1379 Article 3 (3) of the Committee’s statute only states that “cultural property restituted or returned shall be 
accompanied by the relevant scientific documentation”, CLT/CH/INS-2005/21. 
1380 For details on unequal bargaining power, see supra Chapter Four, Section 1.3. 
 323
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
restitution and return can be lodged with the UNESCO Committee upon the condition that 
bilateral negotiations have not made substantial progress within a year. 
 
Moreover, the question of who can lodge requests for restitution and return before the 
Committee is quite essential. Although stakeholders other than States (namely private entities, 
museums, and indigenous people) have recently gained important standing in international 
cultural matters,1381 the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee remains by definition a 
forum of States. In the course of drafting the new rules of procedure for mediation and 
conciliation (adopted by the Committee in September 2010),1382 proposals were made to 
expand the procedure to stakeholders other than States (e.g. private and public 
institutions).1383 However, the member States of the Committee refused to approve these 
proposals. Thus, Article 4 of the rules now reads: “only UNESCO Member States and 
Associate Members of UNESCO may have recourse to a mediation or conciliation procedure 
pursuant to these rules of procedure”; it continues by saying that “States may represent the 
interests of public or private institutions located in their territory or the interests of their 
nationals”.1384 The latter aspect, however, is nothing new and has been possible ever 
since.1385 Consequently, the Committee persists in using its traditional formula: namely only 
engaging in cases where cultural material is requested by one State from another State. 
                                                
 
In sum, further improvements in the way in which the Committee functions can 
certainly be made. Despite the shortcomings mentioned, it might even be reasonable to 
expand the overall role and mandate of the UNESCO Committee: the mandate of the 
Committee could extend beyond that of facilitator during bilateral negotiations between States 
(since other parties are currently not admitted to mediation and conciliation), to that of general 
supervisor of restitution proceedings and the eventual outcome of bilateral negotiations. 
Specifically, the Committee could supervise the course of return – or any other possible 
 
1381 For detailed discussion, see supra Chapter Five, Section 1. 
1382 Rules of Procedure for Mediation and Conciliation in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Statutes 
of the Intergovernmental Committee, CLT-2010/CONF.203/COM.16/7, adopted at the 16th session of the 
Committee (21-23 September 2010), full text available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001925/192534E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1383 For example, proposals made, among others, by Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom (opposing to such 
proposals Japan). See for discussion on the proposals made: Article 4 of the Draft Rules of Procedure on 
Mediation and Conciliation (May 2009), available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001825/182569E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1384 Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure for Mediation and Conciliation of the UNESCO Committee. 
1385 The case of the Makondé mask lodged with the Committee in 2006, involved not Switzerland as State but the 
private Barbier-Müller Museum at Geneva and Tanzania. The case was solved in May 2010 through a bilateral 
agreement donating the mask to Tanzania. For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
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solution found in a particular case. In this manner, the Committee could ensure the execution 
and adequate performance of the agreement reached by the parties, including the monitoring 
of whether the preservation of and access to the cultural material returned is adequately 
managed. 
4.3 National Advisory Committees on Restitution and Return 
Whereas the Intergovernmental Committee of UNESCO takes an advisory role 
providing a forum of discussion on the international level, there is no such equivalent on the 
national level in most States. One might say that in view of the small number of cases lodged 
with the UNESCO Committee, there is no need for having such a body at the national State 
level. Interestingly, however, the national advisory committees that have been established in 
recent years work quite successfully. National advisory committees have been established in 
order to deal with specific cases or a set of cases. One example is the establishment of the 
NAGPRA Review Committee in the U.S. in 1991. The purpose of this committee is to deal 
with disputes pertaining to human remains and related cultural materials in the framework of 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).1386 Another 
example is the establishment of national committees and commissions in order to deal with 
restitution disputes pertaining to Nazi-looted art. The starting point for the establishment of 
such administrative bodies in several States was the adoption of the Washington Principles in 
1998.1387 These principles expressly provide for the establishment of “commissions or other 
bodies to identify art that was confiscated by the Nazis and to assist in addressing ownership 
issues”.1388 
 
The following section will demonstrate that such national advisory committees (such 
as those established in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) could be utilized 
not only for the resolution of disputes related to Nazi-looted art, but also with regard to other 
categories of restitution disputes.1389 As provided by the 1998 Washington Principles, the aim 
of such commissions is twofold: identifying lost cultural materials and resolving ownership 
disputes. The first aim is particularly important, as research on provenance is often missing, 
                                                 
1386 See section 8 of the U.S. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 
101-601 of 16 November 1990. For details on the regulations of the act, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.1.2. 
1387 See supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
1388 See Principle number 10 of the Principles of the Washington Conference with Respect to Nazi-Confiscated 
Art, passed on 3 December 1998, full text available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
1389 For details on the legal categorization of claims, see supra Chapter Two, Section 4. 
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and at least part of the difficulty of dealing with disputes stems from the uncertainty of what 
constitutes a looted object.1390 It is, however, important to note that the nature of a decision 
produced by committees such as these are generally only recommendation. This is because 
the 1998 Washington Principles per se are legally non-binding, and civil law would fail to be 
applicable due to the statute of limitations. 
 
On the basis of the 1998 Washington Principles, Germany set up an office in 2001, 
whose main purpose is to receive and document research results pertaining to cultural 
materials removed because of Nazi persecution or relocated because of war.1391 The office 
also functions as the secretariat of the German Advisory Commission (GAC)1392 and hosts the 
‘lostart.de’ database, which provides an open-access search tool for those seeking information 
on cultural materials lost because of Nazi persecution or WWII, be they museums, potential 
private claimants, or the general public. The Advisory Commission, composed of well-know 
German public figures, acts as a mediator in restitution disputes over cultural materials 
located in museums, libraries, archives or other public institutions in Germany. The Advisory 
Commission can only act on request by both parties to the dispute; a request by only one party 
is not sufficient nor can the commission act ex officio.1393 Due to these limitations on the 
ability of the commission to take action and the fact that private claimants often prefer 
discrete bilateral negotiations with the respective museum or public institution, it is not 
surprising that only four recommendations have been issued thus far.1394 The 
recommendations made by the Commission represent three types of possible solution: firstly, 
return of the requested object; secondly, retention of the object by the respective institution 
without compensation; and thirdly, retention of the object by the institution with 
compensation to be paid to the legitimate owner or heir.1395 
 
                                                 
1390 Cf. Robin Cembalest, Tensions are rising between the restitution community and U.S. museums over the 
proper way to handle Holocaust art claims, in: Art News, 18 October 2010, 
http://artnews.com/issues/article.asp?art_id=3073 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1391 Koordinierungsstelle Magdeburg (Coordination Office for Lost Cultural Materials), homepage and database 
available at: http://www.lostart.de/Webs/EN/Start/Index.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1392 Full title of the Advisory Commission: „Beratende Kommission im Zusammenhang mit der Rückgabe NS-
verfolgungsbedingt entzogener Kulturgüter, insbesondere aus jüdischem Besitz“, in English: “Advisory 
Commission on the return of cultural property seized as a result of Nazi persecution, especially Jewish property”. 
1393 Cf. critical Schnabel and Tatzkow, Nazi Looted Art, Handbuch Kunstrestitution Weltweit, p. 201. 
1394 The recommendations made in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 by the advisory commission as of September 
2011 can be found at: http://www.lostart.de/Webs/EN/Kommission/Index.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1395 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 241. 
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These three types of solution can also been found within the recommendations made 
by the British Spoliation Advisory Panel (SAP).1396 The panel, appointed by the Secretary of 
State in 2001, resolves claims by the original owners or their heirs pertaining to cultural 
property lost during the Nazi era (1933-45), and now held in national collections in the United 
Kingdom. The panel considers “both legal and non-legal aspects, such as the moral strength 
of the claimant’s case, and whether any moral obligation rests on the holding institution”.1397 
In contrast to the German Advisory Commission, the request for meditation by only one party 
of the dispute is sufficient; as a result, public museums and collections are under the 
obligation to take part in the respective proceedings. Moreover, if the parties involved agree, 
the panel can also judge requests concerning objects in private collections.1398 The panel is an 
alternative to formal litigation but, similarly to the situation in Germany, the 
recommendations made are not legally binding on any party. If, however, a claimant accepts 
the recommendation made by the panel, and the recommendation is implemented, the 
claimant is expected to accept this as full and final settlement of the claim. Since the 
establishment of the panel in 2001, eleven recommendations have been issued.1399 
Interestingly, the panel’s recommendations included, for example, the recommendation to 
return three drawings to a claimant that had been previously held by the British Museum – 
one of the reasons to return was the defective quality of the artwork (2007)1400. In another 
case, the panel recommended the permanent loan of a twelfth century manuscript from the 
British Museum to a monastery in Benevento, Italy, which had requested the return of the 
manuscript (2005).1401 Full return – which would include both physical relocation and the 
transfer of title of ownership – could not be recommended, because both British law and the 
statute of the British Museum prohibit the de-accession of objects from collections held by the 
museum. The panel clearly stated in its recommendation that legislation should be introduce 
to amend the British Museum Act of 1963, the British Library Act of 1972, and the Museums 
                                                 
1396 The reports of the British Spoliation Advisory Panel are published online, and are available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/cultural_property/3296.aspx (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1397 Cf. introduction on the work of the Spoliation Advisory Panel, available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/cultural_property/3296.aspx (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1398 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 242. 
1399 The reports of the British Spoliation Advisory Panel are published online, and are available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/cultural_property/3296.aspx (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1400 See panel recommendation of January 24, 2007, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/SixthReportSAPHC
200.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1401 See panel recommendation of 23 March 2005, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/spreport_hc406.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
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and Galleries Act of 1992 in order to permit restitution of objects in particular categories 
falling under the de-accessioning rule.1402 So far, however, no such amendments have been 
made. 
 
Similarly to the German Advisory Commission (GAC) and the British Spoliation 
Advisory Panel (SAP), the Restitution Committee in the Netherlands, established in 2002, 
also issues legally non-binding recommendations.1403 The Restitution Committee investigates 
and assesses claims to items of cultural value in State museums and other public institutions, 
which were involuntarily lost by their owners due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi 
regime. However, unlike the previous examples, this Committee may issue binding 
recommendations in restitution disputes should the parties involved agree this process in 
writing, and if the requested object is not held by a public institution but rather by a private 
person. As a result, the Dutch Committee is in these circumstances able to act as an arbitration 
panel.1404 The regulations on the recommendation procedure for the Committee, which are set 
out in Article 4, indicate that the Committee makes a recommendation “in accordance with 
the requirements of reasonableness and fairness” and “may take the following in 
consideration: (a) the government’s line of policy concerning the restitution of stolen works of 
art in so far as they apply by analogy; (b) the circumstances in which possession of the work 
was lost; (c) the extent to which the applicant has endeavored to trace the work; (d) the 
circumstances in which the owner acquired the work and the inquiries the owner made when 
acquiring it; (e) the significance of the work for the applicant; (f) the significance of the work 
for the owner; and (g) the significance for the public art collection.”1405 In particular, the last 
three considerations taken by the Dutch Committee demonstrate the equal importance of the 
interests of the respective parties, namely the claimant, the current owner, as well as the 
public. 
 
                                                 
1402 Ibid, p. 25, para. 77 of the recommendation (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1403 Full title of the Restitution Committee: „The Advisory Committee on the Assessment of Restitution 
Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War“, homepage of the committee available at: 
http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1404 Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 244. 
1405 See Article 4 of the “Regulations on binding recommendation procedure” establishing the Advisory 
Committee on the Assessment of Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War”, available at: http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/images/stories/regulations%20art2lid2.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
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Initially, the Dutch Committee established a deadline of April 2007 for the submission 
of claims, but this deadline was eliminated in 2009, as applications for requests to the 
Committee continued.1406 Since its establishment in 2002, approximately hundred 
recommendations have been made by the Dutch Committee.1407 The majority of requests 
concern objects, which belong to the so-called ‘Netherlands Art Property Collection’. The 
collection still comprises around 3,800 works of art, mostly of which were confiscated or sold 
during the period during which the Nazi regime controlled the Netherlands.1408 Most of these 
cultural objects were taken to Germany, where they were seized by the Allies in 1945 and 
returned to their presumed State of original location (namely the Netherlands) in order to be 
returned to their owners or respective heirs. The delay in returning the objects has to do, in 
part, with difficulty in identifying the original owners during the 1950s and 1960s; moreover, 
an insufficient amount of provenance research on these objects had been conducted until the 
1998 Washington Principles were established. In autumn of 2012, the Dutch government 
expects to be able to present a report determining a feasible date for terminating the restitution 
policy and the activities of the Restitution Committee.1409 
 
In summarizing this short comparative appraisal of national advisory committees, it 
can be said that the achievements of special committees responsible for restitution disputes in 
the context of Nazi-looted art have major practical importance, even though their 
recommendations based on the 1998 Washington Principles are legally non-binding. First of 
all, these committees have stipulated that provenance research must be conducted, and have 
made specific recommendations on how to resolve restitution disputes. Within their 
recommendations, they have provided claimants with solutions in accordance with traditional 
private law, including return as well as retention with and without financial compensation.1410 
Secondly, in cases in which legal provisions prevent the full return of the requested object, the 
committees have provided alternative solutions, as in the case of the twelfth century 
manuscript given on permanent loan to the monastery of Benevento in Italy.1411 In this 
                                                 
1406 See. Annual Report 2009 of the Restitution Committee, p. 15, available at: 
http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/publicaties.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1407 See. Annual Report 2009 of the Restitution Committee, p. 87, available at: 
http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/publicaties.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1408 Ibid, p. 8. 
1409 Ibid, p. 16 and p. 81. 
1410 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 244. 
1411 Cf. the recommendation made by the British Advisory Panel of 23 March 2005, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/spreport_hc406.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
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particular case, the British Advisory Panel went even further by making specific proposals 
that would amend current legal provisions on restitution in the United Kingdom, in order to 
resolve similar cases differently in the future. Thirdly, the national committees integrate both 
legal and ethical considerations, and reflect whether any moral obligation rests on the holding 
institution.1412 In addition, the committees can weigh the significance of various issues in 
evaluating the facts of the claim, particularly the circumstances of the loss of the object and 
the amount of effort made by the current owner in acquiring the object in question. Moreover, 
as explicitly provided for in the Netherlands, the committees can reflect on the interests of the 
respective parties, namely the claimant, the current owner, and the public in the construction 
of their recommendations. Thus, this informal approach of involving committees in resolving 
restitution disputes provides an opportunity for various issues and interests in restitution 
disputes to be taking into consideration in a way that is not usually possible in legal 
proceedings.1413 Nevertheless, issues of interests that must be considered within purely legal 
rules can still be taken into account, such as due diligence and, as seen above, restrictions that 
prohibit the de-accession of objects from collections. 
 
With regard to advisory committees, proposals have been made for the establishment 
of an international committee in order to resolve cases of Nazi-looted art.1414 The advantage 
of this approach would be that an international body would preclude different national 
decision-making practices. Given that rationale, the question must be raised as to why this 
type of special committee should be restricted to the category of Nazi-looted art, since the 
appropriation of cultural materials has occurred in many incidents of genocide and war.1415 
However, since no such international body has been established so far, this issue remains 
speculative at this point. 
 
That said, a similar type of advisory committee that deals with a category of cases not 
related to Nazi-looted art is the committee created under the U.S. Native American Graves 
                                                 
1412 Cf. introduction on the work and function of the Spoliation Advisory Panel, available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/cultural_property/3296.aspx (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1413 Cf. Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 245. 
1414 Jennifer Anglim Kreder, "Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for Repose in Nazi-
Looted Art Disputes: Creation of an International Tribunal," Brooklyn Law Review (2007): p. 179. 
1415 Norman Palmer, "Should the Principles Underlying the Spoliation Advisory Panel Be Applied to Other 
Types of Repatriation Claim?," The Art Newspaper (2004): p. 26. And Schönenberger, The Restitution of 
Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - Developments, p. 245. 
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Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).1416 The NAGPRA Review Committee was 
established in order “to monitor and review the implementation of the inventory and 
identification process and repatriation activities” and “to facilitate the resolution of any 
disputes among tribes, federal agencies, and museums” through non-binding 
recommendations.1417 Moreover, it is meant to facilitate the exchange of information between 
the various tribes, museums and federal authorities, as well as advising the Secretary of State 
in cases involving culturally unidentifiable human remains. Since its establishment in 1991, 
the Committee has made several dispute findings and recommendations.1418 The composition 
of the Committee is itself remarkable, as its members are appointed by the Secretary of the 
Interior based on nominations by Indian tribes, Native organizations, traditional Native 
American religious leaders, national museum organizations, and scientific organizations.1419 
It is most likely this diverse composition – as well as the overall procedural structure – of the 
Review Committee that has resulted in relatively few disputes being taken to court. It appears 
that NAGPRA has been able to smooth the way of amicable dispute resolution in lieu of 
formal procedure and court litigation.1420 
4.4 Restitution and Return in the Context of World Heritage Sites 
The concept of common cultural heritage is materialized in the designation of cultural 
and natural sites as being one of ‘outstanding universal value’ for humankind. In order to be 
included in the UNESCO World Heritage List, sites nominated by States have to meet at least 
one out of ten selection criteria established in the ’Operational Guidelines’.1421 Next to the 
1972 UNESCO Convention, these ‘Guidelines’ are the main working tool of the World 
Heritage Committee (which is currently comprised of 21 States elected by the General 
Conference of UNESCO). The criteria for determining the ‘outstanding universal value’ of a 
candidate World Heritage site are regularly revised by the World Heritage Committee 
(similarly to the Guidelines) in order to reflect the evolution of the World Heritage concept. 
                                                 
1416 See section 8 of the U.S. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Public Law 
101-601 of 16 November 1990. For details on the regulations of the Act, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.1.2. 
1417 Ibid, section 8 NAGPRA. 
1418 List and full text of findings and recommendations available at: 
http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/REVIEW/Find_and_Rec.htm (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1419 For details, see the information available at: http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/REVIEW/INDEX.HTM (accessed 
23 September 2011). 
1420 Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets: Causes of Action - Obstacles to Restitution - 
Developments, p. 247. 
1421 Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (initially issued in 1977, 
current version issued in January 2008, WHC 08/01), available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines (accessed 
29 August 2011). The criteria for the assessment of outstanding universal value can be found in the guidelines, 
section II.D. No. 77 (p. 20-21), reprinted as Annex IV to this thesis. 
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This has not only allowed for changes in the universal perception of value over time, but has 
also allowed the Committee to address shortcomings in the actual definition of cultural 
heritage as set out in article 1 of the Convention.1422 Although the 1972 UNESCO Convention 
does not specifically encompass movable cultural heritage,1423 listed heritage sites naturally 
also include movable objects that form an integral part of these sites. 
 
The importance of the World Heritage site program to restitution disputes is twofold: 
firstly, the decision to return cultural objects would perhaps be more forthcoming if the 
claimed object were to be returned to a designated World Heritage site. This might occur in 
three specific types of circumstances: (1) an object was stolen or otherwise illicitly removed 
from a World Heritage site; (2) an object was appropriated from a site only subsequently 
designated as a World Heritage site (e.g. removal occurring before the 1972 UNESCO 
Convention came into force in 1975); and (3) an object is considered for return to a World 
Heritage site, since this site would establish a cultural or historical link that previously did not 
exist between the object and that site (e.g. if the original site of the object is unknown, 
destroyed, or simply not adequate for housing the claimed object). Therefore, cultural 
materials of uncertain provenance, as for example in the case of so-called orphaned 
objects,1424 would benefit from the depository within the auspices of a World Heritage site. 
The benefits of associating orphaned objects (as well as others) with World Heritage sites are 
further supported by the fact that these sites must meet specific management conditions in 
terms of preservation and access. 
 
Secondly, World Heritage sites have the capacity to demonstrate the contiguity 
between past and present aspect of cultural heritage: the history behind a certain appropriation 
during war, foreign or colonial occupation, or illicit trafficking would only add to the rich 
historical context of these sites. Although they are located in the territory of one State, World 
Heritage sites are especially well-suited to serve as depositories for certain disputed cultural 
material, since World Heritage sites form part of the common heritage of humankind. Along 
this vein, the possibility to designate both natural and cultural heritage sites as ‘trans-
boundary property’ jointly through the nomination of more than one State,1425 might facilitate 
                                                 
1422 Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 233. 
1423 For details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.3. 
1424 For details, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.8. 
1425 Examples of cultural property inscribed as ‘trans-boundary property’ include, among others, the following: 
‘Frontiers of the Roman Empire’ (Germany and United Kingdom, inscribed in 1987); the ‘Muskauer Park/Park 
 332
Robert Peters –Beyond Restitution: Resolving International Cultural Heritage Disputes 
not only the solution of restitution disputes between neighboring States, but also the 
settlement of territorial conflicts, as in the case of the Temple of Preah Vihear whose 
designation within the territory of Cambodia in 2008 has sparked the borderland conflict 
between Cambodia and Thailand.1426 
 
That said, restitution disputes might also degrade the integrity of World Heritage sites, 
if, for example, cultural material that is currently part of a World Heritage site is subsequently 
claimed for restitution and return. Whereas many cultural sites designated as World Heritage 
sites are not associated with a significant number of movable cultural objects (e.g. 
collections), some are, as for example the Museumsinsel (Museum Island) in Berlin, which 
was as designated as World Heritage site in 1999.1427 It could be argued that the ‘outstanding 
universal value’, thus the World Heritage status, might be degraded if certain outstanding 
objects or a significance number of objects should be subject to claims for restitution and 
return. Within the context of the State Museums of the Berlin Museumsinsel, the loss of the 
‘Pergamon Altar’ or the ‘Ishtar Gate of Babylon’ would undoubtedly diminish the cultural-
historical importance of the Berlin site – similarly to any other loss caused by, for example, 
theft or destruction. Similar institutions, such as the British Museum in London or the Louvre 
in Paris are not (yet) included in the World Heritage list. However, as an independent site of 
its own, the banks of the Seine in Paris have been designated as a World Heritage site; 
however, it remains questionable as to whether the Louvre as such (particularly with the 
collections that belong to it) constitutes a part of that site, since the focus of the inscription of 
the banks of the Seine pertains to their urban setting and the riverside aspects of Paris.1428 
 
The situation pertaining to the Museumsinsel in Berlin raises the question of whether 
or not movable cultural material forms a significant and essential part of World Heritage site, 
whose loss would endanger its status as a World Heritage site. The 2008 ‘Operational 
Guidelines’ do not elaborate on the movable aspect of cultural heritage. The only reference 
                                                                                                                                                        
Muzakowski’ (Germany and Poland, inscribed in 2004); ‘Rhaetian Railway’ (Italy and Switzerland, inscribed in 
2008); the ‘Prehistoric Rock Art Sites in the Coa Valley and Siega Verde’ (Portugal and Spain, inscribed in 
1998); and the ‘Stone Circles of Senegambia’ (Gambia and Senegal, inscribed in 2006). The World Heritage List 
is available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1426 For details on the case, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.6. 
1427 See World Heritage List, Germany, Museumsinsel (Museum Island), Berlin, inscribed as cultural property in 
1999, further information on the inscription available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/896 (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
1428 See World Heritage List, France, Paris, banks of the Seine, inscribed as cultural property in 1991, 
information on the inscription of this site is available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/600 (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
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made to movable heritage can be found in paragraph 48 of the guidelines that read: 
“nominations of immovable heritage which are likely to become movable will not be 
considered.”1429 This reference, however, refers to the nomination of potential sites to be 
designated, but not to scenarios in which a World Heritage site already designated might be 
deprived of its movable components. A World Heritage site, such as the Museumsinsel in 
Berlin, might certainly not be deprived by its integrity through the loss or return of single 
objects – as for example through the return of the ‘Sphinx of Bogazköy’ to Turkey, as agreed 
to in May 2011 – but its significance might certainly be lessened if larger parts of its 
collections would be subject to restitution claims. Examples of exhibits not officially claimed, 
but from time to time discussed within the restitution debate, include: the Pergamon Altar, 
originating from the ancient city of Pergamon in Asia Minor (nowadays Turkey); the ‘Ishtar 
Gate’, originating from the ancient city of Babylon (nowadays Iraq); and the bust of Nefertiti 
(Nofretete), originating from Egypt – one of the highlights and most-known trademark of the 
Museumsinsel. 
 
The justification for the inscription of the Berlin Museumsinsel as a World Heritage 
site in 1999 was based on the criteria (ii) and (iv) of the Guidelines; these criteria focus on the 
museum’s uniqueness, which extends beyond being a mere complex of buildings.1430 Thus, 
the justification given by the World Heritage Committee reads as follows: “Criterion (ii): The 
Berlin Museumsinsel is a unique ensemble of museum buildings, which illustrates the 
evolution of modern museum design over more than a century. Criterion (iv): The art museum 
is a social phenomenon that owes its origins to the Age of Enlightenment and its extension to 
all people to the French Revolution. The Museumsinsel is the most outstanding example of 
this concept given material form and a symbolic central urban setting.”1431 Moreover, the 
report of the 23rd session of the World Heritage Committee (1999), during which the 
Museumsinsel was inscribed, states that: “the observer of Poland emphasized that in this type 
of properties it was essential to maintain not only the values of the monumental buildings, but 
also to maintain the integrity of the museum collections.”1432 Consequently, both the 
                                                 
1429 See para. 48 of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, issued 
in January 2008, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=57 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1430 The criteria for the assessment of outstanding universal value can be found in the Operational Guidelines, 
section II.D. No. 77 (p. 20-21), reprinted as Annex III to this thesis. 
1431 See Museuminsel (Museum Island) Berlin, ‘Justification for Inscription’, full text available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/896 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1432 See Report of the 23rd session of the World Heritage Committee (29 November-4 December1999), WHC-
99/CONF.209/22, full text available at: http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom99.htm#896 (accessed 23 
September 2011). 
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justification for inscription and the observer statement demonstrate that the Museumsinsel has 
not been designated as a World Heritage site merely because of its structural casing, but rather 
because of its unique ensemble of museums, and the nineteenth century museum concept for 
which it stands. Along the same vein, the ‘brief description’ provided by the World Heritage 
Committee clearly highlights the significance of the movable elements of the Museumsinsel 
by stating: “each museum was designed so as to establish an organic connection with the art it 
houses. The importance of the museum’s collections – which trace the development of 
civilizations throughout the ages – is enhanced by the urban and architectural quality of the 
buildings.” Thus, the interplay between the museums buildings and their collections form part 
of the ‘outstanding universal value’ of the Museumsinsel. 
 
A recent example that illustrates the interplay between the protection of World 
Heritage sites and restitution claims is the case of the Sphinx of Bogazköy (also sphinx of 
Hattusha). Uncovered by German archeologists amidst a number of other ruins in 1907, the 
sphinx was once attached to a large city gate and formed part of an imposing welcome to the 
ancient Hittite capital Hattusha in central Anatolia between 1600 B.C. and 1200 B.C (at the 
time of the discovery located in the Ottoman Empire, which is now part of modern-day 
Turkey). The pair of sphinxes that flanked the Hattusha city gate was brought to Berlin in 
1915-17 as incomplete fragments. Both were restored by the Berlin Museum. The better 
preserved of the two sculptures was returned to Turkey in 1924, while the other sphinx – 
consisting of ninety per cent of plaster replacement and only ten per cent original – was 
incorporated into the collection of the Berlin Museum (Museumsinsel) and put on display at 
the museum in 1934. Since 1938, Turkey – having become a sovereign State in 1923 – has 
demanded the return of the second sphinx.1433 While 7,400 cuneiform tables, which were part 
of the original package containing the sphinxes brought to Berlin in 1915-17 were return by 
the German Democratic Republic (the Museumsinsel was located in former East-Berlin) in 
1987, the sphinx was not returned. Thus, Turkey lodged its request with the UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee after bilateral negotiations had failed in 1986/1987.1434 
 
                                                 
1433 See: Official Press release of the Berlin Museum, Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Pressemitteilung 
“Einigung zur Sphinx von Hattusha”, published 13 May 13 2011, available at: http://hv.spk-
berlin.de/deutsch/presse/pdf/110513_Sphinx_von_Hattuscha.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1434 For details on the case in front of the UNESCO Committee, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2 and 
Chapter Six, Section 4.3. 
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Legally speaking, it could not truly be verified by either party whether or not the 
second sphinx was part of an agreement by the Ottoman Empire to reward Germany for 
restoring the sphinxes and financing the excavation in 1907 (many documents at the Berlin 
Museum were lost due to the bombing in WWII). The return of the first sphinx in 1924 could 
actually be used as evidence in favor of both parties: the 1924 return may have concluded an 
agreement that had transferred the sphinxes only temporarily to Germany for restoration 
purposes; alternatively, the return in 1924 may have been part of an agreement dividing the 
two sphinxes.1435 The lack of clear evidence as well as the course of time (namely WWII, the 
subsequent Cold War, and the German unification in 1990) resulted in a delay of resolving the 
matter for decades. Media campaigns and political pressure from Turkey, which included the 
threat of placing a ban on involvement of German archeologists in excavations in Turkey and 
a suspension in exhibition cooperation helped fuel the dispute in early 2011.1436 The German 
side, in turn, feared (as most governments do) establishing a precedent for other restitution 
claims. Thus, it was not before May 2011, that a bilateral agreement was reached between 
Germany and Turkey providing for the return of the sphinx. The agreement was reached “in a 
spirit of friendship between Turkey and Germany”1437 underlining that the case is a case sui 
generis “not comparable with other cases”.1438 Subsequently, the resolution was presented at 
the 17th session of the UNESCO Committee in Paris in July 2011, thereby resolving one of 
the two remaining cases lodged with the Committee.1439 Notably, it has been agreed that the 
sphinx will return by the latest on 28 November 2011 – it is this very date that marks the 25th 
anniversary of the inscription of the site of Hattusha in the UNESCO World Heritage List.1440 
The archaeological site of Hattusha, where the sphinx was uncovered in 1907, was designated 
in the World Heritage List in 1986 for its “urban organization and the notable types of 
                                                 
1435 See above n. 1433. 
1436 See: Susanne Güsten, Turkey Presses Harder for the Return of Antiquities, in: The New York Times, May 
25, 2011; available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/world/europe/26iht-M26C-TURKEY-
RETURN.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1437 Recommendation No. 3, adopted at the 17th session of the UNESCO-Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 
June-1 July 2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF. 208/COM.17/5; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001937/193720E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1438 Official Press release of the German government: Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 
Pressemitteilung Nr. 171, “Hethitische Sphinx wird der Türkei übergeben”, published 13 May 2011; available at: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2011/05/2011-05-13-bkm-hethitische-
sphinx.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1439 See: Recommendation No. 3, adopted at the 17th session of the UNESCO-Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 
June-1 July 2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF. 208/COM.17/5; available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001937/193720E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1440 See World Heritage List, Turkey, the site of Hattusha – Hittite Capital; available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/377 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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construction that have been preserved”.1441 Interesting, both sites –the Museumsinsel in 
Berlin (1999) and the site of Hattusha in Turkey (1986) – are World Heritage sites. Thus, the 
return of the Sphinx from Berlin to Hattusha also marks a rare case in which an object is 
returned from one World Heritage site to another. 
                                                
 
Although this case certainly represents an anomaly, the case is also highly relevant in 
terms of alternative solutions. The bilateral agreement resolving this case contained several 
provisions on future cooperation: the return of the sphinx is intended to initiate a series of 
measures designed to promote German-Turkish cooperation, mainly in terms of museum and 
archaeological cooperation with regard to excavations, exhibitions, and loan agreements.1442 
Moreover, it was agreed that plaster copies should be made – one for the Museumsinsel to be 
displayed in Berlin, and a second one as a model for use by the Turkish authorities in their 
efforts to restore the sphinx at its original site in Hattusha. Upon its return, the sphinx is slated 
to be on display in a newly built museum at the site of Hattusha, close to its original place of 
excavation. The first sphinx, which was returned to Turkey in 1924 and is currently on 
display at the Istanbul Archaeology Museum,1443 is also scheduled to be transferred to the 
newly built museum at the Hattusha site so that it may be displayed with its partner 
sphinx.1444 This should be an important step in terms of re-uniting the former ensemble and to 
re-establish the unity of the sphinxes at its former site, since integrity and context of cultural 
materials are fundamental principles and of common interest to all parties.1445 Whether or not 
the issue of returning the sphinx to a World Heritage site had a major impact in the resolution 
of the dispute is not available in the public record. However, the fact that the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the inscription of Hattusha was mentioned in the connection with the return of 
the sphinx gives support to this assumption.1446  
 
 
1441 Ibid. 
1442 See above n. 1438. 
1443 Cf. Official Press release of the Berlin Museum, Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Pressemitteilung 
“Einigung zur Sphinx von Hattusha”, published May 13, 2011, available at: http://hv.spk-
berlin.de/deutsch/presse/pdf/110513_Sphinx_von_Hattuscha.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1444 “Bogazköy Sphinx finally returns to Turkey after decades in Germany”, Hürrijet Daily News, 28 July 2011, 
available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=bogazkoy-sphinx-finally-returns-to-turkey-after-
decades-in-germany-2011-07-28 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1445 For details on the interests in integrity and context, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.3. 
1446 Recommendation No. 3, adopted at the 17th session of the UNESCO-Committee (ICPRCP), held on 30 
June-1 July 2011 in Paris, CLT-2011/CONF. 208/COM.17/5, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001937/193720E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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The return of the Axum obelisk from Italy to Ethiopia in 2005 represents a similar 
example of return involving a World Heritage site.1447 In this case, the World Heritage 
Committee welcomed “the cooperation between the States parties Ethiopia and Italy, leading 
to the return of the obelisk, which could enhance the value of Axum” and supported “the 
tripartite cooperation between UNESCO and the States parties of Ethiopia and Italy in the 
preparation of the re-erection of the obelisk.”1448 
 
The appraisal of this section of Chapter Six can be summarized by highlighting the 
following three issues: firstly, although the 1972 UNESCO Convention does not provide 
provisions on restitution and return primarily because of its focus on immovable cultural and 
natural heritage, it clearly provides provisions indicating a common responsibility to protect 
the ‘outstanding universal value’ of cultural and natural heritage. Since movable cultural 
materials are integral parts of many cultural sites designated as World Heritage sites, the 
responsibility to protect inevitably extends to the movable elements at such sites. An emptied 
Palace of Versailles,1449 a cleared Museumsinsel in Berlin,1450 or a Taj Mahal bereft of its 
interior decorations,1451 would only be empty shells. Secondly, due to the wide acceptance of 
the 1972 UNESCO Convention (188 States out of a total of 194 existing States have ratified 
the 1972 Convention),1452 it can be argued that the convention’s provisions have became 
customary international law,1453 and, for this very reason, are binding for both States parties 
and non-States parties to the convention.1454 Thirdly, although the inscription of a site as 
World Heritage sites does not exclude the subsequent exercise of restitution and return of 
cultural material from that site, the status as being of ‘outstanding universal value’ must be 
taken into account in the identification of possible options for the resolution of restitution 
disputes. As shown in the case of the Sphinx of Bogazköy, this can influence the position of 
both parties in the dispute, since the Berlin museum and the Turkish site from which the 
                                                 
1447 For details on the case of the return of the Axum obelisk, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.9.1. 
1448 Decision of the World Heritage Committee (2005) 29COM 7B.34 – Aksum (Ethiopia), available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/390 (accessed 23 September 2011). See in this regard also Scovazzi, "Diviser 
C'est Détruire: Ethical Principles and Legal Rules in the Field of Return of Cultural Property," p. 359. 
1449 See Palace and Park of Versailles, designated as a world heritage site in 1979; available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/83 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1450 See Museumsinsel (Museum Island) in Berlin, designated as a world heritage site in 1999; available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/896 (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1451 See Taj Mahal, designated as a world heritage site in 1983; available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/252 
(accessed 23 September 2011). 
1452 See above n. 362. 
1453 For details on customary international law, see supra Chapter Three, Section 6. 
1454 Francioni, "Thirty Years On: Is the World Heritage Convention Ready for the 21st Century?," p. 22. Cf. 
Bandeira Galindo, "The Unesco Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage," p. 
428. 
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sphinx originated are both World Heritage sites. In order to take all relevant issues into 
account – namely the protection of the integrity of World Heritage sites and the necessity of 
providing an adequate reply to claims for restitution and return – requires alternative 
solutions. In the case of the sphinx this was done through a combination of various 
mechanisms: firstly, the return of the requested object; secondly, the fabrication of replicas for 
both the Berlin and Turkish museums; thirdly, the establishment of ground for future bilateral 
cooperation; and fourthly, the re-uniting of both sphinxes (from the Berlin and the Istanbul 
museum) at the original World Heritage site. 
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter began by discussing the legal and policy issues involved in implementing 
the interest-oriented approach into the current legal regime of international law. While formal 
legal procedures and court litigations face three major obstacles, namely (1) the non-
retroactivity of international law treaties; (2) the protection of the bona fide purchaser and the 
problem of burden of proof; and (3) lapse of time, complementary and alternative 
mechanisms that go beyond the mere legal approach might be used to overcome these 
obstacles. Since it is neither beneficial in policy terms to pass legislative acts for the 
resolution of single restitution disputes (as in the French Maori case), nor is it helpful in legal 
terms to omit any legal reference in the solution reached (as in the case of the U.S.-Italian 
agreements), the need for a combination of legal and policy provisions in terms of soft law 
mechanisms for restitution and return was discussed. As this thesis argues, this need can be 
best served by the development and international endorsement of general principles that 
incorporate the common interests of all stakeholders in preservation, access, integrity and 
cooperation. 
 
Since the purely legal approach is not a viable option in many restitution disputes (due 
to the three major legal obstacles discussed), alternative mechanisms to current restitution 
practices are needed. Therefore, the chapter continued by giving a detailed analysis of 
complementary and alternative mechanisms. These include: (1) voluntary returns; (2) 
temporary loan agreements, the fabrication of replicas, and the mutual exchange of cultural 
objects; (3) permanent loan agreements and the return of cultural artifacts without transfer of 
ownership; (4) joint custody and shared management as well as transfer of expertise; (5) the 
re-purchase of objects claimed for return and the establishment of compensation funds in 
order to undertaking such purchases; and (6) considerations on the international reputation of 
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museums and other art holding institutions as an effective leverage mechanism in restitution 
disputes. Although these mechanisms do not form a conclusive enumeration of options, they, 
nevertheless, illustrate the breadth of possible solutions. Several examples have shown that 
there is no single solution through which all restitution disputes can or should be resolved – 
rather, it is the range of alternatives at hand and their possible combination that provide the 
most equitable solution, depending on the merits of the case and the interests of the parties 
involved. 
 
Moreover, complementary and alternative mechanisms must be accompanied by 
policy considerations, and to date, some proposals for institutional improvements on both the 
international and national level have been made. Firstly, it was illustrated that determine 
complementary and alternative mechanisms to current restitution practices goes hand in hand 
with rethinking the traditional collecting and ownership paradigm of museums and the general 
function of stewardship. Secondly, proposals have been made to improve the functioning of 
the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee through a clarification of its mandate and its 
possible role as a competent body to facilitate the resolution of restitution disputes and to 
supervise the completion of bilateral agreements negotiated in conjunction with restitution 
disputes. Thirdly, proposals have been made in terms of the establishment and the 
strengthening of national advisory committees that aim at identifying solutions on the basis of 
legally non-binding recommendations and informal procedures. Furthermore, the fact that 
these bodies do not work exclusively within a legal context but also incorporate legal, ethical 
and historical considerations was demonstrated to be highly advantageous. Fourthly, the role 
of World Heritage sites in the context of the restitution debate has been discussed. Against the 
backdrop of recently resolved cases, in which requested cultural material was return to but 
also from World Heritage sites, the fact that World Heritage sites play an important role in the 
restitution debate, both pro and contra the return of cultural objects, was also demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER VII: Conclusions and Future Prospects 
 
 
Traditionally, international cultural heritage law has been perceived as a dualistic 
conflict of interests between so-called ‘source countries’ and ‘art-market countries’. Since 
most States rich in archeological artifacts have enacted national export regulations and 
antiquity laws, the ‘source’ of newly excavated archeological artifacts available on the 
international art and antiquities market should have certainly run dry by now. However, the 
opposite is true. Together with the trafficking in drugs and arms, the illicit trafficking in 
cultural artifacts constitutes one of the most persistent illicit trades worldwide.1455 Nor are the 
clandestine excavations of archaeological objects exclusively a problem for the so-called of 
‘source countries’: illicit digging can occur in any region of the world. Even in so-called ‘art-
market countries’, the enforcement system in place may fail to adequately protect against 
clandestine excavation and illicit export. Therefore, the destruction of sites, clandestine 
excavation, and illicit trafficking in cultural materials violate not only national export laws, 
but also the ‘common interest’ in protecting cultural heritage, since these activities inevitably 
result in the loss of unique and irreplaceable information that constitutes a valuable part of the 
history of humanity. Consequently, theories that postulate a traditional ‘conflict of interest’ 
approach are based on an outdated assumption, since several ‘common interests’ can be 
identified in cultural heritage matters. 
 
Surprisingly, however, it is this traditional assumption that is repetitively used 
particularly in the field of restitution and return. Moreover, the existing legal provisions in 
international law as well as current State practices used to resolve restitution disputes 
primarily focus on States’ interests. Although the consolidation of the nation State concept 
only occurred relatively late in the nineteenth and early twentieth century – thus calling into 
question the concepts of ‘national patrimony’ and ‘national identity’ as they relate to cultural 
objects that often date back to ancient times – States still remain the primary actors in 
international law. Yet, the analysis undertaken by this thesis has demonstrated that new actors 
have come to the fore; moreover, these actors have had a major impact, since they have 
                                                 
1455 Cf. UNESCO information kit issued on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, 15-16 March 2011 held in Paris, the kit is available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001916/191606E.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011). 
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become essential stakeholders in issues pertaining to cultural heritage. These new actors 
include many non-State actors, such as museums and private entities, scientific and epistemic 
communities, indigenous peoples and ethnic minority groups, as well as the international 
community as a whole. Therefore, this thesis makes the case for the reconsideration of current 
restitution practices and proposes an alternative approach that takes into account the interests 
of the various stakeholders involved in restitution disputes. In addition to the necessity of 
taking the relevant stakeholders into account, the legal analysis undertaken by this thesis has 
demonstrated that a purely legal approach is often insufficient in resolving international 
cultural heritage disputes, since the major legal instruments of international treaty law (such 
as the 1954 Hague Convention, the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention) are unable to adequately address the complexity of many restitution claims as 
well as the question of past removal due to the principle of non-retroactivity.1456 Other legal 
obstacles linked to formal legal proceedings (namely the protection of the rights of the bona 
fide purchaser as well as provisions relating to statutes of limitation) add to the difficulties 
claimants frequently face in restitution disputes. Moreover, the existing international treaty 
law pertaining to restitution and return does not correspond with the multifaceted issues 
associated with the preservation of and the access to cultural heritage. It is this unsatisfying 
state of affairs that created the impetus for the development of the interest-oriented approach 
introduced by this thesis, as an alternative to current restitution practices. 
 
The interest-oriented approach is based on three rationales: firstly, the conceptual shift 
in international law from the notion of ‘cultural property’ towards the notion of ‘cultural 
heritage’. The notion of ‘cultural property’ as such is limited in its scope, since it does not 
incorporate the social value associated with cultural materials – also referred to as its 
‘intangible cultural heritage’. Moreover, the notion ‘cultural property’ emphasizes either the 
aspect of ownership and the exclusive sovereign interests of the territorial State in which the 
‘property’ is located, or the interests of the private owner in reference to his exclusive right of 
disposition. Generally speaking, property rights entail the exclusion of other (public) interests, 
which are not linked to ownership rights. Given the conceptual connotations associated with 
‘cultural property’, the semantic shift from ‘property’ to ‘heritage’ that took place within the 
last forty years in international treaty law necessitates a corresponding shift in the provisions 
                                                 
1456 Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969; entering into force 27 
January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331) states that the provisions of an international treaty “do not bind a party in 
relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into 
force of the treaty with respect to that party.” 
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available for the resolution of restitution disputes. This shift, however, has not yet occurred, 
and States and their national property interests remain the primary concern of international 
cultural heritage law. 
 
Secondly, both bilateral agreements among States and agreements between private 
actors and States are contractual in nature. Contracts, however, suffer from a major 
shortcoming in that their terms depend, in part, on the bargaining powers of the negotiating 
parties. Although this is an accepted reality in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, unequal 
bargaining power becomes particularly problematic in restitution disputes, since these 
disputes frequently reflect difficult issues associated with war, foreign or colonial occupation, 
or significant human rights violations. As this thesis has demonstrated, attempts made to 
‘remedy historical injustices’ by addressing the question of restitution and return are often 
hampered by unequal bargaining power, since hegemony and dependence tend to persist in 
international relations – traditionally dividing parties into so-called ‘source countries’ and 
‘art-market countries’. As a result, nearly all bilateral agreements concluded in order to settle 
restitution disputes explicitly exclude any legal reference to both the circumstances of the 
former appropriation, as well as the terms of the agreed upon solution. As the multiple 
examples provided in this thesis demonstrated, successful outcomes in restitution disputes 
often depend to a significant extent on the political and diplomatic commitment of the 
respective States as well as their bargaining power, rather than on general principles of law. 
This naturally affects the final outcome of negotiations in terms of the recognition of rights as 
well as practical aspects in terms of mutual gain and cooperation; however, it also inhibits the 
development and application of a consistent legal framework in the resolution of international 
cultural heritage disputes. 
 
Thirdly, since both legal concepts of ‘property’ and ‘contract’ fail to take into account 
the different interests of the various stakeholders involved, and fail to provide a consistent 
legal framework for the resolution of restitution disputes, an alternative approach that aims at 
resolving restitution disputes in a sustainable and cooperative manner is needed. Recently 
developed concepts in international law, such as the ‘common heritage of humankind’, 
‘common concern’, and ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ promote the idea that there 
is a common interest in the protection of cultural heritage, and indicate that there is a legal 
basis for interest-oriented considerations. The analysis of the interests involved in cultural 
heritage matters provided in this dissertation has demonstrated that the core concern and 
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common interest of all stakeholders is the interest of protecting and preserving cultural 
heritage. Preventing physical destruction, damage, and deterioration is thus the primary 
objective when dealing with cultural materials of whatever kind. If cultural materials are 
partially damaged or completely destroyed, they can neither be exhibited, nor studied, nor 
enjoyed; more importantly within the context of this thesis – they cannot be returned to the 
requesting party. Thus, even in highly controversial restitution disputes, the interest in 
preservation generally constitutes common ground between the opposing parties. This is even 
valid in those cases, in which cultural materials are requested in order to allow them decay 
and ‘return to the earth’, as illustrated by the example of the wooden Zuni War Gods.1457 
Decaying in this context generally does not include the deliberate or negligent damage or 
destruction by a third party, but instead refers to a ritual act or ceremony performed by a 
certain people (usually the tribe or indigenous community that created the object in question). 
Therefore, even in cases that result in ritual decay of a cultural object, it can still be assumed 
that the destruction of or damage to cultural artifacts not only diminishes property rights and 
the economical value intrinsic to cultural materials, but also the cultural significance of that 
artifact to a particular individual, group or community. Consequently, the protection and 
preservation of cultural heritage can truly be assumed as being the prerequisite and 
fundamental interest in international cultural heritage law upon whose basis all other interests 
may be constructed. These other interests include: the integrity of cultural material and the 
reunification of dispersed fragments; public and scientific access to cultural artifacts; the 
exchange of research information; and general cooperation in cultural heritage matters. 
 
Based on these three rationales, this dissertation posits that the legal conceptualization 
of international cultural heritage disputes must go ‘beyond restitution’: in other words, legal 
conceptualizations must be developed that exceed the exclusive interests of States and 
transcending the idea of property rights as currently conceived. Despite the shortcomings of a 
purely legal approach, the analysis of the existing legal framework of international law has 
demonstrated that most legal instruments contain terms that describe cultural heritage as 
belonging to or being protected in the interest of all humankind.1458 Consequently, this thesis 
has argued that the concept of ‘protection’ is common ground in international cultural heritage 
law and establishes a general responsibility of States (and, within a broader legal 
understanding, of other stakeholders as well) to protect cultural heritage during times of both 
                                                 
1457 For details on the case of the Zuni War Gods, see supra Chapter Five, Section 3.1.1. 
1458 Cf. Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, p. 405. 
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war and peace. Within the scope of the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural 
heritage, certain other interests associated with physical integrity, access and cooperation can 
be identified. Since these interests form part of the ‘common interest’, they are valid not only 
for general cultural heritage issues in war and peace, but must also be taken into account in 
the resolution of disputes over the restitution and return of cultural material. 
 
Against the backdrop of these ‘common interests’, this thesis has demonstrated a wide 
range of complementary and alternative mechanisms – ranging from the voluntary return of 
the requested object and the fabrication of replicas to joint custody agreements and temporary 
or permanent loan agreements. The analysis of these mechanisms has emphasized both the 
tangible and intangible characteristics of cultural heritage. Whereas the tangible (property) 
aspect includes the elements of physical preservation, integrity, and access; the intangible 
(cultural) aspect consists of the elements of cultural preservation, affiliation, reconciliation, 
and the recognition of rights. The latter element, in particular, is essential, given that the need 
of addressing restitution matters often originates from the infringement of rights, including 
property rights, the right to self-determination, the right to cultural and religious participation, 
or the right to cultural diversity and development. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that, despite the number of restitution 
claims made over the past years and the attempts by courts, governments, administrations, 
policy makers, and academics to structure the debate, most claims for restitution and return 
are dealt with – if they are dealt with at all – using an ad hoc approach. In addition to the legal 
obstacles mentioned above, this is due to the fact that international treaty law lacks both 
sufficient instruments to provide effective mechanisms regarding restitution and return,1459 
and the broad acceptance of States.1460 Moreover, international treaty law does not work 
retroactively and thus fails to deal with cases of removal prior to the ratification and entry into 
force of the respective convention for both the requesting and the requested State.1461 Despites 
these shortcomings and all the controversies regarding the application of international treaty 
law at the national level, multilateral treaties pertaining to cultural heritage have had a major 
impact on the development of international cultural heritage law within the last decades; 
                                                 
1459 Like the 1970 UNESCO Convention, for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
1460 Like the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, for details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.4. 
1461 Cf. Planche, "Die Unesco-Konvention Von 1970: Anwendung Auf Internationaler Ebene," p. 146. 
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moreover, the three major UNESCO conventions on tangible cultural heritage1462 indicate a 
universal recognition among the international community of the importance of this issue. As a 
result, they have strengthened the formation of customary international law by creating a 
general obligation to protect cultural heritage, and have shaped the recognition of rights, 
including material redress through restitution and return. Other more recent multilateral 
treaties pertaining to the protection of cultural heritage have not yet universally 
recognized.1463 Moreover, UN declarations, such as the 2003 UNESCO Declaration 
Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (in response to the destruction of 
the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001),1464 and the UN Security Council Resolution 1483/2003 (in 
reaction to the looting in the aftermath of the Iraq war in 2003)1465 indicate that the protection 
of cultural heritage and the prevention of illicit trafficking in cultural materials is a common 
concern of the international community as a whole. 
 
Since the principle of non-retroactivity as well as other legal obstacles frequently 
impede the resolution of restitution disputes, and ethical and historical considerations call for 
the ‘remedying historical injustices’, several attempts have been made in recent years to 
provide consistent legally non-binding guidelines or general principles in order to resolve 
such disputes. Examples include: the 1998 Washington Principles that call for the 
determination of ‘just and fair solutions’ in cases of Nazi-confiscated art;1466 and the 2006 
Principles of the International Law Association that advocate for, among other proposals, loan 
agreements and the production of replicas.1467 Although these attempts have been proven to 
be successful to several cases, they, nevertheless, either apply only to a specific set of 
incidents (e.g. Nazi-confiscated art in public collections), or have not yet found international 
recognition (as in the case of the 2006 Principles of the International Law Association). The 
analysis of current State practice in dealing with restitution disputes has shown that most 
solutions agreed to by the parties on a case-by-case basis are concluded in individually 
negotiated (often not published) bilateral agreements, or – less frequently – through the 
                                                 
1462 See the 1954 Hague Convention, the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1972 UNESCO Convention. 
1463 See the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and the 2001 Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention. 
1464 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference, 17 October 2003; available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17718&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1465 United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1483/2003, adopted 22 May 2003, UN Doc S/RES/1483, 
ILM, 2003, p.1016 ff; See: paragraph 7; the full text version is available at: http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/1465505.html (accessed 23 September 2011). 
1466 For the full text of the Principles see Annex I; for further details, see supra Chapter Three, Section 3.5. 
1467 For detailed analysis of the 2006 ILA Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of 
Cultural Material, see supra Chapter Three, Section 4.2. 
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passage of legislation specific to a particular case.1468 However, solutions that are exclusively 
negotiated by a limited number of parties over a particular object or a limited set of objects do 
not affect other restitution disputes with similar circumstances, nor do they promote the 
further development of international cultural heritage law. In other words, bilateral 
agreements – as successful as they may be within their particular case setting – explicitly 
exclude any legal reference to both the circumstances of the former appropriation as well as 
the terms of the solution found, and thus have only a marginal impact on the future 
development of international law.1469 Moreover, as highlighted above, bilateral agreements 
have the major disadvantage that they and their specific terms depend, in part, on the 
bargaining powers of the respective parties involved. 
 
Therefore, this thesis proposes a new method for the resolution of restitution disputes 
grounded in general principles based on the common interests previously identified: namely, 
preservation, access, integrity and cooperation. Deployment of soft law mechanisms and 
general principles might be of interest to parties not only in restitution disputes in which legal 
proceedings are not available (which is frequently the case), but also in disputes in which the 
parties cannot agree on a legal regime, or simply do not wish to employ legal action. This 
might be due to political or other policy constraints, or the fear of costly and unpredictable 
litigations in domestic or foreign courts. Soft law mechanisms and general principles are by 
their nature legally non-binding; however, they are, in turn, much more flexible and more 
appropriate in terms of incorporating the ethical and historical considerations as well as the 
common interests inherent to many restitution cases. As such, they may also contribute to the 
further development of international cultural heritage law. It has been demonstrated that 
common interests (namely preservation, integrity, access and cooperation) do exist in 
international cultural heritage law, but are not yet sufficiently employed in the field of 
restitution and return. 
 
                                                 
1468 See, for example, the case of the law passed by the French National Assembly in May 2010 ordering the 
return to New Zealand of the sixteen tattooed and mummified Maori warrior heads held by the city of Rouen; 
Law No. 2010-501 of 18 May 2010: “Loi visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes maories à la 
Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections”, NOR: MCCX0914997L; this legislation is available 
at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed 23 September 2011). For further details on the Maori case, see supra 
Chapter Six, Section 3.3. 
1469 For an analysis of bilateral agreements, including the recent agreements with Italy and several U.S. 
museums, see supra Chapter Three, Section 2.10. 
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The necessity of taking these interests into account in an ‘interest-oriented’ approach 
has been illustrated through the use of a legal analogy to child custody determination.1470 
While a ‘best interest doctrine’ was introduced into child custody determinations more than 
thirty years ago, and into international children’s rights more than twenty years ago, it has yet 
to find acceptance in the field of restitution and return. However, an approach limited to 
‘object-oriented’ considerations would be short-sighted, since it would be unable to 
encompass the intangible characteristics of cultural materials associated with the aspects of 
cultural preservation, the affiliation of a people, group or community, and the recognition of 
cultural rights. 
 
In recalling what has been argued so far, the demand for general principles in the field 
of restitution and return can be summarized by the following three considerations: firstly, 
international treaty law does not adequately recognize the interests of the various stakeholders 
involved (including the ‘common interest’ in the protection of cultural heritage); secondly, 
although bilateral agreements may generally be better at recognizing the interests of the 
particular parties involved, they are frequently unable to actualize these interests evenly due 
to unequal bargaining power; and thirdly, these bilateral agreements do not provide grounds 
for the resolution of similar cases. In contrast, general principles may facilitate the resolution 
of restitution disputes regardless the lack of applicable legal instruments and the bargaining 
powers of the parties involved. 
 
In practical terms, it has been demonstrated that the resolution of restitution disputes 
on the basis of common interests may facilitate the development of sustainable and 
cooperative solutions. Depending on the needs of the parties involved, a variety of 
complementary and alternative solutions are at hand. These include: temporary or permanent 
loan agreements and/or the exchange of cultural materials; the fabrication of replicas; the 
physical return of the requested object without transfer of title; as well as joint custody and/or 
shared management. If exercised adequately and in the mutual recognition of the respective 
motives and interests of the parties involved, restitution disputes must not inevitably result in 
zero-sum outcomes (retention vs. return); instead, they may be used to foster both the 
protection of cultural heritage and the exchange of cultural artifacts in a manner that is more 
equitable than would otherwise be possible using a purely legal approach based on the de lege 
                                                 
1470 For details, see supra Chapter Four, Section 1.2. 
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lata domination of State interests. Yet, the interest-oriented approach proposed by this thesis 
does not exclude these common interests from being further implemented into restitution 
policies and existing legal provisions. Moreover, it is highly desirable that the common 
interests – namely preservation, integrity, access and cooperation – may shape the 
interpretation of current legal provisions in both international treaty law and national legal 
systems. In the long run, this may even lead to new legally non-binding general principles in 
international cultural heritage law that – similar to the 1998 Washington Principles – impose 
moral obligations on both parties in restitution disputes, and may even lead to the 
development of new legislation (de lege ferenda). 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the interest-oriented approach introduced by this 
thesis aims at providing at least four additional contributions to the debate on the restitution 
and return of cultural materials. Firstly, it provides an analysis of the shortcomings of the 
existing legal regime of international cultural heritage law and current State practice in 
resolving restitution disputes. Secondly, this thesis provides an analysis of the different 
stakeholders involved in restitution disputes and their respective motives and interests. 
Thirdly, it identifies the common interests in cultural heritage matters based on recently 
developed legal concepts of international law, namely the ‘common heritage of humankind’, 
‘common concern’, ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ and ‘international 
cooperation’. Last but not least, this thesis provides a detailed analysis – in terms of both legal 
and policy issues – of the wide range of complementary and alternative mechanisms to 
current restitution practices. It is the understanding of this thesis that the application of these 
complementary and alternative mechanisms can produce results that are more fruitful for all 
parties involved in international cultural heritage disputes. 
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Table of Treaties and other International Instruments 
 
1. Pre-WWII Instruments pertaining to Cultural Heritage 
 
 Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field as Authorized by the Laws and 
Usages of War on Land, General Orders No.100 of 24 April 1863 (also known as 
Lieber Code). 
 Hague Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 
1899, AJIL, 1907, 66. 
 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 
1907, AJIL, 1908, 165. 
 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 
1907), 1 Bevans 631. 
 Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Monuments, 15 
April 1935, 167 LNTS 279 (also known as Roerich Act). 
 Declaration of the Allied Nations against Acts of Dispossession Committed in 
Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control, 5 January 1943 (8, Department of 
State Bulletin 21) (also known as 1943 London Declaration). 
 
2. Post-WWII Instruments pertaining to Cultural Heritage 
 
 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 
May 1954, 249 UNTS 215 (also known as 1954 Hague Convention). 
 Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 
May 1954, 249 UNTS 358, 144. 
 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769, 149. 
 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 17 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231 (also 
known as 1970 UNESCO Convention). 
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 
November 1972, ILM, 1972, 1358 (also known as World Heritage Convention). 
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 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported of Cultural Objects, 24 June 1995, ILM, 
pp.1322 (also known as 1995 UNIDROIT Convention). 
 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2 November 2001, 
2002, 21 ILM 37 (also known as 2001 Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention). 
 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 17 October 2003, 
2368 UNTS 1. 
 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, 
20 October 2005, 2440 UNTS 311. 
 
3. Post-WWII Instruments relevant to the Field of International Cultural Heritage Law 
 
 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031. 
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth 
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (AJIL, 
1969, p. 875). 
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1982, 21 ILM 
1261. 
 United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. 
 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3. 
 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 
2 December 2004, A/RES/59/38. 
 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 
2000, 2225 UNTS 209 (also known as Palermo Convention). 
 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, 2237 UNTS 319. 
 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 
2000, 2241 UNTS 507. 
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 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their parts 
and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, 31 May 2011, 2326 UNTS 208. 
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 
1967, 6 ILM 368. 
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 1967, 6 ILM 
360. 
 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, 
2007, 46 ILM 1013. 
 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 17 
October 2003, Doc. 32C/Resolution 39, 271, 301. 
 UNESCO Draft of the Declaration of Principles relating to Cultural Objects Displaced 
in Connection with the Second World War, 31 July 2009, Doc. 35 C/24. 
 
4. Instruments of the Council of Europe pertaining to Cultural Heritage 
 
 European Cultural Convention, 19 December 1954, CETS No.18. 
 European Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, 3 
October 1985, CETS No.121 (also known as Granada Convention). 
 European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, 23 June 1985, CETS 
No.119 (also known as Delphi Convention). 
 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, 16 January 
1992, CETS No.143 (also known as Valetta Convention). 
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
4 November 1950, CETS No. 005. 
 Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, 27 October 
2005, CETS No.199. 
 
5. Instruments of the European Union pertaining to Cultural Heritage 
 
 Directive 93/7/EEC on the Return of Cultural Objects Illegally Exported from the 
Territory of a Member State, 27 March 1993, OJ L74/74. 
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008, OJ C 115/47. 
 Regulation 116/2009 on the Export of Cultural Goods, 10 February 2009, OJ L 39. 
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Table of Cases Settled by Bilateral Agreements, Decisions of National 
Advisory Committees, or Out-of-Court Settlements 
 
Belgium 
 144 Ethnographic works and several thousand additional cultural items (Royal 
Museum of Central Africa, Tervuren and the National Museum of Kinshasa, Zaire, 
now Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1970 and 1977). 
 
France 
 Three Nok and Sokoto terracotta statuettes (France and Nigeria, 2006). 
 Sixteen tattooed and mummified Maori warrior heads (Natural History Museum of 
Rouen, France and New Zealand, May 2011). 
 Korean manuscripts (France and Republic of Korea, May 2011). 
 
Germany 
 7,000 Bogazköy cuneiform tablets (Democratic Republic of Germany and Turkey, 
1987). 
 Fragment of the Great Zimbabwe bird (Ethnological Museum Berlin, Germany and 
Zimbabwe, 2003. 
 Fragment of the Parthenon frieze (University of Heidelberg, Germany and Greece, 
2006). 
 Painting by Ernst Ludwig Kirchner “Berlin Street Scene” (Brücke Museum Berlin, 
Germany and the heirs of Hans Hess, 2006). 
 Painting by Arnold Böcklin “Sleeping Diana” (Museum Kunst Palast, Düsseldorf, 
Germany and Jewish heirs, May 2010). 
 Sphinx of Bogazköy (Germany and Turkey, May 2011). 
 
Italy 
 12,000 pre-Columbian objects (Italy and Ecuador, 1983). 
 Obelisk of Axum (Italy and Ethiopia, 2005). 
 Archeological artifacts (Boston Museum of Fine Arts and Italy, 2006). 
 Archeological artifacts, including the ‘Euphronios Krater’ (Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York and Italy, 2006). 
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 Forty archeological artifacts, including vases, amphora fragments, frescos, and the 
‘Morgantiana Venus’ statue (J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Angeles and Italy, 2007). 
 Archeological (artifacts Princeton University Art Museum and Italy, 2007). 
 Archeological artifacts Cleveland Museum of Art and Italy, 2008). 
 
Russia 
 Stained-glass windows (Russia and Germany, Cathedral of Frankfurt/Oder, 2008). 
 
The Netherlands 
 Several Buddhist and Hindu statues (The Netherlands and Indonesia, 1977). 
 202 paintings of the Goudstikker collection (The Netherlands and the Goudstikker heir 
Marei von Saher, 2006). 
 Painting by Jan Steen “The wedding night of Tobias and Sarah” (c. 1660), (city of The 
Hague and the Goudstikker heir Marei von Saher, August 2011). 
 
Switzerland 
 Painting by Max Liebermann “Sewing School - The Workroom of the Amsterdam 
Orphanage” (Bündner Foundation of the Art Museum Chur and the heirs of Max 
Silberberg, 1999). 
 Makondé mask (Barbier-Müller Museum of Geneva, Switzerland and Tanzania, May 
2010). 
 
Sweden 
 Totem pole (Stockholm Ethnographic Museum and Haisla Frist Nation, British 
Columbia, Canada, 2006). 
 
South Africa 
 Carved birds (South Africa and Zimbabwe, 1981). 
 
United Kingdom 
 Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt (Kelvingrove Museum in Glasgow, Scotland and the 
Wounded Knee Survivors’ Association (WKSA) in South Dakota, USA, 1999). 
 Some twelfth century manuscripts (British Library and the Monastery of Benevento, 
Italy, 2005). 
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United States 
 Eighty wooden carved figures, called Zuni War Gods (USA and North-American Zuni 
tribe, between 1978 and 1995). 
 Case of the Panel of Tyche (Cincinnati Art Museum, United States and Jordan, 1986). 
 Case of the Phra Narai lintel (United States and Thailand, 1988). 
 Some 400 archaeological items from Machu Picchu (Yale University, United States 
and Peru, 2007, 2010). 
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Table of Cases Settled by Court Litigation and Decisions relevant in the 
context of International Cultural Heritage 
 
1. Decisions by International and Regional Courts 
 
1.1 International Court of Justice 
 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia vs. Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ 
Reports, 1962, p. 6. 
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium vs. Spain), 
Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 3. 
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United 
States of America). Merits, Judgment of 26 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. 
 
1.2 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 Prosecutor vs. Hadžihasanovic & Kubura, ICTY, case no. IT-01-47, Judgment of 15 
March 2006. 
 Prosecutor vs. Strugar, ICTY, case no. IT-01-42-PT, Judgment of 31 January 2005. 
 Prosecutor vs. Krstic, ICTY, case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment of 2 August 2001. 
 Prosecutor vs. Kordic & Cerkez, ICTY, case no. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment of 26 
February 2001. 
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment of 2 October 1995. 
 
1.3 European Court of Human Rights 
 Beyeler vs. Italy, Application No. 33202/1996, European Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment of 5 January 2000. 
 
2. National Court 
 
2.1 France 
 République fédérale du Nigeria c. Alain de Montbrison, Court of Appeal, Paris 
Judgment of 5 April 2004 (2002/09897). 
 République fédérale du Nigeria c. Alain de Montbrison, Court of Cassation, Judgment 
of 20 September 2006 (JCP 2006, IV, 3005, pp. 1917). 
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2.2 Germany 
 ‘Nigeria Masks‘, Bundesgerichtshof, 22 June 1972, BGHZ 59, 14. 
 
2.3 Italy 
 Associazione nazionale Italia Nostra Onlus c. Ministero per i beni e le attività 
culturali et al., Italian Supreme Administrative Tribunal (Consiglio di Stato), 23 June 
2008, No. 3154. 
 Associazione nazionale Italia Nostra Onlus c. Ministero per i beni e le attività 
culturali et al., Regional Administrative Tribunal (Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale del Lazio), No.3518, 28 February 2007. 
 
2.4 United Kingdom 
 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The Barakat Galleries Ltd. (2007), 
EWCA Civ. 1374; Court of Appeal, 21 December 2007. 
 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The Barakat Galleries Ltd. (2007) 
EWHC 705 QB; Queen’s Bench Division, 29 March 2007. 
 
2.5 United States 
 Republic of Peru vs. Yale University, Case No.1:2008cv02109, 5 December 2008. 
 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. vs. The Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or 
Vessels, No.8, 2006 cv01685, 13 September 2006. 
 Altmann vs. Republic of Austria, 142 F.Supp.2d 1187 (C.D.Cal. 1999), aff’d, 317 F.3d 
954 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), 541 US 677 (2004). 
 United States vs. Frederick Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d445 (S.D.N.Y. 3 January 2002), 
affirmed 333 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 10 June 2003). 
 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus vs. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. and Peg Goldberg, 717 F.Supp.1374 (S.D. Ind. 
1989); 917 F2d 278 (7th Circuit 1990). 
 United States vs. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); 593 F.2d (5th Cir. 1979). 
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Annex I 
 
1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art 
 
On 3 December 1998 the forty-four governments participating in the Washington Conference 
on Holocaust-Era Assets endorsed the following principles for dealing with Nazi-looted art: 
 
Released in connection with the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, 
Washington, DC, December 3, 1998 
 
In developing a consensus on non-binding principles to assist in resolving issues relating to 
Nazi-confiscated art, the Conference recognizes that among participating nations there are 
differing legal systems and that countries act within the context of their own laws. 
 
1. Art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted should be 
identified. 
 
2. Relevant records and archives should be open and accessible to researchers, in accordance 
with the guidelines of the International Council on Archives. 
 
3. Resources and personnel should be made available to facilitate the identification of all art 
that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted. 
 
4. In establishing that a work of art had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently 
restituted, consideration should be given to unavoidable gaps or ambiguities in the 
provenance in light of the passage of time and the circumstances of the Holocaust era. 
 
5. Every effort should be made to publicize art that is found to have been confiscated by the 
Nazis and not subsequently restituted in order to locate its pre-War owners or their heirs. 
 
6. Efforts should be made to establish a central registry of such information. 
 
7. Pre-War owners and their heirs should be encouraged to come forward and make known 
their claims to art that was confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted. 
 
8. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not 
subsequently restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to 
achieve a just and fair solution, recognizing this may vary according to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding a specific case. 
 
9. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis, or their 
heirs, cannot be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair 
solution. 
 
10. Commissions or other bodies established to identify art that was confiscated by the Nazis 
and to assist in addressing ownership issues should have a balanced membership. 
 
11. Nations are encouraged to develop national processes to implement these principles, 
particularly as they relate to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving 
ownership issues. 
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Annex II 
 
International Law Association (ILA) 
 
2006 Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of 
Cultural Material 
 
Resolution No. 4/2006 
 
Adopted at the 72nd Conference of the International Law Association, held in Toronto, 
Canada, 4-8 June 2006 
 
Preamble 
Conscious that cultural material forms a part of the world heritage and should be cherished 
and preserved for the benefit of all; 
Taking into account the significance of cultural material for cultural identity and diversity as 
well as of territorial affiliation; 
Reaffirming the link between culture and sustainable development; 
Being aware of the significant moral, legal, and practical issues concerning requests for the 
international transfer of cultural material; 
Convinced of the need for a collaborative approach to requests for transfer of cultural 
material, in order to establish a more productive relationship between and among parties; 
Emphasizing the need for a spirit of partnership among private and public actors through 
international cooperation; 
Also emphasizing the need for a cooperative approach to caring for cultural material; 
Expressing the hope that these Principles will provide an incentive for improving 
collaboration in the mutual protection and transfer of cultural material; 
Recognizing as well the need to develop a more collaborative framework for avoiding and 
settling disputes concerning cultural material; 
Building on current practice when articulating the following Principles to facilitate non-
confrontational agreements: 
 
1. Definitions 
(i) “Requesting party” or “requesting parties” refers to persons; groups of persons; museums 
and other institutions, however legally constitutioned; and governments or other public 
authorities that request the transfer of cultural material. 
(ii) “Recipient” or “recipients” refers to states, museums, and other institutions that receive a 
request for the transfer of cultural material. 
 
2. Requests and Responses to Requests for the Transfer of Cultural Material 
(i) A requesting party should make its request in writing, addressed to the recipient, with a 
detailed description of the material whose transfer is requested, including detailed information 
and reasons sufficient to substantiate the request. 
(ii) A recipient shall respond in good faith and in writing to a request within a reasonable 
time, either agreeing with it or setting out reasons for disagreement with it and, in any event, 
proposing a timeframe for implementation or negotiations. 
(iii) In the event of disagreement, the requesting party and recipient shall enter into good-faith 
negotiations concerning the cultural material at issue in accordance with principle 8. 
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3. Alternatives to the Transfer of Cultural Material 
(i) Museums and other institutions shall develop guidelines consistent with those of the 
International Council of Museums (ICOM) for responding to requests for the transfer of 
cultural material. These guidelines may include alternatives to outright transfer such as loans, 
production of copies, and shared management and control. 
(ii) Museums and other institutions shall prepare and publish detailed inventories of their 
collections, with the assistance of ICOM and other sources when they lack sufficient 
resources of their own to do so. 
(iii) Whenever a substantial portion of the collection of a museum or other institution is 
seldom or never on public display or is otherwise inaccessible, that museum or other 
institution should agree to lend or otherwise make available cultural material not on display to 
a requesting party, particularly a party at the place of origin, in the absence of compelling 
reasons to the contrary. 
 
4. Cultural Material of Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Minorities 
Consistent with the rights of indigenous peoples under the United Nations Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and cultural minorities, recipients recognize an obligation 
to respond in good faith to a request for the transfer of cultural material originating with 
indigenous peoples and cultural minorities. This obligation applies even when such a request 
is not supported by the government of the state in whose territory the indigenous peoples or 
cultural minorities are principally domiciled or organized. 
 
5. Human Remains 
Museums and other institutions possessing human remains affirm their recognition of the 
sanctity of such material and agree to transfer such material upon request to any requesting 
party who provides evidence of a close demonstrable affiliation with the remains or, among 
multiple requesting parties, the closest demonstrable affiliation with the remains. 
 
6. Registers of Cultural Material 
(i) All state museums and other institutions that hold or control holdings or collections of 
cultural material shall take steps to establish inventories and a register of such material. The 
register may take the form of a database of information that is available to interested parties. 
(ii) Museums and other institutions should submit annual reports of the information recorded 
in these registers for general publication to any national services that are established to 
manage and protect cultural material. 
(iii) A national service responsible for the maintenance of a state register, in a separate section 
of such register, shall record all inquiries by identifying the name of the party making the 
inquiry, the cultural material involved, and the response of the museum or institution 
concerned. Every three years each such national service shall submit up-to-date copies of 
registered items to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) in order to facilitate accessibility. 
(iv) Each register shall be made available to any requesting party that is interested in the 
transfer of cultural material, so as to help identify the location and provenance of such 
material and to facilitate claims. 
 
7. Notification of Newly Found Cultural Material 
Persons, groups of persons, museums, and other institutions possessing significant, newly-
found cultural material should promptly notify appropriate government authorities, 
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communities, and international institutions of their finds, together with as complete as 
possible a description of the material, including its provenance. 
 
8. Considerations for Negotiations Concerning Requests 
Good-faith negotiations concerning requests for transfer of cultural material should consider, 
inter alia, the significance of the requested material for the requesting party, the reunification 
of dispersed cultural material, accessibility to the cultural material in the requesting state, and 
protection of the cultural material. 
 
9. Dispute Settlement 
If a requesting party and a recipient are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of a 
dispute related to a request within a period of four years from the time of the request, upon a 
request of either party, both parties should submit the dispute to good offices, consultation, 
mediation, conciliation, ad hoc arbitration, or institutional arbitration. 
 
10. Other Rights and Obligations 
Nothing in these Principles should be interpreted to affect rights enjoyed by the parties or 
obligations otherwise binding on them. 
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Annex III 
 
The Principles of the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums 
 
Compiled by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and  
the Koordinierungsstelle Magdeburg, Germany 
Paris, May 2011 
 
1. Museums preserve, interpret and promote the natural and cultural inheritance of 
humanity 
Museums are responsible for the tangible and intangible natural and cultural heritage. 
Governing bodies and those concerned with the strategic direction and oversight of museums 
have a primary responsibility to protect and promote this heritage as well as the human, 
physical and financial resources made available for that purpose. 
 
2. Museums that maintain collections hold them in trust for the benefit of society and its 
development 
Museums have the duty to acquire, preserve and promote their collections as a contribution to 
safeguarding the natural, cultural and scientific heritage. Their collections are a significant 
public inheritance, have a special position in law and are protected by international 
legislation. Inherent in this public trust is the notion of stewardship that includes rightful 
ownership, provenance, permanence, documentation, accessibility and responsible disposal. 
 
3. Museums hold primary evidence for establishing and furthering knowledge 
Museums have particular responsibilities to all for the care, accessibility and interpretation of 
primary evidence collected and held in their collections. 
 
4. Museums provide opportunities for the appreciation, understanding and promotion of 
the natural and cultural heritage 
Museums have an important duty to develop their educational role and attract wider audiences 
from the community, locality, or group they serve. Interaction with the constituent community 
and promotion of their heritage is an integral part of the educational role of the museum. 
 
5. Museums hold resources that provide opportunities for other public services and 
benefits 
Museums utilize a wide variety of specialisms, skills and physical resources that have a far 
broader application than in the museum. This may lead to shared resources or the provision of 
services as an extension of the museum’s activities. These should be organized in such a way 
that they do not compromise the museum’s stated mission. 
 
6. Museums work in close collaboration with the communities from which their 
collections originate as well as those they serve 
Museum collections reflect the cultural and natural heritage of the communities from which 
they have been derived. As such they have a character beyond that of ordinary property which 
may include strong affinities with national, regional, local, ethnic, religious or political 
identity. It is important therefore that museum policy is responsive to this possibility. 
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7. Museums operate in a legal manner 
Museums must conform fully to international, regional, national, or local legislation and 
treaty obligations. In addition, the governing body should comply with any legally binding 
trusts or conditions relating to any aspect of the museum, its collections and operations. 
 
8. Museums operate in a professional manner 
Members of the museum profession should observe accepted standards and laws and uphold 
the dignity and honor of their profession. They should safeguard the public against illegal or 
unethical professional conduct. Every opportunity should be used to inform and educate the 
public about the aims, purposes, and aspirations of the profession to develop a better public 
understanding of the contributions of museums to society. 
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Annex IV 
Criteria for the assessment of ‘outstanding universal value’ for the 
inscription of cultural and natural sites in the UNESCO World Heritage 
List1471: 
i. to represent a masterpiece of human creative genius;  
ii. to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a 
cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental 
arts, town-planning or landscape design;  
iii. to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a 
civilization which is living or which has disappeared;  
iv. to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological 
ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history;  
v. to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use 
which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the 
environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible 
change;  
vi. to be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with 
beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The 
Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with 
other criteria);  
vii. to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and 
aesthetic importance;  
viii. to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the 
record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of 
landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features;  
ix. to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological 
processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and 
marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals;  
x. to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation 
of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of science or conservation. 
The protection, management, authenticity and integrity of properties are also important 
considerations. 
 
1471 The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, issued in January 
2008 (WHC 08/01), Criteria for the assessment of outstanding universal value, section II.D. No. 77 (p. 20-21), 
full text available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines (accessed 23 September 2011).  
